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ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

1740 — 1914 



BY 



BERNADOTTE EVERLY SCHMITT 

M.A. (Oxon.), Ph.D. 



PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 
PRINCETON 

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD 
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 



I9l6 






Copyright, 1916, by 
Princeton University Press 

Published April, 1916 



ji 

APR 20 1916 




©CU427771 



TO 

THE MEMORY OF 

MY FATHER AND MOTHER 



PREFACE 

This book is not entirely a product of the Great War. 
The Anglo-German problem first came under my notice 
some years ago, when I was an undergraduate at Oxford. 
A beneficiary of the Rhodes Trust, I was imbued with the 
idea of Anglo-Saxon solidarity, to promote which Cecil 
Rhodes founded the scholarships which bear his name. 
But, instead of harmony, I found discord. Some of my 
Oxford friends were members of the British Navy League, 
and from them I learned that the German navy was re- 
garded as a menace to England's traditional supremacy 
of the seas. When I travelled in Germany I encountered 
considerable animosity to England in several places, and I 
saw little banks, in the shape of war-ships, which tempted 
patriotic Germans to make contributions for the propa- 
ganda of the German Navy League. At every turn one 
was made conscious of this rivalry between two kindred 
nations, each of which professed to fear the aggressive in- 
tentions of the other. The most contradictory statements 
were heard, and the stranger was at a loss to comprehend 
them. 

In time, as I studied the problem, I collected a quantity 
of material from different sources and of varying value: 
this book is the result. I have used very sparingly the 
voluminous literature which has appeared since the war 
began, except, of course, the official documents published 
by the belligerent governments. Nearly all of the evidence 
upon which my conclusions are based was in my hands 
before August, 1914; indeed, the first six chapters, and the 
eighth, were practically written by that date, although 



viii PREFACE 

they have since been rewritten. I have tried to present 
the subject of Anglo-German relations from a historical 
point of view, and if I have taken sides it is because the 
available evidence seemed to warrant certain conclusions. 
The book has been delayed by the severe pressure of pri- 
vate affairs, but the lapse of time has not essentially mod- 
ified the opinions formulated before I began to write. 

Several of the chapters treat of topics that have been 
discussed already in greater detail by other writers, but 
their inclusion seemed warranted in a synthetic treatment 
of my subject. I am well aware of the difficulty of writing 
a history of recent diplomatic affairs, for few documents 
are available, but the main course of events is not in 
doubt. The archives will throw fresh light upon the mo- 
tives of statesmen and their reactions in definite crises ; 
they may even disclose fresh facts; but, until they are 
opened, it is perhaps worth while to attempt to digest 
the enormous amount of unofficial evidence already ob- 
tainable. 

My best thanks are due to my colleagues, Professors 
Samuel Ball Platner, Henry E. Bourne, and Elbert J. 
Benton, who have read the manuscript and offered many 
valuable suggestions. 

Bernadotte E. Schmitt. 

Western Reserve University, 

Cleveland, 30 September, 1915. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Introduction i 

II. Modern England 12 

III. The German Empire 35 

IV. German Expansion 70 

V. Commercial Rivalry 96 

VI. Anglo-German Relations to 1890 . . . . 116 

VII. The Quarrel 139 

VIII. The Admiralty of the Atlantic 173 

IX. The Triple Entente 219 

X. The Near East 253 

XL Agadir and Its Aftermath 302 

XII. The Eve of the War 358 

XIII. The Crisis of 1914 394 

XIV. Armageddon 435 

XV. The Anglo-German Rupture 468 

Appendix 499 

Index 507 

MAPS 

Africa End of the Volume 

The "Drang Nach Osten " ....""" 

ix 



ENGLAND AND GERMANY, 

1740-1914 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

"The central fact in the international situation to-day 
is the antagonism between England and Germany." So 
ran the first sentence of the first article of the first number 
of the Round Table (November, 1910), a non-partisan jour- 
nal of the politics of the British Empire. A French writer 
described this rivalry as "the essential fact which domi- 
nates the whole policy of our time, which thrusts itself into 
all events to embitter and warp them, and which is to be 
found at the bottom of all the political crises by whose 
succession Europe is periodically agitated." 1 In Germany 
"the English danger" was discussed in countless books and 
pamphlets, and the press of the world took up the cue. 
An American magazine published an article, entitled "Will 
England and Germany Fight?" in which the issues were 
represented as irreconcilable and the results fraught with 
incalculable consequences for the whole world. 2 In fact, 
no such spectacular international quarrel had been seen 
since the days of the great Napoleon; its existence was 
recognized by people to whom diplomacy is usually intangi- 
ble; while the inhabitants of both England and Germany 
were subjected to enormous taxes on account of the colossal 

1 Rene Pinon, L' Europe et VEmpire Ottoman, p. xii. 

2 William Bayard Hale, World's Work, February, igog. 



2 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

armaments which both caused and were caused by the 
strained relations between their governments and the mu- 
tual distrust of the two peoples. 

In a broad sense, the issue in the struggle has been the 
balance of power, which, in the words of Bishop Stubbs, 
the great English historian, "is the principle which gives 
unity to the political plot of modern European history." * 
For since the days of Cardinal Wolsey and Henry VIII, 
four hundred years ago, Great Britain has been the prin- 
cipal factor in the maintenance of a European equilibrium : 
her statesmen have consistently held that, in spite of the 
North Sea and the Channel, the "precious stone set in the 
silver sea" was not secure "against the envy of less happy 
lands" if a single Power achieved the ascendency of the 
Continent. To prevent this consummation England waged 
successful war against Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV, and 
Napoleon. And because in the early years of the twentieth 
century Germany bestrode the European continent like a 
colossus, it was inevitable that she should find ranged 
against herself the weight of British public opinion and the 
resources of British diplomacy. 2 

A generation ago, when Anglo-Russian rivalry domi- 
nated the European situation, it was the fashion to speak of 
the struggle between the elephant and the whale, and at 
first sight Anglo-German tension presents a similar aspect. 
The British Empire is a maritime confederacy, with far- 
flung battle lines protected by an enormous fleet; Ger- 
many is primarily a land power, whose strong right arm is 
the mighty army assembled within her European frontiers. 
But a closer inspection reveals a situation singularly remi- 

1 Lectures on Medieval and Modem History, p. 258. 

2 "No nation can maintain the mastery of the continent of Europe as long as a 
strong and independent England exists on its flank. A nation which strives for 
supremacy in Europe is bound to attack Great Britain earlier or later. All the 
rulers from Julius Caesar to Napoleon, who have striven to become supreme in 
Europe, have made war upon Great Britain." (J. Ellis Barker, Modem Germany, 
p. 243, edition of 1012.) 



INTRODUCTION 3 

niscent of the eighteenth century. In that period of Euro- 
pean history Great Britain was repeatedly at war with 
France for the nominal purpose of preserving the balance 
of power in Europe, but the actual result of this policy was 
to make the island kingdom the leading commercial nation 
of the world, to secure for it the control of the seas in time 
of war, and to obtain the fairest colonies of France for the 
extension of her own empire. Similarly, in our own age 
England abandoned her former friendship for Germany 
when that Power deliberately challenged Britain's tradi- 
tional supremacy of the seas, became her doughty com- 
petitor in the markets of the world, and expressed in no 
uncertain voice the opinion that Britain possessed far too 
many of the undeveloped regions of the world, and Ger- 
many far too few. 

That England took up the challenge from across the 
North Sea was due, not to jealousy and envy of Germany, 
as has been so often asserted, but to the instinct of self- 
preservation; which, however, did not exclude the possi- 
bility of an accommodation between the two Powers and 
did not prevent repeated agreements for the delimitation 
of their respective ambitions. But in one matter England 
remained adamant. Drawing the food of its people and 
the raw materials for its factories from every corner of the 
globe, and dependent upon its export trade as the staff of 
life, the United Kingdom was irresistibly driven to main- 
tain a supreme navy. And that was intolerable to Ger- 
many after she had ceased to be a congeries of petty states 
held together in a loose confederation and became in fact 
the leading nation of the Continent. Furthermore, by the 
application of science and patience to industrial problems, 
she developed an overseas trade second only to that of 
England. Germany therefore argued that she must pos- 
sess a fleet sufficient to protect her expanding foreign com- 
merce, lest it should exist on the mere sufferance of the 



4 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

overwhelming British navy; in spite of the fact that every 
stage in the development of her fleet was followed by still 
larger additions to that of England. 

The colonial situation provided a third element of dis- 
cord. Colonies serve a nation in various ways. They 
offer markets, which may be controlled by tariffs, for the 
surplus products of national industry; they may, with 
proper management and exploitation, supply the mother 
country with raw materials for that industry; and under 
favorable climatic conditions they afford opportunities for 
settlement to those who do not find the circumstances of 
life profitable or pleasant, but who wish to preserve their 
own institutions and their native allegiance in a new land. 
In the actual organization of the world, Germany possessed 
almost no colonies suitable for settlement and few terri- 
tories worthy of exploitation. The British Empire, on the 
other hand, was spread over a quarter of the globe, em- 
braced every kind of land, and might, if an imperial pro- 
tective tariff were adopted, become a self-sufficing, eco- 
nomic entity from which German competition would be 
excluded. France likewise possessed a magnificent colo- 
nial domain in Africa and Asia in which she did not wel- 
come the German merchant and the German capitalist. 
Germany must also expand overseas, unless she was to be 
outdistanced in the economic struggle, which is the basis 
of modern civilization. 

It is further to be noted that as in the eighteenth cen- 
tury the British Empire was pieced together in a fit of 
absence of mind as the result of British Continental policy, 
so the maintenance of the balance of power has led to fur- 
ther increases of the empire in the latest age, increases 
which were not counterbalanced by the acquisitions of Ger- 
many. For in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
when Great Britain stood more or less aloof from Conti- 
nental politics, she added Egypt, Burmah, large stretches 



INTRODUCTION 5 

of Africa, and finally the Boer republics to her already vast 
possessions, not to speak of extending her influence in Af- 
ghanistan and the Persian Gulf; while Germany had to 
be content with the least desirable lands in Africa and a 
few islands in the Pacific. Germany therefore boldly de- 
manded "a place in the sun." France she despised as a 
decadent and sterile nation whose colonies were an anomaly; 
Russia she patronized as an unorganized mass, powerless 
for either good or evil; Belgium and Holland she perhaps 
hoped to dispossess of their holdings in Africa and the Far 
East; but Britain she feared as the great obstacle to the 
realization of her ambitions. Not that Germany really de- 
sired to become mistress of certain British colonies; it is 
more probable that her appetite was to be satisfied by the 
annexation of North Africa. If France were deprived of 
this, the richest and most accessible part of her colonial 
empire, she would be seriously weakened as a European 
Power and her decline as a great nation sensibly accentu- 
ated. Germany, in turn, would become a Mediterranean 
Power, thus laying the foundation of a future supremacy in 
that sea when the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
should endow her with Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. 
But the German Government was under no illusions as to 
the attitude of Great Britain toward such a transaction, 
which would at once upset the balance of power and en- 
danger the route to India, and it therefore became the 
great purpose of German diplomacy to prevent that rap- 
prochement and friendship between England and France 
which the statesmen of those countries were bent on achiev- 
ing. This is the key to that antagonism between England 
and Germany which finally led to war, and it is truly aston- 
ishing that, although Germany had learned, first in 1905 
and again in 191 1, that England was prepared to resist 
excessive demands upon France, the imperial chancellor 
should, on the eve of the war, have asked the British 



6 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Government to stand aside while Germany appropriated 
the French colonies. 

Behind these rivalries of commerce, sea power, and col- 
onies there loomed the challenge of culture. "Is the 
world to become English?" was a question frequently to 
be found in German discussions of international politics. 
The nineteenth century witnessed the expansion of the 
Anglo-Saxon over every continent, often by means highly 
questionable from an austere moral standard; more than 
a million Germans settled in lands whose civilization was 
essentially English and there preserved but few links with 
their fatherland; English promised more and more to be- 
come the world language, so far as that honor was reserved 
for a particular speech. For generations French culture 
had enjoyed a wide popularity outside France itself; and 
even backward Russia was represented in the Balkan penin- 
sula and the vast expanses of Siberia, not to mention the 
remnants of Spanish influence from the Rio Grande to the 
Straits of Magellan. Was there no place for "the German 
idea in the world"? demanded a well-known Pan-German 
book of that title. 1 German philosophy long dominated 
the abstractions of men, the researches of German science 
were appropriated by all nations, the battles of Sadowa and 
Sedan were held to establish the superiority of German 
education, and German discipline and thoroughness were 
eagerly imitated by the more sluggish but ambitious na- 
tions. Whatever the precise territorial ambitions of Ger- 
many, she demanded that no obstacle be raised if she 
offered her national culture to a world that had shown it- 
self receptive, and the fact that English influence actually 
dominated a large part of the non-European world was all 
the more an incentive for challenging it and for proving 
the equality of the German spirit. 

In this connection the profound difference between Eng- 

1 Paul Rohrbach, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (1912). 



INTRODUCTION 7 

lish and German ideals must be recognized. It is doubt- 
less true, as was often asserted by those who sought to 
minimize the issues of the Anglo- German quarrel, that no 
European nations are so near in blood, in mental and phys- 
ical characteristics, and in the conditions of their economic 
life as England and Germany. But the parallel can easily 
be carried too far. For centuries Englishmen have stood 
forth as the champions of individual liberty, have resented 
the interference of the state in their private affairs; and, 
while in recent years a newer ideal of social obligation and 
the pressure of German competition have compelled them 
more and more to adopt the corporate theory of life, the 
national reluctance to discard traditions handed down from 
generation to generation has been frequently observed. In 
the mental development of such a people, the idea of com- 
pulsion obviously can play, and actually has played, but a 
minor role. In all the great crises of English history the 
desire for an amicable settlement has ever been to the fore, 
till the fondness for compromise, and the ability to effect 
it, has become notorious. And in the nineteenth century 
a genuine abhorrence of war was instilled into the hearts 
of Englishmen by statesmen like John Bright and Richard 
Cobden on the one hand and Lord Salisbury on the other, 
whose teachings were reinforced by the colossal slaughter of 
the Crimean War and the mismanagement of the struggle 
in South Africa. The British Empire has, indeed, waged 
many wars in the last hundred years, but the vanquished 
have always been generously treated, and the cause of 
human freedom has been immeasurably advanced by the 
exploits of British arms. 

In Germany, on the other hand, the state has long lorded 
it over the individual. Prussia has become notorious for 
regulation and bureaucracy, and her ideas have slowly 
penetrated the other German states, where, it may be re- 
marked, there were old traditions of governmental inter- 



8 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

ference which the Prussian example has galvanized into 
renewed popularity. Nor can it be denied that the mate- 
rial prosperity of Germany has been quite as much the 
result of official guidance as of the zeal and capacity of its 
people. In fact, "efficiency," as we understand the term, 
has been forced upon the world by the precept and practise 
of Germany. 

From the historical point of view, Germany was neces- 
sarily a military state. By sheer valor of arms the electors 
of Brandenburg extended their dominions and created the 
modern kingdom of Prussia, and the kings of Prussia by 
similar means accomplished the unification of Germany. 
It would be surprising if the German, who read in his his- 
tory how for hundreds of years his fatherland was the 
parade-ground of foreign armies, did not believe that the 
new empire must rely upon its military strength alone 
and be able to resist any kind of attack. And the main- 
tenance of peace for forty-three years, during which Ger- 
many ceased to be a mere geographical expression and 
became a Great Power, was for the German a convincing 
argument for military preparedness and a thoroughgoing 
concentration upon the problems of national defense. 

But there is a sinister aspect to the picture. After 1870 
there grew up, first in one, then in another, and ultimately 
in almost every European country, a suspicion and a fear 
that united Germany would one day attempt to repeat 
the exploits of Bismarck, and the reputation for aggressive- 
ness thus acquired was the most potent factor in the forma- 
tion of the coalition now in arms against her. Unfortu- 
nately for every one, Germany did little toward creating a 
different impression of her policy beyond proclaiming its 
peaceful character. Rather, she did not hesitate, on numer- 
ous occasions, to rattle the sabre, till she was persuaded 
that this was sufficient to enforce her will. Also, she regu- 
larly took advantage of every ruffle in the international 



INTRODUCTION 9 

situation to increase the strength of her army, and more 
lately to accelerate the construction of her fleet, with the 
avowed object of becoming the supreme power on both 
land and sea. 1 In other words, at a time when most na- 
tions were asking themselves if war were not out of date, 
and economically unprofitable, Germany was frankly pro- 
claiming that force, and force alone, was worthy of con- 
sideration as the solvent of international difficulties. 

It will doubtless long be a matter of controversy as to 
how far the religion of war was accepted by the German 
people, for the evidence published during the last genera- 
tion is contradictory. They have been alternately por- 
trayed, by competent observers, as rabid jingoes and as 
lovers of peace at any price. General Bernhardi declared 
that "the political power of our nation ... is fettered 
externally by its love of peace," 2 and his writing is so 
far removed from passion or prejudice that his deliberate 
statement must be considered sincere. On the other side, 
innumerable writers so freely propounded his doctrine of 
the duty to make war, albeit without his learning or candor, 
that a people like the Germans, who are accustomed to have 
their views on political questions compounded for them by 
specialists, must have been more or less poisoned by the 
constant asseveration that might is right. Either thesis 
can be proved to the satisfaction of one who sets out to 
do so. The opinion of the present writer is that, if the mass 
of the German people did not show positive enthusiasm for 
war as war, they did desire the fruits of war, and that they 
were less eager to restrain their military leaders than any 
nation in Europe. In this respect the thoroughly undemo- 
cratic character of their political institutions gave the mili- 
tary party an enormous advantage, monopolizing as it 

1 "I shall reorganize my navy so that it shall stand on the same level as my 
army" — which was the most powerful and formidable in the world. (William II, 
1 January, 1900.) 

* Germany and the Next War, p. 12. 



io ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

did the high offices of state, and controlling with an iron 
hand the press and the educational machine, which in other 
countries create an independent political opinion. It is a 
significant commentary upon the two countries that the 
British Government went to war only after taking Parlia- 
ment into its confidence, while the German Emperor first 
declared war and then appealed to the country to present 
a united front. 

A general view of the situation reveals Germany as the 
challenging nation. England would have been quite con- 
tent to let things stand as they were. Mistress of the seas 
for two hundred years and guarantor of the balance of 
power in Europe, the mother of many daughter nations, and 
in consequence of her position in the world rather inclined 
to ignore the susceptibilities of other peoples, her com- 
placency received a profound shock by the advent of a 
Power that demanded recognition as an equal and strove 
for the means to secure it. The dominant note of English 
writing anent the controversy with Germany was that of 
determination to keep the heritage of the past, of insistence 
upon the status quo. To this point of view it was difficult, 
not to say impossible, for Germany to accede. "There can 
be no standing still or stopping for us, no permanent re- 
nunciation of national expansion: we have to choose be- 
tween loss of rank among the imperial peoples and a 
struggle for a place beside the Anglo-Saxons;" 1 in Gen- 
eral Bernhardi's phrase, "world power or downfall!" 2 If 
each power held to its course in all stubbornness, war was 
indeed inevitable. 3 

The most tragic feature of the Great War, however, is 

1 Rohrbach, Der deutscke Gedanke in der Welt, p. 8. 

8 Germany and the Next War, chap. 5. 

3 Price Collier remarked that an autocratic, philosophical, and continental race 
was pitted against a democratic, political, and insular one, and that never the twain 
should meet. The only remedy, in his opinion, was for them to let each other se- 
verely alone. Unfortunately, in the conditions of the modern world no nation can 
live without contact with all other nations. {Germany and the Germans, p. 565.) 



INTRODUCTION 1 1 

that in the two years preceding it Anglo-German relations 
had "sensibly improved," to use the language of Sir Ed- 
ward Grey, and that the British Government was willing 
"to promote some arrangement, to which Germany could 
be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggres- 
sive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her 
allies by France, Russia, and [England], jointly or sepa- 
rately." * Great Britain and Germany had co-operated 
during the Balkan Wars to restrain their friends or allies, 
and the peace of Europe had been preserved. The long 
naval rivalry had been considerably appeased by Admiral 
von Tirpitz's acceptance of a sixteen-to-ten ratio in the 
construction of Dreadnoughts ; on the very eve of the war 
a treaty had been drafted which established a harmony of 
views as regards the Baghdad railway and African colo- 
nial questions ; the animosity between the peoples, so long 
an obstacle to official negotiations, had to a large extent 
burnt itself out. A few years more and their sound com- 
mon sense would, one likes to think, have convinced both 
Germans and Britons that, despite their rivalries in all 
parts of the globe, the world was large enough for them 
both. The friendship of the two countries would have 
become a bulwark for the peace of the world, and British 
statesmanship might then have addressed itself to the 
most pressing of all international problems, the reconcilia- 
tion of France and Germany; after which an alliance of 
the three Powers would have inaugurated a new era in the 
history of Europe and of mankind. 

1 Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen, 30 July, 1014, Great Britain and the 
European Crisis, no. 101. 



CHAPTER II 
MODERN ENGLAND 

It will be readily admitted, even by those to whom the 
fact is unpalatable, that since the end of the Napoleonic 
wars England has been the dominant nation of the world, 
and that her participation in the Great War will probably 
be the decisive factor in its length, if not in its termination. 
Why should so commanding a position belong to a couple 
of islands whose population was less than that of France 
(until a few years ago), Germany, Austria-Hungary, or 
Russia? For none of these nations has accepted British 
hegemony as a law of the universe. The answer is to be 
found in the accidents of history and geography, with which 
must be reckoned certain traits of character that are the 
product of free institutions and a peculiar consciousness 
of national unity. 

First of all, at the end of the eighteenth century a series 
of remarkable inventions, for which English genius must 
receive full credit, transformed England from an agricul- 
tural into an industrial country and vastly stimulated its 
already thriving commerce. By chance this revamping of 
the national life coincided with the French Revolution and 
the first Napoleonic Empire, a period during which the con- 
tinent of Europe was devastated by a succession of wars 
and thereby prevented from imitating the new English 
system. Though England was an active and the most 
steadfast participant in the long struggle to crush Napoleon, 
her territory was not invaded, and her sea power enabled 
her at once to destroy the foreign trade of the Napoleonic 
states and to establish her own monopoly in the Americas 



MODERN ENGLAND 13 

and the Far East. When peace was signed in 181 5, the 
United Kingdom had secured such a lead that in a hundred 
years no rival nation has overcome it. France was about 
half a century behind England in appropriating the new 
industrialism, Germany nearly seventy-five years, and 
Russia's development has begun in the last generation. 
If Great Britain is no longer the "workshop of the world," 
as the Cobdenites of the mid- Victorian period were pleased 
to call her, she is still the premier industrial state and the 
richest. 

But wealth alone, in spite of its power, would not enable 
her to exercise such preponderant influence all over the 
world: that she owes to the empire which the seafaring in- 
stincts of her people have built up in the seven seas. Here 
the accident that Great Britain is an island assumes ex- 
traordinary interest. For centuries the sea has been the 
life of England, and the fact has penetrated deep into the 
national consciousness. Not, of course, that Englishmen 
have enjoyed any iron-clad monopoly of the maritime spirit. 
The fleets of Italian and Hanseatic cities in the Middle 
Ages, the argosies of Spain, and the merchantmen of Hol- 
land recall days when England was a self-sufficient island 
kingdom; and in our own time Greece, Norway, and Ger- 
many have again shown their flags in the waters familiar 
to their fathers. But in no people has the tradition of the 
sea and an appreciation of its importance for the national 
destiny been so permanent, so abiding, and so all-pervading 
as in the inhabitants of the British Isles. If the first dis- 
coverers were Portuguese or Spaniards or Italians, from 
the middle of the sixteenth century Englishmen were in 
the forefront of that movement which colonized the New 
World and brought the Far East into close relations with 
the markets of Europe. Colonial adventure and explora- 
tion came as second nature to a race bred to the sea and by 
virtue of liberal political institutions free to work out so- 



14 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

cial and economic problems without the interference of a 
bureaucratic government. Moreover, from the first, the 
desire to find new markets for English goods never slack- 
ened. Until the eighteenth century woollen and linen 
goods were the chief articles of the export trade; after the 
industrial revolution, when the country was no longer able 
to subsist on its home-grown food-supply, and when the 
output of the huge manufacturing establishments far ex- 
ceeded the domestic demand, it was imperative to find 
outlets abroad for the commodities which must pay for 
the imports of food. Thus English commerce made an 
empire necessary; the hardihood of her seamen and the 
weight of an enlightened public opinion permitted the gov- 
ernment to pursue a policy which in the course of three 
centuries has brought a fifth of the globe and a quarter 
of its population under the rule of England and her daugh- 
ter nations. 

Other peoples have at times been inspired by the imperial 
ideal — Portugal, Spain, Holland, France — , but their ad- 
ventures beyond the seas have ever been secondary to 
their purely European interests, and they lost their colonies 
because of European complications. Great Britain, as an 
island, was happily relieved of such embarrassments. Her 
territory inviolate through the might of her fleet, she could 
not, on the other hand, extend her boundaries by annexa- 
tion or conquest, in spite of the innumerable wars to which 
she was a party lest some Continental nation should be- 
come dominant in Europe. But she invariably recouped 
herself by the acquisition of lands in America, Asia, or 
Africa, till in 1815 she alone of the Great Powers possessed 
a colonial empire worthy of the name. Thus her geo- 
graphical situation and the political and economic genius of 
her people had secured for the United Kingdom an accumu- 
lation of wealth and a position in the world quite out of 
proportion to her own human and material resources. 



MODERN ENGLAND 15 

To protect this empire and its commerce, to see that 
Britannia ruled the waves in time of war, has been the 
first duty of every British government in modern times. 
Charles I was able to collect ship money without consent 
of Parliament in order to renew the fleet which his father 
James had allowed to fall into decay. The Common- 
wealth stopped at nothing to secure naval supremacy in 
home waters and to show the British flag in the Medi- 
terranean, and the one creditable achievement of Charles 
II was his insistence on naval efficiency. In 1689 began 
the intermittent duel with France, which lasted till 181 5; 
when it was over, the fleets of France, Spain, and Holland 
had been swept from the seas, and the Congress of Vienna 
tacitly accepted the maritime supremacy of the state 
whose resources had enabled the Continental nations to 
drive Napoleon from Europe. British power was not al- 
ways wisely used in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- 
turies, for Holland fell a victim to its jealousy, and in 1807 
Denmark had to witness the destruction of her fleet in the 
harbor of Copenhagen at a moment when she was at peace 
with England. Likewise the laws relating to capture at 
sea and the right of search in time of war, which are con- 
sidered illiberal in many quarters, are based mainly on 
British practises in the Napoleonic struggle. But, what- 
ever one may think of the mistress of the seas, her over- 
whelming ascendency throughout the nineteenth century 
is the most important fact in the development of her for- 
eign and colonial policy. 

Since 18 15 Great Britain has utilized her position to 
marvellous advantage. At that date only the fringes of 
Canada, Australia, and Cape Colony had been touched; 
no settlement had been made in New Zealand. Africa was 
almost an unknown continent. In India, although the 
foundations of British power had been laid, the great work 
of regeneration and reform which has justified British 



1 6 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

domination was yet to be conceived. How little the possi- 
bilities of this splendid heritage were appreciated by the 
mass of Englishmen is the favorite theme of modern im- 
perialists. For fifty years after the treaties of Vienna, by 
which Great Britain retained only such conquests as were 
necessary to control the route to India, the aphorism 
of Turgot, that colonies were only fruits which fell from 
the tree when they were ripe, commanded general assent. 
The grant of self-government to the Canadian and Aus- 
tralasian colonies was almost welcomed as the preliminary 
of independence, and the military authorities repudiated 
responsibility for their defense. Perhaps the mother coun- 
try was too absorbed with the political and social problems 
born of the industrial revolution to consider the prospect 
of a Greater Britain beyond the seas; but the revolt of the 
thirteen American colonies was still fresh in men's minds 
and another rule of conduct was hard to imagine. 

Gradually, however, the old tradition reasserted itself. 
The enormous increase of population, the expansion of in- 
dustry under the free-trade system adopted in the 'forties, 
and the subsequent decline of agriculture in both Great 
Britain and Ireland kept before the country the problem 
of food and the necessity of foreign markets. For these 
reasons Canada and Australasia began to fill up with Brit- 
ish emigrants and a policy of expansion was pursued in 
India; coaling-stations or points of strategic value were 
picked up here and there. The Crimean War was fought 
to prevent a Russian domination in the Near East, which 
was conceived to endanger, the Mediterranean route to 
India. Finally, the genius of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of 
Beaconsfield, whose rise from a Jewish obscurity to the 
leadership of the Conservative party and finally to the 
office of prime minister reveals one of the most spectacular 
careers of modern history, endowed Victorian England with 
the ideal of an empire which should be the greatest political 



MODERN ENGLAND 17 

and civilizing force in the world, provided that empire was 
conscious of its future and responded to the needs and 
aspirations of its myriad races and peoples. 

Nor was the father of modern British imperialism con- 
tent with fine phrases and lofty speeches. During his sec- 
ond premiership (1874-80) he inaugurated a policy the 
results and continuation of which provided British states- 
men with perplexing problems for nearly thirty years. 
He bought the Suez Canal for England in 1875, and the 
following year began to interfere in the financial affairs of 
Egypt. To South Africa he sent as high commissioner a 
soldier-statesman who had a vision of the later Union and 
allowed a subordinate to annex the Transvaal Republic to 
the British Empire. In 1877 Queen Victoria was pro- 
claimed Empress of India, an act which gave the people of 
that land a new sense of loyalty and made possible a spon- 
taneous and unanimous rally of the Indian princes at the 
outbreak of the present war. Lord Beaconsfield next in- 
tervened in the Near East to secure a revision of the Treaty 
of San Stefano, which promised to make the Balkan penin- 
sula a Russian protectorate, and when in revenge Russia 
turned to the Middle East and instigated the Ameer of 
Afghanistan to resist British pretensions, the challenge was 
taken up and war declared against the sturdy little coun- 
try which, in 1839-42, had inflicted notable reverses on 
British arms. 1 

Lord Beaconsfield resigned office in 1880, and died the 
next year, before he could devise a satisfactory solution for 
any of the four great problems created by his diplomacy. 
The new ministry, under Mr. Gladstone, was bound to at- 

1 For this and succeeding paragraphs, reference may be made to Ernest L6monon, 
L' Europe et la Politique britannique, 1 882-191 1, a detailed and impartial study which 
abounds in quotations from the press and the speeches of politicians; and to Alfred 
L. P. Dennis, "Tendencies in British Foreign Policy since Disraeli," in Proceedings 
of the American Political Science Association (1909), a brief but illuminating account 
of British policy in its broadest aspects. 



1 8 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

tempt a settlement of some kind in each case, but, because 
it was not sympathetic with this imperial policy and was 
not gifted with the imagination of the Conservative leader, 
it managed to store up much trouble for the future while 
apparently extricating itself with fair success from difficul- 
ties not of its own making. How the splendidly conceived 
plans of Disraeli scored a posthumous victory will be seen 
in subsequent paragraphs, but for the moment something 
must be said of Gladstone's efforts to upset them. 

(i) Many provisions of the " peace with honor" dic- 
tated at Berlin by Lord Beaconsfield (1878) had not been 
carried out, for it satisfied neither the Turks nor the Rus- 
sians, the two most interested parties. With the help of 
Prince Bismarck, Lord Granville, whose work at the for- 
eign office is still the subject of controversy, patched up a 
tolerable solution, but it involved the alienation of Turkey 
and the abandonment of that pro-Turkish policy which 
Lord Beaconsfield and many of his predecessors had con- 
sidered essential for the checking of Russian designs. Yet 
Great Britain did not win Russian good will by this change 
of front; rather Anglo-Russian rivalry in Near Eastern 
politics was quite pronounced until the first years of the 
twentieth century. 

(2) The campaign in Afghanistan had resulted badly for 
the invaders, who were saved from complete destruction 
only by the famous march of Lord (then Sir Frederick) 
Roberts to Kandahar. The position was so delicate that 
in 1881 the British troops were withdrawn and the Ameer 
was left free to intrigue with the Russians if he desired. 
The latter interpreted the evacuation as a sign of British 
weakness. Resuming their aggressive policy, they occupied 
Afghan territory at Pendjeh in 1885, and war was narrowly 
avoided by the conciliatory policy of the Gladstone gov- 
ernment. Not till the new century was British influence 
fully and definitively asserted. 



MODERN ENGLAND 19 

(3) In South Africa the annexation of 1877 na -d pro- 
duced bitter resentment among the Transvaal farmers, and 
rebellion followed. The defeat of a British force at Majuba 
Hill (February, 1881) strengthened Mr. Gladstone's ob- 
jections to an imperialistic policy, and the Convention of 
Pretoria, reinforced by the London Convention of 1884, 
recognized the independence of the Boer republics. But 
the last word had not been said, for the problem was closely 
bound up with Cape Colony and Natal and was not un- 
connected with the disposition of the surrounding African 
lands. 

(4) In Egypt, where the Anglo-French control of finances 
was working badly, trouble was brewing. In 1882 Arabi 
Pasha, a colonel in the Egyptian army, organized a revolt, 
and there was a massacre of Europeans at Alexandria. 
The Turkish Government showing no disposition to rescue 
the Western Powers from their predicament (Egypt was 
an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire), Great 
Britain decided to intervene. But, recognizing that since 
Bonaparte's expedition in 1798 France had cherished a 
strong sentimental interest in the Nile valley and that her 
financial claims were considerable, Lord Granville invited 
the Republic to join in the armed demonstration. France 
refused. If she believed that England would not act alone, 
she was mistaken. A British squadron bombarded Alex- 
andria, and in 1883 Sir Garnet Wolseley overthrew the 
Khedive's army at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, which was 
followed immediately by the "occupation" of Egypt. But 
for Great Britain as many problems were created as had 
been solved. Lord Granville- had incautiously declared 
that the occupation would end when order had been re- 
stored, but various circumstances made a fulfilment of this 
promise impracticable. So the French Government, which 
was much piqued by the turn of events and bitterly re- 
gretted its own lukewarmness in the critical days of 1882, 



20 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

was always able to call attention to this obligation of Great 
Britain, and in a variety of ways to add to the difficulties 
under which the British administration of Egypt labored 
for many years. This hostility and tension, originally local, 
rapidly envenomed the general relations of France and Eng- 
land, caused both countries much trouble, and permitted 
Germany to lord it over the Continent at will till the open- 
ing years of the twentieth century. 

Thus Gladstonian diplomacy had secured for England 
the active opposition of both France and Russia, and had 
failed to ameliorate the situation inherited from the Bea- 
consfield government. This was the more unfortunate be- 
cause the 'eighties and 'nineties witnessed a scramble on the 
part of the Great Powers for those regions of the world 
which were open to colonization or exploitation by Euro- 
pean governments and peoples, viz., most of Africa, parts 
of Asia, and the islands of the Pacific. And so systematic 
and regular were the conflicts between Great Britain and 
the two powers of the Dual Alliance (finally consummated 
between 1891 and 1896) that Englishmen came to regard 
these countries as their natural and hereditary enemies, 
and some confidently predicted that one day the innumer- 
able quarrels would be settled by the arbitrament of war, 
which, in fact, more than once loomed on the horizon. 

The French occupation of Tunis, which was felt to prej- 
udice British commercial interests; intrigues in Morocco; 
rivalries in the Congo and Niger basins and elsewhere in 
Africa, which culminated in the affair of Fashoda; the 
hostility of English missionaries to the French penetration 
of Madagascar; English fears that the French conquests 
in Tonkin and Siam would endanger the northeastern fron- 
tiers of India and affect British commercial supremacy 
in the Yangtze valley; disputes about the Newfoundland 
fisheries which dated back to the Seven Years' War; and 
the problem of New Caledonia and the New Hebrides in 



MODERN ENGLAND 21 

the Pacific — all these show the inflammable character of 
Anglo-French relations. Twice, in 1893 about a Siamese 
question, and in 1898, when Lord Kitchener compelled 
Major Marchand to retire from Fashoda, war seemed pos- 
sible, if not inevitable. Any of these disputes could have 
been settled with a little good will on both sides. But 
when an English statesman (Joseph Chamberlain) dared 
advise France to "mend her manners," and when the 
French press daily warned its readers against the wiles of 
per fide Albion, each government delighted to administer 
"pinpricks" 1 to the policy of the other and left the direc- 
tion of world policy to more sensible Powers. 

With Russia Great Britain had much the same experi- 
ence. Finding every move in the Balkans blocked by the 
policy of the British Government, Russia continued her 
advance in Central Asia, which brought her in time to the 
frontiers of Afghanistan and India itself. She acquired a 
preponderant position in Persia, and seemed likely to push 
on to the Persian Gulf, which for a century had been the 
special preserve of England. To the latter, who refused 
to admit Russia's need of an outlet on warm waters, these 
enterprises betokened but one aim, the invasion of India, 
an opinion concurred in by Doctor Arminius Vambery, the 
famous orientalist of the University of Budapest. In the 
Far East the construction of the Siberian railway across 
Manchuria foreboded the disintegration of China, where 
British commercial interests were extensive — a fear accen- 
tuated by the intervention of France and Russia (with the 
help of Germany), after the Chino- Japanese War, to com- 
pel the surrender of Port Arthur by Japan, only that 
Russia might seize it for herself. Also, Russian intrigues in 
Tibet promised nothing good for the northern regions of 

1 The phrase was used by Sir Edmond Monson, British ambassador to France, in 
a public speech in Paris on 6 December, 1898, and caused great resentment. Cf. 
Sir Thomas Barclay, Anglo-French Reminiscences, 1876-1906, p. 157. 



22 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

India. Kipling's phrase about "the bear that walks like 
a man" expressed accurately the opinion of the man in 
the street, who incidentally regarded Russian officialdom 
as synonymous with corruption, inefficiency, and oppres- 
sion. 

Here, then, was a situation full of danger for the British 
Empire if British policy were at any time to become in- 
transigent. Fortunately for England, her rulers declined 
to push home the quarrel with either France or Russia, but 
reserved their attention for another problem. 

Scarcely had the autonomy of the Boer republics been 
conceded when the discovery of diamonds brought pro- 
spectors and speculators by the thousand into the Trans- 
vaal. Mainly Englishmen, with a sprinkling of Americans, 
they chafed under the political system of President Kriiger, 
who compelled them to pay heavy taxes but denied them 
any share in the government. On i January, 1896, Doctor 
Leander Starr Jameson and a band of raiders, operating 
from British territory, led an expedition against the Boer 
Government, only to be routed and captured. Instead of 
cutting the Gordian knot, they had tied it tighter, because 
Boer pride and British stubbornness were stimulated, and 
the inevitable war broke out in October, 1899. 

Without discussing the merits of that struggle, it may be 
remarked that both races learned to respect each other, 
and came to see that only by co-operation could they pre- 
serve South Africa for the white race; also, that the war 
made possible that unification of the land which its en- 
lightened statesmen had long desired. To Englishmen the 
war disclosed three very unpalatable facts. (1) It had 
cost £250,000,000 and more than 25,000 men, yet the 
grant of self-government to the conquered Boer states con- 
ceded the very points for which the war had been fought. 
(2) The efficiency of the British army was called in grave 
question, and there were rumors that all was not well with 



MODERN ENGLAND 23 

the fleet. (3) The war had revealed an astonishing and un- 
expected hatred of England, her institutions, and her policy 
all over the Continent. In France, Russia, Austria, and 
Germany, especially the last-named, the press had used 
the most abusive language and had gloated over each re- 
verse of British arms. It was known that more than one 
attempt had been made to organize a coalition against 
Britain, which would, at the very least, have prevented the 
prosecution of the war in South Africa and might have 
precipitated the collapse of the whole Empire. 

It is often said that only a sledge-hammer blow will per- 
mit a new idea to penetrate an Englishman's consciousness. 
If so, the recurrent shocks of the Boer War were of great 
value, for they compelled the country to readjust its polit- 
ical spectacles. Men began to reject the old conception 
of imperialism, to see that "the appetite for domination 
belongs to an outworn phase of patriotism," to apply 
Mr. Balfour's description of German ambitions. 1 At last 
the Empire had territory enough, and if that Empire was 
not to follow the example of its Roman predecessor, which 
crumbled under the pressure of continuous warfare, its 
energies must be diverted to the arts of peace and civiliza- 
tion. The dominant idea encountered in responsible and 
serious writings of the last decade is that "peace is the 
greatest of British interests." Englishmen further realized 
that they could neither ignore the opinions of Continental 
peoples nor dictate to those nations their principles of 
conduct, an admission the more galling because for gen- 
erations past these islanders had judged other men by their 
own standards, and had, accordingly, either given Conti- 
nental complications a wide berth or interfered metic- 
ulously in the affairs of all nations. But for the future 
England could not shun Europe; on the other hand, her 
action must be circumspect, her attitude considerate of 

1 England and Germany (191 2), p. 7. 



24 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

the susceptibilities of those with whom she must live in 
contact. 

How deeply these new conceptions took root in the pop- 
ular mind is seen in the failure of the Conservative party, 
which had made the Boer War and was associated with 
jingoistic tendencies, to recover power after the disastrous 
elections of January, 1906. The rise of the Labor party, 
the tone of the Liberal press, the flood of pacificist litera- 
ture, the objurgations of Conservative politicians, and the 
reluctance for war manifested between 23 July and 4 August, 
1914, leave no doubt that the temper of twentieth-century 
England was anything but bellicose. The United Kingdom 
desired only to be left alone to enjoy the heritage of the 
past and, if possible, to set an example to the more warlike 
nations. Not that militarism was entirely disposed of. 
Lord Salisbury's famous remark, "The living nations will 
gradually encroach on the territory of the dying, and the 
seeds and causes of conflict among civilized nations will 
speedily appear," ! included the suggestion that England 
should be prepared for any eventuality and afforded a 
small but noisy party the chance to demand larger mili- 
tary and naval establishments. But the country was not 
converted to the gospel of force. Ten years of agitation 
for a conscript army made but little impression, and the 
navy was allowed to fall below that two-power standard 
adopted by the Naval Defense Act of 1889; it was becom- 
ing increasingly difficult to maintain a full or sufficient per- 
sonnel on either establishment; and, as will be seen in a 
later chapter, the government which declared war against 
Germany resolutely endeavored to keep down the ever- 
mounting expenditure on armaments. 

Isolation being impossible, what should be the aim of 
"a new departure" (Lord Lansdowne's phrase) — by what 
policy could the British Government perform its duty as 

1 Albert Hall, London, 4 May, 1808. 



MODERN ENGLAND 25 

a member of the European community and at the same 
time do justice to its position as the trustee of a vast em- 
pire? The diplomacy of Downing Street since the conclu- 
sion of the South African war would seem to have been 
dictated by five considerations: the taking of a definite 
side in the balance of Europe; the settlement of outstand- 
ing disputes with foreign nations; the reorganization of the 
military and naval forces of the crown against an attack 
on the United Kingdom or the Empire; the revival of the 
concert of Europe; and the development of international 
arbitration. 1 It will be convenient to treat these tend- 
encies in reverse order. 

International arbitration, if not of Anglo-Saxon origin, 
has been chiefly practised by that race. 2 It dates from 
1794, "when England and the United States concluded an 
arbitration treaty to deal with questions arising under the 
peace treaty of 1783. ... La Fontaine, the learned his- 
torian of the subject, estimates that from 1794 to 1900 
there were actually 177 instances of this arbitrament, of 
which he assigns no less than 70 cases as shared in by 
Great Britain, 56 by the United States, and 26 by France, 
with other nations relatively nowhere." 3 For our present 
purpose, the landmark is the Anglo-French treaty of 1903, 
which, though it reserved from arbitration questions affect- 
ing the honor, independence, or vital interests of either 
country, was an important step in advance, in that it has 
been copied by practically all civilized nations. Great 
Britain has since negotiated similar treaties with thirteen 
different governments. It has gone further. In 191 1 it 
signed with the United States, and its example was fol- 
lowed by France, a treaty by which any and all differences 

1 George Peel, The Future of England, pp. 152-153. 

2 For a discussion of the historical origins of international arbitration, see the 
notes to vol. V of John Bassett Moore, International Arbitrations of the United 
States. 

3 George Peel, The Future of England, p. 156. 



26 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

arising between the two governments might ultimately be 
submitted to arbitration. Though the amendments of the 
United States Senate practically nullified this happy ar- 
rangement, so that the treaty was not ratified, the good will 
of Great Britain was demonstrated; so much so that she 
revised her alliance with Japan to prevent its application 
against a country with which either party had signed a 
treaty of general arbitration. 

Once at least in the new century, thanks to the leader- 
ship of the British Government, the concert of Europe did 
yeoman service in the cause of European peace. The out- 
break of the Balkan War, in October, 191 2, threatened to 
set all Europe by the ears, for it had long been assumed 
that the liquidation of the Macedonian problem would 
bring various Great Powers into the arena. But at the 
first sign of tension Sir Edward Grey proposed a confer- 
ence of the ambassadors in London; with their assistance 
he piloted Europe through the most dangerous crisis that 
had arisen in fifty years. He had tried to assemble a con- 
ference in the crisis of 1908-9, and in July, 1914, he made 
a vain effort in the same direction. Under his direction 
British policy was true to the teaching of Lord Salisbury, 
that the concert is "the embryo of the only possible struc- 
ture of Europe which can save civilization from the deso- 
lating effects of a disastrous war." 

With respect to British military policy, the details will 
be set forth in a subsequent chapter. Here it is sufficient 
to point out that the whole Empire felt the necessity of 
an adequate system of defense. Before the war all of the 
self-governing colonies instituted military training of some 
description and, with the exception of South Africa, began 
to create naval forces. So far from this imperial develop- 
ment being a danger, it promised to become more and more 
a guarantee of peace, for the British Government had un- 
dertaken the task of consolidating these scattered outposts 



MODERN ENGLAND 27 

of the Empire's power into an effective enterprise animated 
by a single ideal. But the price of this direction was the 
admission of the overseas dominions to the arcana of the 
foreign office, 1 and, given the diversity of British, i. e., 
imperial, interests, given the increasing influence of the 
colonies over foreign policy, it was unthinkable that the 
Empire should be plunged into war did not the constituent 
parts thereof believe it necessary and just. 

The policy of settling extra-European disputes had been 
begun long before the altered situation in Europe made a 
conciliatory attitude incumbent on the foreign and colonial 
offices. The success of this give-and-take policy and the 
wide range of British interests may be gauged from the one 
hundred treaties, conventions, protocols, agreements, and 
exchanges of notes to which the British Government was 
a party between 1882 and the conclusion of peace with 
the Boer republics twenty years later. France, Germany, 
Italy, Russia, Holland, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Morocco, 
Ethiopia, Zanzibar, China, the United States, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Brazil make a formidable list 
of possible antagonists; to have made amicable and satis- 
factory arrangements with each and all of them is surely a 
record of which any government might be proud and to 
which it might point as evidence of its pacific policy. Be- 
tween 1902 and the outbreak of the present war sixty- 
seven more agreements of a similar character were con- 
cluded with twenty-five governments. 2 

It is true that most of the disputes so adjusted were 
petty matters, but after 1902 the same principle was ap- 
plied to the larger problems of the Empire and its relations 
to the Great Powers. The first step was to negotiate an 

'This was done at the imperial conference of ign, and helps to explain the 
readiness of the colonies to support the mother country in the present war. 

2 A partial list of these agreements is given in Professor Dennis's paper, op. tit., 
p. 118. The British and Foreign State Papers do not at present extend beyond ign ; 
for the years 1911-14 the Parliamentary Papers must be consulted. 



28 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

alliance with Japan, which consolidated Britain's position 
in the Far East, where the Russian designs on Manchuria 
were awakening deep suspicion. The same year the Hay- 
Pauncefote treaty with the United States guaranteed that 
British interests in the Panama Canal would be protected; 
while the renunciation of a clearly denned treaty right to 
share in the construction of that canal earned for England 
the friendship of the United States and proclaimed that 
British and American policies in the New World were 
harmonious. These two momentous bargains left Lord 
Lansdowne, who had become foreign secretary in No- 
vember, 1900, a free hand to deal with the European 
situation. 

The settlement of the Fashoda affair had cleaned the 
slate with France; M. Delcasse, the French foreign min- 
ister, was determined to achieve a reconciliation with Eng- 
land; and the accession of Edward VII, an ardent lover 
of France and a prime favorite of the Parisians, was not 
without bearing on the problem. The arbitration treaty 
of 1903 paved the way. Finally, on 8 April, 1904, there 
was signed in London a series of declarations which soon 
secured a world-wide fame under the name entente cordiale. 
By far the most important feature was the recognition by 
France of the British occupation of Egypt in return for a 
free hand in Morocco, so far as Great Britain was con- 
cerned. Other points referred to Newfoundland, the Niger 
region, Madagascar, Siam, and the New Hebrides; some 
secret articles, not published till November, 191 1, elabo- 
rated the policy of the two governments with respect to 
Egypt and Morocco. Some of the disputes were of long 
standing — none involved grave questions of national exist- 
ence, all were the source of much trouble to both govern- 
ments and prevented them from presenting a united front 
in the tense situation developing in Europe. By a few 
strokes of the pen two eminently wise statesmen relieved 



MODERN ENGLAND 29 

their respective countries of much anxiety and set an ex- 
ample which proved profitable and contagious. 

A change of government in England installed Sir Edward 
Grey at the foreign office in December, 1905; but he was 
pledged to follow the policy of his predecessor. Accord- 
ingly, an exchange of notes with Spain in May, 1907, for 
which the ground had been prepared by the marriage of 
King Alfonso to Princess Ena of Battenberg, bound the 
British and Spanish Governments to maintain the status 
quo in the Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic. When 
Italy was brought into this system by an agreement with 
France, the Mediterranean, which is the highway of the 
British Empire, seemed permanently secure. With Egypt 
practically a British protectorate, and with Gibraltar, 
Malta, and Cyprus as naval bases, it was reasonable to 
suppose that the British fleet could guarantee the safe 
transit of the grain ships which brought from Russia the 
major portion of England's food-supply, and insure the 
free passage through the Suez Canal of the countless liners 
that bore the commerce of England and India. 

In Asia, where the difficulties of the British Government 
had always been great, the situation had been cleared by 
the defeat of Russia at the hands of Japan, who in August, 
1905, renewed and extended her alliance with Great 
Britain. There was no longer any danger of a break-up 
or partition of China, and the Indian frontier was secure, 
more especially as the Ameer of Afghanistan had at last 
accepted freely and fully the proffered friendship of the 
Indian government. "Scientific frontiers," which were 
the obsession of Lord Beaconsfield and predicated a "for- 
ward policy," were no longer necessary. It was therefore 
possible to negotiate with the Russian Government, which 
was struggling with revolution at home and saw its inter- 
ests in the Balkans threatened by its inability to stem the 
Austro-German advance. Incidentally, St. Petersburg ap- 



30 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

predated that warnings from London, in 1903, that Japan 
was in earnest as regards Manchuria had been given sin- 
cerely and in the true interests of Russia. In the circum- 
stances of the hour an Anglo-Russian agreement was more 
than a desideratum, it was a necessity. By the convention 
of 31 August, 1907, which astonished the world even more 
than the entente cordiale, both governments agreed to re- 
frain from intrigues in Tibet, which in the past had been 
profitable to neither. Afghanistan was declared to be un- 
der the protection of Great Britain. Persia was divided 
into three spheres of influence, one (Russian) in the north, 
one (British) along the Gulf of Oman, and the third, a 
neutral zone, lying between the other two. By a letter 
annexed to the convention, Russia recognized the predom- 
inance of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. The bar- 
gain merely gave expression to existing facts, but it was 
worth while to remove all distrust by a frank explanation, 
and from the English point of view, as it was hoped, to 
secure a lever against any future move of Russia in those 
regions. 

There remained two problems for a constructive British 
diplomacy to solve. The first, the future of the Near East, 
was not pressing. Established in the Nile valley, and pro- 
tected on her flank by the young Balkan states, with which 
her influence was considerable, Great Britain could be in- 
different to the expulsion of the Turk from Europe. At 
the same time she was willing to co-operate in any scheme 
of reform which would enable the Sick Man to retain Mace- 
donia, for a forcible solution of that problem might precipi- 
tate a general European war, which it was the great aim 
of British policy to avoid. 

The other task, however, was of appalling difficulty — 
British relations with Germany. With this Power there 
was no historical quarrel, for such disputes as had arisen 
in the last generation had been promptly settled. Until a 



MODERN ENGLAND 31 

few years previous there was a tradition of friendship; any 
differences belonged to the future rather than to the past. 
At scarcely any point throughout the world were the two 
countries in contact, yet their diplomacy was animated 
by opposing motives, and public opinion on both sides of 
the North Sea was becoming irritated, suspicious, threaten- 
ing. And a solution of the enigma was the more impera- 
tive because Germany was unquestionably the dominant 
power of the Continent. Were she to assume an attitude 
frankly and unreservedly hostile to Great Britain, the 
latter might be called upon to stake her own and her em- 
pire's existence upon a gigantic struggle with the greatest 
military machine in the world. 

The preoccupation of the British foreign office after the 
Boer War was, therefore, to arrange a modus vivendi with 
Germany. And precisely because the latter did not, until 
too late, as it will be the main thesis of this book to show, 
respond to the overtures of Great Britain, the resources of 
British diplomacy and the weight of British public opinion 
were thrown into the scale in favor of those Powers whose 
interests were also the object of German attack, lest Ger- 
many by subduing them should be free to concentrate her 
energies upon a still greater enemy. For this reason Eng- 
land supported France and Russia in the diplomatic bouts 
of the decade preceding the Great War. But it will be 
seen that she made repeated efforts to secure the friend- 
ship of Germany, and, in the opinion of the present writer, 
she declared war reluctantly and only because she was 
convinced that no permanent understanding was possible. 

The new foreign policy of the British Government was 
accompanied by a new treatment of certain imperial prob- 
lems. Speaking generally, there was a reversion to the 
laissez-faire traditions of the mid- Victorian period. Just 
as the Whig aristocracy, which controlled England from the 
Reform Act of 1832 to the Reform Act of 1867, had extended 



32 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

self-government to such colonies as were ready for full- 
blown parliamentary institutions, so the Liberal govern- 
ment, which held office from 1905 to 1915, was quite dis- 
posed to make large concessions to the national aspirations 
of the non-English peoples of the Empire. In some cases 
the concessions were granted under pressure, but they 
were made, and once made were loyally respected. 

In 1899 England went to war with the Boer republics 
of South Africa for reasons that, to say the least, are open 
to criticism; in course of time she defeated them and took 
away their independence. Four years after the treaty of 
peace was signed, the government of Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman had the courage to grant complete self-govern- 
ment to the late enemies of the crown, even at the risk of 
placing the English element in South Africa at the mercy 
of the Dutch majority. What has been the answer ? The 
reconciliation of British and Boer and, in this supreme crisis 
of the Empire's history, unswerving loyalty and devotion 
except on the part of a few misguided irreconcilables. The 
capture of German Southwest Africa by an Anglo-Boer 
force, led by General Botha, is surely one of the most dra- 
matic episodes of modern history, illustrating at once the 
antithesis between freedom and force and the conclusive 
superiority of the former. 

In India and Egypt England has governed by force, and 
although her rule has been one of tolerance, not of oppres- 
sion, it has been to some extent resented by the educated 
classes and the champions of nationality. In keeping with 
the spirit of the age, Lord Morley, as secretary of state for 
India, and Lord Kitchener, as British representative in 
Egypt, made reforms which have introduced those oriental 
lands to the privileges of self-government, and have shown 
that the ideal of liberty still rules, as it has made, the Brit- 
ish Empire. Hence that spontaneous and unanimous offer 
of their lives and their substance from the seven hundred 



MODERN ENGLAND 33 

princes of India, who might have seized the golden oppor- 
tunity to sever the imperial connection; hence the refusal 
of Britain's Mohammedan subjects to be seduced by the 
attractions of a holy war. As Mr. Asquith recently re- 
marked, England is "now gathering in, in the hour of trial, 
the fruits of a wise and far-sighted imperial policy." 1 

Best of all is the case of Ireland. After a century of 
agitation a British Government has conceded Home Rule, 
with what magnificent response from a grateful Ireland 
Germany knows to her own confusion. "I say to the gov- 
ernment that they may to-morrow withdraw every one of 
their troops from Ireland. I say that the coast of Ireland 
will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, 
and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the 
south will be only too glad to join arms with the armed 
Protestant Ulstermen in the north." 2 In these words, ut- 
tered in the House of Commons on 3 August, 19 14, John 
Redmond produced his best argument for the cause he had 
so long advocated. 

On paper the British Empire is not an empire at all. 
There is no single authority for the vast dominions which 
acknowledge the Union Jack. The interests of the com- 
ponent parts are by no means identical; in many cases 
there are actually conflicting interests which, on the eve 
of the Great War, threatened to strain the loose-jointed 
imperial fabric to the uttermost. In the self-governing 
dominions the forces of nationalism seemed to point away 
from a contracted imperialism. There was no imperial 
army, the navy was in large measure the creation of the 
United Kingdom. All attempts to create an imperial ex- 
ecutive or an imperial legislature were defeated by the 
opposition of mother country and colonies alike. A few 
years ago it was difficult to discover any common bond 
which held the entire empire together, and many compe- 

1 Guild Hall, London, ig May, 1915. J 5 Bansard, kv, c. 1829. 



34 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

tent and experienced observers gave expression to the fear 
that it would not stand the test of a great European war. 
With the world in the crucible, nothing is more aston- 
ishing than the unity of the British Empire and the en- 
thusiasm of the outlying parts for the successful prosecu- 
tion of a war waged far from their immediate touch. When 
one considers the haphazard imperial organization of the 
past and remembers the reluctance of the self-governing 
dominions to place their armed forces at the disposal of the 
British Government, it is evident that beneath the surface 
there has lain dormant a subtle and elusive spirit which 
defies calculation and responds only to the call of an all- 
pervading ideal. The British Empire is assuredly fighting 
for its interests, but it believes that it is also struggling for 
something greater and more ennobling, human liberty and 
humanity itself. As a French writer has said: "La con- 
quete a pu fonder l'Empire. C'est la liberte qui le main- 
tient." l 

] Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, Revue des Deux Monies, i January, 191 2, p. 85. 



CHAPTER III 

THE GERMAN EMPIRE 

"The new German Empire is the most perplexing quan- 
tity in the modern world, and as unavoidable as it is per- 
plexing." 1 So wrote an English observer two years be- 
fore the war. That Germany was unavoidable the war 
itself is proof. And it may be fairly asked whether the 
war has made her any the less perplexing. Americans at 
least have not ceased to wonder why a nation which had 
kept the peace for forty-three years, and had reached a 
dizzy height of wealth and prosperity within that period, 
should risk this solid achievement by an appeal to the 
sword, and that, too, in an issue not of immediate concern 
to itself. Never was it more true that "the roots of the 
present lie deep in the past." 

Nearly seventy years ago, or, to be precise, in 1848, 
Germany bore little resemblance to the mighty empire of 
to-day. The land still merited the name of "the Ger- 
manies," as the French, with their aptness for accurate 
expression, had long called it. Divided into thirty-eight 
states, and possessed of only a shadowy union in the 
confederation established by the Congress of Vienna, it 
was a prey to particularism and local jealousies, which 
were kept alive, on the one hand by autocratic Austria, 
and on the other by lesser princes who feared the growing 
prestige of Prussia and her traditions of aggression. The 
idea of German nationality was not popular in high polit- 
ical circles; it was cherished by a handful of professors and 

1 G. H. Perris, Germany and the German Emperor, preface, p. v. 
35 



36 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

historians, who painted the glories of the mediaeval em- 
pire or glorified the un-German development of Prussia in 
the last two centuries. Suddenly, as by a miracle, liberal 
sentiment, which, though repressed by the system of Met- 
ternich, had not evaporated, produced a revolution that 
forced the proudest monarchs, Frederick William IV of 
Prussia and Ferdinand I of Austria, to grant constitutions 
to their dissatisfied subjects, and sought, by means of a 
national assembly, to transform the broken confederation 
into a united Germany governed by its democracy. Almost 
overnight Germany became a nation, in the sense that it 
was animated by a definite ideal of union and liberty. 

That movement failed, for reasons that need not here be 
adumbrated, but amid the welter of those years, 1848 and 
1849, two incidents stand out boldly. First, King Fred- 
erick William, on the outbreak of the troubles, proclaimed 
that Prussia was henceforth merged in Germany. Sec- 
ond, relying on the royal promise, the democracy of Ger- 
many, assembled in the Frankfort Parliament, offered to 
him the imperial crown which should be the symbol of a 
new and free fatherland. The vacillating monarch de- 
clined the offer, if for sound Prussian reasons; but for 
Germany a unique opportunity was lost. The particular- 
ist spirit of the lesser princes had been broken, their gov- 
ernments had collapsed, and a great king would have found 
in the Frankfort assembly the force required to deal with 
the ambitions of Austria, who essayed to preserve indefi- 
nitely a disordered Germany subservient to her own in- 
terests. 

It was not to be. Democracy had played its hand and 
lost. For the future, blood and iron, not parliamentary 
majorities, the genius of Otto von Bismarck, and not the 
theories of 1848, must prevail. By the might of Prussian 
arms, wielded in three successful wars against Denmark, 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 37 

Austria, and France, the King of Prussia became German 
Emperor, and Prussia herself not only the bulwark of 
German union but the model according to which the other 
states of Germany were invited to fashion their own life 
in all its details. It is worth while to inquire (1) what this 
has meant for Germany and (2) how far Prussia has suc- 
ceeded in her self-imposed task; for the modern German 
Empire is not the creation of the German people, who long 
disliked and distrusted Bismarck and his coadjutors and 
were reconciled to their work only after the glittering tri- 
umphs of the three wars. 

It is notorious that the old Germany was highly ideal- 
istic, cultured, cosmopolitan. It was largely responsible 
for the Protestant Reformation, it produced some of the 
world's greatest philosophers, musicians, and men of letters : 
Leibnitz, Kant, Beethoven, Goethe, to name but a few of 
the illustrious galaxy of men who made German culture 
the heritage of the human race. But this liberal spirit, 
which was never concentrated in one capital, such as Paris 
or London, and thereby struck deep roots in the German 
character, was unconcerned with political affairs. The 
spectacle of a Goethe who was not humiliated by the Napo- 
leonic conquest of Germany suggests, indeed, an abnormal 
view of life. Not until the nineteenth century did Ger- 
man thought attempt seriously to cope with the problems 
of internal disunion or foreign intrigue. Its remedy was 
parliamentary government, but the revolutions of 1848 
showed the futility of such ideas; so that it was left for 
Bismarck, by seizing a tradition of order, discipline, thor- 
oughness, and frankly material aims, to lead the German 
nation out of the shadows of the Holy Roman Empire and 
the Confederation of 181 5 to the reality of a Prussian- 
governed autocracy. 

Since 1871 Germany has been in the iron grip of Prussia. 



38 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

For under the imperial constitution the governing force 
is the Bundesrath, which is an assembly of delegates from 
the confederated governments, and the votes are so ar- 
ranged that Prussia's will is, for all practical purposes, law. 
The chancellor and his ministers take their orders from 
the Emperor, to whom alone they are responsible. The 
Reichstag, though elected by universal suffrage, which was 
Bismarck's one concession to the spirit of the age, in theory 
holds the purse-strings, but, since no taxes can be changed 
without the consent of the Prussian Government, it is 
really little more than a debating society and sits powerless 
in the palace guarded by the statue of Bismarck. Five 
times since the foundation of the Empire has the Reichstag 
been dissolved for resistance to the imperial will, and in 
each election the opponents of the official policy have been 
pilloried as traitors and invited to leave a country they 
could not appreciate. It is scarcely too much to say that 
there is no way for the people of Germany to limit the ac- 
tion of their government except by open rebellion, against 
which the memories of 1848, a standing army of nearly 
1,000,000 men, and an omnipresent and omnipotent bu- 
reaucracy have hitherto operated as effective restraints. 

This ascendency of the executive over the legislature 
has not passed unchallenged, for the Radical and Socialist 
parties protest against it. The latter, in particular, realiz- 
ing clearly that political reform must precede any social 
revolution, has for years demanded a responsible ministry, 
freedom of speech and of the press, control of war and 
peace by the Reichstag, and the other concomitants of a 
democratic state; all of which are anathema to the govern- 
ing classes. Bismarck endeavored to repress the agitation 
by harsh legislation, Emperor William has violently de- 
nounced its supporters as grumblers and traitors, but with 
each general election the movement has gathered force. 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 



39 



But for their refusal to co-operate with the other opposi- 
tion parties, whom they despise as representing the black- 
coated and white-collared classes, the socialists would long 
since, on paper, have become a menace to the self-perpetu- 
ating government they profess to abhor. 



ADVANCE OF SOCIALISM 



Year 


Total vote 


Socialists 


Percentage 


Seats in 
Reichstag 


1890 

1893 

1898 


7,228,560 
7,674,000 
7,757,7oo 
9,495,586 
11,262,800 
12,206,806 


1,127,300 
1,786,700 
2,107,076 
3,010,771 
3,259,000 
4,250,329 


10. 11 
19-74 
23-30 
31-71 
28.94 
34-82 


35 
44 
56 
81 

43 
no 


1903 

1907 

1912 





Many competent students looked forward to the day 
when the socialist avalanche should overturn the auto- 
cratic system, and it is not impossible that the fear of this 
eventuality was among the factors which induced the im- 
perial government to precipitate a war that promised to 
end speedily in a resounding triumph. But such estimates 
of the situation overlooked three important facts. 

First, to make the chancellor responsible to the Reichstag 
would endanger Prussia's supremacy in Germany, for, under 
the existing arrangements, he is always the Prussian prime 
minister. The commons of England had to cut off the 
head of one king and drive his son from the throne to 
secure even partial control of the executive; France, since 
181 5, has indulged in three revolutions for the same end. 
Let the Reichstag choose the chancellor, and that mouth- 
piece of the Emperor may well be the bitter opponent of 
the Prussian King. Before granting such a concession, 
the Emperor is more likely to follow the advice of a well- 



40 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

known Conservative and send a lieutenant with ten men 
to "close up the Reichstag." 1 

Second, by no means one-third of the German people 
are Socialists. Most of those who voted the Socialist 
ticket in the Reichstag elections did so to protest against 
the government's policy and not against the government, 
which was chiefly criticised for its vacillating conduct of 
foreign affairs. Not more than a million genuine Social- 
ists paid dues to the party organization; the other three 
millions were well aware that the Socialist programme was 
not a matter of practical politics, and if its realization had 
seemed probable they would promptly have rejoined one 
of the national parties. 

r Third, the Socialist members of the Reichstag have never 
really joined issue with the government. They have talked 
vaguely about disarmament and have rendered lip homage 
to the principle of arbitration, but they have always voted 
for the vast appropriations demanded for increasing the 
army and navy, which the government, cleverly enough, 
raised at the expense of the middle and upper classes. 
Thus the Socialists were able at once to save their prin- 
ciples and to further the national policy which could be 
represented as purely defensive. It is well to remember 
that after the Morocco crisis of 191 1 Herr Bebel, the So- 
cialist leader, declared that if Germany were attacked he 
would shoulder his musket and go to the front like all other 
good Germans. The Socialists accepted as fully as the 
other parties the necessity of national expansion, and to 
expect, as some writers have done since the war began, 
that they would raise their voices against a war upon which 
the future of German expansion depended, was to associ- 
ate with them a philosophy of conduct which they never 
promulgated and never accepted. For this very reason 

1 Herr von Oldenburg, quoted by F. W. Wile, Men Around the Kaiser, p. 94 



\ 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 41 

they never accorded their sympathy to the propaganda of 
Jaures and the French syndicalists, who aimed at creating 
an international solidarity among the working classes that 
would render mobilization a farce. 

But not only has popular control been excluded from the 
German constitutional system: south and non-Prussian 
Germany have been deprived of any real voice in the con- 
duct of affairs, and these regions, traditionally rather liberal 
and easy-mannered, have in no small degree been infected 
by the Prussian spirit. According to Prince Biilow, whose 
Imperial Germany is an admirable statement of the Prus- 
sian official doctrine, German idealism has been in this 
fashion tempered by Prussian realism. Both are neces- 
sary for Germany, so that the government rules in Prussia 
with the help of the Conservative party, in the Empire 
with the support of liberalism. From the fusion of these 
two elements a national spirit is being evolved which will 
preserve the united fatherland from both the black peril 
of clericalism and the red peril of socialism. But he is 
thoroughly convinced that Prussia must bear the brunt of 
the burden. 

That proud kingdom, he says very fitly and succinctly, 
"always has been, and still is, a nation of soldiers and 
officials," l and it could not well be otherwise. Prussia is 
not a geographical necessity, as is France or Italy, but an 
artificial patchwork of lands without natural limits on 
either eastern or western frontiers. Nor is it the heir of 
a great historical tradition, which provides Austria-Hun- 
gary with an excuse for existence. Three hundred years 
ago the Hohenzollerns ruled but the Mark of Brandenburg, 
a small district lying mainly between the Elbe and the 
Oder, and two small provinces in south Germany. Thus 
the Prussian state of our time is the creation of half a 

1 Imperial Germany, p. 227. 



42 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

dozen warrior kings and a few more statesmen of tran- 
scendent ability. 

In the middle of the seventeenth century the Great 
Elector found himself possessed of disjointed dominions 
stretching from Konigsberg to the Rhine. He therefore 
got rid of the mediaeval estates which restricted his abso- 
lute authority, and established a standing army out of all 
proportion to the number of his subjects but abundantly 
useful for the acquisitive policy he elected to pursue. 
From the great principles thus laid down his successors 
have never departed. Reduced to a science and success- 
fully applied by Frederick William I (1713-40) and Fred- 
erick the Great (1740-86), they did not save the kingdom 
from the Napoleonic onslaught and the humiliation of 
Jena (1806). 

A new era seemed to open in Prussian history when, on 
22 May, 181 5, Frederick William III promised his people 
a constitution. But, under the influence of Metternich, 
the promise was speedily forgotten till vividly recalled by 
the revolution of 1848. At the end of that episode Fred- 
erick William IV granted a constitution which is still 
the public law of Prussia. This instrument was framed in 
the atmosphere of absolutism, and the King, in opening 
the first Diet, declared that he would never let a scrap of 
paper stand between him and his divine mission to govern 
the people of Prussia. The real power was left in the 
hands of the King, who appointed the ministry and re- 
tained complete control of the army. The legislature, 
though elected nominally by universal suffrage, was ren- 
dered harmless by the three-class system. The largest tax- 
payers, who together pay one-third of the taxes, form one 
class; the next largest class, paying another third, form a 
second class; and the rest of the voters a third. Each class 
in a constituency chooses the same number of electors, who 
in turn choose the deputy; the rich and the well-to-do in- 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 



43 



evitably control the Diet. At the election of 1908 the 
system worked as follows: 



Party 


Votes 


Seats 
earned 


Seats 
obtained 


Social Democrats 


598,522 
499,343 
404,343 
354,786 
318,589 
120,593 
63,612 


112 
94 
76 
67 
60 
22 
11 


7 
104 

19 
152 
65 
36 
60 


Catholic Centre 


Nationalists 


Conservatives 


National Liberals 


Radicals 


Free Conservatives 


Total 


2,360,247 


443 


443 





As the Conservatives support the government unreservedly, 
there is no outlet or hope for democracy. Despite the 
liveliest discontent, the system has withstood all attacks, 
and the laws of the Medes and Persians were not more 
sacred than this antiquated franchise in the eyes of the 
privileged voters. And even if the Conservatives should 
go into opposition, a thing unthinkable, the government 
could, as Bismarck did from 1863 to 1866, rule without 
the Diet by means of the army. 

Thus, in spite of the autonomy left to the other confed- 
erated states by the constitution of 1871, the control of 
Prussia over Germany is complete, which, to be sure, is 
merely the logic of history. Furthermore, that control is 
vested, not in the Prussian people, but in an autocratic 
government operating through the most efficient and highly 
organized bureaucracy in the world. Recruited, at least 
in its higher ranks, from those classes which have profited 
most from the enlightened absolutism of the past — the land- » x ,- 
owners, the capitalists, and the military — this bureaucracy^ 
resents the slightest concession to democracy. Number- 
ing more than two million officials, it regulates the life of 



44 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

the land to the last detail; so that the cities are uncannily! 
clean, the schools hall-marked for efficiency, and more I 
things forbidden by ubiquitous notices than are dreamed j 
of in our American philosophy. That the German people/ 
like this all-pervading governance, and, in fact, need its 
direction, has often been asserted, is probably true, and, 
true or not, is of no immediate concern to the outside 
world. But we are bound to observe that the deadening 
traditions of acquiescence in official action play into the 
hands of the government and permit it to march serenely 
along the course it has staked off, especially in foreign 
affairs. 

Similarly, the German press is sharply differentiated from 
that of Great Britain or the United States, which subjects 
every act of government to meticulous criticism and creates 
that public opinion upon which free government is ulti- 
mately dependent. It would be a great mistake to suppose 
that all German newspapers are inspired by government 
departments or subsidized from secret funds; on the con- 
trary, many of them are exceedingly outspoken, and con- 
victions for Use-majeste are quite common. But, generally 
speaking, the function of German newspapers is to set 
forth a view of men and events that will aid and abet the 
plans matured in official circles; so that public opinion is 
rather a lever in the hands of the government than a check 
upon its activities — is, as it were, made to order and regu- 
lated according to the necessities of the moment. Espe- 
cially has this been true in times of international crisis, when 
the tone of the press invariably reflects the attitude of the 
foreign office. The leading publicists are professors in the 
state-controlled universities, retired officials and military 
men, or aristocratic and titled landowners, all of whom 
are by tradition committed to the existing system. Against 
such forces a free-lance like Maximilian Harden, or the So- 
cialist journals, tilt in vain. In the great reviews there is 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 45 

rarely an interpretation of international problems from any 
point of view not exclusively German; whereas reputable 
English periodicals have never hesitated to publish articles 
by foreigners bitterly denouncing British policy and all its 
works. Internal politics are, indeed, discussed with more 
freedom, but, when all is said, the imperial government 
seldom allows itself to be deflected from its policy by press 
utterances. 

It may therefore be said, in answer to the first of our 
two questions, that Prussian ascendency has pretty thor- 
oughly obscured any recollections of liberalism which may 
have survived the Bismarckian triumphs of half a century 
ago; whatever Germans may think, Americans cannot re- 
gard the loss of political liberty as desirable, even though 
efficiency and thoroughness are acquired in its place. As 
regards the second question, it was indubitable, before the 
war, that Prussian policy had not stimulated the real unity 
of Germany, despite the gilded trappings of the imperial 
edifice. "Bismarck," says the English publicist quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter, "found his country politically 
anarchic but morally united; he left it with a semblance 
of political union and a plague of moral anarchy that has 
become increasingly evident since the veil of his person- 
ality has been removed from the facts." 1 With every al- 
lowance for the Englishman's prejudice, the charge rings, 
true across the fifty years that have elapsed since the great 
chancellor entered the Prussian ministry. Then men were 
willing to sacrifice everything for German unity; on the 
eve of the present war sectionalism and class feeling were 
rampant. The Germans themselves admit it. Are we not 
told, in private letters and public despatches, that the war 
has generated a feeling of unity hitherto unknown? 

Germany, like ancient Gaul, is divided into three parts. 
East of the Elbe lie the Mark of Brandenburg and the old 

1 Perris, Germany and the German Emperor, p. 276. 



46 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

duchies of East and West Prussia. Won by the sword in 
the Middle Ages, and retained by the energies of German 
colonists, these lands are the heart of the Prussian mon- 
archy. They are thinly populated, given over to agricul- 
ture, and dominated by the landed nobility, who exercise 
quasi-feudal privileges. These gentlemen are described by 
Bismarck himself, who was one of them and knew the 
breed, as "the most reactionary class in Europe." De- 
voted to king, army, and church, whether Lutheran or 
Catholic, they are the pillars of the autocracy and look 
with bitter contempt upon the ravages of modern indus- 
trialism. Along the Rhine are the provinces secured by 
Prussia during the Napoleonic wars. Here are located 
the great industries which are the glory of modern Germany, 
here social democracy, the eternal enemy of junker priv- 
ilege, has been most formidable and assertive. Then there 
is non-Prussian Germany. In south Germany, which 
joined the empire reluctantly in 1871 (the Prussian spirit 
was distasteful to its more liberal and democratic ideas), 
Prussianization has made considerable progress, for it has 
been found conducive to material prosperity and Catholic 
interests. But in the provinces acquired by Prussia in the 
last century — Posen, populated chiefly by Poles; Schles- 
wig-Holstein, containing a number of irreconcilable Danes; 
and Alsace-Lorraine, with its cherished remembrances of 
the more liberal French rule — a Prussianizing policy has 
egregiously failed, as every such policy must fail which 
sins against the undying facts of national life and character. 
Finally, across the whole empire there looms the shadow 
of the Catholic Church, roused to life by the Bismarckian 
Kulturkampf and indifferent to ordinary political animosi- 
ties, but ever ready for any bargain that will advance her 
interests; with the curious result that for thirty years the 
Protestant government of a Protestant empire has main- 
tained a majority in the Reichstag only with the help of 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 47 

the Centre or Catholic party ! This, too, in spite of Prince 
Billow's argument that Prussia's mission is to preserve 
Germany from socialism and clericalism. 1 

This lack of real unity is at the bottom of the autocratic 
regime imposed upon Germany. "We are not a political 
people," constantly asseverates Prince Bulow of his coun- 
trymen, and it is intelligible that German statesmen, re- 
calling the long centuries of disunion and weakness, should 
be unwilling to test the new-born unity by experiments in 
self-government. Not unnaturally, perhaps, have they 
argued that the age-old centrifugal forces could be obliter- 
ated only by the power, dominion, and majesty of the Prus- 
sian state, and that the transformation could not be speedily 
accomplished. They have yet to learn that self-government 
and national unity go hand in hand, and that sectionalism 
has been perpetuated precisely because the non-Prussian 
regions distrust the Prussianizing policy of the imperial 
government. Thus events move in a vicious circle, the 
slightest manifestation of a provincial spirit being coun- 
tered by the application of more rigorous Prussian methods. 

The treatment of the conquered provinces fearfully illus- 
trates the bankruptcy of Bismarckian and Guilelmian state- 
craft. Until the Iron Chancellor conceived the idea of 
Germanizing the province of Posen by expropriating the 
lands of the Polish inhabitants and forbidding the use of 
the Polish language, the Poles were loyal subjects of Prussia 
who appreciated the blessings of ordered government in 
comparison with the harsh treatment of their brethren in 
Russian Poland. At a cost of $120,000,000 the Prussian 
Government has established 110,000 Germans in the prov- 
ince, but their presence has been useless to the cause of 
Teutonism, and the Poles have become not only martyrs 
to the idea of nationality but actually dominant in eco- 
nomic as well as political affairs. Prince Bulow himself, 

1 Imperial Germany, part 2, chap. 2, "National Views and the Parties." 



48 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

while ardently supporting the official policy, admits that 
it has failed — and can suggest no alternative but more of 
the same diet! 1 

In Alsace-Lorraine inconsistency has been added to stu- 
pidity. In the opinion of the writer, Bismarck was justi- 
fied in demanding the provinces from France in 1871, for, 
if Napoleon III had been victorious in the war, he would 
have extended the French frontier toward the Rhine at 
the expense of Germany. But the official ground for the 
annexation was that the people of Alsace and Lorraine 
were German in descent and feeling, and must therefore 
belong to a united Germany. If so, were they not entitled 
to be treated like other non-Prussian Germans? Like 
the Bavarians, for instance, who, although enemies of 
Prussia in the war of 1866 and unwilling partners in the 
enterprise of 1870, were allowed to retain autonomy and 
the emblems of their historical sovereignty ? But no. The 
Alsatians and Lorrainers, transferred against their will, 
were treated like Frenchmen and subjected to the full force 
of Prussian bureaucratic methods. To their persistent de- 
mand for self-government, which would have reconciled 
them to their new allegiance, no adequate answer was ever 
given, for the constitution of 191 1 preserved the reality of 
power in the hands of the Statthalter, who was appointed 
by the Emperor. If German statesmen had not been so 
unwilling to learn from English experience, a reluctance 
born of their horror of parliamentary government, they 
would have at least conceded to the provinces privileges 
similar to those granted to Quebec in 1774, which have 
kept a population of bigoted French Catholics splendidly 
loyal to the British crown. It is impossible to say whether 
the people of Alsace-Lorraine desired reunion with France, 
but no one will assert that they were satisfied with the 
Prussian regime that culminated in the affair of Zabern. 

1 Ibid., chap. 4, "The Eastern Marches." 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 49 

In the autumn of 1913 an ardent lieutenant of the gar- 
rison reviled the inhabitants of Zabern for their attach- 
ment to France, and when the compliment was returned 
by the populace, he took to shopping under an escort of 
soldiers with fixed bayonets. One day he struck with his 
sabre a lame shoemaker who brushed him in the street. 
An uproar followed, martial law was proclaimed, and the 
colonel of the regiment threatened to "shoot up" the town. 
A man was arrested for laughing, and also several govern- 
ment officials who protested against the supersession of the 
civil authority. The climax was reached when a court 
martial exonerated the officers involved, and formally sus- 
tained the pretensions of the military; while the gallant 
colonel received the Order of the Red Eagle. Moltke, who 
in 187 1 demanded Metz for military reasons, said that the 
provinces might be reconciled in fifty years; after Zabern 
all signs of friendliness disappeared, and the return of 
the Tricolor seems to have been enthusiastically hailed in 
Alsace. 

The supreme test of statesmanship is the ability to gov- 
ern well and to their own satisfaction a helpless and con- 
quered people, and judged by this standard the German 
imperial system has ignominiously failed. To Americans, 
with an ancient heritage of self-government and political 
freedom, it is almost unintelligible why autonomy, which 
breeds loyalty and contentment, should have been denied 
to Prussian Poland and Alsace-Lorraine. But German polit- 
ical philosophy demands formal connection with and con- 
trol by the central government of all phases of the national 
life, and behind this conviction, it must be admitted, there 
lies the peculiar history of Germany, which is in marked 
contrast to the slow and orderly, almost paradoxical, evo- 
lution of England. 

The Norman conquest saved the island state from the 
worst evils of feudalism, and precisely because the English 



SO ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

king during the Middle Ages was able to maintain order 
and to rest his military and financial system on sound 
principles, he could concede to his subjects privileges and 
liberties which the more absolute monarchs of the Continent 
were bound to regard with abhorrence. In the fulness of 
time a Parliament grew up and waxed strong, which was 
the king's most valiant support as long as he respected 
its rights, as was apparent when the brilliant Tudor mon- 
archs of the sixteenth century erected a despotism prac- 
tically with the consent of Parliament. Then, with this 
despotic machinery to hand, the Stuarts endeavored to 
dispense with Parliament altogether, but they found, to 
their sorrow, that the liberties of Englishmen were far 
stronger than any power the crown might secure, and their 
fate we know. Since then the inalienable rights of Parlia- 
ment and people have remained secure against all attacks. 
On the other hand, even in the palmy days of the Holy 
Roman Empire, the Emperor never exercised absolute 
power. Feudalism ran its logical course in Germany, as in 
no other country, for it managed to destroy the effective 
power of the central government, which alone could pro- 
tect the land against oppression and misgovernment by a 
host of princes now responsible to no higher authority. In 
such a system, or the lack of it, there was no place for 
popular rights, so that in 1848 the Frankfort assembly 
had to waste six precious months in elaborating the funda- 
mental rights of the German nation. Not until very re- 
cent times was there in Germany any strong authority 
which could satisfy the needs of the German people. 
When order was finally evolved out of chaos by the will of 
a single state, and Germans were thereby enabled to achieve 
internal peace and material prosperity, it is small wonder 
that they hastened to idealize and deify the state as some- 
thing above themselves, upon whose strength and power 
their own happiness depended. The very failure of the 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 51 

movement of 1848, based as it was on the attempt to in- 
troduce English practises into Germany, and the resound- 
ing triumphs of 1864, 1866, and 1871 compelled a belief 
in power and force and war. And an English scholar ad- 
mits that "only a powerful state could disregard the grum- 
blings of that provincial patriotism which was still so deeply 
rooted in the German character, or could face with equa- 
nimity the international situation created by Bismarck's 
policy of blood and iron." J 

The most vivid expression of the doctrine of power is 
to be found in the writings of Heinrich von Treitschke, 
who from 1874 to 1895 was professor of history in the Uni- 
versity of Berlin. Owing to the profound respect and ap- 
proval with which professorial utterances are received in 
Germany, the occupant of this chair has a unique oppor- 
tunity to obtain a hearing; his position is decidedly more 
inportant than in America is the presidency of Harvard 
or Columbia University. Treitschke was also the editor 
of the Preussische Jahrbucher, which is the German equiva- 
lent of the North American Review. His teachings were not 
less calculated to please because he was by birth a Saxon, 
and in his earlier years, before the wars of unification, 
had been an advocate of liberal institutions. He had, as 
it were, accepted the logic of events, and adjusted his polit- 
ical theories to the new situation. He was, however, no 
toady. Deeply versed in ancient and modern history, he 
tried to formulate his conclusions on the basis of human, 
or rather national, experience. Nor is it always easy to 
refute his argument, as when he says that "the state is 
the public power of offense and defense," 2 that is, it ex- 
ists to administer justice and to make war. At the time 

1 H. W. Carless Davis, The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke, p. 134. 
Though written after the outbreak of the Great War, the book is a fine piece of 
scholarship and treats Treitschke with considerable sympathy. 

2 Mr. Davis's translations have been generally used; occasionally I have bor- 
rowed from A. L. Gowan, Selections from Treitschke's Lectures on Politics, 1014. 



52 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Treitschke wrote, such were the chief and almost the only 
functions of the state. It must also be remembered that 
he did not propose to elaborate a system of politics suitable 
to all peoples under all conditions; he wrote for Germans, 
and he sought to interpret their problems from the German 
point of view. If he was often prejudiced, especially against 
English practises and institutions, he must be given credit 
for entire sincerity and frankness. The extent of his influ- 
ence in contemporary Germany is a matter of dispute. 
In his lifetime he was certainly the most noted apologist 
of the Bismarckian system, his theories found much favor 
with Pan-German writers after his death, and his inter- 
pretation of history was boldly appropriated 'by General 
Friedrich von Bernhardi for his Germany and the Next War; 
his ascendency among German political thinkers was also 
assumed by the late Professor Cramb in his Germany and 
England. But Mr. Sidney Whitman, whose experience of 
Germany goes back fifty years, states that Treitschke's in- 
fluence has been on the wane for some time. 1 The point 
is perhaps immaterial, for his work had been done. He 
preached to the generation which now dominates Germany, 
and the doctrines he popularized have been highly regarded 
since the foundation of the empire. 

The gist of his teaching, as exemplified in the Politik and 
as already suggested, is that the state is power. "Of all 
political sins that of weakness is the most reprehensible 
and the most contemptible; it is in politics the sin against 
the Holy Ghost." All other purposes are subordinate to 
the acquisition of power, which, in plain language, means 
the ability to make war. For without war, which "is the 
only remedy for ailing nations, " as well as the instinct of 
mighty peoples, the state cannot indulge "the craving to 
impress the seal of its nature upon barbaric lands"; nor 
without war will Germany be able to acquire the colonies 

1 " Germany's Obsession," Fortnightly Review, October, 1914. 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 53 

upon which her future depends. Consequently, the mecha- 
nism of the state must be ordered with the view of conduct- 
ing a successful war. That is to say, individual rights, 
except the privilege of independent thought, cannot be 
tolerated, for they may conflict with the highest interests 
of the state, which the individual cannot appreciate. "On 
principle the state does not ask how the people is disposed; 
it demands obedience : its laws must be kept, whether will- 
ingly or unwillingly. It is a step in advance when the 
silent obedience of the citizens becomes an inward, rational 
consent, but this consent is not absolutely necessary." 

"With reference to the best form of state, all that the 
historian can assert without presumption is that, since the 
state is primarily power, the form of state which will take 
the government into its own hands and make itself inde- 
pendent best fulfils the idea." Parliamentary government, 
which he admitted was admirably suited to eighteenth- 
century England, he disliked because the parties indulged 
in a struggle for office; it worked in England only because 
there was no difference of principles between the parties, 
both of which were aristocratic to the core. But in Ger- 
many, where " the kingship is almost the only force of polit- 
ical tradition which unites our present with our past" and 
where parties profess different principles that are irrecon- 
cilable, parliamentary government is ridiculous. The ex- 
istence of the German state demands that any discrepancy 
between king and ministers be promptly reconciled, "how- 
ever inconvenient this may be for the ministers concerned." 
In fine, the idea of popular government is in contradiction 
with the whole imperial system. "We have reason to 
congratulate ourselves that we do possess a vigorous mon- 
archical civil service, which, in virtue of its own services, 
of its social position, and also of the authority of the crown, 
has a real and absolute importance. We have no ground 
whatever for wishing that it should be otherwise." Mon- 



54 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

archy, in short, is the best lorm of government, for Ger- 
many at any rate, because "the will of the state is repre- 
sented by one single individual," whose authority "is not 
transmitted, but rests on its own right." The monarch 
will be supported by the aristocracy, who, Treitschke says, 
must be maintained by the masses. "The masses will 
always remain the masses. There can be no culture with- 
out the masses." They may rind "a certain superficial 
consolation from universal suffrage," but the nobility must 
do the governing, for they, and they alone, possess that 
will to rule which is the first principle of power. 

Such, in brief and very inadequate form, is the philo- 
sophic justification of the German autocratic government, 
which has ever been indifferent to justification. The 
German people, as a whole, have no complaint about its 
working, and the very limited success of parliamentary 
government in countries outside of England does not sug- 
gest that it would be more suitable to Germany where 
every tradition is against it. There is, then, no ground for 
ridiculing or abusing Germans for not trying a system for- 
eign to their history, and probably abhorrent to their char- 
acter, which has always required leadership, direction, 
command for adequate development or assertion. But 
when the cult of power breeds an excessive devotion to 
distasteful ideals, it is necessary to repudiate the premises 
from which such conclusions follow and to express the belief 
that the extension of this system of life and political or- 
ganization beyond the confines of Germany cannot only 
rouse no enthusiasm, but demands our hearty disapproval. 

The second Prussian tradition, militarism and the re- 
ligion of war, which is the concrete expression of the doc- 
trine of power, finds no little justification from a historical 
point of view. The annals of the Hohenzollerns, from their 
purchase of the Electorate of Brandenburg in 141 5 to the 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 55 

proclamation of the new empire at Versailles in 1871, are/ 
synonymous with military prowess : the two black episodes 
of Prussian history should convince even the antimili- 
tarist that military weakness is the prelude to national dis- 
grace and humiliation. In 1806 Napoleon shattered the 
inefficient Prussian army at Jena and proceeded to parti- 
tion the kingdom. In 1850, when Austria had crushed the 
revolutionary movements in her own territories, she de- 
manded that Prussia forego her plans for a German state 
under her direction and consent to the re-establishment of 
the old Confederation of 181 5; and because of her military 
unpreparedness, Prussia was constrained to yield. The 
modern history of Germany may be said to date from this 
incident, for when the vacillating Frederick William IV 
( 1 840-1 861) was succeeded by William I the first task of 
the new monarch was to reform the Prussian army in all 
its details. How Bismarck provided the genius to carry 
through the reform against the wishes of the Diet and 
then used the new army to achieve the unification of Ger- 
many, is a story that need not be told here. But we must 
not ignore the moral. Germany was created by the sword, 
and only the sword, firmly wielded, it was believed, could 
preserve her from the greed and jealousy of the older na- 
tions that resented her sudden and dramatic entry into 
the European family. Ohne Armee kein Deutschland, to 
borrow a saying of Bismarck. 

No reasonable person has ever denied the necessity for 
Germany to maintain a strong army. Unless she was to 
undergo again the horrors of the seventeenth and eigh- 
teenth centuries, when her fair provinces were overrun by 
armies from every country in Europe, and her people suf- 
fered untold miseries, she must be a match for any probable 
combination of enemies. Also it was well recognized that, 
faced as she was on her western frontier by her hereditary 
enemy (even the Kaiser spoke of France as the Erbfeind), 



56 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

and on the east by a Power possessing inexhaustible re- 
sources of men, that might and did ally itself with France, 
Germany was entitled to be strong, to be prepared for 
any eventuality, to be even "touchy" on the matter of 
other nations' armaments. In addition, universal mili- 
tary service has been an important factor of internal 
policy. Two years of barrack and camp life, after the 
strenuous thoroughness of the schooling period, mean much 
for the physical health and strength of the German peo- 
ple; there is also generated a sense of discipline and a 
regard for authority which is quite necessary for both 
government and governed if the existing political institu- 
tions are to be maintained or the German character to 
remain what it is. Like many other aspects of German life 
which are foreign to American ways of thinking, the Ger- 
man army finds no little justification in the light of German 
history and German problems. 

But Prussian ascendency in Germany has been respon- 
sible for foisting upon the country two unnecessary develop- 
ments of the doctrine of conscription: the reckless and in- 
human increase of armaments, which Germany's neighbors 
have been compelled to emulate ; and the deliberate exalta- 
tion of the military spirit, which has not unnaturally made 
other nations of Europe suspicious of her intentions. 

It may be admitted that the first steps in the heaping up 
of colossal armaments were taken by France. The German 
imperial constitution provides that the army on its peace 
footing shall represent one per cent of the population, and 
as long as Bismarck remained at the helm of state this pro- 
portion was not exceeded. Starting at 401,000 in 1871, 
the army was raised to 427,000 in 1881, and to 468,000 in 
1887. France, however, had gone beyond this, especially 
in the Boulanger law of 1886, which gave her an army of 
above 500,000, although her population was less than 38,- 
000,000. In fairness to Germany let it not be overlooked 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 57 

that she has never kept as large a proportion of her people 
with the colors as has France, and Germans have not un- 
naturally argued that France must be preparing for a war to 
recover the lost provinces. As the French military attache 
wrote in March, 1913: "Moderate persons, military and 
civil, glibly voice the opinion that France, with her 40,- 
000,000 inhabitants, has no right to compete with Germany 
in this way." * To which it may surely be retorted that 
Germany ought not to consider herself in the running with 
Russia ! 

The expansion of the German army is chiefly the work 
of William II. The half -million mark was passed in 1893, 
and further increases in 1899, 1905, and 191 1 merely pre- 
served the constitutional ratio of one per cent between 
army and population. But the law of 1893 reduced the 
term of service from three to two years, thereby increasing 
the number of trained men nearly fifty per cent. Twelve 
years later France followed the example of Germany, and 
by abolishing all exemptions and privileges was able to 
create a peace army of 567,000, including 28,000 colonial 
troops stationed in France. Even this left her behind Ger- 
many by more than 50,000. Indeed, it was this disparity 
in troops, threatening each year to become more marked 
by reason of her stationary population, that led the Republic 
to conclude the alliance with Russia, which has been its 
overwhelming offense against Germany. But France could 
scarcely do otherwise. She believed that the war of 1870 
had been forced upon her by the malevolent intrigues of 
Bismarck; she was convinced that in 1875, and again in 
1887, she would have been the victim of an unprovoked 
attack had not the Tsar interfered to restrain the military 
party in Berlin. On the other hand, the conclusion of the 
alliance gave Germany an excuse for increasing her own 
forces indefinitely. 

1 Yellow Book, no. 1, enclosure 1. 



58 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

This was delayed for some years, for huge sums were 
lavished on the fleet, but after her diplomacy had failed 
in 191 1 to solve the Moroccan imbroglio satisfactorily to 
herself Germany frankly abandoned the old ratio of one 
per cent. To the statement of the Prussian minister for 
war, in 191 1, that "there was no government which either 
desired or was seeking to bring about a war with Germany," 
was opposed the chancellor's remark that "Germany was 
firmly resolved not to be pushed aside." The population 
stood at approximately 66,000,000; the army was, by the 
law of 1912, raised to 723,000. In addition, the machinery 
of mobilization was improved by raising ten corps on the 
frontier almost to their war footing and by creating an 
additional number of reserve officers; likewise various 
technical improvements, which by the law of 191 1 were to 
be spread over a period of five years, were to be completed 
at once. The military budget, which in 1905 stood at 
698,000,000 marks, was raised to 945,000,000, an increase 
of 129,000,000 over that of 1911. 

But these measures were nothing compared with the 
herculean effort of 1913, when, according to the chancellor, 
"the events taking place in the Balkans had changed the 
balance of power in Europe." By this, the last army law 
before the Great War, the peace strength of the German 
army was fixed at 870,000 men. The cost of this colossal 
addition was met by increased taxation for the recurring 
expenditure (over £9,000,000 a year), and for the non- 
recurring expenditure by an extraordinary property levy, 
estimated at £26,100,000. Unquestionably the collapse 
of the Turkish power before the onward rush of the young 
Balkan states had deprived Germany of a potential ally 
in a general European war, and the aggrandizement of 
Serbia increased considerably the difficulties in the way of 
an Austrian forward movement in the Balkans, so that, if 
the Triple Alliance were at war with Russia, the bulk of the 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 59 

fighting would indubitably fall upon Germany. From this 
point of view and on the assumption that Germany, con- 
trary to the advice of Bismarck, would make Austria's 
Balkan policy her own, a general strengthening of the army 
was imperiously necessary. But when the Cologne Gazette, 
without the slightest provocation, declared on 10 March, 

1 9 13, that "never has the relationship to our western 
neighbor been so strained as to-day, never has the idea of 
revenge been exhibited there so nakedly, and . . . that 
it is perfectly certain Germany will have to cross swords 
with France," the rest of Europe doubted whether the 
latest army measures were really directed against Russia, 
and could assert in good conscience that Germany, and 
Germany alone, was responsible for the burden of arma- 
ments. 

It was inevitable that the other European countries 
should follow her example. France returned to the rule 
of three years' service, at a cost of £20,000,000, the bill 
being passed on 16 July, seventeen days after the German 
measure. Belgium introduced universal military service, 
which promised to give her an army of above 300,000 men 
in the course of several years. In Russia the term of 
service was lengthened to three and a quarter years, and 
some £15,000,000 provided for emergency expenditure in 

1914. Great Britain alone of the Entente Powers, who 
were supposedly hostile to Germany, made no change in 
her military establishment. The proof, then, is absolute 
that in the last phase of the armament curse, "the white 
man's burden," the pace was set by Germany, and "it is 
difficult to believe that some startling coup was not even 
then being planned by the military party." x 

This suggestion is thoroughly justified by the popularity 
in modern German thought of the religion of war. The 
bible of this doctrine is, of course, General Friedrich von 

1 Why We Are at War, by members of the Oxford School of Modern History, p. 46. 



60 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Bernhardi's Germany and the Next War, and, although the 
book has been widely read, a brief analysis seems called 
for. Germany, the general argues, can acquire that 
"place in the sun" which is her due only by a war of aggres- 
sion, because the Powers of the Triple Entente — Russia, 
France, and England — , each and all endowed with vast 
possessions which they cannot adequately use, surround her 
with a ring of iron; yet to avoid the appearance of aggres- 
sion she must "initiate an active policy which, without 
attacking France, will so prejudice her interests or those of 
England that both these states will feel compelled to attack" 
her. • There is also a labored analysis of war as a " biological 
necessity"; "the maintenance of peace never has been, and 
never can be, the goal of a policy." Equally striking, per- 
haps, is the remark about the "dangerous agitation" of 
social democracy: "A war may be forced upon a statesman 
by the condition of home affairs." When the war comes, 
and we are told that an Anglo-German war is "inevitable," 
it is to be waged ruthlessly, "frightfully," with the object 
of destroying the balance in Europe and without regard 
to treaties or vested rights — 'the neutrality of Belgium is 
only "a paper bulwark"; "in this war we must conquer, 
or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to be defeated, for it 
will decide whether we can attain a position as a world 
Power by the side of, and in spite of, England." From first 
to last the argument is directed against England. Thus, 
"we must square our account with France if we wish for a 
free hand in our international policy." It is a small mat- 
ter that such a consummation could not be reached without 
the crushing of Russia as well, for the general, like all Ger- 
mans, has a poor opinion of Russia's capacity for war, and 
he does not believe that "Russia would now be inclined to 
make an armed demonstration in favor of France." Eng- 
land, he admits, will make a hard fight, but her colonies 
will revolt, the Turks will attack Egypt, and her relations 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 6 1 

with America will increase the difficulties of her situation. 
Germany, therefore, needs but to increase her navy until 
it can cope with the armada of England and victory will 
be sure. "English attempts at a rapprochement must not 
blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use 
them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we 
may fairly imagine that we have some prospect of success." 
Such is the monstrous theory which seems primarily re- 
sponsible for the present war. It is necessary to point out 
that the cult of militarism is an old story in Germany, or 
at least in Prussia. In 1836 Clausewitz, a Prussian general 
who fought against Napoleon and whose book on War is 
the basis of scientific study of the subject, laid down the 
doctrine that war is "the continuation of policy by other 
means," a doctrine the successful application of which in 
the unification of Germany not unnaturally commended it 
to the governing classes of the next generation. Even the 
great Bismarck was aware that militarist influence might 
escape the bounds which his personality and character im- 
posed upon it. Discussing the question whether diplomacy 
can ever be justified in deliberately causing war, he says, 
in his Reflections and Reminiscences: 

"I have always opposed the theory which says 'yes'; not only 
at the Luxemburg period, but likewise subsequently for twenty 
years, in the conviction that even victorious wars cannot be justi- 
fied unless they are forced upon one, and that one cannot see the 
cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical de- 
velopment according to one's own calculation. It is natural that 
in the staff of the army not only the younger active officers, but 
likewise experienced strategists, should feel the need of turning to 
account the efficiency of the troops led by them and their own ca- 
pacity to lead, and of making them prominent in history. It would 
be a matter of regret if this spirit of the spirit did not exist in the 
army; the task of keeping its result within such limits as the nation's 
need of peace can justly claim is the duty of the political, not the mili- 
tary, heads of the state. That at the time of the Luxemburg question, 
during the crisis of 1875, invented by Gortchakoff and France, and 



62 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

even down to the most recent times, the staff and its leaders have 
allowed themselves to be led astray and to endanger peace, lies in 
the very spirit of the institution, which I would not forego. It only 
becomes dangerous under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of pro- 
portion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally unjustifi- 
able influences." i 

The reference to the present Emperor is obvious (the 
Reflections and Reminiscences were written after Bismarck's 
dismissal in 1890), but William II has from the beginning 
of his reign flattered, caressed, and exalted the military- 
spirit. His first act, after his accession, was to issue a 
proclamation to his army, not to his people as his father 
Frederick III had done, and he has seized every occa- 
sion since then to preach from the same text. True, his 
speeches abound in phrases proclaiming his love of peace, 
but there is always the implication that peace rests upon 
the strength of the German army, which is ready for in- 
stant use if the interests of the fatherland are in question. 

In no other country but Germany could seven thousand 
books dealing with war have been published in the ten 
years preceding the great conflict: General von Bernhardi 
is simply the ablest, the most scholarly, and the most sin- 
cere exponent of the militarist thesis. We in America re- 
main convinced, despite the denials of German apologists, 
that he reflected the sentiments of his countrymen; as the 
late Price Collier put it: "It is a commentary upon the 
three countries that in Germany the soldier receives a re- 
duced rate when travelling, in England the golfer pays a 
reduced rate, and in America, until lately, the politicians 
were given free passes." * The fact that the operations of 
the German army and the German navy in the war have 
followed so closely the strategy outlined by General von 
Bernhardi raises the suspicion that official inspiration had 
something to do with its writing. 

1 Vol. II, pp. 101-2. 2 Germany and the Germans, p. 441. 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 63 

Germany and the Next War appeared in the spring of 
191 2, or some six months after the last Moroccan crisis, 
in which Germany was badly worsted. That defeat was 
universally attributed, and properly, to the intervention 
of Great Britain. General von Bernhardi takes up the 
challenge in true Prussian fashion, at the very time when 
Norman Angell, in The Great Illusion, was insisting on the 
uselessness and improbability of war. It is surely sympto- 
matic that the general's book could be written, and, if it 
did not commend itself to the "general reader" until a 
few months ago, it was thoroughly digested and reviewed 
in the leading journals of France and Great Britain, where 
it was accepted as a semiofficial statement of German 
policy. It was promptly translated into English at least. 
Even so, it was difficult for Englishmen to take its out- 
pourings seriously. 

"If General Bernhardi would come to this country," wrote Lord 
Esher to the Times, "and move among the best elements of our 
people, among our university students, among our workers in great 
cities, and among our peaceful agricultural population, it would 
amaze him not to find a single soul, unless it be here and there a 
lover of paradox, that could be got to understand his point of view. 
. . . For those of us who hope always to see Germans and French 
stand shoulder to shoulder with our own people in the van of 
enlightened thought, it is piteous to see a German writer, so dis- 
tinguished in the technical field of military strategy and tactics, 
plunging so forlornly into a quagmire of international politics and 
ethics, created, let us hope, by himself." J 

One is indeed reluctant to believe that any considerable 
or influential section of a nation, especially if that nation 
be distinguished for its industrial and commercial enter- 
prise, and fond of asserting that its civilization is not only 
the glory of this age but the promise of generations to come, 
can have gone so completely war-mad. Nevertheless, am- 

1 Weekly edition, 5 April, igi2. 



64 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

pie corroboration of such a melancholy temper may be 
found in a report on German public opinion prepared by 
French diplomatic agents in Germany and printed in the 
French Yellow Book. The document is not above suspi- 
cion, for, dated 30 July, 1913, it contains a reference to 
Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, the German foreign secretary 
who died in the last days of 191 2. But the materials on 
which the report is based may have been collected before 
the latter date; there is certainly no analysis of German 
sentiment with respect to the Balkan Wars of 191 2-13, 
which were universally regarded as a decisive set-back for 
German policy. That the testimony of the French report 
was not a figment of the imagination may be seen from 
the interview with "An Ambassador" published by the 
Berlin Lokal Anzeiger in the spring of 1914. According to 
this anonymous personage, supposedly Sir W. E. Goschen, 
then British ambassador in Berlin: 

"Jingoism has made indisputable progress in the German popu- 
lation. I am convinced that there exists among the German peo- 
ple a latent jingoism which is much more dangerous than that of 
England, Russia, or France. German jingoism recruits its partisans 
from the highest classes of the nation — nobility, clergy, army and 
navy, university and gymnasium professors and students, and the 
entire scholastic world. . . . Everywhere among the cultivated 
classes it is made a dogma that the German Empire does not take 
its proper part in world politics. Everywhere the great organs of 
public opinion spread the dangerous and irritating doctrine that 
German prestige is going down. And so patriots clamor for ac- 
tion." 1 

It therefore seems fair to cite the French report in this 
connection. 

"German public opinion," it says, "is divided into two currents 
on the question of the possibility and proximity of war. There are 
in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganized 

1 Nation (New York), 9 July, 1914, "Foreign Correspondence." 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 65 

and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be 
a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian 
domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor-plate would 
get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Eng- 
land. The forces consist of the following elements: the bulk of 
the workmen, artisans, and peasants . . . those members of the 
nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business 
. . . numerous manufacturers, merchants, and financiers in a mod- 
erate way of business . . . Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine 
and Schleswig-Holstein . . . finally, the governments and all the 
governing classes in all the large southern states — Saxony, Bavaria, 
Wiirtemberg, and the grand duchy of Baden. . . . These sup- 
porters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not 
see any other solution for the present situation. 

"People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The 
expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea 
that Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as 
it is said of France that it is the country where the civil power is 
supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of 
attention than this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger 
more evident and more recent. There is a war party, with leaders 
and followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the pur- 
pose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and for- 
midable for the intimidation of the government. It goes to work 
in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a deter- 
mination that is at once thrilling and fixed. 

"Those in favor of war are divided into several categories. . . . 
Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it 
is inevitable. . . . Others regard war as necessary for economic 
reasons based on overpopulation, overproduction, the need for 
markets and outlets; or for social reasons, i. e., to provide the out- 
side interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of 
the democratic and socialist masses. Others, uneasy for the safety 
of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, 
think that events should be brought to an immediate head. . . . 
Others are bellicose from 'Bismarckism,' as it may be termed. . . . 

"War alone can prolong the prestige of the aristocracy and sup- 
port its family interest. The higher bourgeoisie, represented by 
the National Liberal party, the party of the contented spirits, have 
not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With few 
exceptions, however, they are bellicose. . . . Amongst the 'Bis- 
marckians' must be reckoned officials of all kinds. . . . They find 



66 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

disciples and political sympathizers in the various groups of young 
men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public 
schools and the universities," which, "if we except a few distin- 
guished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. . . . Historians, 
philosophers, political pamphleteers, and other apologists of Ger- 
man Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and 
feeling specifically German. . . . We come finally to those whose 
support of the war policy is inspired by rancor and resentment. 
These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among 
diplomatists." x 

The most conclusive proof of this bellicose temper was 
vouchsafed in the fateful days of July, 1914. Early in the 
month the German press vigorously demanded the severe 
punishment of Serbia for the murders at Sarajevo. When 
the Austrian ultimatum was presented, satisfaction was 
universally expressed, and after war had been declared upon 
Serbia by the Dual Monarchy there was general rejoicing 
throughout Germany that at last the hated little nation 
which blocked the designs of both Germany and Austria 
was to be brought to book. Finally, the Kaiser's ultima- 
tum to Russia, followed promptly by the declaration of 
war, was the most popular act of his reign, if one may 
judge from the excitement of the Berlin street crowds and 
the truculent tone of the press. The hysteria of both Ber- 
lin and Vienna stands out boldly against the calm of Paris 
and London; in St. Petersburg there was dignified enthu- 
siasm, splendid determination, but no delirious outburst, 
no thanksgiving that "the day" had come. We do not 
hear that either press or populace in Germany regarded 
the failure of the negotiations as an unspeakable calamity. 
Not less than the French in 1870 did the nation enter upon 
war "with a light heart," for, until Great Britain plunged 
into the conflict, few doubted that the carefully prepared 
plan of the general staff would make the war a short one 
and that the profits would make the game worth the 
expense. 

1 Yellow Book, no. 5. 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 67 

No account of modern Germany would be complete 
without some reference, even at the risk of being hackneyed, 
to the Emperor William II. That redoubtable monarch 
is the most enigmatic individual of our time. Restless in 
his physical make-up, endowed by nature with an active 
mind and a picturesque imagination, possessed of a tena- 
cious memory, and imbued with boundless self-confidence, 
he combines an ardent belief in mediaeval political doc- 
trines with an enthusiastic devotion to every phase of 
modern life. There would seem to be no branch of human 
knowledge or activity in which he has not participated or 
indulged an inordinate love of speechifying. Thus, in ad- 
dition to the ordinary vocations of an emperor and king, 
he has shown an intense interest in the development of 
German commerce, preached stirring sermons on land and 
sea, criticised severely the national educational system, 
and attempted to dictate styles of architecture. He has 
designed yachts for the Kiel regatta, which he himself in- 
spired, directed* productions in the royal opera-house, con- 
ducted an orchestra, composed music, painted pictures, 
and discussed archaeology with learned professors. Till the 
outbreak of the war the world was alternately alarmed and 
amused by the vagaries of the royal arbiter. Outside of 
Germany he was often regarded as a dilettante, but thou- 
sands of his subjects looked upon him as a genius who 
united in his own person the myriad talents of the German 
nation. This many-sided activity was partly explained 
by a feverish desire to lead the German people to great 
things and to impress them, if that were necessary, with 
the sense of their greatness; with it was coupled a deep- 
seated sense of responsibility and a personal charm that 
was universally admitted. 

On the other hand, William II is the greatest living cham- 
pion of reaction and militarism. Of the extent to which 
his people have been infected by the latter disease enough 
has already been said: the Emperor is more responsible 



68 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

for this than any other single person or circumstance, 
having for twenty-six years, by both speech and deed, 
labored to make the army the most important institution 
of the national life. His political philosophy is summed up 
in an unswerving allegiance to the divine right of kings, 
flaunted in innumerable speeches and practised at every 
turn. Thus, in 1890 he declared that "it is a tradition in 
our house to consider ourselves as designed by God to 
govern the people over whom it is given us to reign." In 
August, 1 9 10, after a long period of comparative silence, 
he used these words at Konigsberg: "Here my grandfather, 
by his own right hand, placed on his head the royal crown 
of Prussia, once more declaring with emphasis that it was 
bestowed upon him by God's grace alone, and not by par- 
liaments, national assemblies, or the popular voice; so that 
he regarded himself as the chosen instrument of Heaven, 
and as such he performed his duties as ruler. . . . Look- 
ing upon myself as the instrument of the Lord, regardless 
of the views and opinions of the hour, I shall go my way." 
The imperial views were admirably summarized by the 
reactionary professor who enumerated Pobel, Presse, und 
Parlamentismus as the three evils which must be extermi- 
nated from the life of Germany by the vehement assertion 
of the monarchical power. 

On a par with these antiquated beliefs, which reveal 
some of the Hohenzollerns in a sorry light, and which even 
Thomas Hobbes, the great apologist of monarchy, did not 
care to defend, has been William's intolerance of opposi- 
tion. His most famous utterance, perhaps, is: "There is 
but one master in this country — it is I, and I will bear no 
other." He has proclaimed that "an opposition of the 
Prussian nobility to their king is a monstrosity," and trans- 
formed the old Latin adage into Voluntas regis suprema lex. 
He has been his own prime minister, reducing his chan- 
cellors to the position of clerks and getting rid of each, 



THE GERMAN EMPIRE 69 

from Bismarck to Biilow, at the least sign of insubordina- 
tion, and he has persecuted to the limit of the law all who 
dared to criticise him or offer unwelcome advice. Much 
might also be made of his unusual ability, as a Protestant 
monarch, to rule his empire with the help of the Catholic 
(Centre) party and to cultivate an advantageous friend- 
ship with the Caliph of Islam; or his vacillations might be 
examined, for his policy has been now threatening, now 
pacific, in both tone and action. But William II must re- 
main an enigma for yet a long time to come; indeed, it 
may well be doubted whether he has always known his own 
mind or thought out the problems he set himself to solve. 
It is highly characteristic that his exact measure of respon- 
sibility for the war is not yet determined. Had he planned 
with the Archduke Francis Ferdinand to resume a vigor- 
ous German- Austrian policy in the Balkans, or was he, 
when he returned from Norway late in July, overborne by 
the military party which thought its chance had come? 

In any case William II is the embodiment of his people 
in their inconsistencies, their idealism, their will to power, 
and their utter inability to see any point of view not en- 
tirely their own, or to grasp the psychology of a situation. 
What is the world to think when it is told in the German 
White Book that Russia is responsible for the war, and that 
"shoulder to shoulder with England we labored inces- 
santly" in the cause of peace; while the chancellor before 
the Reichstag accuses Great Britain of having precipitated 
the great struggle in order to preserve the balance of power ? 
This lack of consistency, this confusion of thought is ap- 
parent in every phase of German life, from court and official 
circles to the socialists who are not socialists, and this 
chapter may well conclude with the sentence quoted at 
its beginning: "The new German Empire is the most per- 
plexing quantity in the modern world, and as unavoidable 
as it is perplexing." 



CHAPTER IV 
GERMAN EXPANSION 

Undoubtedly that feature of modern Germany which 
has commanded popular attention is her rise to the second 
position among the industrial and commercial nations of 
the world, and the promise that she would one day over- 
come the traditional supremacy of Great Britain. Yet 
there is nothing remarkable about this. Taking the coun- 
try as a whole, the Germans were probably the most suc- 
cessful business people of the Middle Ages. Their prac- 
tical genius found an outlet in the Hanseatic League of 
north Germany, which controlled the commerce of the 
Baltic and North Seas and exercised enormous political 
power in northern Europe. Along the Rhine and in south 
Germany cities like Cologne, Augsburg, and Nuremberg, 
located as they were on the trade routes between Italy 
and the north, throve splendidly. Not even the collapse 
of the mediaeval empire and the subsequent growth of 
disorder could destroy the foundations of German pros- 
perity, and at the opening of the sixteenth century, in the 
height of the Renaissance, the cities of Germany were 
famous for their comfort, wealth, and culture. Unfortu- 
nately, the failure of German rulers to create a strong na- 
tional state, coupled with that schism in religion which 
ultimately led to the devastating Thirty Years' War, left 
the land a prey to foreign ambitions and local jealousies; 
so that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was 
the shuttlecock of diplomacy and the battle-ground of 
foreign armies, while frontier provinces which it could not 
defend were left open to foreign aggression. No wonder 

70 



GERMAN EXPANSION 71 

that its population fell below that of France, that its eco- 
nomic effort was pitiful compared with the marvellous out- 
burst of English energy associated with the industrial revo- 
lution, or that no colonies were secured at a time when 
the maritime nations were appropriating desirable lands 
all over the globe. 

Yet the heart of the nation remained sound. At the 
end of the eighteenth century the reforming zeal of Fred- 
erick the Great and some of the lesser princes promised well, 
the romantic movement indicated that a new spirit was 
awake, and, curiously enough, the cataclysmic wars of the 
French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire actually ad- 
vanced the clock of civilization. Not only were the three- 
hundred-odd states of Germany reduced to a tenth of their 
number; after the catastrophe of Jena in 1806, which placed 
Prussia and Germany at the feet of Napoleon, the Prus- 
sian Government set an inspiring example to the smaller 
states by abolishing serfdom and sweeping away the ves- 
tiges of mediaeval restrictions and privileges. Nor were the 
lesser governments loath to act upon its advice, and by 
1850 both agriculture and industry were free throughout 
Germany. The Zollverein, or customs union, founded by 
Prussia in 1828, and gradually extended until it included 
all the German states except Austria, laid the foundations 
of a new economic life which possessed boundless possi- 
bilities under a national government able to concern itself 
with the problems of the country as a whole. When unity 
was accomplished in 187 1, Germany responded to the call 
of the shop and the factory with the enthusiasm that char- 
acterized her undertakings in the centuries when she was 
the dominant Power in Europe. It would, indeed, have 
been ridiculous if a nation which had fought its way to 
the political hegemony of the Continent and whose educa- 
tional system was the envy of other lands had not proved, 
its ability in the economic sphere as well. 



72 



ENGLAND AND GERMANY 



Furthermore, Germany had to catch up with countries 
like England and France, which had achieved their national 
unity centuries before, were thoroughly industrialized, and 
had long dominated the markets of the world. Germany 
could meet their competition only by hard work and sci- 
entific endeavor. So, while rendering all honor and praise 
to the thoroughness of her business methods and the sus- 
tained enthusiasm of all classes for the national cause, let 
us remember that, in the light of her history and in the 
face of existing conditions, Germany was bound to make a 
tremendous effort, and her astonishing success has not un- 
naturally persuaded many neutral observers, not to men- 
tion the Germans themselves, that the-Allies now ranged 
against her are actuated chiefly by motives of commercial 
jealousy. 

The prodigious character of Germany's economic en- 
terprise may be grasped from the following brief table — 
187 1 marks the first year of the new Empire, 1888 the acces- 
sion of the present Emperor, 1900 the year in which the ten- 
sion with England first attracted general notice, and 19 13 
the last for which complete figures are available. 





1871 


1888 


1900 


19 13 


Population 


4i,o6o,7g2 


48,693,836 


56,367,178 


66,505,825 


Savings 










deposits. . 






M. 8,800,000,000 


*i7,8oo,ooo,ooo 


Railways.. . 


6,549 miles 


24,036 


3i»i73 


*38,426 


Revenue. . . 


M. t59°,726,30o 


1,225,926,000 


2,025,770,000 


3,696,033,200 


Imports.. . . 


M. 3,464,600,000 


3,429,400,000 


6,043,000,000 


10,695,000,000 


Exports 


M. 2,465,200,000 


3,356,400,000 


4,752,600,000 


9,912,600,000 


Shipping. . . 


982,355 tons 


1,240,182 


1,737,798 


3,153,724 



* Figures for ion. 



t Figures for 1872. 



The measure of this advance may be gauged from the fact 
that in less than half a century Germany has risen to second 
place in the struggle for economic supremacy. In 1913 



GERMAN EXPANSION 73 

the national wealth was estimated at 300,000,000,000 marks, 
the income at 40,000,000,000 marks, figures which are ex- 
ceeded only by those of the United Kingdom. 

Thus the early years of the twentieth century saw Ger- 
many well advanced along that road to economic supremacy 
which she believed to be her goal, and probably most Ger- 
mans anticipated such a realization within the next ten 
or fifteen years. But about one condition of that tri- 
umph, the most essential condition, in fact, they were en- 
titled to be anxious. They were well aware that the pop- 
ulation of the fatherland had increased faster than its 
capacity for food production, an actual demonstration of 
the Malthusian principle, if the ability to purchase food 
abroad is not considered. In the last decade of the nine- 
teenth century the average increase of population ex- 
ceeded half a million yearly, more recently was above 
800,000. Yet even this was not sufficient: for some years 
before the Great War it was necessary to bring in some 
750,000 casual laborers annually from Russia, Poland, and 
Italy to harvest the magnificent crops of the eastern prov- 
inces. Emigration, which in 1880 amounted to 200,000 a 
year, dwindled to 20,000 after 1900, and of that number 
comparatively few were dissatisfied with the conditions of 
life they left behind. A competent authority estimated 
that, given normal conditions, there would be, in 1925, 
80,000,000 people living within the boundaries of the 
German Empire. On the other hand, and this is the 
governing fact, 50,000,000 represented the maximum for 
which food could be grown within the same area. 1 But 
it was open to doubt if the land would receive such 
intensive cultivation, for the proportion of the people 
engaged in agriculture had both relatively and absolutely 
declined since 1871, as is evident from the following 
table : 

1 Paul Rohrbach, Deutsckland unter den Wcltvolkern, igi2, p. 17. 



74 



ENGLAND AND GERMANY 





Population 


Agricultural 


Percentage 


1882 

1895 

1907 


45,222,113 

51,770,284 
61,591,367 


19,225,500 
18,501,300 
17,681,200 


42 

35-6 

28.5 



Indeed, without the stimulus of a protective tariff on agri- 
culture, which the war would seem to have justified from 
a national as opposed to the consumer's interest, Germany 
would have been almost in the position of Great Britain, 
which practically depends on the produce of other nations. 
As it was, Germany ceased to be self-subsistent after 1883; 
in 1900 food imports amounted to 29 per cent of the total 
imports, and in 191 2 to 30 per cent. 

To pay for these foreign food supplies, two courses were 
open to Germany. She might pay cash or she might ex- 
port in exchange native raw materials and manufactured 
articles. The first could take the form of investments 
abroad or the interest thereon, or be discharged by the 
services of German shipping. In both of these respects 
Germany had just cause to be proud of her achievements. 
The amount of capital invested abroad has been esti- 
mated at some 20,000,000,000 marks, the interest on which 
amounts to 1,000,000,000 marks. 1 The profits of the mer- 
chant marine amounted to more than 250,000,000 marks 
in 1899. 2 But, when all was said, exports had to constitute 
the bulk of the payments, and this would be increasingly 
true in years to come. 

Now, next to cheap labor, the necessary condition of 
successful manufacturing is an adequate supply of cheap 
raw materials, and, unfortunately for Germany, she is less 



1 Dr. Karl Helfferich, Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth, 1888- 
1913, p. 113, an English edition, issued by the Germanistic Society of Americajof 
Deutschlands Volkswohlstand, 1888-1913. 

2 Henri Lichtenberger, Germany and Its Evolution in Modern Times, p. 46. 



GERMAN EXPANSION 75 

well endowed with natural resources than any of the Great 
Powers. She lacks in precious metals, the supply of coal 
and iron is limited, there is no native production of cotton 
or silk. In other words, Germany has to import practically 
all the materials consumed by the throbbing factories of 
Saxony and the Rhineland, copper, woods of various sorts, 
rubber, oils, and a large part of the minerals. Without a 
steady and sure supply of these and other stuffs her in- 
dustries cannot live. Furthermore, it is essential that the 
finished articles shall find ready markets in foreign lands. 
Germany, in short, has become a replica of the United 
Kingdom, a nation living by its foreign commerce; let this 
cease, and she "would be the victim of a crisis compared 
with which the crisis in English industry when the American 
Civil War deprived its spindles of cotton would seem a 
child's play." 1 

Observing that Great Britain's commerce was most 
highly developed with her colonies, and that the proportion 
of this colonial commerce with respect to the total volume 
of British trade was steadily increasing, Germans not un- 
naturally argued that their commercial future depended 
upon the possession of large and flourishing colonies. The 
late German ambassador to the United States, Baron 
Speck von Sternberg, might declare that "Germany needs 
no colonies: what she wants is merely free co-operation 
on all seas, the open door, and the right to co-operate 
freely on an equal footing with all other commercial and 
industrial nations, in opening up and developing yet un- 
opened districts and markets." 2 But the voluminous lit- 
erature of the expansionist idea, the trend of official policy, 
and the increase of the navy warrant the belief that such 
statements were intended to dispel American suspicions 

'Paul Rohrbach, "L'Evolution de l'AUemagne comme puissance mondiale," 
Revue Politique Internationale, July, 1914, p. 26. 
2 "The Truth about German Expansion," North American Review, March, 1908, 

P- 322- 



76 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

and did not in any way represent the attitude of the Ger- 
man Government. The imperial chancellor's famous bid 
for British neutrality on the eve of the war---the promise 
to take only the French colonies in case of a German vic- 
tory — revealed unblushingly the true purpose of German 
policy; as an English writer quite sympathetic with Ger- 
man ambitions remarked a few years ago: "Behind the 
colonial movement, as it has been reawakened and rein- 
spired during the past few years, lies a virtually united 
nation," 1 without distinction of party, from Conservative 
to Social Democrat. To such a people, who considered the 
lack of colonies the one defect in an otherwise perfect civili- 
zation, the teaching of Norman Angell, as set forth in The 
Great Illusion, that the political ownership of colonies does 
not in any way affect the wealth of the possessing country, 
was a voice crying in the wilderness. 

As a matter of fact, the colonial question is not so sim- 
ple and unprofitable as Mr. Angell would have us believe. 
All governments do not follow the English — and the Ger- 
man — practise of treating all nations equally in the matter 
of colonial trade. The French allow differential tariffs to 
their nationals throughout their extensive colonial domin- 
ions; the Japanese have been accused of similar sharpness 
in Manchuria, despite their treaty obligations to maintain 
the open door; and the Russians have always managed to 
keep their Asiatic possessions more or less as their own pre- 
serve. In the self-governing colonies of the British Empire 
preferential rates are imposed upon imports from the 
mother country, and since 1896 there has been much talk 
of an imperial customs union which would make England's 
astonishing aggregation of lands and peoples a self-sufhcing 
economic entity. The fact that the trade of Germany 
with British, French, and Russian colonies is of modest 
volume has not deterred Germans from asking: What is 

1 W. H. Dawson, The Evolution of Modern Germany, p. 398. 



GERMAN EXPANSION 77 

to prevent any of these countries, in a moment of jealousy 
or blindness, from taking measures which would exclude 
German commerce altogether? And Germany does im- 
port a considerable share of her raw materials from British 
and French colonies. It is also true that the commerce 
of Germany with her own colonies is ridiculously small, 
considering the large sums that she has sunk in their devel- 
opment; indeed, the total amount, both imports and ex- 
ports, represents less than one-half of the trade of those 
colonies, which in iqio was valued at £17,387,000. In the 
same year Great Britain did business with her colonies to 
the extent of £329,853,099, and France, whose foreign com- 
merce is far behind Germany's, carried on a colonial trade 
of £21,043,000. Is it any wonder that Germany believed 
overseas possessions to be both valuable and necessary, 
and declined to admit that, because she had made no great 
success of the colonies she did possess, she was. doomed to 
similar failure if she were given a wider opportunity under 
more favorable conditions? 

Patriotic Germans were willing to admit that, as matters 
stood in the business world, they were doing very well, 
but they doubted whether, a hundred years hence, when 
the vast dominions of Great Britain, France, and Russia, 
not to speak of the United States, had been adequately 
developed, the position of the fatherland would be secure: 
even if in old Europe she should completely outdistance 
her present rivals, they, by virtue of their far-flung empires, 
would wield political power far superior to her own. Also, 
without adequate colonies, Germany would be unable to 
spread her culture throughout the world and found daugh- 
ter nations who should rise up and call her blessed, after 
the way of the English, whose imperial record it was de- 
sired to emulate and surpass. Thus the maintenance of 
peace, however much it might add to Germany's pros- 
perity in the immediate future, must in the end tell against 



78 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

her, unless, which was not likely, her rivals were disposed 
to surrender to her some of the lands won by long years 
of persistent effort and enterprise. 

Germany had, indeed, fared rather shabbily in the scram- 
ble for colonies which absorbed so much European energy 
in the nineteenth century, especially in the last quarter. 
Her first acquisitions were Togoland and Angra Pequena, 
in 1884. By 1900 she had added the Cameroons, South- 
west Africa, East Africa, German New Guinea, with numer- 
ous islands in the Pacific, and the concession of Kiao-Chou 
in the Shantung peninsula of China: a total area of 1,130,- 
000 square miles and a population of more than 13,000,000, 
of whom, however, white persons represented, in 1910, 
only 25,758, and of that number officials of one kind or 
another accounted for 8,856. On the other hand, since 
1 87 1 France had acquired most of her enormous colonial 
dependencies (4,776,126 square miles; 41,653,650 inhab- 
itants); Russia had pushed on into Central Asia till her 
frontier marched with that of British India; England had 
added Burmah, Egypt, South Africa, half a dozen other 
African colonies, and sundry Pacific islands; even little 
Belgium had, under the will of King Leopold, received in 
the Congo a domain more valuable than all of Germany's 
colonies together; and sleepy Portugal had consolidated 
the remnants of her former power into extensive holdings, 
which were abused by inefficient government and stag- 
nated under the blight of slavery. Germany, whose col- 
onies were the least valuable of all the African lands and 
were not suited for exploitation and settlement, must have 
her "place in the sun." "To talk of saturation, as in the 
time of Bismarck," said one of her sanest and most moder- 
ate publicists, "or of the possibility of Germany being sat- 
isfied with her present frontiers is, under all circumstances, 
rank foolishness." x 

1 Rohrbach, Deutschland unter den Weltvolkern, p. 23. 



GERMAN EXPANSION 79 

It is worth while to ask why Germany has been placed 
at such a disadvantage among the Great Powers of the 
world : and the historian is bound to answer that the great 
statesman to whom modern Germany owes its existence, 
Prince Bismarck, is primarily responsible. The colonial 
movement, in its present form of capitalistic exploitation, 
began in the 'seventies of the last century, when the explora- 
tion of Africa by Livingstone, Stanley, and others opened 
men's minds to the possibilities of that continent as an 
outlet for the surplus energy and capital of Europe. In 
those days Germany had every opportunity to stake out 
for herself a splendid colonial domain, inasmuch as the 
whole continent, except for Algeria, Cape Colony and 
Natal, and the Transvaal and Orange Free State, where 
French, English, and Dutch had already established them- 
selves, was open to the first comer. But Germany neglected 
her opportunity. The people were interested in commer- 
cial and industrial development, the government was busy 
fighting the Catholic Church and the socialists, and a 
steady stream of emigration still directed itself to America 
and Australia, whose temperate climate was preferred to 
the fevers and jungles of tropical Africa. But even more 
decisive was the attitude of Bismarck. Not only did he 
oppose the acquisition of colonies by Germany — from his 
conversations with Dr. Busch, as recorded in Some Secret 
Pages of Bismarck's History, and from the diplomatic cor- 
respondence, we know that he encouraged France and 
England to colonial adventures with the expectation of 
fishing in troubled waters. The French occupation of 
Tunis, in defiance of Italian aspirations in that direction, 
effected a breach between the Latin nations which threw 
Italy into the arms of Germany and Austria; similarly, 
the rivalry of England and France in Egypt and elsewhere 
in Africa paralyzed the Continental policy of both coun- 
tries for nearly twenty-five years. Nor, until 1883, would 



80 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

the Iron Chancellor give any support to various German 
explorers who, in English fashion, were seeking treaties 
with native rulers in the hope that the pressure of opinion 
at home would force the government to action. By such 
expedients Bismarck managed to preserve his mastery of 
Europe, but in the interval the future enemies of Germany 
picked up the most desirable lands of Africa, Asia, and the 
Pacific, and when the mighty empire finally claimed its 
share of the feast it had to be content with the scraps. 
Even then Bismarck had no heart for this policy, for he 
was pushed into it by the Reichstag and the pressure of 
public opinion, both of which he detested. 

In the early 'nineties, when German trade began to 
make enormous strides forward, public opinion awoke to 
the unsatisfactory results of Bismarck's colonial policy, 
and demanded more vigorous action by the government, 
which, inspired as it was by the cult of power, confronted 
by the challenge of Social Democracy in domestic politics, 
and encouraged by the Emperor himself, was the more 
disposed to welcome such manifestations of a truly national 
sentiment. The most positive expression of this idea was 
observed in the Pan-German League (Alldeutscher Bund). 
Founded in 1886, it had at first attracted little notice, but 
after its reorganization in 1893, under the presidency of 
Ernest Hasse, a Leipzig professor, it began a propaganda 
on behalf of German expansion that no student of inter- 
national affairs could either take very seriously or yet 
ignore altogether. An organization counting but 50,000 
members was scarcely representative of German opinion, 
according to English and American standards, but German 
political opinion was so machine-made, and the agitation 
of the Pan- Germans was so vociferous that an accurate 
measuring of its influence was impossible. Its close rela- 
tions with the powerful and vigorous Navy League does 
not suggest a state of innocuous desuetude, and it is worth 



GERMAN EXPANSION 81 

noting that its more provocative outbursts were usually 
followed by militant proceedings at the German foreign 
office and a period of great tension among the European 
Powers. On the other hand, the great newspapers were 
hostile, especially those of the capital which dared to cut 
loose from official communiques and the inspiration of the 
Wilhelmstrasse. Very likely the average German was not 
a little confused between the ultimate goal for which the 
league stood and the programme it put forward for imme- 
diate execution. 

The theoretical basis of Pan-Germanism is logical enough. 
Of more than 80,000,000 Germans in Europe fewer than 
70,000,000 enjoy the blessings of the new Empire. Ten 
millions reside in Austria, a few more in Bohemia, where 
they are intermingled with the Czechs, and still others are 
found in Switzerland and the Baltic provinces of Russia. 
On the assumption that German nationality is synonymous 
with the German race, which, in reality, is far from the 
case, German unity is not complete. In addition, the Dutch 
are of Teutonic race, and their fertile country not only 
once belonged to Germany (up to 1648 in law, in practise 
to 1555), but actually controls the mouth of the German 
Rhine; Holland would also profit economically by being 
incorporated in the German Empire. This doctrine of 
racial kinship would make the Dutch of South Africa sub- 
jects of the Kaiser, and in southern Brazil there is a large 
German population. Finally, there was Belgium, whose 
historical connection with the Holy Roman Empire lasted 
till the French Revolution, and whose Flemish provinces 
could be claimed with as much justification as their Dutch 
neighbors to the north. If we remember how Louis XIV 
claimed the left bank of the Rhine for France on the 
ground that ancient Gaul had extended to that river, we 
can at least comprehend the historical reasoning which 
would justify the incorporation in the modern German 



82 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

state of all lands which had ever belonged to the Holy 
Roman Empire; and considering the favor with which 
the doctrine of nationality has been received in the last 
half-century, we should have to admit the moral right of 
any German communities to join the German Empire if 
they so wished. 

As a piece of practical politics, the extension of Hohen- 
zollern sovereignty over any such territories or peoples was 
unimaginable, and the Pan-Germans themselves never set 
a date for the apotheosis of their grandiloquent schemes, 
which postulated the handling of provinces and nations 
like pawns on a chess-board, after the fashion of the eigh- 
teenth century. Indeed, their argument, in spite of its 
plausibility, was really fallacious. Was Bohemia, for ex- 
ample, to be included in Pan-Germany, and the Czechs 
added to the already formidable list of irreconcilables, or, 
if only Austria proper were taken over from the Dual 
Monarchy, which the Germans of that province would 
vehemently oppose, were the Germans of Bohemia to be 
left to the tender mercies of Russia, toward whom Bohemia 
would inevitably gravitate? The Dutch, though recog- 
nizing their kinship with Germany, were nothing if not 
tenacious of their independence; so was Belgium, whose 
culture, moreover, was rather French than German. In 
the Baltic provinces only the nobility and townsmen were 
German, the peasantry was Lithuanian or Finnish; geo- 
graphically, also, any connection with Germany would be 
ridiculous. 

There is very little evidence to show that the people of 
Germany were seriously enamoured of the Pan-German 
ideal, although they might give it a theoretical approval, 
and would probably have welcomed the incorporation of 
Holland and Belgium in the present Empire. General von 
Bernhardi, albeit a despiser of small states and the cham- 
pion of aggression, does not mention Pan-Germanism by 



GERMAN EXPANSION 83 

name; on the contrary, he opines that any lands which 
once belonged to Germany, but are now under other con- 
trol, are "permanently lost," and does not in any form 
demand territorial aggrandizement in Europe. 1 However 
much he may wish to see the balance of power over- 
turned to the profit of Germany, he would have that 
revolution effected by superiority of armament and the 
arbitrament of battle; Germany can then achieve her des- 
tiny in the colonies she has taken from the vanquished. 
But so many distinguished professors have associated them- 
selves with the Pan-German movement, its typical repre- 
sentatives have been so swashbuckling and jingoistic, and 
the German masses have such a reputation for docility, that 
foreign observers not unnaturally ascribed to Pan- German- 
ism an importance which it did not possess; as a definition 
of the European ambitions of German policy, it can be 
placed on a par with the American aspiration which de- 
mands the annexation of Canada as the consequence of our 
"manifest destiny." 

There was, however, another aspect of the Pan-German 
movement which aroused much enthusiasm, namely, its 
colonial programme, and it is therefore desirable to ascer- 
tain, with as much precision as possible, what Germany 
hoped, or might reasonably expect, to obtain beyond the 
confines of the old Continent. Here we are met by the 
difficulty that the German Government never admitted 
any definite ambitions, that is, of course, in the last twenty 
years since the problem entered into the calculations of 
its diplomacy. But by process of elimination we can ar- 
rive at certain plausible conclusions. At the opening of 
the century, when the break-up of China seemed imminent, 
Germany was fully determined to claim her share of the 
booty; nor did she endeavor to prevent the Russo-Japa- 
nese War, which, had Russia been victorious, must have 

1 Germany and the Next War, p. 195. 



84 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

hastened the collapse of the Celestial Empire. The tri- 
umph of Japan, however, meant the end of European ex- 
pansion in the Far East, and since then Germany has been 
the champion of both Chinese integrity and the open door. 
The rich Dutch colonies in the Malay Archipelago were 
forbidden fruit unless Holland itself were absorbed. Persia 
was practically divided between Great Britain and Russia. 1 
India and Australasia were jewels of the British crown, and 
their conquest would be exceedingly difficult even if Great 
Britain were crushed and her sea power destroyed. South 
America, where sundry German settlements might possibly 
become political outposts of the fatherland, was guarded 
by the Monroe Doctrine and the pride of the South Amer- 
ican nations themselves. 2 There were left Africa and the 
Ottoman Empire, the former in large measure under the 
dominion of other Powers, the latter still in the throes of 
that mortal illness diagnosed by the Tsar Nicholas I in 
1853, when he described the Sultan as "the sick man of 
Europe." 

In these two regions Germany seemingly desired and 
planned to satisfy her colonial ambitions. Her designs 
on the Belgian Congo were long suspected, and were ad- 
mitted in the Franco-German treaty of 4 November, 191 1. 
Not only did Germany receive from France two strips of 
the French Congo that brought the frontier of the Cam- 
eroons to the Congo River, which is the northwestern bound- 
ary of the Belgian Congo, but she induced France to 
forego her right of pre-emption over the Congo, any change 
in the status of which should henceforth be determined 
by all the African Powers. The sudden Italian occupation 
of Tripoli is believed to have been stimulated by the sus- 

1 It will be seen in a later chapter that Germany cherished certain ambitions 
with respect to Persia, but her policy in that country was never very aggressive. 

5 Many persons, of course, believe that Germany has very real designs on South 
America; but obviously she could not prosecute them until she had disposed of 
her rivals in Europe, and particularly of England. 



GERMAN EXPANSION 85 

picion that Germany was herself preparing to seize it. 
An Anglo-German agreement of 1898 envisaged the parti- 
tion of the Portuguese colonies in case Portugal were ready 
to part with them. Finally, German interest in Morocco, 
which kept Europe on tenter-hooks for six years, probably 
arose out of a desire to acquire some part of that country 
for colonizing purposes. As regards Turkey, German pol- 
icy was equally determined, centring around the Baghdad 
railway scheme, but not overlooking the other possibilities 
of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. 

Morocco and Asia Minor, indeed, occupied a special 
place in German colonial plans. Quite apart from the 
desire for more colonies of the plantation or exploitation 
type, it had long offended the national pride that Germany, 
next to Russia the most prolific nation in Europe, possessed 
no settlement colonies comparable to those of England, 
France, or Russia. It was intolerable that a German emi- 
grant was not able to settle in a land ruled by his Kaiser's 
government which was at the same time endowed with 
an equable climate, but must proceed to the United States, 
South America, or one of the British self-governing domin- 
ions, where he rapidly lost touch with his native land and 
was usually assimilated to his new surroundings. Of re- 
cent years, this aspect of the German colonial problem has 
been greatly modified by the decline of emigration, but in 
the 'nineties, when the new colonial movement took form, 
a considerable number of Germans were still leaving home 
each year, and a renewed impetus might at any time be 
given by economic depression or any of the other forces 
which have from time immemorial led men to try their 
fortunes abroad. This is clearly the thought of General 
von Bernhardi when he says: "The importance of Ger- 
many will depend upon two points : first, how many mil- 
lions of men in the world will speak German? secondly, 
how many of them are politically members of the German 



86 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Empire?" Or again: "The dominion of German thought 
can only be extended under the aegis of political power, 
and unless we act in conformity with this idea we shall 
be untrue to our duties toward the human race." 1 

Now, in the latter years of the nineteenth and the first 
part of the twentieth century Morocco and Asia Minor 
(up to 1899 tne Boer republics as well) were precisely the 
regions of the world that might be suitable for German 
colonization; in fact, they were the only lands not already 
appropriated by other Powers. They were, it is true, in- 
habited by a considerable indigenous population, but their 
civilization, at once oriental and the prey of effete admin- 
istration, seemed to clamor for German treatment; natural 
resources were abundant, and in some parts the climate 
was suitable for white settlement. Here Germans could 
settle and spread their Kultur, which must sooner or later 
take its place beside English imperialism as one of the 
world's great dynamic forces; here German capital could 
find an adequate opening for its energies, and German 
business lay the foundations of a permanent prosperity. 

There was nothing unreasonable in this ambition to make 
Morocco and Asia Minor parts of the German Empire; 
indeed, the programme was modest enough compared with 
the actual conquests of England and France in various 
parts of Africa or the advance of Russia in Central Asia. 
Unfortunately, however, both Morocco and Asia Minor 
were already ear-marked by the very Powers whose colonial 
preponderance Germany wished to diminish; the former 
was regarded by the French, established, as they were, in 
Tunis and Algeria, as the natural limit of their North 
African empire; the latter had long been dominated, polit- 
ically and economically, by Great Britain and Russia, 
while France had an outpost in Syria. Germans none 
the less turned with longing eyes to these regions, and pub- 

1 Germany and the Next War, pp. 83, 77. 



GERMAN EXPANSION 87 

lie opinion quickly responded to any move of the foreign 
office which promised to advance the national ambition. 
The popularity of Heinrich Class's little pamphlet, West- 
Marokko deutsch !, not to mention other literature of the 
same description, and the expression, Unser Baghdad, which 
is said to have been widely used, indicated a genuine desire 
to see German policy triumphant in these Mediterranean 
lands, and it is safe to say that the people of Germany 
were not only convinced .as to the justice of their cause 
but fully determined to support the government when the 
hour of decision should come. 

Twenty years of striving, however, brought but a mod- 
erate success with the Baghdad railway, which was the 
epitome of German policy in Asia Minor, and, instead of a 
share of Morocco, only a small stretch of the French 
Congo, which was surrendered as the price of a French 
protectorate over Morocco. The disappointment in Ger- 
many was universal, being reflected in the language of the 
press, which the government made no effort to restrain. 
And Germans of all classes, instead of criticising the diplo- 
macy of the imperial government, except to assert that it 
had not acted with sufficient vigor, convinced themselves 
that their legitimate ambitions had been blocked at every 
turn by the jealousy of Great Britain, as well in Morocco 
as for the Baghdad railway. The truth of this charge will 
be presently examined, but probably no amount of exposi- 
tion and argument would have convinced Germany that 
she was not the victim of a grand conspiracy to deprive 
her of her coveted "place in the sun." 

This conviction, which has been dinned into the masses 
by ardent publicists and a zealous press, throws an inter- 
esting light on German armaments. Prince Biilow notes 
the "curious fact that in the most military and warlike of 
the European nations" — a striking admission, in the face 
of German post-bellum propaganda — "the parties have re- 



88 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

signed themselves so unwillingly to the new demands for 
the defense of the empire that it has taken more than three 
and a half decades to achieve unanimity, at least among 
the middle-class parties." 1 The Reichstag of 1907 was 
the first to give the government a majority for its world 
policy that was not dependent on the Centre, which is 
opposed to colonial expansion; up to that time the Radicals 
refused to vote for the numerous army and navy laws 
which have been so prominent. a feature of the reign of 
William II. The elections of 1907 were fought on the issue 
of German imperialism, and the government got a majority 
of Conservatives and Liberals, who were sympathetic with 
its expansionist schemes. In 191 2 all the middle-class 
parties supported the army and navy bills, and even the 
Socialists indirectly, since they voted the supplies for the 
increased establishments. At last there was a national 
majority for the national policy. The government always 
demanded additional troops or more ships in the interest 
of German world-diplomacy; as one class after another was 
converted to the imperialistic programme the opponents 
of military expansion lost ground, until there stood behind 
the Emperor and his government a united nation, which, 
however torn by party faction and class feeling on matters 
of domestic concern, was determined that Germany should 
take her lawful place among the great colonial and mari- 
time nations. Throughout the summer of 1911, when the 
Morocco controversy was in process of solution, public 
opinion was, on the whole, more aggressive than the gov- 
ernment, and after the settlement with France had been 
disclosed there was a wild outburst of rage in the Reichs- 
tag from all parties, because the national interests had 
been sacrificed to the Emperor's love of peace. From that 
time there was no difficulty in passing measures for the 
increase of armaments, in spite of the fact that Germany's 

1 Imperial Germany, p. 193. 



GERMAN EXPANSION 89 

relations with England underwent considerable improve- 
ment and that the world was disposed to render a due 
meed of praise to the Emperor for not appealing to the 
sword in the Morocco business. Without asserting posi- 
tively that the German people were itching for war, one is 
justified in saying that they wanted all the fruits of war, 
and from such a state of mind the transition to war itself 
is neither difficult to make nor long to be avoided. 

The national attitude toward questions of foreign policy 
and armaments was prodigiously affected by a profound 
change in the German character, a change much remarked 
upon by innumerable travellers, students, and publicists 
for many years back. The generation which witnessed 
the wars of unification was still in the grip of that roman- 
tic and cosmopolitan feeling which had distinguished the 
early nineteenth century. Life was simple, for money was 
scarce; high thinking was the order of the day; the ideal 
of a free and united Germany still was widely cherished, 
except in official society. Treitschke himself, writing in 
1 86 1, could say: 

"How lifeless, how sterile are the supporters of absolutism in 
their opposition to the demands of the nations for liberty ! . . . 
Everything new which the nineteenth century has created is the 
work of liberalism. The enemies of liberty can only persist in 
negation, or waken to the semblance of new life the ideas of days 
which have long since been submerged." 1 

To-day the spirit of Germany is frankly material and 
expresses itself in commercial values. Nor is this surpris- 
ing. The enormous increase of the population since 1870, 
the expansion of industry and commerce, the changed con- 
ditions of every-day life brought about by great wealth 
on the one hand and a restless proletariat on the other, 

1 From Die Freiheit, quoted by Davis, The Political Thought of Heinrich von 
Treitschke, p. 9. 



90 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

and the cult of thoroughness and efficiency — all these and 
other factors have intensified the struggle for bread and 
pushed the humanities into the background. A German 
writer has well described the transformation, not without 
some lament for the old, easy days: 

"One is often pained and overcome," writes Herr Fuchs, "with 
longing as one thinks of the German of a hundred years ago. He 
was poor, he was impotent, he was despised, ridiculed, and de- 
frauded. He was the uncomplaining slave of others; his fields 
were their battle-ground, and the goods which he had inherited 
from his fathers were trodden under foot and dispersed. He shed 
his blood heroically without asking why. He never troubled when 
the riches of the outside world were divided without regard for 
him. He sat in his little bare room high under the roof, in simple 
coat and clumsy shoes; but his heart was full of sweet dreams, 
and uplifted by the chords of Beethoven to a rapture which threat- 
ened to rend his breast. He wept with Werther and Jean Paul in 
joyous pain, he smiled with the childish innocence of his naive 
poets, the happiness of his longing consumed him, and as he listened 
to Schubert's song his soul became one with the soul of the universe. 
Let us think no more of it — it is useless. We have become men, 
and the virtues of our youth are ours no more. We can but face 
the inevitable and overcome it." 1 

A professor at Jena asks: 

"Have we Germans kept a harmonious balance between the 
economic and the moral side of our development, as was once the 
case with the Greeks? No; with the enormous increase of wealth 
dark shadows have fallen on our national life. In the nation as 
in the individual we see with the increase of wealth the decrease 
of moral feeling and moral power." 

Professor Paulsen complains: 

"For new institutes of natural science and medicine new millions 
are always ready, but is any liberality shown toward the modest 
needs of philology or philosophy?" 

1 This and the two following quotations are taken from Dawson, Evolution of 
Modern Germany, pp. 5, 8. For an excellent description of conditions in Germany 
before 1870, cf. Sidney Whitman, German Memories, chap. 2. 



GERMAN EXPANSION 91 

It does not become an American to throw stones at the 
ideals of wealth or bigness, which are our besetting sins 
in the eyes of Germans themselves. But, with all our op- 
timism and boastfulness, we remain an introspective and 
critical people. Germans, however, came to believe, with 
the Emperor, that they were "the salt of the earth," l 
and they looked with good-natured contempt upon their 
neighbors. The inability of the French to multiply and 
replenish the earth, the difficulties of the British in the 
Boer War, and the colossal failure of the Russians in Man- 
churia impressed unfavorably a people who performed 
their military service as a cheerful duty and smiled at the 
suggestion that the nations should turn their swords into 
ploughshares. The heads of all but the most conserva- 
tive were indeed affected by the praises which a wondering 
world showered upon the upstart empire and its spectacu- 
lar Kaiser. Wherever Germans turned they observed that 
their star, lately risen in the heavens, shone brilliantly 
amidst the dimmed rays of the older planets; its glory 
would be even more effulgent if some of the other stars 
were deflected from their ancient courses. Germany's place 
in the sun was not commensurate with her achievements in 
the other fields of human endeavor ; her genius was corre- 
spondingly cramped and her "historical mission " unfulfilled. 

Every self-respecting nation places a high value on its 
peculiar culture. Some years ago a famous British states- 
man, who is still living, dedicated a book to "those who 
believe that the British Empire is, under Providence, the 
greatest instrument for good that the world has ever seen." 2 
A French professor has recently described the civilization 
of his country as the forme exquise de justice et de verite uni- 
verselles. 3 And there is the famous Russian prophecy that 

1 Speech at Bremen, 22 March, 1905. 

2 Hon. G. N. (now Lord) Curzon, Problems of the Far East, 1894. 

5 M. Alfred Croiset, in Bulletin de la Societe autour du Monde, January, 1915. 



92 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

"the Slavs stand on the threshold of the morning," while 
the other European peoples have already reached their 
apogee. But no nation has carried the obsession of its 
superiority to such a pitch as the present-day Germans. 
With all our marvellings at their progress in industry and 
commerce, our efforts to copy their system of municipal 
government, our fondness for their music, and our enor- 
mous debt to their science and philosophy, it comes as a 
distinct shock to read the following in the pages of General 
von Bernhardi: 

"No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and ap- 
propriate all the elements of culture, to add to them from the 
stores of its own spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind 
richer gifts than it received. . . . To no nation, except the Ger- 
man, has it been given to enjoy in its inner self, ' that which is given 
to mankind as a whole.' We often see in other nations a greater 
intensity of specialized ability, but never the same capacity for 
generalization and absorption. It is this quality which specially 
fits us for the leadership of the intellectual world, and imposes 
upon us the obligation to maintain that position." l 

This is national egotism raised to the nth. power, and the 
first impulse is to dismiss it as the ravings of a military 
fanatic. But the utterances of the gallant general can be 
duplicated at every turn. If the reader will consult a 
remarkable work entitled The Foundations of the Nineteenth 
Century, by Houston Stewart Chamberlain, an Englishman 
who married the daughter of Richard Wagner and has be- 
come thoroughly German, he will rind developed there such 
astonishing theories as that Christ was not a Jew, or that 
all the races of Europe — Celt, Slav, Latin, and German — 
sprang from the same original stock and may therefore 
be called German. In the eyes of Chamberlain all that is 
best in European civilization is essentially German, and 
the Germans are the chosen people. His bulky book has 

1 Germany and the Next War, pp. 73-74. 



GERMAN EXPANSION 93 

sold by tens of thousands, and "is, by the majority of Ger- 
mans, considered to be a higher revelation of truth un- 
fathomable." * Other writers argue, on the basis of phi- 
lology and archaeology, that the great artists of the Italian 
Renaissance, and even Jesus himself, were Germans. Or 
there is the statement of Herr Alfred Kerr, a well-known 
critic, as reported by M. Georges Bourdon, in his valuable 
analysis of German opinion, The German Enigma: 

"It is a law of history that the elder societies shall cede their 
place to the younger, and this is the condition of the perpetual 
regeneration of humanity. . . . Nothing has any power against 
the destiny of history. The German with his red corpuscles has 
arrived, and I believe his hour has come. The law of life ordains 
that the least strong shall be eliminated, and the real conquerors 
are the famished. That is to say, we Germans. The money that 
we have earned has given us the taste, and conquered prosperity 
has increased our appetite. When the German contemplates the 
rest of the world, he finds that he has not been spoiled, and that all 
that has been left him are the stale remains of a good dinner. 
But this share is merely a provisory one in his mind, and I believe 
that some day a new redistribution will take place." 2 

Only since the war began has it been fully understood 
to what extent the virus of national conceit has permeated 
the German consciousness. From no other country has 
there poured forth such a deluge of articles, books, and 
pamphlets asserting the superiority of German culture in 
all its aspects, and in many instances proclaiming that it 
must be forced on a reluctant world. The most astonish- 
ing outburst, that of Professor Adolf Lasson of Berlin, 
deserves to be quoted. In two letters to a friend in Hol- 
land, written at the end of September, 1914, he says: 

"One cannot rest neutral in relationship to Germany and the 
German people. Either one must consider Germany as the most 

1 Emil Reich, Germany's Swelled Head, 1907, p. 13. 

2 Interview with Herr Alfred Kerr, p. 171. 



94 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

perfect political creation that history has known, or must approve 
her destruction, her extermination. A man who is not German 
knows nothing of Germany. 

"We are morally and intellectually superior to all: without peers. 
It is the same with our organizations and our institutions. 

"William II, delicics generis humani, has always protected peace, 
right, and honor, although it would have been possible for him by 
his power to annihilate everything. The greater his success, the 
more modest he has become. His chancellor, Herr von Bethmann- 
Hollweg, the most eminent among men who are now alive, does not 
know any higher cares than those of truth, loyalty, and right. 
Our army is, as it were, the image in miniature of the intelligence 
and morality of the German people." 

"We are breathing, with full chest, the full breath of history, 
and we know nothing about this wretched bourgeois existence [of 
Holland]. 

"We have no friends. All fear us and look upon us as dangerous, 
because we are intelligent, active, and morally superior. We are 
the freest people in the world. For we know how to obey. Our 
law is our reason. Our force is the force of the mind; our victory 
the victory of that. That is why we are able to triumph against 
numerous enemies, as did Frederick II in other days. 

"The European conspiracy has woven around us a web of lies 
and slander. As for us, we are truthful, our characteristics are 
humanity, gentleness, conscience, the virtues of Christ. In a 
world of wickedness, we represent love, and God is with us !" 

Such examples of perverted scholarship and distorted 
history are amusing, but they are also significant. There 
must be fire to produce so much smoke. And the fire has 
evidently been burning for some time. The German lit- 
erature of international politics, so voluminous in recent 
years, abounds in references to decadent France, inefficient 
Britain, mediaeval Russia; the whole case for German ex- 
pansion rests on the assumption that the world badly 
needs German Kultur to reach the highest plane of devel- 
opment, and the conviction has become firmly rooted, as 
any one who travelled in Germany or talked with Germans 



GERMAN EXPANSION 95 

was bound to discover, that the fatherland was fully 
capable of imposing its will upon the other Powers of 
Europe. 

The world has not condemned Germany blindly; rather 
it has been convinced, against its will and from a study of 
the available evidence, that her ambitions are too subver- 
sive of others' rights and her people too militaristic for 
these peace-loving times. If her position among the im- 
perial and colonial nations was less favored than seemed 
her due, the fault was her own, either of her tragic past 
or of her recent diplomacy. She made no brilliant record 
in the colonies she did possess; they were costly to main- 
tain, unproductive from both commercial and human stan- 
dards. With all of England's faults and despite the ques- 
tionable methods often resorted to in the expansion of her 
empire, she has done much for the advancement and pros- 
perity of her subject peoples. Germany can adduce no 
such claim. On the contrary, her mechanical and bu- 
reaucratic policy has more than once produced rebellions 
that were suppressed with great cruelty. Hence German 
colonial ambitions, legitimate as they often were, arouse 
no sympathy outside of Germany, and if the argument 
must be reduced to General von Bernhardi's formula, 
"world power or downfall," the unmistakable answer is 
that the world can and will get along without Prussian 
militarism, a Prussian reorganization, or even a Prussian 
world peace. 



CHAPTER V 
COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 

It is a fixed idea with Germany and her sympathizers 
that Great Britain was drawn into the war from jealousy 
of Germany's advance toward the commercial conquest of 
the world. They point to the law of 1887, by which the 
British Parliament required all goods of that origin to be 
stamped "Made in Germany," lest Englishmen should un- 
wittingly patronize foreign industries, and they laughingly 
remark that the law in no small degree failed of its pur- 
pose, because the superiority of German-made commodi- 
ties soon commended them to English buyers. From the 
German point of view, British commercial supremacy has 
been in jeopardy for at least two decades from the ex- 
traordinary expansion of German trade; sooner or later 
it must succumb to the intensified attack of its rival. 
Therefore, when Germany found herself at war with France 
and Russia, the temptation to the nation of shopkeepers 
was irresistible. The armies of other nations would fight 
her battles on land, her own navy would bottle up Ger- 
man merchantmen, and British manufacturers and tra- 
ders would recover the markets filched from them by the 
superior genius of Germans. 

Such is the indictment, which rests on two assumptions : 
first, that Great Britain and Germany are rivals, one of 
whom must destroy the other; and second, that the United 
Kingdom cannot hold its own against the upstart Power 
across the North Sea. Before examining the argument in 
detail, let us frankly admit that Great Britain has not 
viewed the competition of Germany with pleasure or un- 
concern. From a host of writings bearing on the matter, 

96 



COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 97 

the following quotations may be given because they are 
free from prejudice or envy: 

Lady Phillips, in A Friendly Germany : Why Not ?, writes : 

" The rapid development of German trade within the last two 
decades undoubtedly bears part of the responsibility for the ill 
feeling harbored against Germany in some quarters." 1 

H. G. Wells, in Social Forces in England and America, 
writes: 

"We in Great Britain are intensely jealous of Germany. We 
are intensely jealous of Germany not only because the Germans 
outnumber us, and have a much larger and more diversified coun- 
try than ours, and lie in the very heart and body of Europe; but 
because in the last hundred years, while we have fed on platitudes 
and vanity, they have had the energy and humility to develop a 
splendid system of national education, to toil at science and art and 
literature, to develop social organization, to master and better our 
methods of business and industry, and to clamber above us in the 
scale of civilization. This has humiliated and irritated rather 
than chastened us, and our humiliation has been greatly exacer- 
bated by the swaggering bad manners, the talk of 'Blood and Iron' 
and Mailed Fists, the Weltpolitik rubbish, that inaugurated the 
new German phase." 2 

An impartial American could say: 

"In the great total of Germany's trade, and in the rapidity with 
which it has risen to its present volume and value lies the reason 
for the anti-German agitation in England. On the surface this 
antagonism is political, and relates to armaments, but its roots lie 
in the trade of the world, and it is fed upon commercial rivalry." 3 

The historical fact that the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 
seventeenth century arose out of English jealousy of Hol- 
land's control of the carrying trade, may perhaps be ad- 
duced to support the theory that Great Britain has de- 
clared "war on German trade." Or we may believe that 
the American Revolution came about because the greedy 

1 P. 78. s P. 42. « James Davenport Whelpley, The Trade of the World, p. 42. 



98 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

merchants of Great Britain demanded the enforcement 
of the Navigation Acts in restraint of colonial trade. 
More recently, as far back as 1885, a royal commission on 
the depression of trade and industry suggested that Brit- 
ish business men were making an ineffective opposition 
to German competition. 1 If it be added that the tariff 
reform movement, associated with the late Mr. Chamber- 
lain, justified itself on the ground that only a protective 
tariff could preserve British industry from the vigor of 
the German attack, and that the consumers of the United 
Kingdom were invited by spasmodic appeals to insist upon 
British goods, it may sound absurd to assert that com- 
mercial considerations were not very much to the fore 
when the neutrality of Belgium was ostensibly the cause 
of Britain's declaration of war. Here, again, one is con- 
fronted with the difficulty of analyzing accurately the tem- 
per of a nation, but the available evidence points to the 
conclusion that English opinion had pretty thoroughly 
absorbed the teaching of Norman Angell, that war and 
business were contradictory terms. Sir Edward Grey, in 
his speech to the House of Commons on 3 August, 1914, 
certainly brushed aside commercial considerations. "For- 
eign trade," he said, "is going to stop, not because the 
trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at 
the other end." 2 On this very ground the Radical wing 
of the Liberal party opposed his policy, and the Socialists 
conducted demonstrations against war, even after the vio- 
lation of Belgian neutrality. The great banking houses 
of the city are also believed to have been against the war. 
A few years ago Great Britain and Germany did appear 
to be locked in a death-struggle for the commercial domina- 
tion of the world, for the statistics of the last generation 

1 Parliamentary Papers, cd. 4715. Second report of the royal commission on the 
depression of trade and industry, 3 March, 1886, pp. 21, 43-44, 48-5°, 54. 57. °4» 
67-68, ng-122, 124-125, 128, 130, 140, 193, 221, 265, 283. 

2 s Hansard, lxv, c. 1823. 



COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 



99 



showed German trade to have grown far more rapidly 
than that of England. 1 





In Millions of £ Sterling 


(20 Marks=£i) 


United Kingdom 


Germany 


Imports 


Re-exports* 


Exportsf 


Imports 


Exports 


1870 

1880 

1890 

1900. 

1910 


3°3 
411 

420 

523 
678 


44 
63 
64 

63 
104 


200 
223 
263 
291 
430 


I73J 

142 
214 
302 
465 


I25t 

145 
166 

239 
382 



*Of foreign and colonial produce. 



tOf British produce. 



t Figures for 1872, the first year for which they are available. 

In forty years British imports increased 130 per cent, as 
opposed to an advance of 170 per cent for Germany; for 
the export trade the figures stand at 115 per cent and 194 
per cent, respectively (119 per cent for England, if re- 
exports are included). 

It is quite evident, therefore, that in a general way the 
establishment of the new German Empire was followed by 
a prodigious expansion of foreign trade, beside which the 
slower progress of England was in marked contrast. Even 
in the first decade of the twentieth century, after Germany 
had made up for the time lost in a century of disunion, 
her effort was more pronounced than that of her long- 
established competitor. From all parts of the globe com- 
plaints began to pour in that Germany was displacing Great 
Britain in the markets which had belonged to the latter 
since the early days of modern industry. Whether one 
reads the reports of consuls and commercial attaches, or 
is content with articles in newspapers and reviews, there 

1 Except where otherwise indicated, the statistics cited in this chapter are culled 
from the Statesman's Year Book, the Statistisches Handbuch des Deutschen Reiches 
(1907), and the Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich (annual). 



IOO 



ENGLAND AND GERMANY 



is the same story. German business methods — cheap 
goods, efficient advertising, competent salesmen, catering 
to individual and national tastes,, governmental assistance 
— were challenging the supremacy of the British trader. 
South America, Africa, the Ottoman Empire, China, and 
even British colonies figured in the imagination of scare- 
mongers, who could see no limit to German cupidity or 
German ingenuity, as lands where the British position 
would soon be seriously threatened. 

In fact, the British nation was told by Joseph Chamber- 
lain that "during the last thirty years . . . our general ex- 
port trade has remained practically stagnant" (Newcastle, 
20 October, 1903). "Cotton will go"; "wool is threat- 
ened"; "your iron trade is going." Such phrases of the 
Conservative statesman indicated a pessimism which de- 
manded either retaliatory measures or a complete over- 
hauling of the national industrial machine. Even the 
great staple industries seemed to be losing their hold, as 
the following statistics of production show: 



Date 


Coal Production 


Iron Ore Production 


United 
Kingdom 


Germany 


United 
Kingdom 


Germany 


1880 

1890 


Tons 
146,969,000 
181,614,000 
225,181,000 
264,433,000 


Metric Tons 

46,974,000 

70,238,000 

109,290,000 

152,828,000 


Tons 
18,026,000 
13,781,000 
14,028,000 
15,226,000 


Metric Tons 
7,239,000 
11,406,000 
18,964,000 
28,710,000 




1910 




Date 


Pig Iron Production 


Crude Steel Production 


United 
Kingdom 


Germany 


United 
Kingdom 


Germany 


1880 


Tons 

7,749,000 

7,904,000 

8,959,000 

10,012,000 


Metric Tons 

2,713,000 

4,651,000 

8,507,000 

14,794,000 


Tons 

3,579,000 
4,901,000 
6,515,000 


Metric Tons 

2,232,000 

6,362,000 

12,281,000 


1890 


1900 







1 metric ton =2,204 pounds. 



COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 101 

Even in the cotton trade Germany had become quite in- 
dependent of England, as evidenced by the number of 
bales imported at Liverpool and Bremen. 1 





Liverpool 


Bremen 


1885-1886 


2,558,798 
3,690,800 


530,451 
2,792,000 


1911— 1912 





Finally, in a province wherein the English were wont to 
reign supreme Germany made marvellous progress, the 
shipping industry. The Hamburg-America Company and 
the Norddeutscher Lloyd are the two largest shipping con- 
cerns in the world. A generation ago they usually bought 
their ships in the British Isles, but no one will now dispute 
the ability of the German yards to build as good ships as 
any in the world. In most aspects of agriculture German 
production has, thanks to the high protection obtained by the 
Conservative party, forged considerably ahead of England. 
To these undoubted facts of German competition may 
be added the pitiful misery of the lower orders of English 
society, which moved the late Sir Henry Campbell-Banner- 
man to declare that twelve millions of the people lived on 
the verge of hunger and "in the grip of perpetual pov- 
erty"; 2 the collapse of many enterprises under the pressure 
of German competition and the inevitable growth of un- 
employment; the persistence of the tariff reform agita- 
tion for ten years; and the endless discussion as to what 
British manufacturers should do to prevent the capture 
by the Germans of the markets which were left. It is not 
surprising, therefore, if the casual observer assumed that 
Great Britain belonged to the nations with a past, and was 
correspondingly jealous of the new German state which prom- 
ised ere long to become the wealthiest nation in Europe. 

1 These and the immediately preceding figures are taken from Hurd and Castle, 
German Sea Power, pp. 230-231, 297. 

2 At Perth, 5 June, 1903. 



102 



ENGLAND AND GERMANY 



Yet the figures in the case do not reveal England as deca- 
dent and listless. Unluckily for the tariff reformers, they 
argued too closely from the condition of England on the 
morrow of the Boer War. The additional taxation which 
that enterprise entailed was naturally reflected in the busi- 
ness world and, furthermore, the competition of Germany 
was still so recent that the possibility of meeting it had 
not been thoroughly grasped. The statistics of British 
and German foreign trade for the fifteen years 1899-1913, 
during which the former is usually represented as at the 
mercy of the latter, are very instructive. 





In Millions of Pounds Sterling 


United Kingdom 


Germany 


Imports 


Re-exports 


Exports 


Imports 


Exports 


1899 


485 
524 
522 
528 
543 
55i 
56s 
607 

645 
593 
625 
678 
680 

745 
769 


65 
63 
68 

65 
69 
70 

78 

85 
92 
80 

91 
104 

102 
112 
109 


264 
291 
280 
283 
291 
301 
33° 
376 
426 
377 
378 
43° 
454 
487 
525 


289 
302 
286 
290 
316 
343 
372 
422 
45° 
404 

443 
405 
477 
55o 
534 


218 

239 
225 
241 

255 
265 
292 
324 
355 
324 
343 
382 
405 
454 
495 


1900 


1901 

1902 


1903 


1904 


1905 


1906 




1908 


1909 

1910 


1911 


1912 


1913 





During the Boer War and a few years afterward British 
trade remained practically stationary; that of Germany 
expanded rapidly. From 1905 to 1907 both countries felt 
the stimulus of a world-wide boom, and both were badly 
hit the following year by the collapse of credit which fol- 
lowed the American panic. After 1909 there was a general 



COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 



103 



recovery, in which — and this is the point — Great Britain 
fared quite as well as Germany. 



INCREASE 1909-1913 

(In Millions of Pounds Sterling) 





Imports 


Exports 




146 

9i 


148 (with re-exports 177) 
152 


Germany 



But these figures do not consider the growth of population, 
which was greater in Germany than in the United Kingdom. 



1900 



IQIO 



Per cent 
increase 



Great Britain . 
Germany 



41,605,323 
56,367,178 



45,365,599 
64,903,423 



11. 4 



Examined on this basis, the export trade of the United 
Kingdom is seen to have been increasing its margin of 
superiority. 

EXPORTS PER HEAD OF POPULATION > 





United Kingdom 


Germany 




£ 

6 

9 
10 


s. 

14 
2 

3 


d. 

9 


7 


£ 

4 

5 

6 


5. 

1 

6 

10 


d. 

3 




Average 1907-19 10 

1912 


Increase 


3 


18 


10 


2 


18 


9 



To contend, as many have done, that Great Britain was 
falling behind as an industrial and commercial nation is 
obviously absurd. 

The growth of the import trade was another sign of Brit- 
ish prosperity. In America we are accustomed to think 

1 Liberal Year Book, 1913, p. 172. 



io4 



ENGLAND AND GERMANY 



that a balance of international trade "in our favor" is 
essential to our happiness, and it is true that our greatest 
prosperity has been attained under such conditions. "Our 
English cousins look at these things from a different point 
of view, for it is equally true that England's fattest years 
have been those in which, as we say, her balance of trade 
has been 'against' her. It is when her imports exceed 
her exports by the most millions that business is good and 
profitable." 1 The surplus of imports represented, not an 
unfavorable balance of trade, but the tribute of the world 
for the services of British shipping and the interest on 
British investments abroad. The larger the excess of im- 
ports, the greater the activity of Britain's merchant ma- 
rine, the more productive her capital in foreign countries, 
and, of course, the greater the supply of commodities for 
home consumption. 

Despite the growth of Germany's merchant marine, -de- 
spite the capacity of her shipyards, the United Kingdom 
still enjoyed an overwhelming supremacy among maritime 
nations. She owned approximately 50 per cent of the ton- 
nage of the world, and she built more ships annually than 
the rest of the world together. Her position was, indeed, 
in little danger of being challenged for an indefinite period. 

NET REGISTER OF TONNAGE 



1870 
1880 
1890 
1900 
1910 
1912 



United Kingdom 



Total 



'5,690,789 
6,S74,Si3 
7,978,538 
9,304,108 
",555,663 
11,894,791 



Steam 



1,112,934 
2,723,468 
5,042,517 
7,207,610 
10,442,719 
10,992,073 



Germany 



Total 



982,355 
1,181,525 

1,433,413 
1,941,645 
2,903,570 
3,023,725 



Steam 



81,994 

215,758 

723,652 

1,347,845 

2,396,733 

2,513,666 



1 J. D. Whelpley, The Trade of the World, p. 47. 



COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 105 

If, on the one hand, Germany achieved a larger percentage 
of increase than the mistress of the seas, the latter strength- 
ened her general lead by 4,162,632 tons and her ascendency 
in steam shipping by 7,447,467 tons. British supremacy 
was as fully apparent in the construction of new ships. 

NEW TONNAGE 





United Kingdom 


Germany 


1881-1885 


3,313,431 tons 
4,126,093 " 


248,504 tons 
612,112 " 









In 191 2, the last year for which figures are complete, 
new tonnage to the amount of 1,738,514 gross tons was 
constructed in the shipyards of the United Kingdom, as 
opposed to 1,163,255 for the rest of the world, and 480,038 
for Germany. In perhaps no other phase of world busi- 
ness was the ascendency of Great Britain so overwhelm- 
ing, and there was no sign of a change for the worse. 1 

The capital invested abroad by Englishmen and Ger- 
mans is difficult to estimate. Sir George Paish, the editor 
of the Statist, credited Britain with £1,681,000,000 in her 
overseas dominions and £1,837,000,000 in foreign coun- 
tries, a total of £3,518,000,000, on 31 December, 1912. This 
was capital publicly subscribed, and the private invest- 
ments probably brought the total up to £4,000,000,000, 
from which the nation derived an income of about £200,- 
000,000, or one-tenth of the national income. 2 The amount 
of German capital sent abroad has probably been exagger- 
ated. For the year 1900 20,000,000,000 marks (£1,000,- 

1 Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power, pp. 305 Jf. 
1 Liberal Year Book, 1913, p. 181. 



io6 



ENGLAND AND GERMANY 



000,000) was quoted by several authorities; 1 but Dr. Karl 
Helfferich, director of the Deutsche Bank, writing in 
1913, stated that "the estimate of 20,000,000,000 marks 
for all Germany's investments of capital abroad seems 
rather too high than too low," adding that "new invest- 
ments abroad have, within the last few years, been con- 
siderably restricted owing to the enormous home demand 
for capital for industrial and public purposes." 2 The 
ratio between Great Britain and Germany stood at four 
to one, and was certainly not diminishing. 

The export trade of Great Britain and Germany must be 
further compared, as regards the geographical distribu- 
tion. 3 





In Millions of Pounds Sterling 


United Kingdom 


Germany 


Average 


1899-1903 


1904-8 


1912 


1899-1903 


1904-8 


1912 


Europe 

Extra - European , ex- 
cept British Empire 
British Empire 


108 

75 
94 


132 

in 
118 


175 

128 
188 


173 

43 
9 


224 

65 
11 


337 

91 
19 



Two conclusions seem warranted from these figures. First, 
the bulk of Germany's foreign commerce was with coun- 
tries of the European continent, and in these regions she 
had pushed considerably ahead of England. The latter, 
on the other hand, did an increasing business with her 
vast Empire, where Germany's hold was quite slender; 
even though the mother country had refused to adopt a 
protective tariff for the benefit of her colonies, her exports 
went to them in increasing quantity and increasing per- 

1 E. g., Wolf von Schierbrand, Germany, p. 101. 

1 Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth, 1888-1913, p. 113, an Eng- 
lish edition, issued by the Germanistic Society of America, of Deutschlands Volks- 
woklstand, 1888-1913. 

* Geoffrey Durham, "The Foreign Trade of Great Britain and Germany," in 
Contemporary Review, October, 19 10. 



COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 



107 



centage. It was, of course, only natural that Germany 
should have the stronger position on the Continent, for 
she was advantageously placed for developing close com- 
mercial relations. Similarly, political considerations, and 
in the case of the self-governing colonies preferential tariff 
treatment, secured Great Britain the commercial ascend- 
ency in her own Empire. Thus the main field for competi- 
tion between Great Britain and Germany lay in the non- 
British territories outside of Europe. The results of that 
competition over a period of ten years are indicated as 
follows : 

EXPORTS 
(In >£i,ooo; 20 marks=;£i) 



China 

Japan 

Dutch Indies 

Siam 

Korea 

Congo 

French Colonies 

Portuguese Colonies . . . 

German Colonies 

Persia 

Liberia 

United States 

Argentina 

Brazil 

Chile 

Rest of South America 

West Indies 

Central America 

Mexico 



United Kingdom 



1902 



,142 
,142 
,155 

251 
So 

102 
,319 
,596 

117 

369 

52 
,760 
,871 
,389 
,839 
,612 

,379 

718 
,170 



1912 



i4,3H 
12,229 

6,233 
1,086 

3i9 
367 
3,867 
2,357 
S83 
878 

93 
31,355 
20,505 
12,658 

6,159 
8,156 
2,956 
i,352 
2,508 



Germany 



1902 



i,845 

2,490 

i,i75 

no 

no 

30 

290 

295 

357 

55 

35 

22,460 

2,360 

2,190 

1,700 

1,770 

710 

325 

1,705 



1912 



4,275 
5,6oo 

3,765 

320 

20 

100 

1,100 

620 

2,865 

180 

7o 

35,3oo 

11,970 

9,640 

5,600 

5,i35 

1,805 

630 

2,263 



In not a single region of the world was the British trade 
being expelled, or even seriously hampered, and the import 
figures would demonstrate the same fact with perhaps 



108 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

even more conviction. Finally, not to dishearten the reader 
with endless figures, it may be remarked that Germany 
was the best customer of the United Kingdom, and exported 
to it more goods than any country except the United States. 
In 1913 the reciprocal trade of the two countries exceeded 
£121,000,000, not counting re-exports from England to 
the amount of £19,878,000. Even if German imports to 
England increased more rapidly than the reverse trade, 
the fact remained that British commerce with Germany 
represented one- tenth of the trade of the country: a most 
excellent reason why war would be a calamity to both 
parties. 1 

Still, it may fairly be asked whether Englishmen accepted 
this point of view. The most convincing evidence is that 
in three general elections (January, 1906, January, 19 10, 
December, 1910) they declined to adopt the new gospel 
of tariff reform. The baldly avowed purpose of a protect- 
ive tariff was to save British industry from German com- 
petition, but ten years' discussion merely served to con- 
vince the majority of the voters that free trade was the 
only possible system for a country which imported the 
greater part of its food and the raw materials for its in- 
dustries. 

On the eve of the war tariff reform was quite distinctly 
in the background. Similarly, as regards the imperial 
aspects of that controversy, Englishmen seemed instinc- 

1 The German view of Anglo-German trade rivalry is well expounded by Pro- 
fessor von Schulze-Gaevernitz in Deutschland und England (1908). He recog- 
nizes that Germany has profited enormously by the free-trade system of England, 
but believes that German competition will force the adoption of a protective tariff 
sooner or later; also that war is not impossible for this very reason. "Let us not 
forget" the fate of Holland; and "what the Spain of Philip II and the France of 
Louis XIV and Napoleon were, Germany is to-day: the enemy" (p. 33). But he 
concludes with the observation: "If once Germany and England realize that 
neither can be annihilated and that third parties will be the only gainers from a 
war between them, all danger thereof will disappear, despite all the jingoes on 
either side." See also his article in the American Review of Reviews, November, 
1909. The book is reviewed by C. S. Goldman in the Nineteenth Century, February, 
1909. 



COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 109 

tively to realize that the best guarantee for the preservation 
of their Empire lay in maintaining a fair field for all, with 
favors for none; so that throughout the vast British 
dominions, except in the self-governing colonies, British 
manufacturers and traders enjoyed no privileges which 
were not equally available for Germans. 1 Nor is it with- 
out bearing on the question that the British Government, 
after years of hesitation, withdrew its opposition to the 
Baghdad railway, which was calculated to stimulate Ger- 
man commerce in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, 
a field of endeavor long sacred to British enterprise. So 
far as public sentiment was reflected in the great reviews, 
the bugbear of German competition disappeared when the 
trade figures showed that British exporters were getting 
their share of the increased volume of business so charac- 
teristic of the last decade. For two years before the war 
England experienced such a boom as she had not known 
for many a day, and if in the spring of 1914 there were 
signs of relaxation, the favorable conditions of English in- 
dustry were indicated by the comparative lack of unem- 
ployment. 

The impartial observer will probably recognize, in the 
pressure of German competition, a stimulus much needed 
by the easy-going Briton of the late Victorian era. The 
United Kingdom had so long dominated the markets of 
the world that the advent of a serious rival was difficult 
to imagine or understand. With true British insularity, 
her manufacturers had insisted on selling to foreign cus- 

1 Since these lines were written German propagandists in the United States have 
sought to create the impression that German trade is discriminated against in the 
colonies of the British Empire and that this policy is intended for further develop- 
ment. Nothing could be farther removed from the facts; except, of course, as 
regards the self-governing dominions. But in those countries the British Govern- 
ment has absolutely no control of fiscal policies. Canada, New Zealand, Australia, 
and South Africa have granted preferential treatment for British goods primarily 
for economic, and not for political, reasons, and it will be seen in Chapter VII that 
the German Government has accepted the principle that in tariff matters the Brit- 
ish self-governing colonies enjoy complete autonomy. 



no ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

tomers the same commodities that were acceptable to 
Englishmen. They expected peoples who spoke every lan- 
guage but English to peruse catalogues written in English. 
They ignored shipping directions, and they were indiffer- 
ent about the appearance of their product. British goods 
were supposed to rest on their reputation for quality; if 
they were not acceptable as they stood, it was not the fault 
of their makers. And so ad infinitum. The carelessness 
and lack of initiative on the part of manufacturers, the in- 
ferior quality of their agents abroad, and the utter absence 
of governmental assistance, the conservatism of investors 
and the positive ignorance of foreign lands, all contributed 
to reduce British industry almost to stagnation. 

This lassitude was not confined to business circles. The 
recklessness with which the country plunged into the Boer 
War, in the expectation of an easy victory, was an index 
of that feeling of smugness which Englishmen were wont 
to exhibit in their dealings with other people, and which 
had recently found expression in the Diamond Jubilee of 
1897. The conduct of the war, however, suggested that 
national complacency had been carried to a dangerous 
pitch, and the Prince of Wales (now King George V) was 
moved to exclaim, in a famous speech, "England, wake 
up !" It was indeed high time that she did. Her educa- 
tional system, according to the then prime minister, Mr. 
Balfour, was "chaotic, ineffectual, utterly behind the age." 
The Irish problem still remained unsolved ; there were vast 
questions of social reform which must be faced unless the 
conscience of Englishmen was utterly dead, and a new 
period in international affairs was clearly opening. The 
pursuit of pleasure and the love of sport, the luxury of 
the rich and the indifference of the middle classes were 
slowly sapping the creative power of an ancient and famous 
people, who seemed to have forgotten their glorious past 
and were now content to rest complacently upon the 



COMMERCIAL RIVALRY in 

laurels of a bygone age. In his book England and the 
English the late Price Collier has a brilliant chapter on 
"The Land of Compromise." Modern England, he sug- 
gests, has refused to face the problems of the modern world, 
and has sought refuge in her traditional policy of compro- 
mise; she is a national ostrich that hides its face in the 
sands, a twentieth-century Belshazzar who will not read the 
handwriting on the wall. "The world has changed, but 
the Englishman has changed least of all," and a casual 
reader of Mr. Collier's indictment must have despaired of 
a really United Kingdom or an Empire which was more 
than a name. 

There can be little question, however, that in the last 
ten years a new England has been in the making. One 
does not need to defend all the policies and actions of the 
Liberal government which took office in December, 1905, 
to recognize that it honestly endeavored to cope with the 
multitude of problems accumulated in the late Victorian 
period. Social reform, economic readjustment, Ireland, 
even the constitution itself — nothing escaped the attention 
of this zealous and able cabinet. We cannot judge as yet 
of the value or soundness of their measures, but we are 
very much aware of a deep awakening in the national life 
of the most conservative people in Europe. Contemporary 
England is, indeed, a kind of Rip Van Winkle, roused from 
slumber by the loud and persistent energy across the North 
Sea, and neither the world at large nor England herself 
has fully realized the significance of this awakening. 

What other country could have weathered so easily and 
so calmly the storms produced by the great strikes of 
a few years ago? Seamen, railway servants, transport 
workers, dockers, miners, etc., seemed suddenly to have 
been infested by the virus of syndicalism, and their in- 
transigeance for a while threatened to destroy the entire 
edifice of national prosperity. They unquestionably pos- 



112 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

sessed many just grievances, for of the increasing wealth 
of the country they were receiving little advantage, but 
were, on the contrary, adversely affected by the general 
rise of prices. Nor is it clear how far these elements of 
English society were satisfied with the concessions which 
their employers made with tolerable good will. Yet in 
spite of the very considerable dislocation of the national 
life caused by these recurring strikes, British commerce 
continued to expand rapidly (cf. table on p. 102) and the 
chancellor of the exchequer was able to count on a progress- 
ive increase of revenue from customs. Between 1909 and 
1 9 14, a period during which the revenue increased from 
£151,442,837 to £188,853,233, there was no increase of 
taxation — a striking contrast with Germany, where the 
imperial government was able to make both ends meet 
only by heavy borrowing (£59,3 53>97°) • 

"There is no sign of decadence in England. By contrast with 
the rapid development of Germany and of the United States she 
seems, however, to be progressing but slowly. It needs but a 
glance at the vast figures of her foreign trade, encompassing as they 
do the world-wide field of human endeavor and industry, to gain 
some understanding of what has yet to be accomplished to retire 
her to second place. To British ports come vessels of every nation 
and to every seaport in the world are sent British-owned vessels on 
trading missions. Millions of tons of staples are bought by England 
in the country of their origin, loaded on British ships, and delivered 
to her customers elsewhere without touching British ports. In 
the warehouses along the Thames and elsewhere are concentrated 
the supplies of the world, in many notable articles of commerce. 
The ivory of India and Africa are first brought here. The furs of 
the world are sold at auction in the London fur -market. Mahogany 
logs lie on the London docks awaiting transshipment to countries 
much nearer to their native growth than England. In brief, this 
little island is the commercial heart of the world, and the slowing 
or quickening of its pulses is reflected on the bourses of the nations 
of the earth. With all the internationalizing of finance which has 
come about in recent years, England still keeps tight hold upon the 
purse-strings. The London bank rate is a governing factor from 



COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 113 

New York to Peking. England has been for generations and still 
is the great creditor nation. More than £200,000,000 is scattered 
abroad annually. It is her money which builds the pioneer rail- 
roads, opens mines, dams the waters, and finances the lesser nations. 
From all these enterprises her people take their toll and seek new 
outlets for this increment. That too much money and too many 
men have been sent abroad" attracted by promise of greater returns 
is probably true. She has bled herself too freely, and the heart 
now shows some signs of weakness. The rivalry of younger and 
more daring and strenuous peoples for the trade of the world is a 
severe test of her seasoned strength." 1 

Personal impressions are doubtless of little value, but in 
1 91 3, when the writer revisited England after an absence 
of five years, he was not conscious, either in conversation 
with Englishmen or in reading the daily press, of that 
national depression and pessimism which was so noticeable 
in the first decade of this century. Domestic politics, not 
foreign affairs, were the subject of controversy. Of anti- 
German sentiment there was little or no evidence. The 
country had got used to the German navy, and except 
for a few extremists welcomed Mr. Churchill's efforts to 
strike a bargain with Admiral von Tirpitz. Trade was 
flourishing, unemployment rare, prosperity general. The 
possibility of war had almost faded from the popular mind, 
the more so as Anglo- German relations had "sensibly 
improved" during the Balkan Wars. 

It would be foolish to assert that when the war did come 
there was not in the back of the English mind the idea 
that if the royal navy could control the seas a severe blow 
would be inflicted on German foreign commerce, but such 
a result was regarded as the means to an end, not the end 
itself. There is no evidence at all to show that the destruc- 
tion of Germany as an economic Power was considered by 
Parliament in deciding to support the policy of Sir Ed- 
ward Grey. And since war was declared the sober and 

1 J. D. Whelpley, The Trade of the World, pp. 63-65. 



ii4 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

responsible journals have insisted that the annihilation of 
Germany, of the German people, was neither possible nor 
desirable for Great Britain to accomplish. No looser 
statement can be made than that British participation in 
the great conflict was dictated by cupidity or jealousy, 
for if sheer profit were the only" consideration England 
would never have risked her very existence in a struggle 
which must cost infinitely more than the sum total of 
Germany's foreign trade for many, many years. 

As a matter of fact, in the summer of 19 14 there appeared 
to be no reason for a war to destroy German commerce, 
even if one had been planned by Great Britain, for the 
economic condition of Germany was far from roseate. The 
first nine months of 191 2, a period of great commercial 
expansion, were followed by a disorganization of the rail- 
way service which occasioned great losses. Then came the 
Balkan Wars and the consequent collapse of a profitable 
market, so that during the year 1913 the shortage of cap- 
ital, first noticed at the time of the Agadir crisis, became 
quite serious. An issue of Prussian four-per-cent treasury 
bonds, offered at 99 and redeemable in 191 7, was only 
half taken up in March; a second loan in June fared little 
better, and even imperial-government consols could be 
sold only to 80 per cent of the issue. New industrial enter- 
prises decreased from £134,000,000 in 191 1 and £146,000,- 
000 in 1912 to £87,000,000 in 1913; the throbbing factories 
of Westphalia had to curtail considerably; and the building 
trade, which had been depressed since 191 1, was saved 
only by large orders from the military authorities. In 
Bavaria the toy, hat, pencil, brush, and india-rubber 
trades suffered considerably, and in the case of baskets, 
cane furniture, granite, and paint, which had been sent 
chiefly to England, the market was lost by the competi- 
tion of British manufacturers ! Unemployment assumed a 
dangerous dimension, and was the more serious because 



COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 115 

of the constant rise in the cost of living. It is also be- 
lieved that the yield of the great war tax of 1913 was far 
less than had been expected. Economically, therefore, 
Germany on the eve of the war was getting into difficulties 
for the first time since the period of expansion began, nor 
was the outlook for better times favorable. This may 
well have weighed with the military authorities in deciding 
that the time for war had come; with equal emphasis it 
would suggest to Great Britain that she had only to wait 
for a financial crisis in Germany to recover whatever 
ground had been lost in the heyday of German prosperity. 1 

1 This paragraph is a summary of the British consular reports, published in the 
appendix to Ford Madox Hueffer, When Blood is Their Argument. 



CHAPTER VI 
ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 

The relations of England and Germany, as regards 
modern international politics, begin with the year 1740. 
Not that before this date the two countries were disinter- 
ested the one in the other. The captivity of Richard the 
Lion-Hearted in the twelfth century; the election of 
Richard of Cornwall as King of the Romans in the thir- 
teenth; the appointment of Edward III as Vicar of the 
Empire on the eve of the Hundred Years' War; the im- 
portance of the Steelyard in London as an outpost of Hansa 
commerce, an experiment which insular jealousy forced 
Queen Elizabeth to terminate; the inspiration which Eng- 
lish reformers drew from the teachings of Luther and 
Zwingli; and the vacillating interference of James I in the 
Thirty Years' War: these episodes testify to a connection 
between the two lands usually political, sometimes eco- 
nomic, and latterly religious, but none the less constant 
if viewed in the perspective of centuries. In the interval 
between the close of the religious wars and the expansion 
of European politics to America and India, that is to say, 
during the growth of French ascendency in the age of 
Louis XIV, England and Brandenburg — the forerunner of 
Prussia, which was in turn the creator of Germany — 
discovered a mutual interest in the preservation of Hol- 
land from French acquisitiveness and in the protection 
of Protestantism against the onslaughts of the Most Chris- 
tian King. 

Throughout the eighteenth century Germans played an 
important part in English history. On the extinction of 

116 



ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 117 

the house of Stuart in 17 14, it was a German, the Elector 
of Hanover, who mounted the English throne as George I. 
Though his positive services to his adopted country were 
not conspicuous, he brought Handel to England, and, from 
his ignorance of the English language and English politics, 
made parliamentary government both possible and nec- 
essary. German soldiers were repeatedly the agents of 
British expansion. Thus, Gibraltar was captured, with 
the assistance of the British navy, by a force under Prince 
George of Hesse-Darmstadt. English battles on the Con- 
tinent were fought by Hanoverians or other German troops 
in English pay, and in the War of the American Revolu- 
tion Hessians were used in a manner quite familiar to us. 
Before that war there had begun an emigration of Ger- 
mans to British colonies which continued unabated until 
a generation ago; many Germans went to England itself, 
and rose rapidly in the business world. "England and its 
dominions have wisely honored and welcomed these men, 
and no lists of notables in any part of the British Empire 
could be made without including softie of German birth 
or German extraction." 1 

But not till the reign of Frederick the Great of Prussia 
did the mistress of the seas appreciate the importance of a 
fixed policy with respect to German affairs. That policy 
came to rest on two considerations, the possession of Han- 
over by English kings and a determination to resist French 
predominance in Europe. Of "Germany" or of its future 
there was no conception. As long as the house of Hapsburg 
remained the enemy of France, British statesmen found an 
Austrian alliance the natural basis of the balance of power. 
But the refusal of Maria Theresa to defend Hanover on 
the eve of the Seven Years' War and her overtures for an 
alliance with Louis XV threw England into the arms of 
the King of Prussia. From the Convention of Westmin- 

1 Lady Phillips, A Friendly Germany, Why Not ?, p. 48. 



n8 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

ster (January, 1756) and later treaties under which William 
Pitt subsidized Frederick to the extent of £670,000 a year 
immense consequences flowed. Frederick raised Prussia 
to an equality with Austria, and began the creation of that 
Germany which in recent years has been the preoccupa- 
tion, if not the terror, of Great Britain; while by conquering 
America and India on the plains of Germany the island 
kingdom laid the foundations of that colossal Empire which 
is to-day the envy of united Germany. In the light of this 
strange development, it is not surprising that German 
historians regard the abandonment of Frederick by Lord 
Bute and George III an act of treachery which might be 
repeated by a modern English cabinet to escape from an 
unprofitable alliance with the Germany of to-day. Fred- 
erick, it may be noted, recouped himself by leaving England 
to "stew in her own juice" when confronted by the Franco- 
American alliance of 1778. 

During the Napoleonic wars British policy was at one 
with German interests, to achieve the overthrow of imperial 
France. That Great Britain thought mainly of her in- 
sular security and the preservation of her Empire did not 
deprive her action of results advantageous to Germany. 
Without her subsidies to the allied armies, the pressure 
exerted by Wellington's troops in Spain, and her resistance 
to the Continental system which impelled Napoleon to 
undertake the fatal Russian campaign — above all, without 
the example of her steadfast refusal to make terms with 
the Corsican adventurer, Germany to this day might have 
been, if not a province of France, at least an outpost of 
French culture, a travesty of race and national honor. 
German historians, although they contend that Waterloo 
was won by Blucher and his Prussians, and complain of 
England's refusal at the Congress of Vienna to allow the 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Prussia, recognize the 
debt of the Continent to English wealth and English stub- 



ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 119 

bornness from 1793 to 181 5. Englishmen in turn have 
always thrilled at the thought of Prussia in 1813. Crushed, 
partitioned, and humiliated after the catastrophe of Jena, 
her people, under the guidance of Stein, Scharnhorst, 
Gneisenau, and Hardenberg, had risen as a nation in arms 
and given to the world an inspiring picture of what may 
be accomplished by a great idea and a lofty purpose. If 
the relations of England and Germany in the following 
century had continued the traditions of Napoleonic days, 
the two nations would have avoided the death-struggle in 
which they are now locked and have stood shoulder to 
shoulder as the apostles of peace and progress. Dis aliter 
visum. 

During the great peace, from 1815 to 1848, Great Britain 
settled down to the work of political regeneration, economic 
development, and humanitarian legislation. She quickly 
recovered from the strains of the war, and became the 
workshop of the world. Her colonial Empire expanded on 
all continents, her fleets policed and dominated the seas, 
and her institutions became the model for Continental 
nations. Still struggling to be free, and rent by internal 
dissensions, the latter enjoyed, if they did not merit, the 
mingled contempt and dislike of the island Power, to whose 
interest it was that they remain in a condition of innocuous 
desuetude. The pages of Thackeray reflect the attitude 
of aristocratic society toward the European peoples among 
whom they sought their pleasures, and the middle or lower 
classes were too prejudiced or too ignorant to regard "for- 
eigners" dispassionately. English insularity was probably 
at its worst in the years before nationality began to be the 
controlling factor in European affairs. 

Germany, unfortunately, entered upon an inglorious 
period in her history. In 181 5 Frederick William III of 
Prussia was hailed as the leader of Germany, for he was to 
achieve its unity and endow it with those liberal institu- 



120 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

tions which were considered the secret of English greatness. 
But his acceptance of the German Confederation, by which 
the Congress of Vienna restored Germany to the tutelage 
of absolutist and obscurantist Austria, destroyed the hopes 
of his people, and for the rest of his reign Germany groaned 
under the oppression of Metternich. The King himself 
adopted the Austrian system, which reduced Prussia to the 
rank of a second-rate Power, and thereby earned the ob- 
loquy of English liberals who conceived their own phi- 
losophy to be a panacea for all evils existent and potential. 
For this state of affairs Great Britain was in part respon- 
sible. 1 She had it in her power to dictate the settlements 
of the Congress of Vienna. Had she seen fit to demand 
the creation of a strong and united Germany, which should 
satisfy the aspirations of the German people, she might 
well have accomplished it. The Tsar Alexander ardently 
supported the claims of Prussia to the whole of Saxony, 
and Prussian statesmen demanded Alsace-Lorraine as well. 
But Alexander, who was then posing as a liberal, was dis- 
tasteful to Castlereagh, the British plenipotentiary, and 
his designs on the Ottoman Empire were suspected; Aus- 
tria was the traditional ally of Great Britain, except in the 
Seven Years' War, and was the opponent of Russian de- 
signs in the Balkans. Castlereagh, therefore, joined with 
Metternich and Talleyrand, the French representative, to 
upset the Prusso-Russian schemes, and to force the Con- 
federation upon Germany. Perhaps German unity was 
yet only an ideal, but if British statesmen could have 
looked ahead fifty years and perceived how British policy 
in the Italian wars of unification would cement an abiding 

1 For the German attitude toward English policy up to 1871, see Erich Marcks, 
England and Germany, 1500-1900 (1900), Richard Graf von Moulin-Eckart, Eng- 
lands Politik und die Machte (1901), and Heinrich Oberwinder, Die Aufgaben des 
Deulschen Reiches (1905). Lord Palmerston is severely criticised by Sir Spencer 
Walpole in his two works, History of England from 1815 and History of Twenty- 
Five Years. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 121 

friendship between England and Italy, they might well 
have done something for the great nation of central Europe. 
Intelligible as was Gastlereagh's attitude in the light of 
narrow " British interests," it is to be regretted that he had 
no vision of a Europe reconstituted on the basis of liberty 
and nationality. 

In the reaction which followed the Congress of Vienna, 
German liberals looked across the North Sea for light, for 
with the passing of Castlereagh, in 1822, English policy 
became distinctly liberalizing, in both foreign and domestic 
affairs. The Carlsbad Resolutions of 1819 gave the German 
governments absolute control over the intellectual life and 
political activities of their peoples; in comparison, England, 
even before the Reform Act of 1832, was free and enlight- 
ened. Not even the unconstitutional regime in Hanover, 
which was still bound to England by a personal union, 
and until its severance refused to join the Zollverein, could 
dampen the enthusiasm of German professors for the in- 
stitutions and liberties of England. In official circles, on 
the other hand, English policy was not popular, more espe- 
cially after Palmerston, speaking in the House of Com- 
mons, advised the German princes to restrain their reac- 
tionary tendencies. 

The name of Palmerston hangs like a dead weight over 
Anglo- German relations till the days of Bismarck. Con- 
trolling the foreign relations of Great Britain for the 
greater part of a generation, he certainly achieved some 
remarkable successes. The independence and neutrality 
of Belgium, the establishment of British influence in China, 
and the checking of French and Russian designs in the 
Near East are not less conspicuous than his benevolent 
neutrality in Italian politics, without which Italy might 
never have been made. But with respect to Germany, 
his attitude was deplorable. He described the country 
as "a land of damned professors," and quoted with favor 



122 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

the aphorism of Voltaire, that its people should be content 
to rule the clouds, while France ruled the land and Britain 
the seas. While the Frankfort Assembly of 1848 purchased 
a fleet to protect Schleswig-Holstein from Danish acquisi- 
tiveness, he airily remarked that the "German" flag was 
unknown to international law, and that British cruisers 
might treat the ships of the Confederation as "pirates"! 
His policy was regarded as meddlesome, high-handed, and 
treacherous. The famous doggerel, 

"Hat der Teufel einen Sohn, 
1st er sicher Palmerston," 

reflects accurately German antipathy to the great Eng- 
lishman. His dismissal from office in 185 1, for a too 
prompt recognition of Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat, was 
hailed with delight at the German courts, and his diplo- 
macy was felt to be an important factor in the maintenance 
of British economic supremacy, which aimed to keep Ger- 
many divided in the interests of its own monopoly. But 
his worst offense was to exclude Prussia from the Congress 
of Paris, which met after the Crimean War, until the terms 
of peace had been settled, although as a neutral nation 
Prussia had no legal claim to participate. 

As Lord Palmerston enjoyed boundless popularity among 
all classes of Englishmen they accepted his view of a coun- 
try about which they knew little and cared less. The typ- 
ical German, as portrayed in literature and on the stage, 
was "a genial, wool-gathering professor in a formidable 
pair of spectacles, untidy of habit, and far from athletic 
in form, the dedicated slave rather than the possessor of 
several large note-books and a collecting-box." 1 Not even 
the old universities were free from the prevailing preju- 
dice, perhaps because they were strongholds of Anglicism 
and suspected the "undisciplined freethinkers" (Palmer- 

1 The Round Table, September, 1Q14, p. 617. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 123 

ston) of Germany. 1 Prince Albert was long disliked as a 
foreigner scarcely worthy to be the consort of an English 
queen, in spite of the deep regard of Frederick William IV 
for Queen Victoria 2 and the partiality of Bunsen, his min- 
ister at the court of St. James, for English institutions. 3 
Finally, the international exhibition of 1851, held to de- 
monstrate the complete superiority of English civilization 
and the ineffable blessings of peace, was considered a kind 
of rebuke to Germany for the revolution of 1848 and the 
backward "Kultur" which produced them. 

On the other hand, says Sir Harry Johnston, "the mar- 
riage of Queen Victoria gave a fresh impetus to the Ger- 
manization of Britain. Notable Germans were more or 
less directly brought to this country by those far-seeing 
helpers of England, Leopold and Albert of Saxe-Coburg. 
They explored unknown lands for the British Empire, 
founded colleges of music and chemistry, schools and mu- 
seums of art, studios in philology, ancient and modern, 
improved both theatre and drama, extended horticulture, 

1 See W. Tuckwell, Reminiscences of Oxford, p. 147. 

1 In 1848 he addressed to Queen Victoria the following remarkable letter: "Most 
Gracious Queen and Sister . . . God has permitted events [the Paris revolution 
of February, 1848] which decisively threaten the peace of Europe. ... If the 
revolutionary party carries out its programme, 'the sovereignty of the people,' my 
minor crown will be broken no less certainly than the mighty crowns of your Majesty, 
and a fearful scourge laid upon the nations: a century of rebellion, lawlessness, and 
godlessness. . . . God has placed in your Majesty's hands and the hands of the 
two Emperors, and in those of the German Confederacy and in mine, a power which, 
if it acts now in union and harmony, with reliance on Heaven, is able, humanly speak- 
ing, to enforce with certainty the maintenance of the peace of the world. . . . The 
power I mean is 'the power of united speech.' In the year 1830 the use of this 
immeasurable power was criminally neglected. ... On both knees I adjure you, 
use, for the welfare of Europe, ' Engellands England.' With these words I fall at 
your Majesty's feet." (Letters of Queen Victoria, vol. II, p. 151.) 

3 The comment of a Pan-German is worth reading. Bunsen was "the worst 
choice that could have been made. Instead of being a man of the old Prussian 
type, he was a weak and fanciful representative, whose Anglomania was accentuated 
by his English wife." He desired an Anglo-German alliance, "forgetful of what 
such an alliance had cost Prussia " in the time of Frederick the Great. And "the 
almost sickening prejudice of Frederick William IV was increased by Bunsen's 
effusive reports." (Moulin-Eckart, Englands Politik und die Machte, p. 60.) This 
is practically a paraphrase of Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte, vol. V, pp. 125-6. 



124 . ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

and assisted to make Kew Gardens and the Herbarium 
what they are and have been to an Empire in which eco- 
nomic botany is a matter of necessity, not a pretty lux- 
ury as some of our home-bred statesmen have imagined. 
Glance through the eminent names which have become 
famous during the nineteenth century in British colonial 
and imperial history, in British exploration, biology, metal- 
lurgy, painting, music, journalism, banking, law making 
and expounding, soldiering and seamanship, and note how 
many are of recent or immediate extraction." x There fol- 
lows a truly astonishing list of notabilities who gave Eng- 
land their best efforts, and were well rewarded by a grateful 
country. Between none of the countries now at war did 
there exist such close and intimate personal relations of 
long standing as between England and Germany. 

When the movement for German unification began to 
take definite shape, Queen Victoria lent her sympathy and 
her influence to the Prussian cause, 2 but Bismarck's defi- 
ance of the Prussian Diet aroused much indignation. The 
foreign office had no definite policy, although it did not 
stand alone in this respect, for Bismarck's designs were 
nowhere understood, not even in Germany itself. Palmer- 
ston had once written (22 November, 1850): 

"We should have no objection to see Prussia take the first place; 
on the contrary, a German union, embracing all the smaller states, 
with Prussia at its head, and in alliance with Austria as a separate 
Power, would have been a very good European arrangement." 3 

With such remarkable prescience did Palmerston envisage 
the future organization of central Europe, but when the 
crucial moment came he abandoned this view for a policy 
of bluster. 

1 Views and Reviews, p. 104. 

2 Cf. Sir Sidney Lee, Life of Queen Victoria, passim. 
8 Ashley, Life of Lord Palmerston, vol. II, p. 171. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 125 

The unification of Germany began when Bismarck in- 
terested himself in the problem of Schleswig-Holstein. 
That question was one of the most complicated which 
ever confronted European diplomacy. As Palmerston ex- 
plained, only three persons had ever understood it: the 
Danish prime minister, who had lost his mind; the late 
Prince Albert; and himself, who had forgotten it. 1 It did 
not occur to him that the Prussian statesman had thor- 
oughly grasped the possibilities of the situation, and as 
the status of the duchies rested on an international agree- 
ment of 1852 Palmerston supposed in 1863, when the 
attempt Of Denmark to annex them brought both the Ger- 
man Confederation and Prussia on the scene, that the Con- 
cert of Europe would settle the matter. Hence his state- 
ment that, if any violent attempt were made to overthrow 
the rights or interfere with the independence of Denmark, 
those who made the attempt would find that they would 
not have to contend with Denmark alone. A more un- 
fortunate declaration could not have been made, because 
England was not prepared to use force on behalf of Den- 
mark, even if the Prince of Wales had just married a Da- 
nish princess, and diplomacy was quite unable to prevent 
Bismarck from taking both Schleswig and Holstein for 
Prussia. 2 "The war of 1864 was one of the great cross- 

1 The problem itself and the insufficiency of British diplomacy is admirably pre- 
sented in the Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier, 1 826-1 876. Sir Robert was 
one of the few Englishmen who possessed an adequate knowledge of German affairs. 
He was attached to the Berlin embassy, and had his advice been followed the ques- 
tion would probably have been peacefully settled ; which doubtless explains Bis- 
marck's bitter dislike of him and his rejection for the Berlin embassy after the uni- 
fication of the empire. 

J "When in the year 1864 the sudden death of the King of Denmark opened up 
the Schleswig-Holstein question, the British Government proposed to France that 
they should oppose the advance of Prussia and Austria-Hungary, that is, they should 
interfere in the internal affairs of Germany, with a view to hindering the advance- 
ment of German unity." (So Heinrich Oberwinder, Die Wellkrise und die Aufgaben 
des Deutschen Reiches, p. 37.) This is, of course, a ridiculous overstatement, because 
the Schleswig-Holstein question had been internationalized by the Treaty of 1852, 
and no one, not even the Germans themselves, who were far from approving of Bis- 
marck's policy, anticipated his real intentions. Until after the war with Austria 



126 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

roads of British history," observes a competent student of 
naval affairs, and he opines that England "took the wrong 
turning. The great German chancellor candidly admitted 
that the possession of Kiel and a strategic canal through 
Holstein were two of the principal objects which Prussia 
had when she drew the sword. ... A war which should 
have left Schleswig-Holstein in the hands of Denmark 
would have been . . . exceedingly advantageous, eco- 
nomical, and opportune for Great Britain." 1 But royal 
interference restrained Palmerston and Russell, and Bis- 
marck had achieved the first of his great triumphs. 

Not until the defeat of Austria in the war of 1866 and 
the establishment of the North German Confederation did 
England comprehend the progress of events in central 
Europe. But as the policy of Napoleon III grew more 
reckless, English sentiment began to see in the new Ger- 
many an important bulwark for the balance of power. 
The annexation of Savoy and Nice by the French Em- 
peror after he had withdrawn from the Italian War of 
Liberation, had been deeply resented in England, and his 
negotiations with Bismarck for "compensation" on the 
morrow of Sadowa branded him as a veritable highway- 
man. His raising of the Luxemburg question in 1867 
ended by involving England in a difficult pledge to pro- 
tect its neutrality. And as it became evident that the 
Second Empire was tottering he was expected to stake all 
on a last desperate throw. 

For these reasons English opinion, in the early stages 
of the Franco- German War, was decidedly favorable to 
Germany. She had been attacked after conceding the 
essential point in the preliminary diplomacy. On 25 July, 
1870, the Times published a draft treaty, in the hand- 
Bismarck was generally regarded as a traitor to the German cause. Herr Ober- 
winder's remark admirably illustrates the fashion in which history has been dis- 
torted to serve modern political ambition. 
1 Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power, p. 87. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 127 

writing of the French ambassador in Berlin, which pro- 
vided for the annexation of Belgium to France, and to the 
same newspaper Thomas Carlyle, then at the height of 
his influence, sent a long letter in praise of Germany. 1 The 
Queen's sympathy was known to be with the German 
legions. In short, politicians and publicists were agreed that 
a strong Germany was essential to Europe and to England ; 
to quote the Times, a propos of the adhesion of the South 
German states to the North German Confederation, "in 
this the policy of past generations of English statesmen 
will be fulfilled." 2 The first French defeats aroused no 
sympathy — they were considered a proper punishment for 
a reckless and uncalled-for declaration of war. 

But the disinterested spectator could not remain indif- 
ferent to the fate of France. Bismarck's protest against 
the sale of coals and ammunition to France by Newcastle 
and Birmingham, and the refusal of the German military 
authorities to let an English gunboat ascend the Seine to- 
remove British subjects from France were not kindly re- 
ceived, and when, after Sedan and the collapse of the 
Empire, it was realized that the Germans would make 
peace only for a heavy price, English opinion began to 
rally to France. To the feeling that France should not be 
unduly punished for the mistakes of a government she 
had repudiated, the desire was added that the city and 
people of Paris should be spared the horrors of war. Lord 
Granville therefore endeavored to bring about an armistice 
before the capital should be bombarded. Bismarck spoke 
of this proposal as so much "rubbish," pretending to be- 
lieve that slow starvation and the horrors of a siege were 
worse than a bombardment; in his Reflections and Remi- 
niscences he declared that the Commune was directly caused 
by conditions arising out of the siege. In the same place, 
and even more in Moritz Busch's Bismarck : Some Secret 

1 11 November, 1870. 2 10 December, 1870. 



128 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Pages of His History., his irritation against England finds 
constant expression: now a complaint that the Crown 
Princess, who was the daughter of Queen Victoria, was 
influencing the King or her husband; now a lament that 
the two men were more anxious to be praised in the English 
press than to further the interests of Germany. Nor was 
Bismarck pleased when Lord Granville protested vigor- 
ously against Russia's repudiation of that clause of the 
Treaty of Paris which restricted her from building war- 
ships in the Black Sea, for he himself had urged this action 
upon Prince Gortchakoff, the Russian chancellor; and in 
the London conference which met to consider the Russian 
demand, the Prussian representative voted steadily with 
his Russian colleague. In such an atmosphere the sug- 
gestion of Queen Victoria that King William should be 
"magnanimous" in the final terms of peace was ignored; 
while Gladstone's protest against the annexation of Alsace- 
Lorraine inspired Bismarck with a permanent dislike for 
the great Englishman and a contempt often manifested 
in the title "Professor" Gladstone. 1 

British policy, throughout this period of Bismarckian 
triumphs, was frankly opportunist, and perhaps it was a 
mistake not to take sides more resolutely. "A great 
English statesman would either have prevented the uni- 

1 Sybel in his Begriindung des Deutsches Reiches, of course, follows the cue of Bis- 
marck. Oberwinder and Moulin-Eckart, in the works cited, are very bitter because 
Great Britain did not prevent the war with France, as if Bismarck had not boasted, 
in the Reflections and Reminiscences, that he had contrived to make the war inevi- 
table! Professor Marcks writes: "The unity of Germany was accomplished with- 
out the aid, and somewhat against the wishes, of England. The historian under- 
stands how the interests of Great Britain caused her indifference and unfriendliness, 
but he also understands how her course of action affected Germany. The German 
mind does not understand, and has not yet forgotten, how the land it had hitherto 
so greatly admired, and which was so closely akin to it, so bitterly disappointed 
it." (England and Germany, 1500-1900, p. 50.) As a matter of fact, Lord Gran- 
ville did endeavor to mediate between France and Germany in the two weeks before 
the war, and his policy as regards the neutrality of Belgium was scrupulously im- 
partial. Cf. Morley, Life of Gladstone ; Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville ; Lord 
Augustus Loftus, Diplomatic Reminiscences, second series; Wemyss, Memoirs and 
Letters of Sir Robert Morier. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 129 

fication of Germany or have loyally welcomed it as a guar- 
antee of the peace of Europe." * But British interests 
were not directly involved; "watchful waiting" and a 
strict neutrality were seemingly called for in the circum- 
stances of the moment. Thanks to its ignorance of Ger- 
man affairs, English opinion had not grasped the necessity 
of German unity — it could not see that "Germany" de- 
served its sympathy quite as much as "Italy." English 
assistance was invaluable to Garibaldi and Cavour ; why 
should it be denied to Bismarck and Moltke ? 

The answer, of course, is that Cavour fought for an in- 
telligible purpose; from the first the unification of Italy 
was his acknowledged aim, and his policy enjoyed the en- 
thusiastic support of the Sardinian Parliament and the 
people of Italy. When Italy was made, parliamentary 
government became the basis of her national fife, union 
and liberty went hand in hand. Such a cause appealed 
strongly to all classes of Englishmen. But they were ut- 
terly unable to understand the devious ways of Otto von 
Bismarck. His defiance of the Prussian Diet in the in- 
terests of the army; his unblushing destruction of the 
liberties of Schleswig-Holstein to protect which had been 
the ostensible purpose of his policy; and the annexation of 
Hanover and other small states after the war of 1866, were 
disgusting and repugnant to the English mind. Had a 
liberal Prussia, such as was struggling to be born when 
Bismarck thrust his sinister personality into the balance, 
struck for the unity of Germany, had the liberal ideas of 
some of the lesser princes been more favorably received by 
the Prussian Government, England would doubtless have 
rallied to the German national cause with the same en- 
thusiasm which enabled Palmerston and Russell to support 
the Italian patriots against a reactionary Austria. But 

1 Sidney Whitman, "England and Germany," in Harper's Magazine, April, 1898, 
P- 783. 



130 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Bismarck cared little for German nationality — he thought 
only of Prussian supremacy, and Englishmen could not 
respond to the autocratic and military ideals of Prusso- 
Germany. Even so, the events of 1862-71 received sym- 
pathetic treatment at the hands of Mr. C. A. Fyfle, whose 
History of Modern Europe long was, and perhaps still is, 
the standard account of nineteenth-century history. 

We shall not be far from the truth if we say that English- 
men were taken aback by the meteoric rise of Prussia to 
the headship of a great nation, the more so because her 
methods were contrary to English traditions, but there 
was no disposition to ignore the new Power. To contend, 
as some superpatriotic Germans have done, that Great 
Britain tried to prevent the unification of the fatherland 
or to "embitter the proudest moments of our victory by 
phrases about civilization and humanity," x is absurd, 
pace Bismarck and Busch. Whatever the unpleasant 
features of the new Power, they were expected to dis- 
appear when the Crown Prince should inaugurate a more 
liberal system upon his accession to the throne. For 
twenty years after the creation of the German Empire — 
that is, until the dismissal of Bismarck — the attitude of 
Great Britain was decidedly friendly, in spite of many dis- 
agreeable incidents, and the possibility of a fatal quarrel 
between the two countries was beyond imagination. 

The unification of Italy and Germany fixed the map of 
Europe, outside of the Balkans, for forty-three years — from 
187 1 to the beginning of the Great War. The new Ger- 
many was immeasurably stronger than the old Prussia, 
whose part in international politics since 181 5 had been 
negligible. South of the Alps an entirely new Power had 
arisen. The war of 1866 with Prussia and the compro- 
mise with Hungary in the following year had transformed 

1 Moulin-Eckart, Englands Politik und die Machte, p. 76. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 131 

Austria into a dual monarchy. The future of France, 
shorn of two fair provinces and equipped with a genuine 
constitutional system for the first time in her history, was 
problematical. Only England and Russia had experienced 
no organic changes. 

It was natural, therefore, that for some years interna- 
tional politics should be in a state of flux. For Bismarck 
the great problem was: Will defeated France accept the 
new situation? She could undertake a war of revenge, 
he saw clearly, only if she were allied with Austria or 
Russia. So, to keep the new Republic isolated, the chan- 
cellor in 1872 devised the Three Emperors' League, an 
elastic agreement between the Tsar, the Austrian ruler, 
and' the German Emperor, whose nominal purpose was the 
preservation of monarchical principles in Europe. As room 
in this combination was left for Italy, and Great Britain 
was eschewing an active part in Continental politics, Bis- 
marck's ascendency was complete. France was helpless, 
and was quite aware of the fact. 

Then occurred one of those incidents which have done 
so much to prejudice Germany in the eyes of other nations. 
In 1874-5 the military party in Berlin professed much 
alarm at the rapid recovery of France from the effects of 
the war, and in particular at the reorganization of her army. 
The Kulturkampf was then at its height, and Bismarck 
was disposed to relieve the internal pressure by a vigor- 
ous foreign policy. The international atmosphere suddenly 
became thick with rumors of a second Franco-German war, 
nor were they dissipated when the French Government 
communicated to the Times a report from its ambassador 
in Berlin on German war preparations. Bismarck always 
denied that war was in sight at this time ; on the contrary, 
he asserted that he had restrained the military enthusiasts. 
But the evidence is against his contention. Queen Vic- 
toria wrote to Bismarck and Emperor William, and at the 



132 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

critical moment Gortchakoff descended on Berlin, from 
which, after an interview with the Emperor and Bismarck, 
he issued a circular beginning: "Peace is now assured." 
The peace was not broken, but Europe was stunned to 
observe that in four years Germany had "learned and exag- 
gerated the besetting vice of the people she had conquered," 
with the distinction that while French chauvinism was 
"spasmodical and undisciplined," hers was "methodical, 
calculating, cold-blooded, and self-contained." x 

The repercussions of this war scare were soon felt. Bis- 
marck was furious with Gortchakoff, whose conduct could 
be regarded as either an insinuation or an affront; the 
Three Emperors' League was doomed. As the Turkish 
crisis of 1875-8 developed and revealed Russia and Austria 
as rivals in the Balkans, Bismarck drew closer to the latter 
Power, and at the Congress of Berlin consistently supported 
the Anglo-Austrian pretensions against Russia. It was 
also clear that Russia would not permit France to be crushed 
at the convenience of German militarism, and that Great 
Britain, under the leadership of Lord Beaconsfield, was 
conscious of her duty as a European Power. Russian opin- 
ion deeply resented this ingratitude for Russian neutrality 
during the wars of unification; it suddenly gave vent to 
much abuse of Germany, and early in 1879 Russo-German 
relations became very strained. 

Under these circumstances Bismarck negotiated an agree- 
ment with Austria which was expanded into the Triple 
Alliance by the adhesion of Italy in 1882. So far as is 
known the purpose of the combination was purely defen- 
sive. Austria was not pledged to act against France, nor 
Italy against Russia. In this form the Triple Alliance en- 
dured for thirty- three years as one of the "hard facts" 

1 Wemyss, Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier, II, p. 346. The evidence 
is discussed in J. Holland Rose, The Development of the Modern European Nations, 
1905, chap. 12: "The Triple and Dual Alliances." See also Lord Newton, Life of 
Lord Lyons vol. II, pp. 67-84. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 133 

(Prince Biilow) of Continental politics. Thus the three 
Powers which had been born or reorganized in the third 
quarter of the century were united to preserve the new 
settlements; furthermore, they formed a compact block 
in the centre of Europe, recalling after a fashion the old 
Holy Roman Empire, and their united military strength 
was irresistible. 

Here was a fact of which British statesmen were not 
slow to take advantage. Since 181 5 British policy had en- 
deavored to restrain the aggressive tendencies of France, 
and to check the advance of Russia toward the Mediter- 
ranean or the frontiers of India. Thanks to German arms, 
France had ceased to be dangerous; but the revision of 
the Treaty of Paris in 187 1 and Lord Beaconsfield's diplo- 
macy in the crisis which culminated in the Congress of 
Berlin had aggravated Anglo-Russian bickerings almost to 
the point of war. On the other hand, German assistance 
had been invaluable in securing the "peace with honor" 
(Treaty of Berlin), and Bismarck had formally stated that 
there was no conflict of interests between England and 
Germany. Lord Salisbury, who held the foreign office 
from 1878 to 1880, welcomed the news of the Austro- 
German alliance as "good tidings of great joy." x Accord- 
ing to one account, Bismarck proposed an Anglo-German 
alliance to Lord Beaconsfield on the morrow of the Berlin 
Congress, and the idea was cordially received, but the elec- 
tion of 1880 drove the Conservative statesmen from office 
before the negotiations were complete. It is likewise stated 
that in 1887 Bismarck wrote a personal letter to Lord Salis- 
bury, to urge that England join the Triple Alliance, but that 
the latter was then too obsessed by his policy of "splendid 
isolation." 2 

Generally speaking, the British Government co-operated 

1 Speech at Manchester, 17 October, 1879. 

2 Daily Telegraph, 12 May, 19 12. Special correspondence from Vienna. 



134 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

with the Powers of the Triple Alliance as long as Bismarck 
was chancellor of the German Empire. England and Aus- 
tria equally desired the exclusion of Russia from the Bal- 
kans; Lord Granville accordingly sought and secured the 
help of Bismarck in carrying out the treaty of Berlin. 
England and Italy were at one in opposing the pretensions 
of France in the Mediterranean, especially after the latter's 
occupation of Tunis; in 1888 some kind of bargain was 
made between the first two Powers, and a British squadron 
appeared in Italian waters when Franco-Italian relations 
became difficult. "In Egypt," Bismarck declared, "I 
am English." If the decade from 1880 to 1890 be viewed 
as a whole, Anglo-German intimacy must be credited with 
evicting Russia from the control of Bulgaria and prevent- 
ing General Boulanger from precipitating a war of revenge. 
Disputes there were between London and Berlin. Bis- 
marck refused to tolerate the marriage of Prince Alexander 
of Battenberg, the deposed ruler of Bulgaria, with the 
daughter of the Crown Princess, an arrangement upon 
which Queen Victoria had set her heart. His treatment 
of the Crown Princess, amounting almost to persecution, 
and his conduct toward the Emperor Frederick during his 
brief reign of three months (March- June, 1888) aroused 
much resentment in England. He boasted to Busch, his 
Boswell, that he encouraged the colonial ambitions of 
France to make bad blood between Paris and London; 
he frequently complained that Great Britain was endeavor- 
ing to use Germany as a catspaw in her quarrels with Rus- 
sia; he often discanted upon that hypocrisy which most 
Germans believe is the dominant trait of the English char- 
acter. He raised no objection when Russia provoked the 
Pendjeh incident on the Afghan frontier shortly after the 
death of Gordon at Khartoum; and he was not opposed to 
a Russian occupation of Constantinople provided Austria 
was given a free rein in the western Balkans. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1S90 135 

In the difficult question of colonial expansion, which 
was now coming to the fore, there was considerable wran- 
gling between England and Germany; at times the tension 
was acute, as the Life of Lord Granville clearly reveals. 
But the statement of Professor Hans Delbriick, that, "im- 
mediately on taking her first steps to share in the exploita- 
tion of the earth, Germany encountered the negative of 
England and, in consequence of the English attitude, ac- 
quired during a quarter of a century only very few and 
very unimportant colonies," 1 is an exaggeration. In two 
instances Great Britain did impose her veto. In 1884 the 
British flag was hoisted at Santa Lucia Bay, on the east 
coast of Africa, shortly before a German man-of-war ar- 
rived for a similar purpose; and the following year Bech- 
uanaland was occupied, to prevent a junction between the 
Transvaal and German Southwest Africa. The refusal to 
surrender Walfisch Bay to the last-named colony may also 
be considered a legitimate grievance, although the Union 
Jack was hoisted there before Germany manifested any 
interest in the region; for that matter, the London authori- 
ties would probably have surrendered the possession ex- 
cept for the emphatic protests of Cape Colony. 

For the rest, Downing Street made a point of admitting 
the claims of Germany where they did not conflict with 
a well-recognized and clearly established British interest. 
In some cases anterior British rights were renounced in 
order to humor Germany. Lord Granville withdrew the 
British claims to Angra Pequena (Luderitz Bay), which 
became the nucleus of German Southwest Africa. He wel- 
comed the protectorate over Togoland, on the ground that 
Germany was a more desirable neighbor than France, 
which would then have surrounded the Gold Coast on three 
sides; and he made it possible for a German agent to ac- 

1 "The Price of a German-English Entente," Contemporary Review, February,. 
1911, p. 13. 



136 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

quire the Cameroons for the fatherland. He yielded to 
German remonstrances against an Anglo-Portuguese con- 
vention of 1884 which would have secured the control of 
the lower Congo region by the signatories. Finally, he 
restricted the British claims in New Guinea, in order that 
Germany might have a share of the island, in spite of vigor- 
ous objections from Australia. 

The only serious rivalry between England and Germany 
concerned Zanzibar, where each had strong claims. In 
the end Lord Salisbury arrived at a complete understanding 
with Count Caprivi, which was recorded in the conven- 
tion of 1890. Germany's claims to what is now — or was, 
before the war — German East Africa were admitted, ex- 
cept that the island of Zanzibar remained a British pro- 
tectorate; Great Britain in return secured a free hand in 
Uganda. But, in the light of later developments, the most 
important provision was the cession of Heligoland, for 
which Bismarck had been clamoring since 1884. This 
must always remain the conclusive proof that Great Britain 
was not jealous of a legitimate German expansion, for that 
would have been impossible so long as Heligoland gave the 
British navy a base of operations on the very coast of Ger- 
many. If Germany was not satisfied with her acquisitions 
in Africa and the Pacific, the blame must rest, not upon 
Great Britain, but with the policy of Bismarck, who delib- 
erately encouraged France to a programme of colonial 
adventure in order to divert her thoughts from Alsace- 
Lorraine and a war of revenge. 

The truth is, Bismarck never allowed any difference 
with England to become serious. Mr. Sidney Whitman, 
who knew the prince better than any Englishman, has 
said that "he was free from that petty dislike of England 
so often imputed to him." 1 In his German Memories, the 
same writer has stated: 

1 Conversations with Prince Bismarck, p. 173. 



ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 137 

"I know for a fact that Bismarck's final verbal instructions to 
German officials, such as consuls and diplomatic agents to India 
and Egypt, invariably culminated in the words: 'Do all you can to 
obtain the good will of the English. You need never use a cipher 
in telegraphing, for we have nothing to conceal from them. It would 
be madness for us to quarrel with England, or she with us.' " l 

Various statements of Bismarck to the Reichstag might 
be quoted to show his appreciation of England's position 
with respect to Germany : it will suffice to recall that upon 
the conclusion of the convention of 1890, which was not 
popular in Germany because Zanzibar was conceded to 
England, although Heligoland was given in exchange, he 
declared that the good will of England was more important 
to Germany than the whole of Africa, and he might have 
added that Germany had secured the colonies she then 
possessed in Africa through the good will of the British 
Government. 2 Whatever the mistakes or evil deeds of 
the Iron Chancellor may have been — and he can be charged 
with a good many of both; however much he might differ 
with Great Britain in even important matters, till at times 
his relations with London were severely strained — he was 
under no illusions as to the danger which the permanent 
hostility of the British Empire would be to the splendid 
edifice of German power he had been at such pains to con- 
struct. In no phase of his policy did he show more strik- 
ingly his ability to distinguish between the possible and the 
impossible. This is not to say that Bismarck would not 
have broken with England if he had remained in office 
till his death, but one thing is certain — he would not have 
risked such a quarrel until he had squared Germany's 
account with France and have arranged with Russia for a 
diversion against British interests in Asia. 

In England there was no disposition to regard Germany 
as an enemy. Sir Charles Dilke, easily the most acute 

1 P. 125. 2 This appears clearly in Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville. 



138 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

observer of international politics in his day, presented a 
sympathetic view of Germany in his Present Position of 
European Politics (1887), and was able to say: " Little harm 
has been done to English interests by Germany since she 
became the foremost of Continental Powers, and few occa- 
sions of serious difficulty between the countries are likely 
to arise." 1 He thought that the German general staff, 
underrating the military capacity of England, would attack 
France through Belgium in case of another war between 
the two nations, but he credited Germany with a desire 
to keep the peace, and believed that if Belgium strength- 
ened her army, so that it might offer effective resistance, 
war in western Europe might be indefinitely postponed. 

To-day two kindred nations, who have more in com- 
mon than any other European nations as regards natural 
characteristics, and who have through the centuries usu- 
ally stood shoulder to shoulder in the great movements of 
European history, whose best interests, separate and re- 
ciprocal, would have been best served by the permanent 
enjoyment of peace, are locked in a struggle to the death. 
Even if a drawn battle is the ultimate result the loss to 
each country will be enormous, almost irreparable; more 
likely one will be badly defeated by the other and will 
sink from the high position it has hitherto enjoyed in the 
world. Is it possible to determine with any approach to 
accuracy or fairness where the responsibility for this lamen- 
table rupture should rest? An overwhelming majority of 
Americans have close ties with either England or Germany; 
they would rejoice to see a lasting peace established be- 
tween the two most progressive countries of the Old 
World. In the succeeding chapters an effort will be made 
to discuss these problems as dispassionately as possible, 
and, if possible, to establish the responsibility for the 
rupture of 1914. 



CHAPTER VII 
THE QUARREL 

The last decade of the nineteenth century is a very 
confused period for the student of international politics. 
It opened with an Anglo-German convention which seemed 
to dispose of all serious disputes between the two govern- 
ments; at its close the world had become aware of an 
Anglo- German rivalry that boded ill for the peace of Europe. 
In 1890 the Triple Alliance was well-nigh omnipotent in 
Europe; in 1900 it was confronted by a hostile alliance 
of France and Russia, with which Powers, however, the 
German Empire had managed to preserve tolerably cor- 
dial relations. The position of Great Britain had changed 
most of all. Lord Salisbury and Prince Bismarck were in 
substantial agreement in 1890; in 1900 Anglo-German re- 
lations were so delicate, thanks to the inflamed state of 
public opinion on both sides of the North Sea, that the 
most careful handling of the difficulties arising out of 
the Boer War was required of the German Government to 
prevent an open rupture. Four years later, on April 8, 
1904, France and England signed a series of agreements, 
which not only adjusted numerous disputes of long stand- 
ing, but rescued England from the "splendid isolation" to 
which the policy of Lord Salisbury condemned her, and 
effected a diplomatic revolution comparable only to the 
reversal of alliances on the eve of the Seven Years' War. 
The essential point lay in the fact that Great Britain passed 
over to the side of Germany's hereditary enemy, France, 
and by her action restored a semblance of equilibrium to 
a Europe long dominated by Germany. 

139 



140 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

The most striking characteristic of these fifteen years 
is the absence of any guiding hand in the international 
game, for William II was a poor substitute for the great 
Bismarck. The Iron Chancellor had insured the predomi- 
nance of Germany by "keeping the wire open to St. Peters- 
burg." William II, in 1890, refused to renew the secret 
"reinsurance" treaty, out of loyalty to Francis Joseph, 
his formal ally, and Bismarck resigned shortly afterward. 
His passing removed the last obstacle to that Franco- 
Russian alliance which he had always feared, and which 
had been foreshadowed by Russian loans in Paris, not to 
speak of Russian warnings to Berlin in 1875 and 1887 that 
the Tsar would not allow France to be crushed. The alli- 
ance was concluded sometime between 1891, when a French 
fleet visited Cronstadt, and 1896, when the Tsar came to 
Paris, probably in 1895. The treaty has never been pub- 
lished; its purely defensive character and its limitation to 
European affairs, however, have always been assumed. 
For some years the French unquestionably cherished the 
hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine with the help of Russia, 
and Germans were able to stigmatize the alliance as un- 
natural, on the ground that a democratic and republican 
country could have nothing in common with an autocratic 
empire. But their own policy was primarily to blame for 
this development, and they must be held in large measure 
responsible for the enormous armies of recent years. After 
all, France was merely reviving the policy of her Valois 
and Bourbon kings, who always maintained an alliance 
with some state of Eastern Europe against the predominant 
power in Germany. Whatever the motives of the Repub- 
lic may have been, Germany was henceforth compelled to 
reckon with the possibility of a simultaneous attack on 
both frontiers. William II, therefore, tried to handle the 
situation by diverting the new alliance to his own purposes. 

There is some reason for believing that it was directed, 



THE QUARREL 141 

in the first instance, against Great Britain. Here was 
Germany's opportunity. She was resolved to become a 
world, as distinct from a European, Power; she believed 
that England was the chief obstacle to her success in such 
a policy, and English opinion, it may be admitted, had 
not taken kindly to her first ventures in this field. Further- 
more, in the lack of an adequate German fleet, the assist- 
ance of France and "Russia was essential for any humilia- 
tion of the island Power. 

It happened that the French foreign minister from 1894 
to 1898, M. Gabriel Hanotaux, was by no means averse 
to a policy of " pin-pricks" which would cause embarrass- 
ment to Great Britain in various parts of the world. Since 
the dismissal of Bismarck William II had in various ways 
tried to cultivate friendly relations with France. So it 
was easy for Paris and Berlin to strike up a temporary 
accord. In 1894 they protested successfully against an 
Anglo-Congolese treaty which would have given Great 
Britain a connecting strip of territory between Rhodesia 
and the Uganda Protectorate. The following year Ger- 
many supported the Dual Alliance in "advising" Japan 
to give back Port Arthur, which China had surrendered 
by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and winked at its subse- 
quent seizure by Russia, who had made no opposition to 
the German occupation of Kiao-Chou. Next, Germany 
was certainly aware of, and may possibly have abetted, 
the expedition of Major Marchand, which the French 
Government sent into the Sudan in the hope of blocking 
the recovery of that region by the Anglo-Egyptian forces 
under Sir Herbert (now Lord) Kitchener; when the expe- 
dition was abruptly stopped at Fashoda by Lord Kitch- 
ener's victory near Khartoum, Germany offered, so Eng- 
lishmen believe, to make a demonstration in South Africa 
if France would hold firm. In the same year Prince Miin- 
ster, the German ambassador in Paris, proposed an alliance 



142 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

with France in order to nullify the British guarantee of 
the Portuguese colonies, which was understood to be the 
price of a free passage for British troops through Delagoa 
Bay into the Transvaal. As all these overtures required 
a tacit recognition by France of the Treaty of Frankfort, 
they led to nothing definite, but generally speaking Germany 
supported the aggressive policy of both France and Russia, 
who were still the rivals of Great Britain. If she gained 
little for herself, the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897 for 
preserving the status quo in the Balkans removed a serious 
obstacle to her own programme of commercial and railway 
development in Asia Minor. 

William II had very early appreciated the importance 
of the Ottoman Empire in that scheme of expansion which 
was the great idea of his reign. To win the friendship of 
the Sultan, the German ruler opposed the British plan for 
reforming the Ottoman administration, which the Arme- 
nian massacres had completely discredited, and he dis- 
creetly refused to join in settling the Cretan problem 
against the wishes of Abdul Hamid. Finally, in 1898, he 
visited the Sultan at Constantinople, from which place he 
proceeded to Jerusalem as the latter's guest. In a famous 
speech he there declared that Germany was the only true 
friend of Islam, for she was the only European Power 
which neither possessed Moslem subjects nor coveted 
Moslem territory. The rise of German influence at Con- 
stantinople was detrimental to British interests through- 
out the Ottoman Empire, and this rivalry between the two 
Powers, begun at a time when England's attention was 
being directed more and more to South Africa, was destined 
to acquire very great importance when England's hands 
were free again. 

The year 1898 witnessed the Spanish- American War. 
There is every reason to believe that a coalition of the 
European Powers to help Spain against the United States 



THE QUARREL 143 

was proposed by Germany, but was quashed by Lord Salis- 
bury's intimation that Great Britain would support the 
United States. Similarly, in the harbor of Manila, when 
Admiral Dewey had trouble with the commander of the 
German fleet, the British admiral probably had orders to 
give our admiral all necessary assistance. 

All such incidents, however, might be regarded merely 
as moves on the diplomatic chess-board, although they 
intimated that the intimacy of Bismarckian days was gone. 
What first brought home to Englishmen the reality of Ger- 
man hostility was the Kaiser's telegram to President 
Kriiger on the morrow of the Jameson raid: 

"I express to you my sincere congratulations," William II tele- 
graphed on 3 January, 1896, "that without appealing to the help 
of friendly Powers, you and your people have succeeded in repelling 
with your own forces the armed bands which had broken into your 
country and in maintaining the independence of your country 
against foreign aggression." 

This message, as we now know, emanated from the 
Berlin foreign office rather than from the Emperor him- 
self. 1 There was nothing objectionable in the protest 
against such an international misdemeanor, and the sen- 
timent of the civilized world approved the imperial action. 
But it intimated, and the foreign secretary, Baron von 
Marschall, formally stated in the Reichstag, that the in- 
dependence of the Boer republic fell in the scope of Ger- 
man interests. From that moment till the outbreak of 
war eighteen years later, Great Britain and Germany were 
seldom sincerely in accord, though their relations were 

1 According to the Paris correspondent of the Times, 29 October, 1908, as soon as 
the news of the raid reached Berlin, Baron Marschall visited M. Herbette, the French 
ambassador, to inquire whether France would join Germany with a view to securing 
the integrity and independence of the Boer states. M. Herbette demanded as a 
quid pro quo German assistance in the Egyptian question, and the matter got no 
farther. Prince Biilow admitted in the Reichstag on 12 December, 1901, that the 
telegram was a ballon d'essai and that he was disappointed by its reception in France. 



144 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

now and again friendly and usually "correct"; also, there 
was created between the two peoples a barrier of suspicion, 
if not of jealousy, which seriously militated against the 
belated efforts of their governments to arrange an under- 
standing. The situation, however, was not yet beyond 
control, as was shown by the events of 1899-1900. 1 

The first step toward an Anglo- German detente was an 
agreement with respect to the Portuguese colonies, which, 
though never published, was understood to provide for 
their disposition in case Portugal wished to sell. As Ger- 
many was well treated in the division, her interest in the 
Fashoda affair rapidly declined, and Lord Salisbury dic- 
tated his own terms to France in March, 1899. Cecil 
Rhodes journeyed to Berlin, where he was cordially re- 
ceived by the Emperor and, in default of the Cape to Cairo 
railway, arranged for a telegraph line which should pass 
through German territory. A most important convention, 
to which the United States was a party as well as Great 
Britain, settled the ten-year-old quarrel over Samoa on 
terms distinctly to Germany's advantage (Prince Billow). 2 
In announcing the agreement Lord Salisbury declared that 
the relations between England and Germany were all that 
could be desired, and that for years there had been friend- 
ship and sympathy with Germany as with no other country. 
Indeed, late in the year 1899 Count Billow (as he then was) 
called on Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, in 

1 "The Jameson raid and the Emperor's telegram did something to inflame the 
mutual distrust and jealousy already growing between England and Germany. 
The sentiment was carefully watched by both governments, and was not permitted 
to produce any adverse effect on their political or diplomatic action. But, though 
the two foreign offices kept their tempers admirably, a bitter warfare of tongues and 
pens was raging between England and Germany during the final years of the cen- 
tury, and was at its height when Queen Victoria's reign came to a close." (Low 
and Sanders, Political History of England, XII, "The Reign of Queen Victoria, 
1837-igoi," p. 437.) 

2 Imperial Germany, p. 116. This admission is quite important, for it disposes 
of the contention often met with in German writings that England in this matter 
was playing her favorite game of blocking the expansion of Germany. 



THE- QUARREL 145 

London, and three days later (30 November) the latter in 
a speech at Leicester proclaimed the necessity of an Anglo- 
German alliance. 

Unfortunately, the Boer War had already begun. That 
struggle, which put an end to German aspirations for the 
incorporation of South Africa in a Greater Germany, was 
the great landmark in Anglo-German relations. All over 
the Continent British policy was bitterly criticised, but 
the German press exceeded all others. It did not stop at 
vilification, at distortions and falsifications — it demanded 
action from the government. The caricatures of the aged 
Queen Victoria were often vulgar, and anything, however 
unreasonable, was printed and believed. Especially ob- 
jectionable in German eyes were the concentration camps 
for Boer non-combatants. Ultimately Mr. Chamberlain 
reminded the Germans of the conduct of their own troops 
in the war of 1870; Count Biilow replied that to criticise 
Germany was like biting granite, and the evangelical clergy 
of the Rhenish provinces protested against the "wanton 
audacity" of comparing their fathers and brothers with 
"the craven bands of mercenaries who placed Boer women 
and old men in front of their ranks in battle in order to 
protect themselves against the bullets of the Boers." 1 
At this time professorial lucubrations, which ransacked the 
past for proofs of English hostility to Germany, began to 
make their appearance. To all this hue and cry the Brit- 
ish press replied with spirit, and the recollections of those 
unfortunate days were never eradicated from the minds 
of either Germans or English. 

The German attitude was explained by Englishmen as 
an aftermath of bungling diplomacy. 2 Moderate Ger- 

1 For details about this exchange of compliments, see the Annual Register for 1900, 
1901, and 1902. 

2 "The most intelligible explanation of this state of affairs was not creditable to 
Great Britain, which was her attitude in the affair of Angra Pequena in 1882, and 
more recently in 1895 in the Armenian question. In the latter matter Italy, the 



146 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

mans like Theodor Mommsen, who had formerly admired 
the free institutions of England and desired their develop- 
ment in Germany, were revolted by "the repetition of 
Jameson's raid by the English Government dictated by 
banking and mining speculators." 1 

" When the burghers of the two little Teutonic republics were 
fighting to resist annexation to the British Empire we had the 
same feelings as every Englishman would have if the German 
Government — absit omen — should take the fancy to add to the 
German Empire the German-speaking Swiss republics." 2 

But neither a few moves of British diplomacy nor sym- 
pathy with a kindred race would scarcely have aroused the 
German people to a passionate display of hatred for Eng- 
land. Germans spoke freely, if frankly, because they 
perceived clearly that the mistress of the seas must be 
humiliated before their own plans of Empire could be re- 
alized. 

In marked contrast to this, the attitude of the German 
Government would seem, throughout the war, to have 
been not only studiously "correct" but actually friendly 
to England. In June, 1899, President Kriiger had been 
warned to come to terms with England. 3 When the war 
broke out Prince Muravieff, the Russian foreign secretary, 
three times endeavored to organize a demonstration against 

ally of Germany, had been invited to join with Great Britain to force Turkey to 
more humane treatment of her Armenian subjects. With the consent of Germany, 
and with the assurance of her support, Signor Crispi had thrown himself heartily 
into the British policy, only to find himself saddled with the Abyssinian War and 
the hostility of Russia and France. Lord Salisbury thereupon disinterested him- 
self altogether in the trouble of which he had been the principal cause. This deser- 
tion of Italy, behind whom Germany was standing, and ready to support her, im- 
pressed German statesmen and writers with such a sense of selfishness of British 
policy that they came to the conclusion that no understanding with England was 
possible." {Annual Register, 1900, pp. 7-8.) The accuracy of this interpretation 
may be questioned, for Germany consistently opposed all efforts to reform the ad- 
ministration of Turkey. 

1 North American Review, February, 1900. 

2 Independent Review, November, 1903. 

3 Annual Register, 1900, p. 313. 



THE QUARREL 147 

England, in which the Kaiser, according to his own state- 
ment, refused to participate. 1 He seems also to have sent 
some military advice to the British Government, 2 and he de- 
clined to receive President Kriiger for a personal interview. 
Doubtless William II was not playing the part of a disin- 
terested knight, 3 and he expected due consideration from the 
British Government for German interests in Africa, 4 but, 
whatever the motive, his policy allowed Great Britain 
a free hand in South Africa. Only when some German 
steamers were seized by British cruisers on the ground that 
they were carrying contraband to the Boers, was there 
any friction between the two governments, and this was 
speedily adjusted by the release of the steamers and the 
payment of damages. 

That the Boer War had little bearing upon the official 
relations of Great Britain and Germany is clearly seen from 
the convention of October, 1900, by which the two govern- 
ments agreed to uphold the integrity of China and to ob- 
serve the principle of the open door in their commercial 
dealings with that country. In fact, the identical char- 
acter of British and German interests in the Far East came 
near culminating in' that Teutonic alliance of which Joseph 

1 Interview in Daily Telegraph, 28 October, 1908. 

2 In the Daily Telegraph interview, the Emperor said that he had sent a plan of 
campaign to the war office, "which can be found in the archives of Windsor Castle." 
Actually, it would seem to have consisted of "some general aphorisms on military 
tactics" contained in a letter to the Queen, and the British Government denied that 
it had ever received such a document as the Emperor described. (Perris, Germany 
and the German Emperor, p. 411.) 

3 According to the Paris correspondent of The Times, 29 October, 1908, the pro- 
posed coalition fell through because France and Russia refused to guarantee the 
status quo in Europe, i. e., the treaty of Frankfort, apart from the fact that M. 
Delcasse, the French foreign minister, ardently desired to effect a general settlement 
with England. On this last matter, see Berard, La France et Guillaume II, p. 23. 
On 18 October, 1899, one week after war was declared between England and the 
Boer republics, the German Emperor spoke of " the bitter need of a strong German 
navy," with which "we should be able to further our flourishing commerce and our 
interests overseas." 

* Lady Phillips, A Friendly Germany, Why Not ? pp. 63-64, quoting special 
correspondence of the Daily Telegraph, sometime in 191 2. 



148 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Chamberlain had dreamed and spoken. When the Marquis 
Ito opened those conversations with the British Govern- 
ment which produced the Anglo- Japanese alliance of 30 
January, 1902, "there was a German suggestion of a triple 
alliance between Germany, Great Britain, and Japan, and 
for some time Germany was kept au courant with the nego- 
tiations by Lord Lansdowne." l She "was finally ignored," 
according to a competent authority, because she demanded 
"terms which might have involved Great Britain in heavy 
responsibilities in Europe, Africa, and America, without 
involving Germany in any corresponding responsibilities 
in Asia." The German idea was that the Japanese alli- 
ance would protect British interests in Asia, and "leave us 
[England and Germany] both free to co-operate in other 
quarters where our interests might be found to approxi- 
mate much more closely." But even supposing an Anglo- 
German agreement, "it is more than doubtful whether, in 
view of Germany's relations with Russia, Berlin would ever 
seriously have entertained the idea of Germany's open 
adherence to the Anglo- Japanese alliance, even if it had 
commended itself to Japan." 2 

About an Anglo- German alliance 'Prince Biilow has 
written: 

"Germany might perhaps not have been disinclined to conclude 
a treaty with England on a basis of absolute equality, and with 
mutual obligations. German interests would have gained nothing 
by stipulations which England might disregard in the event of a 
change of ministry, or the occurrence of any other circumstances 
over which we had no control, while we continued bound by them. 
Nor would it have sufficed us that some minister or other was in 
favor of an Anglo-German treaty. To make a lasting agreement 

1 Hayashi revelations, Times (weekly edition), 12 September, 1913. 

s Sir Valentine Chirol, Times (weekly edition), 19 September, 1013. He has 
since stated that at the time of the German intervention, after the war with China 
in 1895, Marquis Ito said emphatically to him that "Japan would never forgive 
Germany" — and she never did. ("The Origins of the Present War," Quarterly 
Review, October, 1914.) 



THE QUARREL 149 

the whole cabinet, and above all the prime minister, would have 
had to support it. Bismarck pointed out how difficult it was to 
establish firm relations with England; because treaties of long 
duration were not in accordance with English traditions, and the 
expression of opinion of English politicians, even those in a promi- 
nent position, and the transitory moods of the English peers were 
by no means equivalent to immutable pledges. For many reasons 
English public opinion is more favorable to France than to us, for 
England no longer looks upon her as a rival, and certainly not as a 
serious competitor, at sea; consequently France occupies a different 
position from ours with regard to England. In consideration of 
the wide-spread jealousy roused in England by Germany's industrial 
progress, and especially by the increase of the German navy, it 
was only on condition of absolute binding pledges on the part of 
England that we could have set foot on the bridge of an Anglo- 
German alliance. We could only thus unite ourselves with Eng- 
land on the assumption that the bridge which was to help us over 
the real and supposed differences between England and Germany 
was strong enough to bear our weight. 

"At the time this question of an alliance was being ventilated 
the European position differed in many respects from the present 
one [1913]. Russia had not then been weakened by the Japanese 
war, but intended to secure and expand her newly won position 
in the Far East, in particular on the Gulf of Pechili. Owing to the 
Asiatic questions pending between the two empires, relations be- 
tween England and Russia were then rather strained. The danger 
was imminent that if Germany allied herself with England she 
would have to undertake the role against Russia which Japan 
assumed later single-handed. But we should have had to play 
this part under very different conditions from the very favorable 
ones which Japan found at her disposal in her conflict with Russia. 
The Japanese war was unpopular in Russia, and it had to be waged 
at an immense distance, like a colonial war. If we had allowed 
ourselves to be thrust forward against Russia, we should have 
found ourselves in a far more difficult position. A war with Ger- 
many would not, in these circumstances, have been unpopular in 
Russia, and would on the part of the Russians have been carried 
on with that national enthusiasm which is peculiar to them when 
defending their native soil. France would have preferred the ex- 
cuse of the casus foederis, and would have been able to wage her 
war of revenge under favorable circumstances. In the event of a 
general conflict, we Germans would have had to wage strenuous 



150 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

war on land in two directions, while to England would have fallen 
the easier task of expanding her colonial Empire without much 
trouble and the profiting by the general weakening of the Conti- 
nental Powers. Last, but certainly not least, while military opera- 
tions were going forward on the Continent and for a long time 
after, we should have found neither strength nor means nor leisure 
to proceed with the building of our navy, as we have been able to 
do. Thus the only course left to us was not to intrench upon Eng- 
lish interests, and to avoid both a hostile encounter and a docile 
dependence." * 

The failure of this project, which, had it been success- 
ful, would have ranged the greatest naval and the greatest 
military powers of the world against the Dual Alliance, 
and profoundly changed the course of European history, 
may be regarded as the last effort of both Germany and 
England to find a basis for a common policy. For Great 
Britain the rise of the German navy and the outburst of 
Anglophobia during the Boer War were at once disturbing 
and surprising; Germany in turn was exceedingly disgusted 
to see the Boer republics incorporated in the British Empire, 
for ever since the Jameson raid the opinion had been ven- 
tilated in countless newspapers and pamphlets that only in 
South Africa could Germany acquire a settlement colony 
in a temperate climate. Official circles in both countries 
might argue that conditions had not changed, that an alli- 
ance was both possible and desirable, or the close relation- 
ship of the two royal families might be considered a barrier 
to an irreconcilable quarrel; but after 1900 the two peoples 
were so mutually suspicious that cordial co-operation be- 
tween their governments would have been exceedingly 
difficult. In such circumstances it was doubly unfortunate 
that a clash of national interests should be suddenly re- 
vealed by the bad faith of one or the other party. 

By article 3 of the Anglo- German convention of October, 
1900, it was stipulated that, "in case another Power should 

1 Imperial Germany, pp. 39-42. 



THE QUARREL 151 

take advantage of complications in China to obtain terri- 
torial advantages in any form whatsoever, the two con- 
tracting parties bind themselves to conclude a preliminary 
agreement with respect to measures eventually to be taken 
for the protection of their respective interests in China." 
The very case seemed to have arisen when the Russian con- 
tingent of the allied army which rescued the legations in 
Peking from the Boxer warriors, instead of retiring beyond 
the Amur River, remained in occupation of Manchuria; 
which permitted the cabinet of St. Petersburg to negotiate 
with China an arrangement that practically made Man- 
churia a Russian province. Lord Lansdowne desired the 
Wilhelmstrasse to join in a formal protest to Russia against 
these proceedings, but Count Biilow stated in the Reichs- 
tag (15 March, 1901) that " the agreement had no reference 
to Manchuria" and that Germany had "no important 
national interest" there. Between his contention that 
"during the negotiations we left no doubt that Manchuria 
was in no way involved " and Lord Lansdowne's reply 
that "the agreement referred not only to China proper, 
the Eighteen Provinces, but to Manchuria as well," it is 
impossible to pass judgment until more information is 
vouchsafed by one party or the other. 1 But the result of 
the controversy was quite definite. In British eyes, Ger- 
many was deliberately encouraging Russia in a line of ac- 
tion detrimental to British commercial interests, in order 
that German diplomacy might have a freer hand in the 
Near East, where British interests were already suffering 
from German competition; and Germany was once more 
able to argue that British diplomacy was playing its fa- 
vorite game of using a Continental Power to exert pressure 
on Russia. 

From this malaise there gradually developed an atmos- 
phere of hostility. When in 1902 Great Britain and Ger- 

1 Lemonon, L 'Europe et la Politique brittanique, 1882-1909, p. 225. 



152 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

many, in co-operation with Italy, interfered in the affairs 
of Venezuela, "profound and almost universal annoyance" 
was manifested by Englishmen that "His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment had gone into the business in alliance with a coun- 
try which had shown itself during the South African war 
thoroughly disaffected toward [themselves]"; 1 and the 
following year, when Great Britain had to decide whether 
she would participate in the Baghdad railway, public 
opinion forced the Balfour government to withdraw the 
support which had practically been promised to Germany. 
It was further held against Germany that she had abetted 
Russian designs in the Far East, and that she was the main- 
stay of the Red Sultan, Abdul-Hamid, whose intolerable 
misgovernment of Macedonia had produced a general 
outbreak in that unhappy country. 

One delicate matter between Great Britain and Ger- 
many had, indeed, been adjusted, but not without much 
irritation on both sides. In 1897 the Canadian Govern- 
ment granted a preferential tariff to British imports. 
Under the treaty of 1865 between Great Britain and the 
Zollverein, German products were granted in the British 
colonies a footing of equality with those of the mother 
country, and to escape the German demand that the 
Canadian tariff should be overruled, Her Majesty's Gov- 
ernment terminated the treaty. Lord Salisbury would 
negotiate no new treaty which did not recognize the fiscal 
autonomy of British colonies, and Germany threatened 
to withdraw the most-favored-nation treatment from Brit- 
ish trade unless the Canadian preferences were disavowed. 
In June, 1898, the Bundesrath excepted Canada from the 
benefit of the most-favored-nation clause, in spite of the 
British protest that colonies of other Powers which differ- 
entiated in favor of their metropolitan countries were not 
so treated. The controversy dragged on for five years. In 

1 Annual Register, 1902, p. 240. 



THE QUARREL 153 

April, 1903, the Canadian government imposed a surtax 
of one-third the general tariff upon German imports, and 
Lord Lansdowne gave warning that "should the German 
Government persist in the attitude which they have taken 
up in this matter, ... a very wide and serious issue must 
inevitably be raised involving the fiscal relations of this 
country and the German Empire." The German Govern- 
ment precipitately retreated, and nothing more was heard 
of interference with imperial reciprocity, probably because 
German trade with Canada was of no great volume. But 
had the Conservative policy of a British imperial customs 
union reached maturity, a serious issue might have been 
raised between Great Britain and Germany. 1 

Such were the relations between Great Britain and Ger- 
many when on 8 April, 1904, Lord Lansdowne and M. Paul 
Cambon, the French ambassador in London, signed a 
series of conventions which not only guaranteed the neu- 
trality of England and France in the Russo-Japanese War, 
which had begun in February, but also swept the slate 
clean of a multitude of differences which had in the past 
often produced great tension between London and Paris. 
This entente cordiale ushers in a new period in diplomatic 
history which was to end disastrously in the Great War 
of 1914. That the British Government should reconcile 
itself with its enemy of centuries, was explained partly by 
a genuine desire to adjust its differences with all the world, 
and no wiser step in the direction of a sound diplomacy 
had been taken in many years. But England also felt 
herself face to face with a greater problem — the challenge 
of a new Power, whose commercial advance, colonial aspira- 
tions, and naval ambitions seemed to take the whole world 
for its field of operations, and at certain points to threaten 
the safety of the British Empire. 

»The correspondence between the British and German Governments may be 
conveniently read in Barker, Modern Germany, pp. 148-174 (edition of igi2). 



154 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Unfortunately for the world, the Anglo- German quarrel 
was not restricted to the wranglings of Downing Street and 
Wilhelmstrasse — it was quickly taken up by the two peoples 
and by them transformed into a struggle for ascendency 
between two antagonistic civilizations. And precisely be- 
cause Englishmen and Germans were closely related, be- 
cause they had, in fact, long regarded each other as cousins, 
their animosity was distinguished by that virulence, un- 
reasonableness, and resentment which usually accompanies 
a family quarrel. 1 Given the necessary good will, diploma- 
tists can usually patch up the most threatening dispute, 
but if the peoples whose interests they represent seem to 
be spoiling for a fight, their task is well-nigh hopeless. 
Such was the condition of Anglo- German relations for 
many years, and the possibility of an understanding was 
not grasped until too late. 

For this melancholy state of affairs the press of both 
countries is very largely to blame. For nearly twenty 
years publicists and journalists engaged in the pleasing 
business of dissecting Anglo- German relations from every 
conceivable point of view, and the more irresponsible of 
them delighted to exaggerate differences and minimize 
points of common interest. On both sides facts were gar- 
bled, motives imputed, official statements belittled, and a 
most outrageous lack of perspective revealed. There was 
not enough effort to discover the other nation's point of 
view, and when once it is assumed that a contradiction of 
interests exists, an infinite deal of labor is required to prove 
the contrary. In England it was frequently charged that 
the campaign in Germany derived inspiration from official 
sources, for the Bismarckian methods of using the press 
were well known, and the semiofficial character of many 
newspapers was notorious. This, however, could scarcely 

1 "The existence of race kinship has only added bitterness to the feud." (Sidney 
Whitman, "England and Germany," Harper's Magazine, April, 1898.) 



THE QUARREL 155 

explain the voluminous output of pamphlet literature, in 
which German writers excel, and which passed for the work 
of scholars and responsible thinkers, many of them pro- 
fessors in the great universities or men high in the business 
and official world. The English opposition to Germany 
was voiced primarily in the Conservative journals of 
London and by a small group of military and naval en- 
thusiasts. Few Englishmen of standing indulged in abuse 
of things German, except indeed German policy; rather 
the tendency was to praise the extraordinary achievements 
of Germany since 1870, and to argue that the hostility 
manifested in certain quarters of both countries did not 
reflect the sentiments of either people. 

German writers never tired of quoting a famous article 
in the Saturday Review, which created an extraordinary 
impression at the time, and which was probably the most 
provocative diatribe in the annals of newspaper effrontery. 
After pointing out how the superior British navy could 
bottle up the German harbors and sweep German mer- 
chantmen from the seas, the organ of Tory chauvinism 
argued that "were Germany destroyed to-morrow there is 
not an Englishman in the world who would not be the 
richer," and proceeded to the conclusion expressed in the 
paraphrase Germania est delenda. 1 However intelligible 
such an outburst may have been in the light of what the 
German press had been saying, it must ever be a regret 
to those who sympathize with Great Britain in the present 
war that a great journal with an established reputation 
could descend to such depths of ignorance and folly. For 
Germans would not and did not understand that this 
weekly journal represented but a small section of English 
opinion, that is, the military and upper-class world of 
London. 

Certain London newspapers, notably the Daily Mail, 

1 11 September, 1897. 



156 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

and to a lesser degree the Times and the Morning Post, 
were frankly pessimistic about Anglo- German relations, 
and often treated their readers to inflammatory articles. 
But the industrial centres, which are the heart of England 
and the source of her power, were conscious only of com- 
mercial rivalry, which they endeavored to meet in good 
spirit by adopting German science and German methods. 1 
The men of Lancashire and Yorkshire were under no illu- 
sions as to the ruinous cost of even a victorious war. The 
Liberal press, with the Manchester Guardian (one of the 
most influential newspapers in England) at its head, and 
the organs of financial circles, especially the Economist, 
never ceased to plead for moderation and fairness. No 
one will deny that there was a strong current of opposition 
to all things German in twentieth-century England, and 
that the needs and ambitions of Germany were often mis- 
understood and misrepresented; but there also existed a 
powerful party which honestly strove to create a better 
atmosphere, and which unquestionably gained prestige 
with the passage of time. 

The same temper cannot be predicated of modern Ger- 
many. The perusal of a considerable quantity of the 
German literature of international politics has convinced 
the present writer that the animus of Germany toward 
Great Britain was far more bitter and deep-rooted than the 
reciprocal feeling among English people, and that the seed 
of the press polemics was sown in Germany. 

It is, of course, difficult to estimate accurately to what 
extent the dislike for one nation penetrated the national 
life and consciousness of the other. But it may be very 
safely said that from 1896 to the outbreak of the Balkan 
wars the tone of public discussion in Germany, as regards 
relations with England, was consistently bitter; the occa- 
sional protests of clear-headed patriots against the folly 

1 Charles Trevelyan, in England and Germany (191 2), p. 98. 



THE QUARREL 157 

of chauvinism were like voices crying in the wilderness. 1 
Men there were who perceived that a permanently hostile 
England would be the most serious obstacle to Germany's 
imperial ambitions — the late August Bebel, Karl Lieb- 
knecht, and Eduard Bernstein. 2 But such critics were not 
heard, probably because they belonged to the Social Demo- 
cratic party; the nation preferred the teaching of Hans 
Delbruck and the Preussische Jahrbiicher, Karl Lamprecht 
of the University of Leipzig, and Paul Rohrbach, whose 
travels made him the best equipped of German publicists. 
These men were not exactly anti-English; indeed, they were 
anxious for an understanding with England; 3 but the terms 
of the agreement they conceived were to be dictated by 
Germany, and they consistently preached the idea that 
England refused to recognize Germany as an equal. 4 In 
the hands of lesser men, especially the writers of the Pan- 
German League, just criticism of English policy degener- 
ated into malignant abuse and gross misrepresentation. As 
long ago as 1898, Mr. Sidney Whitman, an Englishman 
with ardent German sympathies, remarked upon "the 
intense political distrust and dislike for England in Ger- 
many," which he ascribed to the Anglophobe historical 
works of German professors; and as for English jealousy 
of Germany, it "was resented and paid back in kind . . . 

1 "The world power of England does not obstruct the interests of Germany in 
any particular. I do not know on what grounds Germany could desire the British 
Empire to go to pieces. . . . Nothing would be more profitable than a permanent 
alliance between the greatest sea power and the greatest military state. It would be 
the best guarantee for the free and peaceful development of the world, and far more 
effective than all the speeches, writings, and congresses of the pacifists." (Rudolf 
Martin, Deutsckland und England, 1908, pp. 89, 91.) 

J Cf. Bernstein, Die englische Gefahr und das deutsche Volk, 1911. 

* Cf. Delbruck, in Preussische Jahrbiicher, March, 1912. 

4 Dr. Rohrbach's books afford the best insight into Germany's needs and as- 
pirations: scholarly, moderate, and written from a historical point of view, they 
are in striking contrast to the dangerous polemics of most German writers. Die 
Bagdadbahn, 1902; Deutschland unter den Weltvblkern, 1908, 191 2; Der deutsche 
Gedanke in der Welt, 1912 (English translation, German World Policies, 1915); Der 
Krieg und die deutsche Politik, 1914. 



158 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

with a large amount of malignant envy added to the 
score." l 

Mr. Whitman further points out that the fall of Bismarck 
was welcomed in England because he was reputed anti- 
English, and William II was expected to be pliable, even 
obedient, to the wishes of his grandmother, Queen Victoria. 
German opinion in the 'nineties was, indeed, thoroughly 
suspicious of British policy. Lord Salisbury was repre- 
sented as desiring an Anglo- German alliance in order that 
Great Britain might have the assistance of a Continental 
army in her inevitable war with Russia, and Germans were 
fain to ask how such a campaign would profit themselves. 
But even if all the counts against England are returned in 
the court of civilization, the historian is entitled to say that 
Germany is responsible for the bitterness of feeling and the 
violence of language which long characterized the discus- 
sion of Anglo-German relations. The testimony of Ger- 
many's sanest publicist may be invoked against her. 

In his Deutschland unter den Weltvolkern Dr. Paul Rohr- 
bach has written: 

"It cannot be denied that if the utterances of the German press 
at the time of the Kriiger telegram are considered, they were excel- 
lently calculated to convince an Englishman that England was 
regarded by us with a far more powerful and general aversion than 
was to be explained by the mere sympathy with that happy stroke 
by which the Boers resisted the plot against their independence. 
It must, furthermore, be admitted, from the highly explosive out- 
bursts of Anglophobia in the whole German press, without regard 
to party and feeling, that public opinion with us was hostile per se 
to England, and that it not only did not begrudge the Boers any- 
thing good, but also wished the English the worst of everything. 
To make this clear is quite important, for in judging the political 
relations of England and ourselves, much depends upon what peo- 
ple on the other side believed they had in general to expect from us. 
There can be no doubt in the mind of an impartial political observer 

1 "England and Germany," Harper's Magazine, April, 1898, p. 779. 



THE QUARREL 159 

that the idea was not first mooted in England that Germany pre- 
sents a danger to England, and must be struck down before it is 
too late, but that, on the contrary, Germany was thinking of attack- 
ing England at a favorable opportunity, and enriching herself at 
her expense. Accordingly, it is not particularly surprising that in 
English eyes the German Emperor, the German nation, and the 
German press were thrown together and taken for one, and even 
less does it appear wonderful that Germany's economic expansion 
which was gradually becoming noticeable, and the very disagree- 
able and surprising experiences with German competition which 
the English business world was beginning to encounter in all cor- 
ners and regions overseas, must very soon serve the purpose of pro- 
viding a basis for the plans ascribed to Germany." ' 

Doctor Rohrbach explains the attitude of his country- 
men as "an emotional reaction against the high-and- 
mighty condescending air with which Englishmen were 
formerly accustomed to treat us, socially, commercially, 
and politically as poor relations." But he is bitter against 
the irresponsibility and bad manners of the German press, 
which, he says, "have wrought the greatest damage to 
Anglo-German relations," and when he advises the hack- 
writers of an unrestrained press not to advocate policies 
which they could not carry out if intrusted with political 
power, he puts his finger on the most insidious of the many 
offenses for which modern journalism is responsible. 

At this point it is fitting to speak again of Treitschke, 
whose Deutsche Geschichte int Neunzehnten Jahrhundert is 
a "great fact" (Richard Meyer) and who "devoted all the 
resources of a mordant rhetoric, a pitiless invective, and a 
vitriolic ridicule to making Britain odious and contemptible 
in the eyes of the generation which heard him with enthu- 
siasm in the class-room, and read his book as a gospel." 2 
The late Professor Cramb wrote of him: 

1 Pp- 53 - 55- A similar admission is made by Dr. Theodor Lorenz, Die Eng- 
lische Presse, in England in deutscher Beleuchtung, 1907, Heft 9, pp. 76, 136. 

1 Vigilans sed ^Iquus (W. T. Arnold), German Ambitions as They Affect Britain 
and the United States, 1903, p. xv. 



160 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

"More than any other single character in German political life 
he is responsible for the anti-English sentiment which blazed out 
during the Boer War, which still reigns in German society and the 
German press, which in the Reichstag reveals itself in the frigid 
or ironic applause with which any references to 'our amicable rela- 
tions with England' are greeted. The foundations of that senti- 
ment, of course, lie deeper than the creative power of an individual 
intellect or will. They are . . . beyond the control of any passing 
generation, rooting themselves in the dark forces which determine 
the destinies of peoples and of the universe itself. But Treitschke, 
beyond any other German, stands forth as the interpreter of these 
forces." 1 

It is significant that his famous dictum, "With Austria, 
with France, with Russia, we have already squared ac- 
counts; the last settlement — with England — seems likely 
to be the longest and the hardest," 2 was quoted with equal 
approval by Pan-German agitators and British jingoes. 
It is not entirely true that he was unknown in England 
until his name was found in the writings of Professor Cramb 
or General von Bernhardi. English publicists who read 
German discussions of international politics certainly found 
repeated quotations in castigation of their own country, 
and some of these were translated for English readers. 
His Deutsche Geschichte was one of the books recommended 
by the Oxford faculty of modern history for a study of the 
nineteenth century. But there was no wide-spread knowl- 
edge of his teaching, no appreciation of the place he occu- 
pied in German life; which is the more remarkable because 
rabidly anti- German organs like the Daily Mail and the 
National Review were always searching for fresh proofs 
of German designs upon English liberties, and surely no 
one ever pursued England with such relentless and bitter 
hatred as this apostle of Neo- Germanism and Realpolitik. 

Treitschke did not write directly upon English history, 

1 Germany and England, p. 70. (English edition.) 

2 Deutsche Kampfe, Neue Folge, p. 34g. 



THE QUARREL 161 

but he frequently diverted from the topic in hand to dis- 
cuss certain problems of the island state. Thus in the 
Deutsche Gesehichte the main events of English history up 
to 1848 are discussed at length, and British foreign policy 
is the subject of several essays, printed in Deutsche Kampfe. 
He can be credited with entire sincerity, for he sought to 
abide by the canons of historical writing; much of what 
he says is true; he expressed himself with no little eloquence, 
and, according to all reports, he aroused in his hearers or 
readers the same passionate desires which he himself felt 
so deeply. His great purpose was to construct an indict- 
ment of Great Britain which should make Germans regard 
her as the inevitable enemy that must be crushed before 
Prussia could accomplish her divine mission of leading the 
world into the way of truth and righteousness of life. In 
his glowing pages, stored with facts and replete with bit- 
ter invective, three sins of England are constantly held 
up to the withering scorn of honest and idealistic Ger- 
many. 1 

First, "England is at the present day the unblushing 
representative of barbarism in international law. It is 
England who is to blame if naval warfare, to the shame 
of humanity, still bears the character of privileged rob- 
bery." 2 Again and again he returns to this congenial 
theme, that the right of a belligerent to capture enemy 
ships on the high seas is "an organized form of piracy"; 
that "it is the common task of all nations to establish on 
the sea that balance of power which had long existed on 
land, that healthy equilibrium which should make it im- 
possible for any state to do just as it pleased and to secure 
for all alike the protection of a humane system of inter- 
national law." It was therefore Germany's mission to 

1 The translations used in the following quotations are borrowed from H. W. C. 
Davis, The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke, 1914, which is the most 
sympathetic, yet critical, study of Treitschke in English. 

1 Deutsche Kampfe, II, p. 362. Quoted hereafter as D. K. 



1 62 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

"mitigate that oppressive alien despotism" which the 
British fleet exercised in all the waters of the world. 1 

Second, Treitschke is very scornful of English com- 
mercialism, which he regards as the ordinary motive of 
British policy. Cobden's "doctrine of a universal free 
exchange of commodities was based on the tacit assump- 
tion that England was to control the wholesale industries 
of the whole world, and that only the primary industries, 
and a few others, which would be difficult to transplant, 
should be left to the other nations. Just as Canning and 
Palmerston had relied on the phrase 'constitutional,' so 
Cobden relied on the phrase 'free trade' as a profitable 
article of export, which should make the tour of the globe, 
and enlist all the nations in the interest of British trade 
supremacy." 2 " Such a gospel of mammon- worship threat- 
ened to mutilate the human race"; but it has been the 
constant inspiration of the British foreign office. Thus 
Canning, "in the midst of peace, ordered the marauding 
expedition against Copenhagen because the interests of 
English trade demanded this act of violence." 3 For the 
same reason did he break with the Holy Alliance at the 
Congress of Verona, when it was proposed to intervene 
in Spain against the revolutionists and help the King to 
recover his revolted American colonies: "If England were 
the first to express formally that recognition of the inde- 
pendence of South America which was, in fact, already 
partly ratified, the British flag would win the lead in the 
newly opened market, and might possibly secure in the 
West another greater Portugal and the commercial and 
political exploitation of a vast territory." In 1877, when 
the Russians were nearing Constantinople, Treitschke re- 
marked that "Great Britain desires at any price to pre- 
serve the existence of the Ottoman Empire, because the 

1 Deutsche Geschichte, V, p. 63. Quoted hereafter as D. G. 

2 D. G., V, p. 477- 3 D. G., Ill, p. 263. 



THE QUARREL 163 

ridiculous commercial policy of the Turks has opened a 
vast hunting-ground to the English trader"; 1 "the eco- 
nomic helplessness of the slumbering Balkan peoples," he 
said in another place, " offered such a convenient market 
to the British merchant." 2 With regard to the repeal of 
the Corn Laws he wrote: 

"A commercial spirit pervaded the whole life of the nation. 
That last indispensable bulwark against the brutalization of society 
— the duel — went out of fashion; the riding- whip supplanted the 
sword and the pistol; and this triumph of vulgarity was celebrated 
as a triumph of enlightenment. . . . The gulf between German and 
British manners widened more and more. Such traces as remained 
of the Puritans of Shakespeare's merry England were completely 
submerged in the prose of commercial life. Therefore the atti- 
tude adopted by the island kingdom toward the other states of the 
world was more than ever determined by the calculations of a 
commercial policy." 3 

Third, Treitschke never tired of parading, in order to 
criticise it, the habit of interfering in Continental politics 
— what he called " Palmerston's old policy of secretly dis- 
turbing the peace of the world." 4 This interference was 
now in the name of liberalism, now to the tune of nation- 
ality; but its real object was to perpetuate "that condi- 
tion of veiled dissension which England needed for her 
plans." "Like Canning, Palmerston wished to preserve 
the peace of the world, in order not to injure British trade; 
but, like his master, he desired with equal intensity that 
the Continent should always be threatened with a simmer- 
ing danger of war, in order that England might have a 
free hand for extending her colonial Empire, and for secur- 
ing the markets of the whole world." Another notion 
also animated the "paltry statesmanship" of "a policy 
which, like that of Metternich, merely strives to preserve 

" D. K., II, p. 396. - D. G., Ill, p. 265. 

• D. G., V, p. 480. * D. G., V, p. 63. 



1 64 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

existing conditions because they exist, lives from hand to 
mouth. ... In their blissful seclusion, the inhabitants 
of this rich island have preserved an antiquated notion of 
a European balance of power, and they torment their 
brains with horrid visions which, since the revolutions in 
Italy and Germany, have lost any justification." 1 But 
it is all cant, sheer hypocrisy. England will not recognize 
the right of other nations to become as rich, as strong, as 
famous, as herself, and therefore she does not scruple to 
restrain their development by every means and at every 
turn. "Overrich and oversatiated, vulnerable at a hun- 
dred points of their widely scattered dominions, the Brit- 
ish feel that they have nothing more in the world to wish 
for, and that to the young and developing forces of the 
century they need still only oppose the mighty weapon 
of a vanquished age." 2 

Thus, in the name of impartial history, Treitschke drew 
a picture of England as a great robber state which clamored 
vainly for peace, although it had waged more wars than 
any nation in Europe. "England! the successful burglar, 
who, an immense fortune amassed, has retired from busi- 
ness, and, having broken every law, human and divine, 
violated every instinct of honor and fidelity on every sea 
and every continent, desires now the protection of the 
police ! " 3 Such unctiousness would have been less dis- 
tasteful to Treitschke had he not cherished the conviction 
that modern England was a colossus with feet of clay, a 
nation decadent in every fibre and utterly unable to ac- 
complish the mission she proclaimed with intolerable 
egotism. Professor Cramb, in his Germany and England, 
has explained Treitschke's feelings in these words: 

"Britain's world-predominance outrages him as a man almost 
as much as it outrages him as a German. It outrages him as a 

1 D. K., H, p. 464. 2 D. K., II, p. 362. 

' Cramb, Germany and England, p. 44. 



THE QUARREL 165 

man because of its immorality, its arrogance, and its pretentious 
security. It outrages him as a German because he attributes 
England's success in the war for the world to Germany's preoccu- 
pation with higher and more spiritual ends. But for her absorp- 
tion in those ends and the civil strife in which that absorption re- 
sulted, Germany might, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
have made the Danube a German river and established a German 
predominance from the Bosphorus to the Indus. . . . 

"His strongest motive is the conviction, which becomes more 
intense as the years advance, that Britain's world-predominance 
is out of all proportion to Britain's real strength and to her worth 
or value, whether that worth be considered in the political, the 
social, the intellectual, or the moral sphere. It is the detestation 
of a sham. 'In this universe of ours the thing that is wholly a 
sham — wholly rotten — may endure for a time, but cannot endure 
forever.' This is the protest of the stern apostle of reality. He 
frequently rings the changes on the nation of shopkeepers, point- 
ing with aptness and justness to the general meanness and gradu- 
ally increasing sordidness of English political life. That which 
Treitschke hates in England is what Napoleon hated in England 
— a pretentiousness, an overweening, middle-class self-satisfaction, 
which is not really patriotism, nor the high and serious passion of 
Germany in 1813 and 1870, but an insular, narrow conceit, in fact, 
the emotion enshrined in that most vulgar of all national hymns, 
' Rule Britannia ! ' . . . 

"For Treitschke it is not genuine, it is not valor, it is not even 
great policy, as in the case of Venice, which has built up the British 
Empire; but the hazard of her geographical situation, the supine- 
ness of other nations, the measureless duplicity of her ministers, 
and the natural and innate hypocrisy of the nation as a whole. 
These have let this monstrous Empire grow — a colossus with feet 
of clay. Along with this he has the conviction that such a power 
can be overthrown. And with what a stern joy and self-congratu- 
lation would not the nations acclaim the destruction of the island 
state ! ' Old England ! ' — old, indeed, and corrupt, rotten through 
and through !" 1 

If the reader doubts that the "conception of England as 
a colossus with feet of clay was widely cherished in Ger- 
many, let him read Alexander Tille's Aus Englands Flegel- 

1 Pp- 92-94- 



1 66 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

jahren ("England's Hobbledehoyhood"), published in 1901 
by a sometime teacher in Glasgow University who was 
compelled to give up his post during the Boer War. Every 
aspect of English life or English policy is held up to scath- 
ing criticism, and the United Kingdom is pictured as almost 
on the verge of dissolution. Or there is Mariano Herg- 
gelet's England's Weak Points and Germany's Position in 
Europe, published in both countries in 191 2. The author 
states that "in the whole of England there are about 
150,000 really capable men, according to German ideas," x 
and summarizes the British philosophy of life in these 
words : 

"Dream, live in a pleasant mist of unreality, take refuge in de- 
lightful meditation about money and games, sleep late, live well, 
do a little work, spend a quarter of an hour daily in abuse of the 
scandalous behavior of the other side in politics, pay your taxes, 
be content, believe firmly in the natural superiority of the British 
race, and, for the sake of appearances, always look pleasant and be 
pleasant to every one." 2 

The complaint that Britain refused to recognize Ger- 
many as her equal found constant expression. English- 
men knew nothing of Germans, whom they looked upon 
as "an inferior race, living on all kinds of impossible things, 
and satisfied with an economic and political existence 
which is semislavery." 3 Thus, the Saturday Review 
printed four columns about "dirty, dusty, nasty, smelling, 
unromantic Germany." 4 And Mr. Sidney Whitman la- 
mented that "somehow or other the German race has 
never succeeded in getting itself accepted by the English 
as on a parity." 5 To a people who conceived their civil- 
izing mission in large and vigorous terms, who looked upon 

*P. 17. 2 P. 15. 

8 Fritz Schneider, We Germans and Our British Cousins (igog), p. ig. 

4 14 August, i8g7. 

5 "England and Germany," Harper's Magazine, April, 1898, p. 779. 



THE QUARREL 167 

themselves as "the salt of the earth," this contemptuous 
attitude of the island race was exasperating in the extreme, 
not less so because in the field of social legislation and sci- 
entific achievement the latter openly copied the methods 
of Germany! "We want nothing better than to love the 
English, but they will not let us," Bismarck had once re- 
marked. Similarly, in the twentieth century many Ger- 
mans frankly ventilated the opinion that war with England 
was bound to come, because in no other way could Ger- 
many secure adequate recognition as the equal of the older 
European states, who were being organized by England 
in a coalition to keep Germany in swaddling-clothes. 1 

The German view of England has been admirably 
stated by Mr. Bernard Shaw in The Man of Destiny. 
When that play was published, in 1898, France was the 
principal opponent of British policy, and the dramatist 
used Napoleon for the expression of his caricature. In 
point of fact, the words put into the Corsican's mouth 
reflected with substantial truth the opinions of the his- 
torical Emperor, who, it may be noted, has become almost 
a hero to Pan- German writers, because he endeavored to 
destroy the world Empire of Great Britain. In this speech 
we have the best possible expose of English hypocrisy, 
about which Germans have written so much. 

"No Englishman is too low to have scruples; no Englishman is 
high enough to be free from their tyranny. But every English- 
man is born with a certain miraculous power that makes him master 
of the world. When he wants a thing he never tells himself that 
he wants it. He waits patiently until there comes into his mind, 
no one knows how, a burning conviction that it is his moral and 
religious duty to conquer those who have got the thing he wants. 

1 "We owe the North German Confederation to the dualism between Austria 
and Prussia. We owe the German Empire to the jealousy of France. We shall 
have to thank the dualism between Great Britain and the German Empire for the 
new Greater Germany." (Rudolf Martin, Kaiser Wilhelm und K'dnig Eduard > 
1907, p. 58.) 



1 68 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Then he becomes irresistible. Like the aristocrat, he does what 
pleases him and grabs what he covets; like the shopkeeper, he pur- 
sues his purpose with the industry and steadfastness that come 
from strong religious conviction and deep sense of moral responsi- 
bility. He is never at a loss for an effective moral attitude. As 
the champion of freedom and national independence, he conquers 
and annexes half the world, and calls it Colonization. When he 
wants a new market for his adulterated Manchester goods he sends 
a missionary to teach the natives the Gospel of Peace. The natives 
kill the missionary: he flies to arms in defense of Christianity; 
fights for it; conquers for it; and takes the market as a reward 
from heaven. In defense of his island shores he puts a chaplain 
on board his ship; nails a flag with a cross on it to his topgallant 
mast; and sails to the end of the earth, sinking, burning and de- 
stroying all who dispute the empire of the seas with him. He 
boasts that a slave is free from the moment his foot touches British 
soil: and he sells the children of his poor at six years of age to work 
under the lash in his factories for sixteen hours a day. He makes 
two revolutions, and then declares war on our one in the name of 
law and order. There is nothing so bad or so good that you will 
not find Englishmen doing it; but you will never find an English- 
man in the wrong. He does everything on principle. He fights 
you on patriotic principles; he robs you on business principles; 
he enslaves you on imperial principles; he bullies you on manly 
principles; he supports his king on loyal principles and cuts off 
his king's head on republican principles. His watchword is Duty; 
and he never forgets that the nation which lets its duty get on the 
opposite side to its interest is lost." 1 

And, as the Round Table admitted, "there is much truth 
in the general charge that the national characteristic of 
the Briton is not only to ignore the other man's point of 
view but to believe that indefeasible right lies behind his 
own." 2 

Englishmen, if they gave any heed to the problem of 
Anglo-German relations, formed their opinions in three 
main directions. Those few who possessed any knowledge 
of German history ascribed to the government of William 

1 Plays Pleasant and Unpleasant, II, pp. 200-201. 

2 "Britain, France, and Germany," December, 191 1, p. 41- 



THE QUARREL 169 

II the same brutal, unscrupulous, and aggressive aims that 
characterized the policy of Bismarck from 1862 to 1871; 
wherefore they concluded that imperial Germany was try- 
ing to shuffle the cards of diplomacy in such fashion that 
Great Britain would be left isolated, upon which consum- 
mation the Kaiser would promptly declare war. Others 
drew the same inference from the rapid construction of a 
German navy; when it was large enough, or when the Brit- 
ish fleet had been lured away from British waters, it would 
sally forth to challenge the mistress of the seas. Still 
others harked back to the outbursts of Anglophobia in 
Germany during the Boer War and afterward; not being 
aware that England had given offense to Germany, they 
argued that Germany must be envious of England's wealth 
and England's colonies. The Emperor, his government, 
his people were thus credited with the plan of attacking 
England and destroying her Empire, and that, too, without 
warning or provocation. To quote Professor Cramb: 

"There beyond the North Sea is the stern watcher, unsleeping, 
unresting, bound to her own fate, pursuing her own distant goal 
undeviatingly, unfalteringly, weighing every action of England, 
waiting for every sign of England's weakness.". 1 

Conscious of their own desire for peace, many Britons 
believed that Germany desired war, and interpreted the 
policy of her government since the accession of William II 
as a Machiavellian plot to usher in the struggle when the 
circumstances seemed favorable to German success. Four 
times between the opening of the twentieth century and 
July, 1914, Europe was faced with the possibility of war. 
Each crisis was precipitated by Germany or her ally, 
Austria-Hungary: by Germany in 1905 and 191.1 in Mo- 
rocco; in 1908 and 191 2 by the Dual Monarchy in the 
Near East. In each case peace was preserved by British 

1 Germany and England, p. 130. 



170 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

diplomacy, so at least Englishmen believed; except after 
the Balkan settlement of 1913 Germany vented her in- 
dignation in press campaigns against England and by add- 
ing to her navy. Englishmen may have been wrong, they 
may have misjudged the intentions and ambitions of Ger- 
many; but they were at least sincere. 1 They looked upon 
Germany not as a rival but as a probable enemy, and they 
allowed their government to take all precautions against 
the arbitrament of war, even though such precautions in- 
volved a reversal of many sacred traditions of British policy; 
even though the new policy, by irritating Germany, actu- 
ally brought nearer the danger it was intended to forestall. 
And the undoubted fact that Germany resented the policy 
of England only persuaded Englishmen the more that Ger- 
many's own policy was directed primarily against them- 
selves. The British attitude was admirably stated by the 
Round Table in the following question: 

"If a nation constantly proclaims that it is the strongest and 
greatest people on earth, that its destiny is to dominate the world, 
that it will do so by the use of the mightiest armaments the world 
has ever seen, and that it will use them instantly and mercilessly 
against those who thwart its will, what wonder that its neighbors 
take it at its word, and insure one another's prosperity and safety 
by ententes and understandings?" 2 

The interests of Britain and Germany were not irrecon- 
cilable. But the essential preliminary to an understand- 
ing was proof positive that the aims of Germany did not 

1 Among anti-German publications in England may be noted: Emil Reich, 
Germany's Swelled Head, 1907; Rowland Thirlmere, The Clash of Empires, 1907; 
W. N. Willis, What Germany Wants, 1912; Charles Sarolea, The Anglo-German 
Problem, 1912. The Spectator for years maintained the thesis that the danger to 
England lay in the incalculable ambitions of the bureaucracy which completely 
controlled the policy of Germany; it freely admitted the right of Germany to 
build as large a fleet as it could pay for, also the justice of the German desire for 
more elbow-room in the world. Only, it insisted, Great Britain must be prepared 
for all eventualities. 

2 "Britain, France, and Germany," December, 1911, p. 51- 



THE QUARREL 171 

threaten the interests of the British Empire, or that it 
was not her policy to squeeze and cajole weaker nations 
at the risk of plunging the world into war. Not until the 
Balkan crisis of 191 2-13, however, did the imperial gov- 
ernment or the German press make a serious effort to 
disabuse Englishmen of their suspicions, to translate into 
action their oft-professed desire for an accommodation with 
Great Britain. If during the ten or fifteen years preceding 
the rapprochement of 19 13 German policy was sincerely 
pacific, then its directors committed an irreparable error 
in not taking note of English susceptibilities; on the other 
hand, if its intentions were equivocal, as English opinion 
was not unjustified in believing, the reserve of Sir Edward 
Grey and the watchfulness of the London press 1 were 
measures of elementary prudence. 

A fitting conclusion to this chapter may be found in 
two quotations. From the Round Table : 

"Ignorance spells suspicion, and the British and the Germans, 
being extraordinarily ill-informed about one another's affairs and 
being fed largely on reports of the extravagances of extremists, 
came to believe that their rivals were incredibly efficient and far- 
sighted, were malignantly hostile, and by some miracle were so free 
from internal difficulties that they were able to pursue their bane- 
ful designs with relentless labor night and day." 2 

In large measure each nation did make identical accusa- 
tions against the other. 3 Not until too late did either rec- 
ognize any justice in the position of the other, or perceive 

1 Certain English newspapers and writers made a practise of collecting from 
German newspapers, pamphlets, and books innumerable expressions of hostility 
to England and the Empire. Such outbursts can scarcely be explained away as the 
extravagances of extremists, for they represented all shades of opinion; if they were 
not spontaneous, then the German Government must be held responsible for delib- 
erately encouraging or restraining, as the political situation demanded, a dangerous 
and execrable habit. Examples of these pronunciamentos may be found in J. Ellis 
Barker, Modern Germany, and A. D. Maclaren, An Australian in Germany (1912). 

2 "Britain, France and Germany," December, 1911, p. 40. 

l Cf. Sigma, "The Tu Quoque Quarrel," Contemporary Review, June, 1907. 



172 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

that concessions on both sides might open the wide world 
to the energies of both peoples. Asking "what were the 
roots of the jealousy that gave such fruits?" Mr. G. H. 
Perris says, in Germany and the German Emperor: 

"Fear, of course. Fear, on the part of England, of an unprece- 
dented competition, both in commerce and armaments. On the 
part of Germany, fear of a kindred race, an old friend turned enemy, 
one not content with possessing a quarter of the land surface of the 
globe, but claiming also to be 'mistress of the seas' and holding 
the power at any moment to sweep away every German ship and 
to seize every German colony. The fear of an old state, its nerves 
shaken by the strain of a petty expedition grown into a first-class 
war; the fear of a young state, instably constituted, politically ill- 
equipped, trying its new strength in an unwonted field. A pitiful 
spectacle history will call it." 1 

ip.423 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 

In the preceding chapter we have seen how, within a 
period of fifteen years, the British Government exchanged 
its traditional friendliness with the Powers of the Triple 
Alliance for an unexpected intimacy with the French Re- 
public, which was a member of the Dual Alliance. The 
growth of bitter feelings between the peoples of Germany 
and England was also described at some length. But the 
primary and most lasting cause of Anglo- German rivalry 
was not referred to at all: the rise of a German navy, 
which, in the eyes of Englishmen, was intended to filch 
from them the supremacy of the seas and thereby endanger 
the safety of the United Kingdom and the British Empire. 
In the treatment of that question it will be convenient to 
set forth chronologically the bald facts concerning the 
navies of Germany and Great Britain up to the outbreak 
of war; after which the merits of the controversy can be 
more easily discussed, and the responsibility for the burden 
of naval expenditure properly attributed. 

The German navy has been created in the reign of 
William II. In 1888, when he ascended the throne, it 
consisted of "floating forts placed at the estuaries of the 
rivers on which stood the rising commercial centres," 1 
together with an excellent torpedo-fleet; it was adminis- 
tered by military men who considered it of secondary im- 
portance to the army, a view inculcated and sustained by 
the full force of Bismarck's personality. But by this time 

1 Hislam, Admiralty of the Atlantic, p. 13. 
173 



174 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

"the national mercantile marine had risen to the third 
place among the trading Powers, and the Emperor clearly 
saw the futility of endeavoring to defend it by coast-de- 
fense gunboats and torpedo-craft." l He therefore created 
an imperial navy office {Reichsmarineamt) in charge of 
Admiral Hollman, who induced the Reichstag to provide 
for five battleships and three small cruisers. 

The next stage was a campaign to educate public opinion 
in -naval affairs. Not much success was achieved until 
the formation of the Navy League (Deutscher Flottenverein) 
in April, 1898, an organization of which the Krupps have 
been the chief financial supporters. But the decisive step 
was the appointment, in 1897, of Admiral Tirpitz as secre- 
tary of state for the navy. An efficient officer, risen from 
the ranks, who believed with the Emperor that "Neptune 
with the trident is a symbol that we have new tasks to per- 
form . . . and that trident must be in our hands," 2 he 
has been the chief craftsman of the German fleet and " the 
most dangerous international mischief-maker of our time." 3 
Chancellors and ministers have come and gone, but Grand 
Admiral von Tirpitz, as he now is, has survived them all, 
for the fleet has been the Emperor's hobby and Tirpitz 
an extraordinarily efficient minister. 

The German navy in 1898 consisted of 9 battleships 
(excluding coast-defense vessels), 3 large cruisers, 28 small 
cruisers, and 113 torpedo-boats; there were building 3 
battleships, 7 cruisers; the personnel comprised about 25,- 
000 men. 4 Concentrated in the Baltic, this fleet was of 
little concern to the mighty British navy of 54 battle- 
ships, 14 coast-defense ships, 104 cruisers, and several hun- 
dred torpedo- vessels. Immediately upon taking office Ad- 
miral Tirpitz decided to inaugurate a policy which has 

1 Ibid., p. 15. 2 Cologne speech, 4 April, 1897. 

* Collier, Germany and the Germans, p. 529. 

4 Parliamentary papers, 1912, cd. 6513. Admiralty Memorandum, sec. 2. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 175 

been consistently pursued ever since. Its four elements 
were: 

(1) The creation of a high-seas fleet {Hochseeflotte). 

(2) The establishment by law of a fleet of fixed size and 
character. 

(3) The replacement of old ships after a definite interval. 

(4) Argument with and persuasion of the Reichstag, in 
place of Admiral Hollman's policy of coercion, and the 
moulding of public opinion through an elaborate campaign 
waged in the press and by the Navy League. 

The first-fruits of the new course were gathered in the 
Navy Law of 1898, which revealed ambitions far exceeding 
the modest demands that Admiral Hollman had failed to 
carry through the Reichstag. The law provided for 19 
battleships, 8 coast-defense vessels, 12 large cruisers, and 
30 small cruisers. Battleships were to be replaced in 
twenty-five years, large cruisers in twenty, and small 
cruisers in fifteen. Although the entire programme was 
to be completed within six years, it "bore no reasonable 
relation," says an English writer, "to Germany's growing 
trade and overseas interests." x But greater things were 
at hand. 

The Boer War began on n October, 1899. A week later 
the Emperor, in an impassioned speech, declared: 

"We are in bitter need of a strong German navy. If the increases 
demanded during the first years of my reign had not been continu- 
ously refused in spite of my warnings and continued entreaties, 
how differently should we now be able to further our flourishing 
commerce and our interests oversea ! " 

Though the Emperor declined to take any measures against 
England during the course of the war, the German people 
understood his meaning: it was impossible to interfere as 
long as the British navy controlled the seas. Public opin- 

1 Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power, p. 118. 



176 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

ion was further stimulated by the seizure of several German 
steamers in South African waters. The Navy League in- 
creased its membership to 200,000, and Admiral von der 
Goltz issued a statement to the effect that "we are almost 
defenseless against England at sea." The press fell in 
line, with what deplorable results upon the future of Anglo- 
German relations has been noticed in the last chapter. 

So in 1900, in spite of Admiral Tirpitz's declaration the 
year before that there was no intention of altering the 
programme of 1898, a new law was passed, by which in 
1920 the German fleet was to consist of 38 battleships, 14 
large cruisers, and 38 light cruisers, with the necessary 
torpedo and auxiliary craft. Two battle squadrons and a 
flag-ship, 17 battleships in all, were to be kept permanently 
in commission, and the age of replacement for battleships 
was fixed at twenty-five years. 

What gave exceptional interest to this programme, which 
definitely announced Germany's intention to become a 
mighty naval Power, was the memorandum annexed to 
the law. 1 The important passage reads as follows: 

"To protect Germany's sea trade and colonies, in the existing 
circumstances, there is only one means: Germany must have a 
battle fleet so strong that even for the adversary with the greatest 
sea power a war against it would involve such dangers as to im- 
peril his own position in the world. 

"For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German 
battle fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, 
because a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to 
concentrate all its striking forces against us. But even if it should 
succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, 
the defeat of a strong German fleet would so substantially weaken 
the enemy that, in spite of a victory he might have obtained, his 
own position in the world would no longer be secured by an ade- 
quate fleet." 

l The text of all the German navy laws, in English, is given in Appendix I of 
Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 177 

And in an exposition of naval strategy published at the 
same time by Admiral von der Goltz, a former chief of 
the admiralty staff, occur these words: 

"Let us consider the case of a war against England. In spite of 
what many people think, there is nothing improbable in such a 
war, owing to the animosity which exists in our country toward 
England and, on the other side, to the sentiments of the British 
nation toward all Continental Powers, and in particular against 
Germany. . . . Our chances of success in a war against England 
grow more favorable day by day. 

"The maritime supremacy of Great Britain, now [1900] over- 
whelming, will certainly remain considerable in the future; but she 
is compelled to scatter her forces all over the world. In the event 
of war in home waters, the greater part of her foreign squadrons 
would, no doubt, be recalled; but that would be a matter of time, 
and then all stations overseas could not be abandoned. On the 
other hand, the German fleet, though much smaller, could remain 
concentrated in European waters. 

"With the increases about to be made, it will be in a position 
to measure its strength with the ordinary British naval forces in 
home waters; but it should not be forgotten that the question of 
numbers is far less important at sea than on land. Numerical in- 
feriority can be compensated for by efficiency, by excellence of 
material, by the capacity and discipline of the men. Careful prep- 
aration permitting rapid mobilization can insure a momentary 
superiority." • 

In this language there is nothing threatening, but much 
that is illuminating. Whatever Germany might intend 
to do, she was clearly of the opinion that her fleet would 
at least be a good match for the British, which appeared 
to be incapable of defending British interests. It is there- 
fore necessary to examine the condition of the British navy 
at the opening of the twentieth century. 

The British fleet in its modern form dates from the Naval 
Defense Act of 1889, which provided for the construction 
of 70 men-of-war, including 10 battleships, within seven 

1 Quoted in Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power, pp. 1 21-123. 



178 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

years, at a cost of £21,500,000. The avowed object of 
the measure was to create an " establishment on such a 
scale that it should be at least equal to the naval strength 
of any two other nations." 1 Under this two-Power 
standard 30 more ships of the line were laid down before 
the end of the century, thanks to which the Boer War had 
been conducted without interference by any Continental 
Power. By 1904 10 others were built or building, making 
a total of 50 battleships not more than fifteen years old. 
It might seem that only jingoism or jealousy could, under 
such circumstances, regard the new German navy as a 
danger to the overwhelming British fleet. 

As a matter of fact, the royal navy was in a very parlous 
condition. Except for the desultory operations of the 
Crimean War and the bombardment of Alexandria in 
1882, it had lived on its reputation since the Napoleonic 
struggle that ended in 181 5. How lax discipline had be- 
come, how inefficient the gunners were, how far a general 
slackness had permeated the whole naval administration, 
was known only to the inner circles of the admiralty and 
a few officers afloat. Moreover, innumerable ships were 
kept in commission which had long outlived their useful- 
ness, while more modern vessels were rendered useless 
from the shortage of crews; eighteen types of ships actu- 
ally figured in the navy list, and many of them were divided 
into classes, so that homogeneity, an essential attribute of 
an efficient battle fleet, was notoriously lacking. But this 
was not all. The two-Power standard had been devised 
against the Powers of the Dual Alliance, France and Russia, 
and the strategic distribution of the British squadrons was 
determined by the possibility of war with those countries. 
The most powerful ships were stationed in the Mediter- 
ranean; the Atlantic fleet was as important as that sta- 

1 Lord George Hamilton, first lord of the admiralty, House of Commons, 7 March, 
1889. (3 Hansard cccxxxiii, c. 1171.) 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 179 

tioned in the Channel. Strong squadrons were maintained 
in the Far East to watch the designs of Russia, and others 
in American waters for no particular reason except habit. 
In the North Sea there were only antiquated or obsolescent 
ships, which were used chiefly for training purposes. Also 
it was deemed necessary for political motives to show the 
White Ensign 1 in all parts of the world, so that cruisers 
and gunboats had to be kept in service wherever British 
interests had assumed any importance. In other words, 
circumstances, tradition, and necessity had combined to 
leave home waters, in particular the North Sea, practically 
defenseless. 

Yet it was from across the North Sea that a direct chal- 
lenge seemed to have been flung at the heart of the British 
Empire. To rouse public sentiment in favor of a large 
fleet, the German press and the Navy League had openly 
spoken of England as the eventual enemy; the language 
of the two memoranda quoted above seemed to convey a 
clear warning; the diplomatic situation did not indicate 
any slackening of the tension between the two countries. 
But this was not all. The Russo-Japanese War relieved 
Germany from any danger on her eastern frontier, and thus 
upset the balance of power in Europe; while the success 
of Japan, England's ally since 1902, insured the safety of 
British interests in Asia. Events in the Balkans demanded 
the attention of British statesmen. There was also only 
too much reason to believe that neither the French army 
nor the French navy, as they had been administered by 
General Andre and M. Pelletan, were prepared to risk a 
combat with Germany if the policy of the latter should 
become aggressive. 

These circumstances explain the momentous measures 
taken by the British Government in the year 1904. First 

1 The name usually applied to the British naval flag. The red cross of St. George 
is shown on a white field, with the Union Jack in the upper corner. 



180 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

of all, the agreement with France, the famous entente cor- 
diale, and the situation in the Far East permitted a whole- 
sale redistribution of the British squadrons. Those in 
the North Pacific and South Atlantic were abolished, and 
the Mediterranean and China fleets were almost denuded 
of battleships. The Channel fleet was correspondingly- 
strengthened. An Atlantic fleet resting on Gibraltar, and 
a home, fleet stationed in the North Sea, for which public 
opinion had been clamoring, 1 were also envisaged, and made 
their appearance in 1906. Thus was begun that concen- 
tration of British naval strength against Germany, the 
silent pressure of which has been one of the marvels of the 
Great War. 

Of equal, perhaps greater, importance was the appoint- 
ment of Sir John Fisher as first sea lord at the admiralty, 
whose one ambition was to put the British fleet in a state 
of "instant preparedness for war." His first step aroused 
considerable opposition among, sentimentalists, for he 
"scrapped" 180 obsolete ships of no fighting value. Not 
only was the heavy charge for up-keep abolished and the 
money freed for purposes of new construction; the crews 
and officers thus released were sent to fighting units hitherto 
kept in reserve and the first step taken toward simplicity 
of organization and efficiency in practise. 

Much more sensational was the introduction of the 
Dreadnought type of battleship. In the early years of the 
century the admiralty had materially reduced its pro- 
gramme of construction, while the German fleet was ad- 
vancing toward its statutory limits. Under such circum- 
stances the 4 battleships which the Balfour government 
proposed to lay down annually would not suffice to maintain 
the two-Power standard. Moreover, the Russo-Japanese 

x In February, 1903, a meeting was held in London to discuss the "desirability 
of creating a North Sea squadron and of establishing a naval base on the east coast." 
It was voted that the "proposed measures are urgently required in view of the 
continuous increase of the German navy." (Annual Register, 1903, p. 35.) 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 181 

War was held to have demonstrated the comparative in- 
efficiency of medium armaments, and ships which should 
carry only guns of heavy caliber had already been fore- 
shadowed by American and Italian designers. British 
tendencies were in the same direction. The ships built 
before 1900 were regularly provided with four 12 -inch and 
twelve 6-inch rifles; the 8 King Edwards (1 901-1903) were 
equipped with four 12-inch, four 9.2-inch, and ten 6-inch; 
the 2 Lord Nelsons (1904) had four 12 -inch and ten 9. 2 -inch 
guns. The transition to the Dreadnought, therefore, was 
not so revolutionary as is usually supposed. This famous 
ship, laid down in October, 1905, and commissioned before 
the end of 1906, carried ten 12 -inch guns on a displacement 
of 17,900 tons, which made possible a speed of twenty-one 
knots, or at least two knots more than had been attained 
by any battleship heretofore. Three other ships, known as 
battle-cruisers, with eight 12-inch guns and a speed of 
twenty-eight knots, were also laid down and completed 
within two years, which now became the recognized period 
for construction. Since then practically all capital ships 
in all navies have been Dreadnoughts. 

Beyond a doubt the admiralty had achieved a triumph 
not only of engineering skill but, for the moment, of di- 
plomacy: from the summer of 1905 to July, 1907, no battle- 
ship was laid down in Germany. The first 4 German 
Dreadnoughts were not completed until May and September, 
1910, by which date the British navy possessed 10 of these 
monsters. Furthermore, the cost of construction per ton 
was smaller than for the old type of ship, and the main- 
tenance per year less by £50,000. But it is equally clear 
that, by inaugurating the Dreadnought, the admiralty con- 
demned the magnificent collection of older ships to an 
earlier uselessness than would otherwise have been the 
case. With respect to the new type, Germany was able to 
start the race on fairly equal terms, and at the beginning 



1 82 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

of the Great War possessed 17 modern ships of the line 
to England's 29. In addition, the enthusiasm created in 
England by the Dreadnought and the battle-cruisers gave 
a new fillip to the propaganda of Admiral von Tirpitz and 
the Navy League, who for a campaign cry asked nothing 
better than an undoubted increase of British superiority. 

In 1906 a third navy law was passed by the Reichstag. 
Six large cruisers, which the Reichstag of 1900 had refused 
to grant, were added to the 14 provided for in the earlier 
law. Anglo-German naval rivalry now began in earnest. 
The preceding year had been one of great tension, for Great 
Britain intervened in the Morocco dispute between France 
and Germany, and the German Government took advan- 
tage of the new outburst of Anglophobia to carry through 
the naval increment. Most unfortunately, it also de- 
clined to respond to British overtures for a reduction of 
armaments. 

When the crisis of 1905 had been adjusted by the Alge- 
ciras Conference, the Liberal and Radical press in Eng- 
land, taking up Prince Biilow's statement that Germany 
thought as little of challenging British maritime supremacy 
as of building a railway to the moon, 1 began a strenuous 
campaign for a limitation of armaments. The movement 
reached its height when Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 
the prime minister, published an article in the first issue of 
the Nation (London) , 2 a new Radical weekly, in which he in- 
vited Germany to discuss the whole problem; only to en- 
counter an obstinate refusal from Prince Biilow. 3 

Sir Henry's sincerity, which Germans were not inclined 
to admit, cannot be doubted. His government had taken 
office pledged to a vast policy of social reform, which prom- 
ised to be very costly. So the Cawdor programme had 

1 August, 1906, to a correspondent of the Daily Mail; quoted in Bardoux, L'An- 
gleterre radicale, 1906-1912, p. 340. 
* 2 March, 1907. s Reichstag, 30 April, 1906. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 183 

been abandoned, only 3 ships being laid down in 1906, and 
again in 1907; this after the German increase of March, 
1906. The British Government also earnestly strove to 
have the limitation of armaments discussed at the second 
Hague Conference, in 1907. But the German Emperor, 
who in August, 1906, expressed to Sir Charles Hardinge, 
then permanent undersecretary for foreign affairs, the 
opinion that the coming conference was "great nonsense," 
refused to be represented at it if the question of disarma- 
ment were to be brought forward. 1 Nevertheless, at the 
conference the British delegate read a declaration that 
Great Britain was ready to exchange naval estimates in 
advance with any other Power in the hope that the exchange 
might lead to a mutual reduction. 

In the autumn of 1907 the Emperor William visited 
England and, in a speech at the Guild Hall, professed em- 
phatic sentiments of amity toward the country of his 
grandmother; but during the time of his stay he prob- 
ably received the impression that the British reductions 
were dictated by weakness. Otherwise he would hardly 
have dared write to Lord Tweedmouth, then first lord of 
the admiralty, a letter reassuring him as to German naval 
plans and protesting against "this perpetual quoting of 
the German danger" as "utterly unworthy of the great 
British nation, with its world-wide Empire and mighty 
navy." 2 EUs Majesty's belief in British decadence must 
have been confirmed by Lord Tweedmouth's reply, which 
communicated the naval estimates for the coming year, 
1908-9. Providing for only 2 battleships and reaching 
the lowest figure for new construction since 1898, they 

1 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace (1914), p. n. This is a "record 
of Anglo-German negotiations, 1808-1014, told from authoritative sources," evi- 
dently the British foreign office. The narrative presented has not been denied, 
except in one detail, by the German Government or its apologists. The pamphlet 
is the most valuable contribution to the subject of Anglo-German relations that 
has appeared since the war began. 

* First published in the Morning Post, 30 October, 1914. 



1 84 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

could have only one meaning for the German admiralty. 
Might not a supreme effort practically destroy the British 
superiority in modern ships ? 

So in March, 1908, a fourth navy law was passed, by 
which the period of replacement was reduced for battle- 
ships from twenty-five to twenty years, that is, Dread- 
noughts would take the place of old ships five years earlier 
than originally planned. To give effect to the new plan, 
the programme of 2 battleships a year, which had been 
increased to 3 in 1907, was now increased to 4; so that 
between 1906 and 1908 9 German Dreadnoughts were actu- 
ally authorized to England's 8. 

^--In the summer of 1908 the British Government once 
more endeavored to make an arrangement with Germany. 
King Edward VII, with Sir Charles Hardinge, visited the 
German Emperor at Cronberg and explained to the latter 
that "the naval rivalry set on foot by Germany was sure 
to provoke suspicions as to its ultimate intentions, and thus 
to embitter relations, then perfectly friendly and natural, 
between the two countries." 1 William II flatly refused 
to discuss his naval armaments with a foreign government, 
and, it is understood, "avowed his intention to go to war 
rather than submit to such a thing." The German for- 
eign office repelled the British overtures with equal em- 
phasis. Proceeding to Ischl, where he met the Emperor 
Francis Joseph, the King urged the Austrian monarch to 
exert his influence with the German Emperor, but to no 
purpose, doubtless because German assistance might be 
needed in the coming annexation of Bosnia and Herzego- 
vina. 2 King Edward is believed to have returned to the 
charge on the occasion of his visit to Berlin in February, 
1909. 

An awakening was now at hand. The continued re- 

1 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, pp. 13-14. 
s Maximilian Harden, Monarchs and Men, p. 33. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 185 

fusal of the German Government to discuss a limitation of 
armaments; the interview with the Kaiser published in 
the Daily Telegraph, in which he stated that the majority 
of his people were hostile to England; the contention of 
Lord Cromer that the money intended for old-age pensions 
should be devoted to battleships; some fiery letters in the 
Daily Mail by Robert Blatchford, a socialist; the agita- 
tion carried on by Lord Roberts for national military serv- 
ice and the sensation produced by the play "An Eng- 
lishman's Home"; and the crisis in the Balkans from 
October, 1908, to March, 1909 — all prepared the way for 
the "panic" of March, 1909. In submitting the naval 
estimates for 1909-10 Mr. McKenna pointed out that the 
British navy then possessed 5 Dreadnoughts, which would 
be increased to 12 in 191 1. In the same year Germany 
would have 9, according to the announced programme; 
but in 1908, when only 2 British ships were laid down, the 
German Government had accelerated the construction of 
4 ships, so that there would be 13 German Dreadnoughts 
in 191 1, as opposed to the 12 British. By the autumn of 
191 2 there would be 17, and, if acceleration were again 
resorted to, by April, 191 2. To meet this emergency the 
admiralty proposed to build 4 capital ships at once, which 
would raise the British strength to 16 by November, 191 1; 
if the German ships of 191 1 were accelerated, 4 more British 
ships would be laid down, which when completed in March, 
191 2, would give Great Britain 20 Dreadnoughts as opposed 
to the German 17. 1 

It was subsequently proved that these figures were based 
on a mistaken estimate of German capacity. The imperial 
government declared that it would not possess 11 Dread- 
noughts till April, 191 2, and that there would be no further 

1 House of Commons, 13 March, 1909. (5 Hansard ii, cc. 930 ff.) Mr. Balfour 
declared that Germany would have at least 21 Dreadnoughts in April, 191 2, and 
perhaps 25, and that therefore not even a one-Power standard was being main- 
tained by the mistress of the seas ! 



1 86 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

acceleration, that is, there would be only 13 ships ready 
in the autumn of 191 2. 1 But public opinion in England 
paid no attention to these assurances. Ignoring, wisely, 
as events have shown, the enormous preponderance of 
England in older ships, the Conservative newspapers took 
up the cry, "We want eight and we won't wait"; the op- 
position in Parliament demanded a clear-cut two-Power 
standard without exceptions, so as to avoid offense, 2 and 
the by-elections began to indicate popular uneasiness. 
On 26 July the government conceded the 4 contingent ships, 
in spite of the protests of its followers, thus taking the 
first step toward securing that preponderance in ships of 
the line which has been of such incalculable importance 
in the war. Advantage was taken of the delay, it should 
be noted, to equip 6 of the 8 ships with 13.5-inch rifles, so 
that they go by the name of super-Dreadnoughts. 

This episode was not really a "panic." The 4 contin- 
gent ships merely rilled up the shortage in the Cawdor 
programme, from which the Liberal government had de- 
parted for three successive years (8 ships instead of 12, 
1906-8). When the Germans did not respond to the 
British overtures for disarmament, it was inevitable that 
the old programme should be restored and its deficiencies 
remedied. There was, to be sure, much unnecessary fire- 
eating on the part of irresponsible journalists in England, 
but no corresponding outburst across the North Sea oc- 
curred. On the contrary, the fatherland was greatly im- 
pressed by the resolute determination of a Liberal govern- 
ment to maintain that "unassailable supremacy" (Mr. 
Asquith) at sea which it had previously seemed to let pass. 

1 Admiral von Tirpitz, in the Reichstag, 17 March. Even these forecasts were 
not realized, for in March, ion, there were only 5 Dreadnoughts in. commission; 
in March, 1012, only 9. 

2 On 12 November, 1908, Mr. Asquith said that the government accepted the 
two-Power standard as defined by Lord Cawdor, that is, a ten-per-cent margin above 
the two next strongest Powers. (4 Hansard cxcvi, c. 560.) 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 187 

In the budget of 1909 Mr. Lloyd George easily raised the 
huge sums required for the naval estimates; Prince Biilow 
was defeated in the Reichstag when he demanded new 
taxes to pay for the vast armaments authorized during his 
chancellorship. Perhaps for this reason the Kaiser did not 
demand a new naval law from the Reichstag in reply to 
the British programme. Whether Germans realized the 
fact or not, they had been too clever in 1906-8, for the 
situation was now less favorable to them than it had been 
previous to their efforts to catch up with England. 1 In 
addition, the British Channel fleet was now absorbed in 
the home fleet, which comprised 16 battleships on a war 
footing and 16 more in reserve. 

For the next three years the rivalry went silently on, 
in spite of British efforts to stop it. In the summer of 
1909, after the resignation of Prince Biilow, overtures 
were made by the new chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann- 
Hollweg, to secure British neutrality in the event of a 
Continental war, in return for which Germany was willing 
to "retard her rate" of construction without abandoning 
her programme mapped out up to 1918. 2 The offer was 
naturally refused as inadequate, but new negotiations were 
opened the following year. After informal views had been 
exchanged for some months, the chancellor declared that 
"a frank and sincere interchange of views followed by an 
understanding as to the economic and political interests 
of the two Powers offered the surest means of allaying all 
distrust." 3 He would seem to have been willing not to 
increase the German programme in return for a general 
understanding with England, and "the British Govern- 

1 The German Government denied that definite proposals had ever been made 
by Great Britain (Reichstag, 2g March, 1909); this in reply to Mr. Asquith's state- 
ment (House of Commons, 16 March) that "informal" communications had taken 
place with regard to a reduction of armaments. 

1 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, p. 20. 

* Reichstag, 10 December, 1910. 



1 88 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

ment were considering their reply when the German 
Emperor informed the British ambassador that he would 
on no account ever consent to any agreement binding 
Germany not to enlarge her naval programme." x The 
chancellor himself crushed all hopes of an agreement by 
his speech in the Reichstag on 30 March, 191 1. 

"I consider," he said, "any control of armaments as absolutely 
impracticable, and every attempt in that direction would lead to 
nothing but continual mutual distrust and perpetual friction. Who 
would be content to weaken his means of defense without the 
absolute certainty that his neighbor was not secretly exceeding 
the proportion allowed to him in the disarmament agreement? 
No, gentlemen, any one who seriously considers the question of 
universal disarmament must inevitably come to the conclusion 
that it is insoluble so long as men are men and states are states." 

Germany meanwhile adhered to her programme of 4 
ships each year until 191 2, when she was expected to lay 
down only 2. But it soon became clear that she intended 
to build 58 Dreadnoughts, instead of the 38 capital ships 
authorized by the law of 1900, for the large cruisers would 
gradually be replaced by battle-cruisers. 2 The British 
Government was therefore compelled to increase the 
Cawdor programme, and laid down 5 ships in both 19 10 
and 191 1. Even so, at the beginning of 191 2 England 
possessed but 30 Dreadnoughts, built and building, as op- 
posed to Germany's 19. Nevertheless, in preparing the 
estimates of 191 2, the admiralty assumed that Germany 
would lay down only 2 ships, according to previous an- 
nouncements and reduced its own programme to 4. 

Unfortunately, the Agadir crisis of 191 1 had aroused in- 
tense indignation in Germany. Within two weeks of the 
announcement of the British plans the German Govern- 
ment presented a new fleet law for the consideration of 

1 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, p. 25. 

2 So Colonel Gaedke, in Berliner Tageblatt, 23 February, 1910. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 189 

the Reichstag. As passed without amendment, it added 
3 battleships to the familiar 38, but its main feature was 
an increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which 
would be available — immediately available — at all seasons 
of the year. A third squadron of 8 battleships was created 
and maintained in full commission as part of the high-seas 
fleet, which was henceforth to consist of 25 battleships, 
8 battle or large armored cruisers, 18 small cruisers, and 99 
destroyers; in short, four-fifths of the entire German navy 
was to be kept constantly and instantly ready for war. 
Fifteen thousand men were added to the personnel, which 
in 1920 was to number 107,000 apart from the reserves. 1 
When completed, this fleet would be the most powerful 
aggregation of war-ships the world had ever seen. No 
wonder an English writer exclaimed: "For the first time 
in history a Great Power definitely asserted its intention 
of being supremely powerful both by sea and land." 2 

Once more Great Britain endeavored to arrange some 
agreement to stop the insensate naval rivalry. The Ger- 
man chancellor had declared that the settlement of the 
Morocco difficulties had "cleaned the slate" as regards 
Anglo-German relations, and at the invitation of the Em- 
peror Lord Haldane went to Berlin to discuss the naval 
problem, although only two days before his arrival the new 
navy law had been announced. But the German Govern- 
ment would not offer more than a temporary retardation 
of their existing programme, even in return for a political 
understanding with Great Britain which the latter was 
quite willing to conclude. Nothing, therefore, came of 
the negotiations. A month before Sir Edward Grey had 
indicated the British acceptance of a proposal that the 
two governments should exchange information on naval 

1 Mr. Churchill's summary, House of Commons, 24 July, igi2. (5 Hansard,. 
xli, cc. 838-840.) 
2 A. S. Hurd, The Command of the Sea (1912), p. xvi. 



190 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

matters; this was left unanswered, and also came to 
naught. 1 From this time to the outbreak of the Great 
War no further overtures were formally made to Germany 
' by the British Government, so far as is known, for a limi- 
tation of armaments. But it was barely possible that 
public opinion would succeed where official negotiations 
had failed. 

Under the various navy laws 35 German Dreadnoughts 
should be in commission in 1920. A two-Power standard 
for England, without a ten-per-cent margin, would require 
70 British ships of the same type. In March, 191 2, 16 
of these monsters were completed, 12 were building, and 2 
provided for, a total of 30. In the next eight years to 
build 40 capital ships would be a herculean task, and Mr. 
Churchill, first lord of the admiralty since October, 1911, 
recognized the fact. Speaking in the House of Commons 
on 18 March, 191 2, he discussed the situation with entire 
frankness, on the ground that plain speaking would be 
welcomed in both Germany and England. The principle 
of the two-Power standard was no longer applicable to 
Europe. In recent years the admiralty had maintained 
a superiority of sixty per cent in Dreadnoughts over the Ger- 
man fleet, and would continue that standard for the next 
four or five years. But England stood on the defensive, 
so that any reduction in the German programme would 
be immediately imitated. If the Germans built no ships 
in a given year, neither would England, and on this basis 
a limitation of armaments could be effected without formal 
agreement or any restrictions of national sovereignty. 
The futility of this appeal was apparent when the German 
navy law of 191 2 was passed through the Reichstag by an 
overwhelming national majority. 

Mr. Churchill's programme, as outlined in July, 191 2, 
provided for 25 Dreadnoughts, spread over the next six years. 

1 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, p. 25. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 191 

This would have given 55 to the German 35, which did 
not represent a superiority of sixty per cent; they would, 
however, provide a margin of a little more than sixty per 
cent above the 33 German ships, which could be foreseen 
in commission in 1920. But to achieve this result in the 
North Sea, all the Dreadnoughts must be withdrawn from 
the Mediterranean, where by 191 6 Austria and Italy were 
due to have 4 and 6 Dreadnoughts respectively. 1 The 
problem of manning the British fleets was also beginning 
to attract attention. It was estimated that, instead of the 
134,000 enrolled in 191 2, 170,000 would ultimately be re- 
quired, and while the additional quotas could doubtless be 
raised they would be very expensive, whereas German 
ratings were conscripted and therefore cheap. 2 

In these circumstances Mr. Churchill's efforts to lessen 
the naval rivalry were quite intelligible, nor was he dis- 
couraged by the chilling reception of his first overtures. 
When Admiral von Tirpitz in February, 19 13, stated that 
the ratio of sixteen to ten for the construction of battleships 
was "acceptable" to Germany, he was formally invited 
by Mr. Churchill to proclaim a "naval holiday." 3 It was 
at once objected in Germany that the net result would be 
to increase the superiority of England, for the Canadian 
Government was then proposing to present 3 capital ships 
to the mother country; and that Germany could not afford 
to let her plants and workmen stand idle; moreover, the 

1 There was talk of creating a Mediterranean squadron which should be truly 
imperial in character and intrusted with the defense of the highway of the British 
Empire: the Australia, presented to the imperial government by the Common- 
wealth in March, 1909, but stationed in Australian waters; the New Zealand, pre- 
sented at the same time, and lent for use in the North Sea temporarily; the Malaya, 
presented by the Federated Malay States; and 3 ships which the Canadian Gov- 
ernment was then proposing to build. ' As the Canadian ships were not finally au- 
thorized, the proposal came to nothing. 

2 Most German discussion of British naval problems assumed that England could 
not raise the necessary quotas, but there was no real foundation for this theory, 
which merely served to stimulate German ambitions. 

s House of Commons, 26 March, 1913. (5 Hansard 1, c. 1759-) 



192 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

navy laws stood in the way. But the British statesman 
was indomitable. On 18 October, 1913, speaking at Man- 
chester, he renewed his offer, with a detailed proposal. 
If Germany would put off for twelve months the beginning 
of her 2 ships of the 1914 programme, Great Britain, "in 
absolute good faith," would postpone for the same period 
the laying down of her 4 ships, provided that other Powers 
fell in line with the idea. This proposal commended itself 
to neither British nor German public opinion and was 
quietly dropped. But in one matter Mr. Churchill had 
succeeded. The British and German Governments agreed 
to exchange information about naval matters, so that 
"scares" would be difficult to organize in the future. On 
the eve of the war recrimination had practically ceased, 
and many believed that an Anglo-German rapprochement 
was not impossible. 

In spite, however, of the more cordial relations reflected 
in the last paragraph, the concentration of the British fleet 
in home waters proceeded. In 191 2 Mr. Churchill an- 
nounced that the navy would be organized in three fleets: 
the first, of four squadrons of 8 battleships each, in full 
commission, with a fleet flag-ship; the second, of two 
squadrons with nucleus crews; 1 the third, of two squadrons, 
one with nucleus crews, the other of the oldest ships of 
the line. To complete the active battle fleet of 33 capital 
ships, it was necessary to recall the Atlantic fleet to the 
Channel, and the Mediterranean fleet, hitherto resting 
on Malta, to Gibraltar, besides reducing the strength of 
the latter from 6 battleships to 4 battle-cruisers. Thus the 
Mediterranean was practically abandoned, 2 in spite of the 

1 Enough men were retained to keep all the machinery of the ships in order — about 
two-thirds of the full complement. 

2 "England has suffered her first defeat, her first moral defeat. She has had to 
withdraw her fleet from the Mediterranean. That sea was once ours — an English 
lake. It is no longer ours. { Our power is concentrated, watching our dearest friends, 
those Germans who have no-intention whatever of coming near England ! " (Cramb, 
Germany and England, p. 37, note 1.) 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 193 

fact that through it came about fifty per cent of the grain 
consumed in England. But, inasmuch as in March, 1913, 
there would be 13 German Dreadnoughts in the North Sea, 
British interests in the Middle Sea had to be left in charge 
of France, against whom the British fleet had been con- 
centrated ten years before in the same waters, but whose 
own fleet was concentrated there in the autumn of 191 2. 
But the sea is all one, and the principal business of a 
British fleet in case of war would be to destroy that of the 
enemy. Sound strategy, therefore, demanded the strong- 
est possible armament in the North Sea. 

The situation in 19 14 was as follows: England possessed 
29 modern battleships, 1 Germany 17; they were building 
15 and n respectively. In older battleships the propor- 
tion was exactly two to one — 40 British, 20 German. There 
were 125 British cruisers built and building, as opposed to 
55 German. In torpedo-craft the figures stood at 237 for 
Britain, 154 for Germany; in submarines, 99 British, 45 
German. The Berlin correspondent of the Times pre- 
dicted an increase of the foreign-service cruiser squadron, 
but he went on to say: 

"Every effort is being made, and will be made, to sterilize the 
rivalry with Great Britain and to shift the scene of action, or 
rather the arguments for eventual expansion, from the North Sea 
to the Baltic. To all appearances we are going to hear a great 
deal more about the naval strength of Russia, and to a minor ex- 
tent of France, than about the naval strength of Great Britain." 

The ratio of sixteen to ten in the construction of battleships 
was "still acceptable" to Admiral von Tirpitz, who said: 

" If it were really desired to come to an armaments agreement, 
it was only natural that England, as by far the most powerful sea 

'Including the New Zealand; the Malaya is included among the ships building. 
Both ships were gifts to the imperial government. Two others, taken over from 
Turkey, raised the total to 46. 



194 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Power in the world, would have to make the positive proposals. 
He had no doubt that such proposals would be examined by Ger- 
many most minutely." 

He added that "if a general reduction of displacement 
were to set in he would welcome it"; 1 which was not un- 
likely, for England and France had agreed that their ships 
should not exceed 26,000 tons for the future. 2 

One cannot say that Anglo-German naval rivalry had 
subsided when the murder of the Archduke Francis Fer- 
dinand disturbed the diplomatic situation; but the calm 
temper in which the first lord of the British admiralty and 
the German naval secretary now discussed their problems 
was in marked contrast to the feverish excitement previ- 
ously attendant upon a striking move by either government. 
English opinion had somehow got used to the German fleet. 
Germany, on her side, had taken to heart Lord Haldane's 
statement: "Whatever efforts Germany may make, she 
must reckon upon our making efforts which will be still 
greater, because sea power is our life, and in sea power we 
intend to remain superior." 3 Furthermore, the predic- 
tions of economists like Professor von Schulze-Gaevernitz, 4 
that English resources would be unequal to the strain of 
German competition, had been disproved by the enormous 
expenditure in the five years preceding the war, which, it 
should be noted, had been met entirely from the increased 
yields of taxation, whereas the German fleet had been 
built very largely from the proceeds of loans. Similarly, 
the idea so prevalent in the early years of the twentieth 
century, that the British navy was rotten to the core and 
living on its traditions, 5 had been dissipated by the reforms 

1 Times, 6 and 10 February, 1914. 2 New York Times, 15 February, 1914. 

3 House of Lords, 23 July, 1912. (5 Hansard xii, c. 668.) 

4 "England and Germany — Peace or War?," American Review of Reviews, 
October, 1909. 

5 See Ernst Meyer, Los von England, translated in Contemporary Review, July, 
1902. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 195 

carried out since 1904. Germans had abundant proof that 
Great Britain was not a colossus with feet of clay. Prob- 
ably they had also come to see that their challenge of 
British naval supremacy was stimulating, as nothing else 
could do, the organization, perhaps the federation, of the 
British Empire. But, above all, the policies of the British 
and the German Governments had been found less antag- 
onistic than was previously supposed; at least, this was the 
lesson drawn from their co-operation during the Balkan 
wars of 1 91 2-13. If a political understanding could be 
reached between London and Berlin, the naval question 
would ultimately settle itself, as it was already in a fair 
way of doing. And the tragedy of the Great War lies in 
the fact that early in the summer of 1914 a substantial 
agreement had been reached between Great Britain and 
Germany on those matters about which they had previously 
disagreed. 

From this narrative of events we may now turn to dis- 
cuss the merits of the Anglo- German naval controversy. 
The British Government certainly exhausted the resources 
of diplomacy and persuasion to secure from Germany an 
agreement to limit the expenditures upon naval armaments. 
Failing in that policy, it faced with courage and resolution 
the task of maintaining that supremacy of the sea which 
has belonged to Great Britain since the Napoleonic wars. 
Was such an attitude justified, or has she been guilty of a 
"navalism" comparable to that militarism of Germany 
which has been counted the chief cause of the Great War ? 

The case for a German navy was admirably summarized, 
in its broad outlines, by the great expositor and champion 
of sea power. 

"The only shore-line of the German Empire," wrote the late 
Admiral Mahan, in his Interest of America in International Condi- 



196 ' ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

tions, "is that of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. All the river 
ways of Germany, so extensively developed and utilized, inter- 
connected by canals already existing or planned, constituting a 
huge internal system of water communications, find their outlet in 
one or other of these two seas through which all sea-borne trade 
enters or departs. The whole external commerce of Germany, 
going or coming, focusses there. The North Sea, if it be covered 
by hostile cruisers, is little over sixty miles long from the Ems to 
the Elbe. The Baltic seaboard is much more extensive; but all 
access to it from the Atlantic is through the Skager-Rack, the ex- 
ternal approach to which is less than a hundred miles wide. . . . 
Directly across all lines of communication to the Atlantic, and so to 
every ocean, lie the British Islands. Most of us carry in our mind's 
eye the width of the English Channel and the Straits of Dover, 
along the full length of which, moreover, is English land contain- 
ing two principal naval stations; but the other way round, by the 
north of Scotland, the North Sea itself is nowhere four hundred 
miles wide, and in places only three hundred. In case of war be- 
tween the two countries, no German ship, as international law now 
stands, can use this stretch of water without liability to capture; 
while a successful blockade of the German harbors on the two seas 
puts a stop to all commerce as well by neutrals as by Germans." 
Even supposing that through the use of the Kiel Canal the ports 
of the Baltic or the North Sea can be kept open, "the neutral ton- 
nage would be quite inadequate to the necessary transportation 
to German ports. . . . Americans who recall what Cuba once 
meant to our international policy may appreciate what the British 
Islands by situation mean to German commerce. . . . The su- 
premacy of Great Britain in European seas means a perpetual 
latent control of German commerce." 1 

The above quotation represents quite fairly the official 
view that Germany's growing commerce must be ade- 
quately protected. Closely connected with this was the 
complaint that through her occupation of Gibraltar, Egypt, 
Aden, South Africa, and innumerable coaling-stations in 
all oceans, Great Britain effectively controlled the trade 
routes of the world; Germany not only possessed no such 
stations, except some islands in the Pacific, but could not 

1 Pp- 53 _ 6i, passim. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 197 

secure any, because of British opposition. 1 The idea was 
also ventilated that the supremacy of the seas on the part 
of a single Power was an anachronism in an age when the 
commercial interests of all the Great Powers demanded 
that the seas be kept open. 2 In the same strain, Germans 
argued that England refused to treat them as equals in 
the affairs and politics of the world. Germany would be 
"most willing," said Prince Bulow, "on the basis of mutual 
consideration and absolute parity, to live with England in 
peace, friendship, and harmony." 3 "The English . . . 
are not willing to admit us to a political and national 
equality in the world," declared Dr. Paul Rohrbach. 4 
As a German admiral put it: 

"The source of misunderstanding resides in the fact that Eng- 
land refuses us equal maritime power, and only recognizes us on 
land, or in the realms of culture and the like." 5 

Finally, we may quote Herr Arthur von Gwinner, the 
manager of the Deutsche Bank: 

"That sea supremacy is, for Great Britain, a life-and-death 
question is understood and appreciated in Germany as well as it 
is in England. Can public opinion on the other side of the North 
Sea not be convinced likewise that the possession of a strong fleet 
is for Germany, if not to such a complete extent, still to an im- 
portant degree, also a question of vital importance?" 6 

1 This point is well developed by L. von Amran, Englands Land-und-See Politik 
und die Mdchte, 1902. The author proposed the neutralization of all straits then 
under British control, as well as their adjacent territories; if the Ottoman Empire, 
which he foresaw shorn of its European provinces, were similarly treated, England 
could surrender her points of vantage with equanimity, and if she refused, the other 
European Powers were to unite for the purpose of executing the plan. 

'Professor von Schulze-Gaevernitz, "England and Germany — Peace or War?" 
American Review of Reviews, October, 1909. 

* Reichstag, 16 December, 1900. 

* Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (1912), p. 196. 

* England and Germany (1912), p. 156. 
1 Ibid., p. 113. 



198 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Politically, the case was put by the Emperor when he 
said: "We need a fleet to protect ourselves from arro- 
gance." * Or when he remarked: 

"Every German war-ship launched is one guarantee more for 
peace on earth, yet it also means that our adversaries will be so 
much less inclined to pick a quarrel with us, while it renders us by 
an equal amount more valuable as allies." 2 

Professor Hans Delbriick was less cautious, if more frank: 

"The German navy is not, and never will be, sufficiently strong 
directly to menace England; yet it is strong enough to necessitate 
a cautious English policy and to compel England continually to 
consider her relations with Germany. ... If Germany had been 
content to maintain her position of thirty years ago as a Continental 
Power, and had built no war-ships in addition to her few cruisers, 
England's power on the seas would be boundless." 3 

Germany must, he contends, restrict the movements of 
England to prevent them becoming hostile to herself. 

Finally, Germans never tired of asserting that their fleet 
was intended only for defense, that it would never be used 
offensively against Great Britain; whereas the naval his- 
tory of England, they contended, was largely one of aggres- 
sion. When the Dutch in the seventeenth century man- 
aged to secure the carrying trade of Europe, had not the 
English used their navy to secure that trade for themselves ? 
Had not the Earl of Chatham explained the Anglo-French 
wars of the eighteenth century as a struggle for the mastery 
of the sea? In 1807 an English squadron had bombarded 
Copenhagen and brought the Danish fleet to England as 
a prize of war: this when Great Britain and Denmark 
were at peace ! Within the present generation Alexandria 

1 1 have not been able to discover the time and place of this remark, although it 
is often ascribed to the Emperor. 
2 Bremen, 22 March, igos. 
1 "Why Germany Builds War-ships," Contemporary Review, October, 1909. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 199 

had experienced the same fate at the orders of a Liberal 
British government; and during the Boer War German 
mail steamers had been taken into port by British cruisers. 
So no nation is safe from the tyranny of the British fleet, 
which alone is responsible for the continued liability of 
private property at sea to capture. In short, Nieder mil 
dem englischen Seeraubertum I x 

Such is the indictment which for the past fifteen years 
and more, especially since the Great War began, German 
officials and German publicists have drawn up against the 
mistress of the sea. And if the British fleet has been a 
danger, actual or potential, to Germany, then she was 
well advised not to accept British overtures for a limita- 
tion of armaments, but, on the contrary, to strain every 
nerve in the hope of some day overcoming the British su- 
premacy. It is therefore necessary to examine the counts 
of Germany's indictment with an open mind. 

First, as regards the protection of their commerce, Ger- 
mans would seem to have been guilty of deliberate mis- 
representation or much loose thinking, for they often talked 
as though the British navy was a continual menace to their 
overseas trade. Of course, this was not true. From the 
creation of the German Empire to August, 1914, the seven 
seas were just as free to the ships of Germany as to those 
of Great Britain and her colonies; and Germans made full 
use of that freedom to develop a merchant marine second 
in general importance to that of England. Only during 
the Boer War were German steamers molested in the 
slightest degree by British cruisers, and then they were 
released as soon as complaint was made. The British 
position was made clear some years ago by an English 
writer on military problems: 

"It ought to be made clear to all the world," wrote Mr. Spenser 
Wilkinson, "that, whatever may be the language used in English 

1 Paul Rohrbach, Der Krieg und die deulsche Politik (1914), p. 100. 



200 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

discussions, Great Britain makes no claim to suzerainty over the 
sea, or over territories bordering on the sea not forming parts of 
the British Empire; that, while she is determined to maintain a 
navy that can, in case of war, secure the 'command' of the sea 
against her enemies, she regards the sea, in peace, and in war ex- 
cept against her enemies, as the common property of all nations — 
the open road forming the highway of mankind." 1 

Thus, only if Germany were involved in war with Great 
Britain would her commerce be in the slightest danger 
from the British fleet. Was such a contingency probable ? 
Not if England's wishes were to prevail. In the account 
of Anglo-German relations up to 1904, it was pointed out 
that Anglo- German relations were satisfactory enough 
until William II began to give a distinctly anti-English 
bent to German policy; and in the following chapters it 
will be seen that in the decade before the Great War 
British policy toward Germany was essentially defensive. 
In other words, an Anglo-German war would result only 
from German aggression, and Germans denied that they 
were planning such a war. True, they accused Great 
Britain of a desire to destroy the German navy; but if such 
was the main purpose of British policy (which can by no 
means be admitted), then to increase the German navy 
so that it might become more distrusted than ever by the 
British was surely a paradox of reasoning and the ne- 
gation of statesmanship. The truth is, the British navy 
could become a danger to Germany only if her own policy 
was so devised as to endanger the legitimate interests of 
Great Britain, in which event the main German argument 
against the British navy falls to the ground. 

Next, as to the contention that the control of the seas 
by a single Power could not be tolerated in these days of 
international commerce, and that Germany must be recog- 
nized as the equal of Great Britain. "For reasons abso- 

1 Britain at Bay (1909), p. 92. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 201 

lutely vital," said the late Admiral Mahan, "Great Britain 
cannot afford to surrender supremacy at sea." x The fron- 
tiers of Germany are, in the main, land frontiers; in the 
matter of food she is largely self-supporting or fed over- 
land. The British Isles, on the other hand, must import 
most of the food they consume, and such imports must come 
by sea, for there is no contiguous country through which 
the necessaries or the luxuries of life may come. The clos- 
ing of the trade routes would be the prelude to famine, 
revolution, national collapse. To quote Sir Edward Grey: 

"There is no comparison between the importance of the Ger- 
man navy to Germany and the importance of our navy to us. 
Our navy is to us what their army is to them. To have, a strong 
navy would increase their prestige, their diplomatic influence, their 
power of protecting their commerce; but it is not the matter of life 
and death to them that it is to us." 2 

To Englishmen, devoid as they were (with some excep- 
tions, to be noted presently) of aggressive intentions 
toward Germany, the German fleet was bound to appear 
a "luxury," as Mr. Winston Churchill once called it. 3 

Could Great Britain have solved her problem by con- 
senting to make private property at sea immune from 
capture in time of war? Theoretically, at least, there 
could then be no interruption of her food supplies. The 
traditional British view, however, has been that the ability 
to destroy an enemy's sea-borne trade is at once the surest 
means of defeating him in war and of restraining him from 
making war. It is also urged that as war interrupts all 
commerce on land between belligerents, a similar interrup- 
tion must occur on the sea. The analogy, indeed, between 

1 Interest of America in International Conditions, p. 61. 

'House of Commons, 29 March, 1909. (5 Hansard iii, cc. 60-61.) As long 
ago as 1862 Francis Urquhart said: "England will be the sea's victim on the day 
she ceases to be its queen." 

* Speech at Glasgow, 9 February, 191 2 



202 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

private property on land and at sea is not complete, for 
the latter is almost entirely the means or the articles of 
commerce, not the paraphernalia of every-day life, and 
a belligerent always restrains the land commerce of his 
enemy in every way possible. Finally, would the im- 
munity of British trade be actually respected by a bellig- 
erent possessed of strong naval power? 

For these reasons the British Government opposed any 
change in the existing rule at the second Hague Conference. 
But Sir Edward Grey "expressly intimated to the German 
Government his readiness to make the concession, if it 
were made the basis of an agreement for the restriction of 
naval armaments," only to meet with an absolute refusal. 1 
Hence the statement of Mr. Edwin D. Mead, who has 
long advocated the change: 

"One of the ablest statesmen in England declared to me his be- 
lief, shared, he assured me, by many like himself, that, if England 
had voted at The Hague for the inviolability of ocean commerce 
in war, Germany would have been at war with her in less than two 
years." 2 

Nevertheless, in May, 1914, Sir Edward Grey declared that 
England would not offer "a blank opposition to this ques- 
tion on the next international occasion," if she could secure 
the conditions which would make her ocean trade abso- 
lutely safe. He added this promise: 

"If it is understood that we must have conditions, I should be 
quite prepared to take up the attitude that we should not on the 
next occasion refuse to negotiate, but should come forward our- 
selves with the actual conditions which we regard as essential and 
fair in the matter with the possibility of a settlement." 3 

1 J. M. Robertson, M.P., who says he had "special means of knowing the facts," 
New York Times, 3 August, 19 15. 

'"England and Germany," Atlantic Monthly, March, 1908. 

3 Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, 6 May, 1914. (5 Hansard xlii, c. 410.) 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 203 

It is plain, therefore, that the British Government was 
ready to concede the essential point if that were the price 
of a limitation of naval armaments; while the German 
Government, although it put forward the necessity of pro- 
tecting German commerce as the raison d'etre of its fleet, 
did not respond to any overtures to remove the grievance 
of which it complained. 

Quite apart from the duty of keeping the trade routes 
to England open, another equally important task devolves 
upon the British navy — the defense of the British Empire. 
Not one of the numerous colonies or dominions of England 
would be able, alone, to defend itself against aggression, 
and the time is far off when the mother country can con- 
fide to her children the burden of self-defense. It is usually 
overlooked that until England felt her own situation im- 
perilled by the rise of the German navy the British fleet 
was actually employed for the defense of British dominions 
on the spot. And since more and more ships have been 
withdrawn to home waters at least two self-governing 
colonies, Canada and Australia, have felt constrained to 
begin the construction of their own fleets at their own ex- 
pense. In the existing organization of the world an enor- 
mous fleet is needed for the protection of an Empire which 
comprises a fifth of the land of the globe and contains a 
quarter of its inhabitants ; whether that fleet is maintained 
by the Empire as a whole or by the metropolitan nation 
is entirely a matter of imperial, as opposed to world, poli- 
tics. So, from whatever angle the question may be viewed, 
it is evident that Britain is bound to maintain a navy su- 
perior to that of any other Power. 

And curiously enough, paradoxically even, Germans on 
paper conceded this point, which was the fundamental 
issue in the Anglo- German quarrel ! While he was chan- 
cellor of the. Empire Prince Btilow repeatedly declared 
that Germany did not aspire to wrest the control of the 



204 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

seas from Great Britain, and in his Imperial Germany, 
written after his retirement, he said: "English policy has 
remained true to itself up to the present time, because 
England is still, as she was formerly, the first sea Power." 1 
Admiral von Tirpitz was equally positive that Germany 
had no intention of challenging the supremacy of Great 
Britain; he renewed the assurance whenever a new navy 
law added to the strength of the German fleet. Count 
Reventlow, the well-known naval critic; 2 Herr Ernst Bas- 
sermann, the leader of the National Liberal party; 3 and 
several admirals 4 could be quoted as proof that thinking 
Germans accepted the necessity for England to maintain 
a predominant navy. Even more interesting was the ad- 
mission of the Kreuzzeitung, the well-known Conservative 
paper, the foreign columns of which are edited by Pro- 
fessor Schiemann, the personal friend of the German 
Emperor. 

"England," it wrote on 28 January, ion, "must protect her 
enormous imports of food against every disturbance, especially in 
time of war. Therefore the English Government is compelled to 
maintain a navy strong enough to open all trade routes, and if 
possible to blockade all hostile squadrons in their ports in order 
to protect the British Isles against the danger of starvation and a 
panic affecting the prices of foodstuffs." 5 

Yet, in spite of these admissions, both official and private, 
whenever the British Government proposed a limitation 
of armaments the German reply invariably was that any 
agreement would have the effect of making the British 
supremacy permanent! The conclusion can scarcely be 
avoided that Germany did aspire to the admiralty of the 

1 'p. 33. 

1 "Die englische Seemacht," in England in deutscher Beleuchtung, Heft 5, pp. 1-2. 

8 England and Germany (igi2), p. 149. 

4 E. g., Vice- Admiral Karl Gaster, in England and Germany, p. 143. 

6 Quoted by J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany (1912 edition), p. 245. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 205 

Atlantic, 1 and that she expected to achieve it. "The main- 
tenance of Great Britain's naval supremacy has become 
impossible in the future. . . . That is the great historic 
process which we are witnessing." 2 

With respect to British naval policy in the past, some of 
the German criticism is justified; but it is scarcely fair to 
judge the twentieth century by the canons of the seven- 
teenth and eighteenth. Even so, at the time of the Anglo- 
Dutch wars "England was not yet a great Power; Holland 
and England fought as rivals and on equal terms, in a 
feud which subsequent alliances have healed, over a policy 
which England has long since renounced as mischievous 
and futile." 3 The bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807 
was a great wrong; in extenuation it may be noted that 
the British Government had learned of the plan of Napoleon 
and the Tsar to seize the Danish fleet for use against Eng- 
land. The high-handed impressment of American seamen 
for the British navy was one cause of the War of 181 2 
between England and the United States; but that policy 
has not been reinvoked in the somewhat similar condi- 
tions of a hundred years later. 

Since 18 15 the British navy has been used with great 
restraint. Apart from the Crimean War, which was not 
primarily concerned with European politics, Great Britain 
kept out of the numerous struggles which occupy so large 
a page in the history of the nineteenth century. Her naval 
power has not been used to prevent the legitimate devel- 
opment of any European state, except where British in- 
terests have been directly threatened; and she has endeav- 
ored to keep that naval power within bounds. Of course, 
the wide sweep of British interests throughout the world 

1 In August, igo2, at Revel, the German Emperor is said to have signalled to the 
Tsar: "The admiral of the Atlantic greets the admiral of the Pacific." 

2 Deutschland set Wachl (1912), quoted in Fortnightly Review, June, 1012. 

* Why We Are at War, by members of the Oxford faculty of modern history (1914)1 
p. 121. 



206 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

has involved England in many disputes, some of which 
were unnecessary or unjustified. But, when all is said, 
it can be admitted that from 1815 to 1914 the British navy 
was but twice used for aggressive purposes against a Euro- 
pean Power: in 1853, when Great Britain declared war on 
Russia to prevent the destruction of Turkey, and again 
in 1878, when she threatened war against the same Power 
for the same purpose. All things considered, England's 
record for the nineteenth century is better than that of 
any /Great Power except, perhaps, that of Italy. 

When the Anglo-German naval rivalry became acute 
Germans professed to believe that England would one day 
pounce upon their fleet as she had upon the Danish in 1807. 
They could point to the famous article in the Saturday 
Review, to which reference was made in the last chapter. 
They were told how Mr. Arthur Lee, civil lord of the ad- 
miralty in the Balfour government (1902-5) had said at 
a dinner that England might strike the first blow before 
Germans had read in the newspapers that war had been 
declared. 1 The Army and Navy Gazette had remarked 
that "once before we had to snuff out a fleet which we be- 
lieved might be employed against us," and the Daily 
Chronicle, a Liberal paper, had written that "if the German 
fleet were destroyed the peace of Europe would be assured 
for two generations." After the Morocco crisis of 191 1, 
Captain Faber, M.P., asserted that on 18 September the 
British squadrons were ready to attack the German fleet 
preparatory to landing a British army in France, and the 
admiralty admitted that precautionary measures had been 
taken. 2 And unquestionably there was a feeling in cer- 

1 This and the next two quotations are borrowed from Paul Rohrbach, Der deut- 
scke Gedanke in der Welt ; they are reproduced in Prince Billow's Imperial Germany. 

2 17 November, 1911, at Andover. In December the Illuslrirte Zeitung (Leipzig) 
published a series of maps showing the distribution of the British fleet at different 
times in the summer of 191 1. In none of them is the fleet represented as concen- 
trated in the North Sea. Vice-Admiral Karl Gaster ridiculed the idea that a 
surprise attack was being planned. {.England and Germany, p. 145.) 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 207 

tain English circles that, "if England were ever going to 
check the rapidly growing German navy, the sooner she 
did it the better, before it got any larger; the smashing 
would be easier now than later." * Germans were, per- 
haps, the more inclined to ascribe such madness to England 
because it seemed to them a natural proceeding, thoroughly 
in keeping with those Bismarckian traditions which domi- 
nated the policy of their own foreign office. 2 But England 
wisely refused to listen to its jingoes, who were splendidly 
described as "false guides, bad strategists, and worse states- 
men." 3 In August, 1905, Mr. (now Lord) Bryce, after a 
consultation with the leading men of both political parties, 
assured Germany that "no English politician of standing, 
no leader in any department of English thought, had the 
slightest idea of a war with Germany, or would contem- 
plate its advocacy by reckless writers with anything but 
abhorrence and dismay." 4 

Such evidence, however, is no more conclusive than 
similar statements by representative Germans that Eng- 

1 Edwin D. Mead, "England and Germany," Atlantic Monthly, March, 1908. 
Thus Sir Edmund C. Cox ("England and Germany: How to Meet the Crisis," 
Nineteenth Century, April, 1010) demanded an ultimatum to Germany that she 
should stop the construction of her fleet. "Not a shot need be fired. . . . The 
whole of Europe, with the exception of Austria, would gladly support England in 
an ultimatum demanding the instant cessation of this universal danger." "An 
Englishman" (The German Menace and How to Meet It, 1911) proposed "a diplo- 
matic notification to Germany that her naval programme will be interpreted as in- 
dicative of intended conflict with this nation and must be arrested. It would be 
notified to Germany that an agreement must be come to without delay, limiting 
the strength of her navy: that failing such an agreement the laying down of any 
batteships after a given date would be regarded by this country as a casus belli. 
If this notification were disregarded and further Dreadnoughts were laid down after 
the specified date, war would be declared, and Germany's naval power and mer- 
cantile marine, as they now exist, would, in six months, become things of the past " 
(p- 33)- One would have thought that Englishmen were sufficiently aware of 
Napoleon's failure in restricting the Prussian army after Jena to forego another 
such experiment. 

s /Eneas O'Neill, "Six German Opinions on the Naval Situation," Nineteenth Cen- 
tury, May, 1909; R. C. Long, "Naval Armament Delusions," Fortnightly Review, 
January, 1910. 

J Spenser Wilkinson, Britain at Bay, p. 102. 

* Nation (New York), 17 August, 1905. 



208 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

land had no reason to fear an attack from Germany. 
Much more to the point is the policy pursued by the Brit- 
ish Government. At least twice since the tension with 
Germany controlled its international relations the United 
Kingdom could have precipitated a war with Germany 
had it been so minded: in 1908 over the Bosnian crisis, 
and again in 191 1 in the last stages of the Morocco dis- 
pute. Each year that passed decreased the superiority 
of the British fleet over that of Germany, yet Great Britain 
did not strike, and, as will be seen in a later chapter, 
she was ready to pledge herself never to undertake a war 
of aggression against Germany. And surely, if Great Brit- 
ain had desired war with Germany, she would not have 
striven so manfully for peace in the last days of July, 19 14, 
would not have withheld any promise of assistance to France 
until the latter had received an ultimatum from Germany. 
Equally important for the student of history, is the con- 
sistent refusal of successive British governments to create 
a military establishment on Continental models. At any 
time after 1896 war with Germany was a possibility. Now, 
whenever England has been involved in European wars in 
the past, the decision has invariably been secured by land 
warfare. In many cases the pressure of the British fleet 
has seriously reduced the fighting capacity of the enemy, 
but it has never won Great Britain's victories. Napoleon 
was overthrown by the campaign in Spain and the "crown- 
ing mercy" of Waterloo, and similarly England could not 
defeat Germany by merely destroying her fleet. Never- 
theless, the British army for service abroad was not in- 
creased above 160,000 men — a mere bagatelle compared 
with' the hosts of Germany. For home defense a territorial 
army of about 300,000 volunteers, reorganized by Lord 
Haldane in 1907, was deemed sufficient, and even that 
force never reached its legal establishment. 1 Yet in spite ^ 

1 Duke of Bedford, "The Territorial Force Fiasco," Nineteenth Century, June, 1013. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 209 

of the agitation ably conducted by the late Lord Roberts 
for some kind of universal military service, in spite of the 
fact that in the fleet manoeuvres of 191 2 the "enemy" 
succeeded in landing an armed force on the east coast, 
both the government and public opinion resisted the prop- 
aganda of the military party, on the grounds that even 
Great Britain could not maintain both a supreme navy and 
a conscript army, 1 and that such an army would every- 
where be regarded as the proof of aggressive intentions 
and would indeed stimulate British diplomacy to an aggres- 
sive policy. A nation bent on war would not have neglected 
its preparations to such an extent that when war did come 
the conduct of operations would have been seriously ham- 
pered by the utter lack of supplies and munitions of every 
kind, such as was actually revealed in the winter of 19 14-15. 
Lastly, we come to the question whether England should 
frankly have accepted the frequent German asseverations 
that their fleet was meant only for defense. In other words, 
is there any reason for believing that the German navy was 
a positive danger to England ? Germans often complained 
that, although until very recently the American navy was 
stronger than their own, English opinion never used hard 
words about it, never looked upon it as a menace to their 
liberties and their happiness. 2 To begin with, Englishmen 
were profoundly impressed by the achievements of Bis- 
marckian diplomacy. In their eyes, the great chancellor 
had isolated diplomatically, then attacked, and finally de- 
spoiled — for the profit of Prussia — Denmark, Austria, and 
France, in turn; they were aware that a noisy section of 
the German people clamored for a repetition in the twen- 
tieth century of the exploits of 1864-71, and regarded war, 

1 Edinburgh Review, April, 1013; "An Islander," The Naval and Military Policy 
of the British Isles (1913); J. A. Spender, The Foundations of British Policy (1012); 
J. L. Garvin, in England and Germany, p. 82. 

1 This is a favorite idea of Dr. Paul Rohrbach, and finds expression in his 
various books. 



210 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

in Mirabeau's phrase, as the "national industry." It was 
notorious that the Pan-German League represented Eng- 
land as the great obstacle to the realization of its ambi- 
tions, and that the Navy League, which was little more 
than a department of the German Government, 1 openly 
pointed to the British fleet as the main reason for increas- 
ing the German navy. There was the widely believed 
story that in the wardroom messes of the German navy 
the favorite toast was "To the Day!" that is, the day 
when the Kaiser's fleet should engage that of his Britannic 
Majesty for the mastery of the seas. Likewise, the Em- 
peror's famous dictum, "Our future lies on the water," 
had for British ears an ominous ring. To some extent 
Englishmen's nerves were certainly affected, but the cumu- 
lative effect of innumerable expressions of Anglophobia 
in Germany, the circumstances in which the German fleet 
was constructed, and the generally hostile tone of German 
foreign policy from 1896 to 191 2 were admirably calculated 
to inspire a strictly commercial people with a genuine dread, 
not to say positive terror, of the most military and efficient 
nation in the world. 

In the second place, many Englishmen believed that 
Germany actually contemplated an invasion of England. 
It has been stated that "the British Government, by those 
means which are always open to the Power ready to pay 
for information, came into the possession of a matured 
scheme for the invasion of this country which had not 
only been submitted to the German Government, but had 
been adopted as a plan of campaign that could be put into 

1 Prominent government officials were responsible for its organization and 
have always held the chief offices; private patronage is a sure road to official 
favor; the Reichsmarineamt supplies it with information and the Emperor has 
more than once interfered in its affairs. Its membership fluctuates around a mil- 
lion, in striking contrast with the private Navy League of England, which numbers 
about 20,000. Die Flotte, its monthly journal, is said to have the largest circulation 
of any paper in Germany. Cf. Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power, pp. 207-213; 
J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany, pp. 324-344. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 211 

operation at almost any moment with the minimum of 
ostentation and the maximum probability of success." * 
At a time when the British fleet was away from the North 
Sea a military force was to be embarked in the steamers 
always available in German harbors and convoyed to the 
Humber. At the same time the high-seas fleet would 
seize Dover. The landing force would then march across 
England to Liverpool and by paralyzing the industrial 
life of Lancashire dictate peace to the British Government. 
Whether this plan was more than one of the campaigns 
which the German general staff had worked out for war 
against any country there is no way of knowing; and as 
the British military authorities had for some years before 
the war consulted with those of France and Belgium with 
reference to joint operations in case of a war with Germany, 
the mere existence of a German plan of campaign against 
England cannot be considered proof of hostile intentions. 
What did make the matter serious was the frequency with 
which the possibility of invading England was discussed by 
German military and political writers, and the confidence 
they expressed that such an undertaking was quite feasible. 2 
For many years the question was vigorously debated in 
the English press, and the Balfour government thought the 
problem serious enough to have it discussed by the com- 
mittee of imperial defense. Gradually the view that "a 
serious invasion of these islands is not a possibility which 
we need consider" was accepted, 3 although the danger of 
a "sudden raid" was officially admitted. 4 The relatively 
long time required by Italy to transport her Tripolitan ex- 
pedition across the Mediterranean doubtless lulled popular 

1 Hislam, Admiralty of the Atlantic, p. 75. 

2 Ibid., p. 144; Edelsheim, Operationen iiber See, translated in Barker, Modern 
Germany, pp. 34s Jf.; Rudolf Martin, Deutschland und England (1908). . 

3 Mr. Balfour, House of Commons, 11 May, 1905. (4 H ansard cxlvi, c. 77.) 
* The secretary of the admiralty, House of Commons, 5 March, 1907. (4 Hansard 

clxx, c. 662.) 



212 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

suspicions. 1 In 191 2 the admiralty took the unusual step of 
publishing, over the initials of the first sea lord, a reasoned 
argument against the possibility of invasion, on the con- 
dition, of course, that British naval supremacy was main- 
tained. 2 But if that supremacy were surrendered, then 
all was lost, for not even an invasion would be required to 
humble Britain in the dust; she could be starved into sub- 
mission. 

Lastly, when the purely defensive theory of the German 
navy was examined, it was noted that the German coast 
was already defended against the landing of an English 
army. The German fleet could not protect German com- 
merce on the high seas, because that function appertained 
to fast cruisers, of which Germany had built few, and 
because the necessary coaling stations were conspicuously 
lacking. Germany had no point of contact with Japan 
or the United States; naval operations against Russia or 
France would be of little use, and their fleets were far from 
formidable. Yet a war armada like the German high-seas 
fleet was not built for nothing: by process of elimination, 
England must be its objective. 3 It would be too much to 
say that Englishmen really believed Germany to be medi- 
tating an unprovoked attack upon their country, although 
they undoubtedly feared that such might be the case. 
Their feeling simply was that they must be prepared for 
the worst, and their political instinct told them that "the 
moment the German navy became strong enough to con- 
front that of Great Britain without risk of destruction 
British influence in Europe would be at an end, and the 
Continent would have to follow the direction given by 

1 Cf. Archibald Hurd, "Italy's Bolt from the Blue," Fortnightly Review, December, 

IQII. 

2 As an appendix to the second edition of Sir Ian Hamilton's Compulsory Service. 
The first sea lord was Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson. 

3 Naval Supremacy: Who? (1908); Edinburgh Review, April, 1012; Captain 
Hartwig Schubert, Die deutsche Schlachtflotte eine Gefahrfiir Deutschlands Machtstel- 
lung (1911). 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 213 

German policy." l After that Germany could subdue Eng- 
land at her leisure and convenience. To quote Admiral 
Mahan: 

"The British navy is left the sole military force in the world 
superior to anything that Germany can as yet bring into the field. 
. . . This removed, neutral, or fallen in power, Germany, under 
present anticipations, which accord with reasonable probabilities, 
becomes the dominant naval state of the world, as well as the pre- 
dominant country of Europe." 2 

Here, indeed, is the root of the whole controversy. Britain 
never aimed at, never acquired, the hegemony of Europe: 
Germany did dominate the Continent; and whatever her 
precise ambitions might be, the world would lie at her 
feet if she secured the control of the seas as well. 

The British view was well formulated by two eminent 
statesmen, one an ex-prime minister, the other a leading 
member of the present government. In a letter written 
for the German magazine Nord und Siid in May, 191 2, 
Mr. Balfour said: 

"If recent years have produced a change in the way in which 
ordinary Englishmen judge of German policy, it is due to no na- 
tional prejudice, to no underestimate of German worth, to no 
want of gratitude for German services in the cause of universal 
culture. ... If Englishmen were sure that a German fleet were 
only going to be used for defensive purposes, i. e., against aggres- 
sion, they would not care how large it was. . . . But does Germany 
make it easy for Britain to take this view? The external facts of 
the situation appear to be as follows: the greatest military Power 
and the second greatest naval Power in the world is adding to both 
her army and her navy. ... It is conceivable that all this may 
be only in order to render herself impregnable against attack. But 
unfortunately no mere analysis of the German preparations for 
war will show for what purposes they are designed. A tremendous 
weapon has been forged; every year adds something to its efficiency 
and power; it is as formidable for purposes of aggression as for 

1 Spenser Wilkinson, Britain at Bay, p. g3. 

* Interest of America in International Conditions, pp. 67, 68. 



214 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

purposes of defense. But to what end it was originally designed, 
and in what causes it will ultimately be used, can only be deter- 
mined, if determined at all, by extraneous considerations. . . . 

"The danger lies in the coexistence of that marvellous instru- 
ment of warfare which is the German army and navy, with the 
assiduous, I had almost said the organized, advocacy of a policy 
which it seems impossible to reconcile with the peace of the world 
or the rights of nations. For those who accept this policy German 
development means German territorial expansion. All countries 
which hinder, though it be only in self-defense, the realization of 
this ideal, are regarded as hostile; and war, or the threat of war, 
is deemed the natural and fitting method by which the ideal itself 
is to be accomplished." 

Disclaiming any intention to criticise the theories held 
and preached by German students, Mr. Balfour went on: 

"Do not let them ask Englishmen to approve. We have had 
too bitter an experience of the ills which flow from the endeavor 
of any single state to dominate Europe; we are too surely convinced 
of the perils which such a policy, were it successful, would bring 
upon ourselves as well as upon others, to treat them as negligible." x 

In a speech to the House of Commons on 27 November, 
191 1, Sir Edward Grey remarked: 

" German strength is by itself a guarantee that no other country 
will desire or seek a quarrel with Germany. That is one side of 
the shield of which the Germans may well be proud. But I think 
it ought to be remembered by German public opinion that there is 
another side of the shield, and that if a nation has the biggest army 
in the world, if it has a very big navy and is going on to build a still 
bigger navy, then it must do all in its power to prevent what 
would otherwise be natural apprehensions in the minds of others 
who have no aggressive intentions against that Power, lest that 
Power with its army and navy should have aggressive intentions 
toward them." 

Without positively ascribing such intentions to Germany, 
Sir Edward added: 

1 Reprinted in England and Germany, pp. 1-7. 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 215 

"I think it must be realized that other nations would be appre- 
hensive and sensitive, and, of course, will be on the lookout for any 
indication of aggressive intentions." * 

No responsible Englishman denied the right of Ger- 
many to build as large a fleet as she could man and pay 
for; what was wanted was an assurance that such a fleet 
would not be used aggressively against England, for Ger- 
man policy seemed to point in such a direction. That as- 
surance Germany would never give, although the British 
Government was willing to undertake most solemnly never 
to be a party to aggression upon Germany. It is in the 
light of this circumstance that we must now consider which 
of the two rivals — England or Germany — was responsible 
for the burden of modern naval armaments. 

The German thesis from the first has been that her navy 
was being built to further the interests of Germany, with- 
out regard to the size of other navies — if Great Britain 
chose to build two battleships for every one laid down in 
Germany, the fault was hers; if she found the burden in- 
tolerable, the remedy was to abandon the two-Power 
standard. Even English radicals and social reformers 
took much the same ground, 2 and Sir Edward Grey ad- 
mitted that England built the first Dreadnought. 3 

But Germany's case would be infinitely stronger if she 
had been willing to negotiate upon the matter of disarma- 
ment. As it was, she invariably took refuge behind her 
navy laws, which she alleged could not be changed with- 
out the consent of the Reichstag; as if the British pro- 
gramme was not subject to the approval of Parliament, 
and as if the Reichstag was not frequently called upon to 

1 s Hansard xxxii, cc. 59-60. As an illustration of Sir Edward Grey's criticism, 
Germany in 191 1 fixed her army establishment for the next five years, and declared 
that her navy was satisfactory; the chancellor said that Germany was at peace 
with all the world, but quite ready for war if it were forced upon her. Yet in 191 2 
she increased her army and passed a new navy law. 

1 E. g., F. W. Hirst, The Six Panics (1913). 3 Manchester, 3 February, 1914. 



2l6 



ENGLAND AND GERMANY 



change the existing laws in an upward direction! As for 
the two-Power standard, it first appears eo nomine in 
the Naval Defense Act of 1889; but its principle had 
been acted upon ever since the Napoleonic wars. Neither 
France nor Russia, which nations were usually hostile to 
Great Britain throughout the nineteenth century, had 
found the British supremacy of the seas injurious to them, 
primarily because, in spite of innumerable disputes with 
Great Britain, both perceived that the British navy was 
the bulwark of the European balance of power. 

An analysis of the programmes of construction and of 
the moneys voted for that purpose shows clearly that Brit- 
ish policy, viewed over a period of twenty years, was re- 
markably constant, in marked contrast with that of Ger- 
many: 

BATTLESHIP CONSTRUCTION 



Period 


Great 
Britain 


Average 


Germany 


Average 


1889-1898 


30 

23 
12 


3 
3 


9 
15 
11 


A 

2f 


1898-1905 

1905-1909 





Or take the amounts voted for new construction, which is 
the real key to naval expenditure: 



Year 


Great Britain 


Battleships 


Germany 


Battleships 


1902-1903 

1903-1904 

1904-1905 

1905-1906 

1906-1907 

1908-1909 


£10,341,780 

9,282,217 

12,398,133 

13,184,419 
11,368,744 
10,480,397 

8,849,589 
8,521,930 


3 

2 

5 
2 

4 
3 
3 
2 


£4,653,423 
4,662,769 
4,388,748 
4,275,489 
4,720,206 
5,167,319 
5,910,959 
7,795,499 


2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 



Thus Great Britain, up to 1909, took little notice, in con- 
crete fashion, of the development of the German navy; 



THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 



217 



she built, on the average, approximately the same number 
of ships annually, before and after 1898, and the expendi- 
ture for new construction showed a persistent tendency 
to diminish. 

For the five years preceding the Great War it is more 
difficult to form an impartial judgment. The figures are 
as follows: 



Year 


Great Britain 


Germany 


Construction 


Ships 


Person- 
nel 


Construction 


Ships 


Person- 
nel 


1909-1910. . 
1910-1911. . 
1911-1912. . 
1912-1913.. 
1913-1914. . 
1914-1915. . 


£11,227,194 
14,957,430 
17,566,877 
17,271,317 
17,361,850 
18,676,080 


8 
5 

5 
4 
5 
4 


127,968 
130,817 
132,792 

136,443 
142,500 
151,000* 


£10,177,068 
11,392,850 
11,710,859 
",393,340 
10,719,787 
19,902,859 


4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
2 


53,946 
57,373 
60,805 
66,810 
73,176 
79,386 



The German estimates do not include votes for aeronautics; the British 
estimates have exceeded the actual payments for construction by amounts 
ranging from £200,000 to £2,000,000. 

* Estimated number. 

The verdict must depend largely upon the point of view. 
If the German contention be accepted, — that British sea 
power is simply piracy brought up to date, — then the addi- 
tion of 31 Dreadnoughts and super-Dreadnoughts to the 
first dozen was a crime against humanity and an unneces- 
sary burden upon a country as heavily taxed as modern 
England. On the other hand, those who believe that the 
growing German fleet was a positive danger to the United 
Kingdom and the British Empire — and a large number of 
Englishmen did so believe — will acquit the British Govern- 
ment of reckless extravagance, and will argue in good con- 
science that an abdication of British naval superiority 
would have been a premium upon stupidity, a confession 
of cowardice, an act of treason; more especially as the 
British Government made repeated efforts to keep its naval 



218 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

expenditure within bounds, but invariably encountered 
the obstinate refusal of Germany to discuss even the prin- 
ciple of disarmament. 

It is not out of place to remember, in conclusion, that 
nothing succeeds like success. Prince Biilow, iri his Im- 
perial Germany, argues that the entry of Germany into the 
world politics of the twentieth century was made possible 
by the building of her fleet, and that she had gained both 
profit and glory in the adventure. 1 What are the facts? 
Between 1884 and 1899, during which period the German 
fleet was a quantite negligeable, Germany secured all the 
colonies she possessed at the opening of the Great War, 
with the exception of what was surrendered by France in 
191 1 in return for a protectorate over Morocco. Between 
1900 and 1914, while the German fleet was build- 
ing, England disarmed the French opposition in Egypt; 
France secured Morocco; Italy seized Tripoli; Austria- 
Hungary regularized her position in Bosnia; Russia prac- 
tically annexed northern Manchuria and established a pro- 
tectorate over Mongolia. Even the little Balkan states 
despoiled the unspeakable Turk, who was the cherished 
friend of Germany. Spain received part of Morocco, and 
Belgium the Congo as the legatee of King Leopold. Ger- 
many alone got nothing, or next to nothing, for the Congo 
concessions of 191 1 did not satisfy her appetite. Whether 
or not the Powers of the Triple Entente were responsible 
for this starvation of a hungry nation, it is evident that 
the German fleet produced no adequate return upon the 
colossal sums borrowed for its construction; nor has it been 
of appreciable value to Germany in the conduct of the war. 
Judged by the standard of results, the whole policy asso- 
ciated with naval expansion has been a lamentable failure, 
and a blunder for which Germany is paying by the par- 
ticipation of Great Britain in the Great War. 

1 F. 119. 



CHAPTER IX 
THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 

The ten years from 1904 to 19 14 form one of the most 
stormy periods in the history of European diplomacy. 
Four times did the spectre of war stalk across the horizon — 
in the summer of 1905, in the winter of 1908-9, again in 
the summer of 191 1, and lastly in the winter of 191 2-13. 
In not all of these crises were the interests of Great Brit- 
ain directly affected ; yet because indirectly her position in 
the world and her honor as a Great Power were called in 
question, she was an active participant on each occasion, 
and the experience and knowledge she thereby gained of 
German policy was the secondary cause of her ultimatum 
to Germany in August, 1914. Three of the four disputes 
found England and Germany in opposite camps, and as 
crisis followed crisis, it became increasingly clear that the 
real issue was a test of strength between the two Powers, 
however much disguised by the circumstances of the 
moment. 

Anglo- German relations became strained in the early 
years of the twentieth century, or in the last years of the 
nineteenth if the first symptoms of hostility be considered, 
because two great questions hitherto distinct were fused 
into a single issue. Those questions were the balance of 
power in Europe and the division of certain non-European 
lands which had thus far escaped effective penetration or 
absorption by white men. From 1870 Germany domi- 
nated the Continent of Europe, whereas she took but a 
limited interest in the problem of expansion; France and 
Russia, on the other hand, pursued an active colonial 
policy, which involved many disputes with Great Brit- 

219 



220 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

ain. Hence a policy of splendid isolation commended 
itself to British statesmen of both political parties. But 
when with the accession of William II to the throne Ger- 
many began to manifest an intense interest in the disposi- 
tion of unappropriated lands, when the increase of her 
population, the accumulation of wealth, and the heaping 
up of great military and naval armaments threatened to 
overturn the balance of power in her favor, and when the 
direction of her policy became unmistakably anti-British, 
it was inevitable, first, that England should emerge from 
the isolation by drawing closer to one or more Continental 
Powers; and, second, that Germany should encounter the 
opposition of the island Power on every hand. For the 
moment the question may be passed whether the British 
attitude was offensive or defensive : it is sufficient to recog- 
nize that the ramifications of Anglo- German rivalry were 
endless and that the peace of the world was bound up with 
the issue of their antagonism. 

The real cause of that hostility was, of course, the de- 
velopment of the German navy. To the pacifist and the 
advocate of disarmament, the danger to either Power from 
the navy of the other seemed to belong distinctly to the 
future, and for that reason he could not or would not 
admit the reality of the latent conflict. Yet the question 
has a very practical bearing upon the policy of each coun- 
try, as Prince Biilow has rather naively confessed. 

"The fleet was to be built," he writes in his Imperial Germany, 
"while we maintained our position on the Continent, without our 
coming into conflict with England, whom we could not as yet 
oppose at sea, but also while we preserved intact our national 
honor and dignity." 

Or again: 

"Patriotic feeling must not be roused to such an extent as to 
damage irreparably our relations with England, against whom our 
sea power would for years still be insufficient." 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 221 

And a propos of the Boer War: 

"Our navy was not strong enough for us forcibly to achieve a 
sufficient sea power in the teeth of English interests." * 

Whatever may be thought of British sea power, Great 
Britain can scarcely be blamed for taking every precaution 
to meet the challenge of the German navy; for she believed 
the maintenance of her supremacy to be absolutely vital 
to her safety. 

In the chapter on "German Expansion" it was pointed 
out that German colonial ambitions were to be satisfied, 
so far as may be guessed, in Morocco and Asia Minor. 
For reasons that will presently be set forth, a complete suc- 
cess of the German plans as regards those regions would 
prejudice England's interests severely, either by cutting 
into her trade, or by leaving her isolated diplomatically. 
Germany was fully entitled to carry through her schemes 
if she could, and the impression one gets from a study of 
her policy is that she aimed to present England with fails 
accomplis, which are the strongest arguments in the armory 
of diplomacy. Unfortunately for Germany, England re- 
fused to be taken by surprise, and endeavored to block the 
German designs in one way or another. Some will have it 
that British policy was dictated by jealousy. In any case, 
the interests of the two countries were for many years 
frankly contrary, and for that reason diplomatic tension 
was inevitable; which fact made difficult, if not impossible, 
a sincere co-operation in those fields where there was no 
conflict of interests. 

Another factor in the situation was the attitude of pub- 
lic opinion in both countries, which had been lashed to 
fury by the Boer War and its attendant circumstances. 
Repeated efforts were made to restore confidence, and no 
little success had been achieved; so much, indeed, that 

1 Imperial Germany, pp. 23, 24, 38. 



222 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

until the violation of Belgian neutrality English opinion 
was far from convinced that English intervention in the 
war was necessary. But up to 191 2 the difficulties of Down- 
ing Street and Wilhelmstrasse were certainly enhanced by 
the conviction of many sections of both peoples that war 
was inevitable. 

The emergence of Great Britain from her cherished iso- 
lation was a gradual rather than a sudden development, 
and was accomplished against her wishes and in spite of 
repeated attempts to prevent it. A more melancholy fact 
can hardly be imagined than that the Anglo-French recon- 
ciliation of 1904, designed to secure a lasting peace between 
England and France, should prove one of the main causes 
of war between England and Germany ! 

The entente between England and France was the work 
of three men: M. Delcasse, French minister for foreign 
affairs from 1898 to 1905; Mr. Thomas Barclay, sometime 
president of the British chamber of commerce in Paris, 
and the late King Edward VII. Upon taking over the 
Quai d'Orsay in November, 1898, when the Fashoda inci- 
dent was still fresh in men's minds, M. Delcasse said to 
M. Victor Berard, the noted publicist: "I do not intend 
to leave this office until I have re-established good relations 
with England." 1 Six years passed before the definitive 
conventions were signed, but the thoroughly correct atti- 
tude of the French foreign office during the Boer War, 
when there were rumors of an anti-English coalition, paved 
the way. Queen Victoria was decidedly pro- German in 
her sympathies, and Lord Salisbury entertained a deep 
distrust of all things French. These obstacles were re- 
moved by the death of the Queen in 1901 and the retire- 
ment of Lord Salisbury from the ministry in July, 1902, 
and in the late summer of 1902 M. Delcasse made over- 

1 Victor Berard, La France el Guillaume II (1907), p. 23. 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 223 

tures to London for a joint settlement of the Egyptian and 
Moroccan questions. LordLansdowne was sympathetic, but 
the South African situation and a dispute with Venezuela 
postponed active negotiations until the summer of 1903. 1 

Meanwhile unofficial influences were at work. In the 
summer of 1899 Mr. (now Sir Thomas) Barclay determined 
to bring about a reconciliation between England and 
France. At his suggestion, and with the cordial approval 
of the French Government, the chambers of commerce of 
the United Kingdom held their annual meeting in Paris 
during the exposition of 1900 as guests of the British 
chamber of commerce, and from that time Englishmen 
flocked to the exposition in great numbers. Mr. Barclay 
then began a campaign in favor of an arbitration treaty 
between England and France, in which he enlisted the 
enthusiastic support of the chambers of commerce and the 
trade unions of both countries. It was no small under- 
taking to break down the prejudices of centuries and the 
time-honored belief in both countries that their respective 
interests were conflicting; and not the least obstacle was 
the attitude of Sir Edmund Monson, the British ambas- 
sador in Paris, who did not consider a rapprochement pos- 
sible and possessed a capacity for making tactless speeches. 
But in the end provincial opinion on both sides of the 
Channel was converted. Only the two capitals remained 
suspicious. Finally, in May, 1903, King Edward, who as 
Prince of Wales had been adored by the Parisian populace 
and who was an ardent admirer of France, visited Paris 
and was respectfully received. The return visit of Presi- 
dent Loubet in July was an even greater success, so that 
it only remained for the two governments to translate their 
friendly sentiments into concrete agreements. 2 

•William Morton Fullerton, Problems of Power (1013), p. 57- 
* For the history of the entente cordiale, see Sir Thomas Barclay, Thirty Years' 
Reminiscences, 1876-1906, especially pp. 175-326. 



224 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

This was done by the arbitration treaty of 14 October, 
1903, and the epoch-making political conventions of 8 
April, 1904. The details of these treaties have been given 
in the chapter on "Modern England," and need not be 
here recited; nor will their historical importance lie in the 
fact that the two countries adjusted sundry colonial dis- 
putes in various parts of the world. A perspective of only 
ten years was needed to show that the entente cordiale 
marked a new period in recent history, the chief character- 
istic of which, internationally considered, was the freedom 
enjoyed by both France and England in their dealings 
with Germany. Such freedom was the more desirable be- 
cause the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, in Feb- 
ruary, 1904, deprived France of any possible assistance 
from her ally, and for practical purposes left Germany in 
absolute control of the Continent. 

The balance of Europe was restored by the entente, as 
Prince Billow subsequently admitted, but this was appar- 
ently the result rather than the cause of the entente. There 
was nothing in the conventions themselves, which were 
being negotiated before the war in the Far East, to indicate 
any arriere-pensee toward Germany, and they were obvi- 
ously designed simply to end the long strife between France 
and England. Lord Lansdowne "strongly repudiated the 
assumption that because there had been an approximation 
between Britain and two great and friendly Powers, there 
must necessarily be an estrangement between ourselves 
and any other Power or Powers." 1 To the German am- 
bassador in Paris the Anglo-French arrangement seemed 
"perfectly natural," 2 and his government declared its 
acceptance of what was regarded as a new pledge and 
guarantee of the peace of the world. Prince Billow's re- 
marks in the Reichstag, on 12 April, 1904, are conclusive 
of Germany's opinion at the time. 

'6 November, igos; quoted in Annual Register, 1905, p. 228. 
' French Yellow Book, Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905, p. 122. 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 225 

"We have no cause," he said, "to apprehend that this agreement 
was levelled against any individual Power. It seems to be an 
attempt to eliminate the points of difference between France and 
Great Britain by means of an amicable understanding. From the 
point of view of German interests we have nothing to complain of, 
for we do not wish to see strained relations between Great Britain 
and France, if only because such a state of affairs would imperil the 
peace of the world, the maintenance of which we sincerely desire." 

"There was another reason why Germany would rather 
welcome than find fault with the agreement. The general 
impression in Germany throughout 1904 was that the rap- 
prochement between France and Great Britain tended to 
weaken the alliance between France and Russia. Any 
enduring friendship with both, owing to existing political 
conditions in both the Middle and Far East, seemed im- 
possible. The public excitement in England caused by 
the Dogger Bank affair and the exploits of the Russian 
cruisers Petersburg and Smolensk accentuated, if anything, 
this impression." l As it turned out, the German assump- 
tion that England and Russia were of necessity hostile and 
irreconcilable, an assumption that governed the weekly 
reviews of foreign politics written by Professor Theodor 
Schiemann for the Kreuzzeitung, was to prove Germany's 
undoing, for when England and Russia made up their 
differences Germany had no policy prepared to meet the 
new situation, and the ultimate result of that deficiency 
was the war of 1914. 

Thus the entente cordiale of 1904 augured well for the 
peace of the world. Yet it must be recognized that the 
agreement commended itself to the public opinion of both 
France and England, and to their respective foreign offices, 
because at the very least each country would enjoy a free 
hand against Germany, and might, in certain contingen- 
cies, count on the diplomatic support of the other. 2 Ger- 

1 Barclay, Thirty Years' Reminiscences, p. 261. 

* This is admitted by Sydney Brooks, "England and Germany," Atlantic Monthly, 
May, igio, p. 624. 



226 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

mans subsequently convinced themselves that M. Delcasse's 
policy was inspired solely by the desire to secure British 
support in a war of revenge, and that King Edward VII 
was at the bottom of a matured scheme to effect the diplo- 
matic isolation of Germany. 1 Here, then, was a situation 
full of dangerous possibilities. Would either France or 
England, or both of them, pursue an aggressive policy 
toward Germany? or would the latter endeavor to break 
up the new friendship before it had been consolidated as 
an effective force against a German hegemony of Europe? 
In either case the peace of Europe was bound to be seriously 
threatened; so that the agreement concluded between 
Great Britain and France for the purpose of avoiding war 
on account of numerous questions in which they were both 
interested actually opened up the vista of war between 
one or both of them and Germany ! 

As it happened the initiative in testing the new situa- 
tion came from Germany. Although she had raised no 
objection to the Anglo-French convention at the time of 
its publication, even though it had not been formally com- 
municated to her, 2 the prospect of a permanent reconcilia- 
tion between the two old enemies was far from pleasing to 
her; for her colonial policy had hitherto profited from the 
jealousy of London and Paris, not to mention her ascend- 
ency in Europe. But when the Russian armies, in Feb- 
ruary, 1905, met defeat at Mukden, it was obvious that 
France could expect no assistance from her ally in case of 
trouble with Germany. The temptation was too strong 
for the latter. Count von Biilow, the chancellor, stated 
in the Reichstag that Germany was ignorant of any agree- 

1 Inter alia, Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Deutschland unter den Weltvolkem, pp. 243-247. 
Innumerable references could be cited. 

2 The British Government notified the Powers of its undertakings with respect 
to Egypt. France unofficially informed Germany of the Moroccan clauses of the 
agreement, and the latter made no protest at the time. Personal motives seem to 
have inspired M. Delcasse in neglecting the formal communication to Germany. 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 227 

ments as to Morocco recently made between France and 
England, and to reinforce the position Emperor William 
II appeared at Tangier on 31 March, 1905, where he spoke 
to this effect: 

"It is to the Sultan in his position of an independent sovereign 
that I am paying my visit to-day. I hope that under the sover- 
eignty of the Sultan a free Morocco will remain, open to the peace- 
ful rivalry of all nations, without monopoly or annexation, on the 
basis of absolute equality. The object of my visit to Tangier is 
to make it known that I am determined to do all that is in my power 
to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco, 
for I look upon the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign." 

This speech produced the most serious diplomatic crisis 
that Europe had known since thirty years before, when a 
Franco-German war was threatened by the attitude of the 
German military party. For Germany now challenged 
the principle of the Anglo-French convention, that "it 
appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose 
dominions are coterminous for a great distance with those 
of Morocco, to preserve order in that country and to pro- 
vide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, eco- 
nomic, financial, and military reforms which it may re- 
quire." l In brief, Germany demanded that Morocco be 
placed under international control, while France seemed 
disposed to insist upon her ascendency in its affairs. As 
the French policy was peculiarly the work of M. Delcasse, 
a German ultimatum that France should consent to the 
meeting of an international conference was tantamount 
to a demand for the dismissal of the Republic's foreign min- 
ister, and was so regarded, both then and since. France, 
unable to face a war with her mighty neighbor, yielded, 
and Germany seemed to have scored a distinct triumph 
at the expense of the new entente, for, although the Brit- 
ish Government was willing to assist France by landing 

1 Anglo-French Declaration (public), Art. II. 



228 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

100,000 troops in Schleswig-Holstein, the French cabinet 
declined to support M. Delcasse in a policy of resistance, 
and he resigned. 1 After long negotiations, extending over 
the summer of 1905, it was arranged between France and 
Germany that the conference should meet at Algeciras, 
opposite Gibraltar on the Spanish mainland, in January, 
1906. 

Inasmuch as the agreement with France only bound the 
British Government to afford its " diplomatic support" to 
obtain the execution of the Morocco clauses, it is not sur- 
prising that Germany considered the offer of military as- 
sistance an evidence of England's unfriendliness, and that 
there was a renewed outburst of Anglophobia in the Ger- 
man press toward the end of 1905. The Morocco question 
was, indeed, one of the few definite issues between the two 
countries, although Great Britain was not involved as a 
principal. It is therefore necessary to explain what the 
problem was, and, if possible, to express some opinion as 
to the merits of the controversy. 

Morocco, or the Shereefian Empire, was the last inde- 
pendent state of Africa Minor, as the southern littoral of 
the Mediterranean is sometimes called. In the course of 
the nineteenth century all the surrounding regions had been 
appropriated by European Powers, and by 1900 the fron- 
tier of Morocco marched with that of the French posses- 
sions, except in the extreme south, where it touched a 
Spanish colony. The government was no more successful 
than that of Mohammedan states elsewhere; the country 
was, in fact, a feudal state of the variety to be found in 

1 A special envoy, Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, was sent to Paris by the 
German Government to warn the prime minister, M. Rouvier, that M. Delcasse" 
was persona non grata to Germany, and that both the interests of France and the 
peace of Europe required his dismissal. So the Gaulois (Paris) in June, 1905. 
M. Delcasse" took his revenge by disclosing in the Matin, in October following, the 
details of the British offer of assistance. 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 229 

Europe about the year 1000. Geographical divisions 
worked against national unity, even if there had not been 
many strong tribes much addicted to fighting and a tradi- 
tion of corruption which prevented the working out of an 
efficient administrative system. Even the strongest sul- 
tans could maintain some semblance of order only by trav- 
elling about the Empire and quartering themselves upon 
powerful tribal chieftains. The last great ruler was Mulai 
Hassan, who died in 1894, and had prevented excessive 
European interference by protecting such Europeans as 
resided in the land for purposes of commerce; his policy, 
however, was continued by the grand vizier, Ben Hamed, 
down to 1 90 1, when death removed the one man who 
understood the situation clearly. 

The Sultan Abdel Assiz achieved considerable notoriety 
by his addiction to photography and other refinements of 
European life. But civilization led to bankruptcy, which 
could be liquidated only by European assistance; and tribal 
restlessness, culminating in the revolt of El Rogui in 1903, 
created a dangerous and difficult position for European resi- 
dents. As the land had long been the arena of European 
intrigue without falling a prey to it, the unhappy Sultan 
was likely to be overwhelmed by applications from Powers 
anxious to give his country their respective types of colonial 
organization. 

Historically Spain enjoyed the greatest interest in Mo- 
rocco, on account of the long struggle between Christianity 
and Islam for the control of the Iberian peninsula. But 
at the opening of the twentieth century her holdings were 
confined to four presidios on the Mediterranean littoral 
and a small settlement on the Atlantic coast. Her friend- 
ship with Great Britain guaranteed that no other Power 
would be allowed to secure the Mediterranean coast lest 
it be used as a balance to Gibraltar. 

Great Britain's interest was entirely commercial, except 



230 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

that she could not tolerate an occupation by a hostile 
Power which might control either the Suez or the South 
African route to India. She had several times tried to 
secure reforms in the Shereefian Government, but, failing 
that, was content with some forty per cent of the trade of 
Morocco. Her diplomatic agents and her merchants en- 
joyed the confidence of the Sultan, who regarded the Eng- 
lish friendship as the surest barrier to the introduction of 
European influences; so that in 1901 a protectorate was 
practically offered to the British Government. 

The Power with a vital interest in the future of Morocco 
was France. Ever since Algeria became a French colony 
the anarchy which reigned on the Morocco-Algerian fron- 
tier had been a constant source of trouble; also of profit, 
for by perpetuating the disorder the French Government 
provided itself with a convenient excuse for intervening 
in Morocco should a favorable occasion ever arise. After 
the occupation of the last Sahara oases in the 'nineties, 
Morocco came to be regarded as the keystone of the French 
African Empire, and the colonial party in France openly 
avowed its desire for a French protectorate, or for an an- 
nexation, if possible. French commerce stood second to 
that of Great Britain, being reckoned at about twenty 
per cent. And some patriots, keenly aware of the ever 
increasing discrepancy of France and Germany in popula- 
tion, looked forward to the time when the Republic might 
use African troops to supply the deficiency of the regular 
army; for which purpose the fighting tribesmen of Morocco 
would be of great value. Furthermore, in the event of a 
European war, the position of France throughout northern 
Africa might be seriously compromised by the activities 
of Mohammedan secret societies operating from an inde- 
pendent Morocco. On the whole, therefore, France's 
moral claim to the reversion of the Shereefian Empire may 
be fairly admitted. 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 231 

There remained Germany, who was not disposed to al- 
low her western neighbor a free hand in dealing with the 
decaying Moorish state, partly because of her own definite 
interests therein, partly because, as the Emperor once re- 
marked, "without Germany and the German Emperor, no 
important step in international policy should be taken, 
even beyond the seas." * Unfortunately, it is well-nigh im- 
possible to determine whether the German Government 
ever had a definite policy as regards Morocco itself, for its 
conduct in the years 1 905-1 1 was curiously inconsistent. 
Prince Bulow repeatedly stated that the interests of Ger- 
many were purely economic, and that she would be content 
if the open door and the sovereignty of the Sultan were 
adequately maintained. At the end of the last century 
German commerce with Morocco amounted to only nine 
per cent of the total trade, but it was displaying the usual 
German energy and was rapidly increasing. Well aware 
that the French occupation of Tunis had led to sharp 
differential treatment in favor of French goods and that 
in Madagascar practically all non-French goods had been 
excluded by a high protective tariff, Germany insisted 
upon equal treatment for all nations in Morocco, and 
might reasonably expect the support of other governments. 
Her point was well taken because the Anglo-French agree- 
ment bound France to maintain the open door for thirty 
years only and did not in any manner insure the rights of 
other nations after that period. 2 So long, therefore, as 
German policy envisaged the maintenance of the inde- 
pendence and integrity of Morocco, together with a recog- 
nition of the sovereignty of the Sultan, as a guarantee of 
the open door, it occupied a strong position. In addition, 
a convention signed at Madrid in 1880 by all the European 
Powers and the United States made Morocco a kind of. 

1 Kiel, 3 July, igoo. 

2 Anglo-French Declaration (public), Art. IV. 



232 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

international hunting-ground. True, that agreement had 
reference to the protection of European residents in the 
Shereefian Empire and was not concerned with trading 
rights; but Article XVII declared that "the right of most- 
favored-nation treatment is recognized by Morocco for 
all the Powers represented at the Conference of Madrid." 
The most-favored-nation treatment was also promised to 
Germany in the commercial treaty signed by Germany 
and Morocco in 1890. 

On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that Germany 
did not cherish ambitions of another description. Through- 
out the period during which the Morocco controversy kept 
Europe on tenter-hooks the agitation for "a place in the 
sun" was at its height, and Morocco figured prominently 
in the programmes of the Pan- German League and the 
Colonial Society. In the propaganda of these associations 
the Shereefian Empire was described as a veritable Gol- 
conda; nor was this a distortion of the truth. With an 
area of 219,000 square miles and a population of only 
5,000,000, the land was capable of receiving a large num- 
ber of European settlers; the climate, more especially in 
the southwest, was salubrious; the agricultural possibilities 
were boundless, for the soil was both rich and sparsely 
cultivated; above all, from a German point of view, the 
earth was known to be extraordinarily rich in iron and 
other ores in which Germany was either lacking or increas- 
ingly dependent upon imports. A further recommenda- 
tion could be found in the fact that Morocco was practically 
the last semicivilized region of the globe that was not 
mortgaged to some European Power or was not entangled 
in the meshes of Pan-American or Asiatic politics. The 
acquisition of Morocco would probably have gone far to 
satisfy German colonial ambitions, and, whether or not the 
imperial government aimed to secure the whole or a part 
of the spoils when the Sultan capitulated to European pres- 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 233 

sure, public opinion fully expected the fatherland to ob- 
tain its proper share of the prey. 

For political reasons as well as economic considerations 
Germany would find Morocco useful. For some time she 
•had felt keenly the need of a coaling station somewhere on 
the route from Europe to her African colonies — Togoland, 
Cameroons, and Southwest Africa. For that purpose the 
western coast of Morocco offered many possibilities. 
Furthermore, a German Morocco would neutralize French 
Algeria in case of a European war. But most important 
of all, Germany would become a Mediterranean Power, 
at least in its western area. Then, if her Baghdad railway 
could be put through and her hold on Asia Minor estab- 
lished; if also her ally, Austria-Hungary, were to carry 
through an ambitious naval programme, then the Germanic 
Powers might in time acquire a preponderant position in 
the Middle Sea, that is, across the most important trade 
route and the strategic centre of the British Empire. It 
must be frankly admitted that the above interpretation 
of Germany's Moroccan policy is inferential, for the im- 
perial government never admitted that it cherished terri- 
torial aspirations in Morocco. But if Germany were 
merely championing the open door, it is difficult to under- 
stand why Great Britain opposed so resolutely every for- 
ward move of the Berlin foreign office, for her own trade 
was bound to profit by the success of the German policy. 
Either Germany did aspire to a part of Morocco — and in the 
negotiations preceding the Great War, she declined, be it 
remembered, to guarantee the integrity of the French col- 
onies, of which Morocco was surely the most desirable; 
or she was using the Morocco question as a means of test- 
ing the Anglo-French entente. The one did not exclude 
the other, for that matter. If Germany avowed her de- 
signs upon Morocco, the entente would speedily become an 
alliance; on the other hand, if she could break up the 



234 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

entente, Morocco would be hers for the asking, as France 
was in no position to undertake a war single-handed. But 
from whatever angle the matter is viewed, it is clear that 
Great Britain, deeply concerned as she was at the growth 
of the German navy, was bound to resent the establishment 
of German influence in Morocco, which would prejudice 
her position in the Mediterranean, or to draw nearer to 
France if the latter were subjected to any threats at the 
hands of Germany. If Germany's interests obviously 
demanded a forward policy in Morocco, British interests 
equally required that such a policy be blocked; and be- 
yond that point it is neither useful nor possible to refine the 
dispute. 1 

After the foregoing statement of the attitude of the sev- 
eral Powers toward the Moroccan question we may nar- 
rate the course of events in the Shereefian Empire which 
led up to the Conference of Algeciras. 

The first step toward securing a hold on Morocco was 
taken by France in iqoi, when her relations with England 
were still problematical and when the latter was still 
engaged in the Boer War. In July of that year, after a 
French squadron had repaired to Tangier (a French subject 
had recently been murdered) , a treaty was concluded which 
prepared the way for that penetration pacifique so dear to 
modern diplomacy and pledged France to maintain the 
independence and integrity of the Sultan's dominions. 
This was followed in April, 1902, by another convention, 
which regulated the policing of the Morocco-Algerian fron- 
tier in a manner distinctly favorable to France. Shortly 
after this M. Delcasse opened negotiations with Germany 

1 Gustav Diercks, Die Marokkofrage und die Konferenz von Algesiras (1906); 
Krieg mit Frankreich? Wohin muss die deutsche Marokkopolitik fuhren? (1907); 
Heinrich Class, West-Marokko deutsch I (191 1), 60,000 copies being sold; Dr. 
Albrecht Wirth, Die Entscheidung iiber Marokko (191 1); Dr. Wilhelm Arning, 
Marokko-Kongo (1912). Andre Tardieu, La Conference a" Algesiras (1906) ; Augustin 
Bernard, Le Maroc (1913). E. D. Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy (1912), bitterly 
critical of British policy, but containing all the essential documents. 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 235 

to buy off her opposition, and proposed to Spain a parti- 
tion of what did not yet belong to France. But nothing 
came of the former, and Great Britain got wind of the 
Franco-Spanish scheme and blocked it. This check was 
probably the decisive factor in deciding the Republic to 
give up its claims in Egypt in return for England's con- 
sent to its Morocco policy. The agreement with London 
was then concluded on 8 April, 1904. 

The published articles of the Anglo-French convention 
bound the two governments not to "alter the political 
status" of either Egypt or Morocco, but in secret articles, 
which were not published until 191 1, they considered "the 
event of either government finding itself constrained, by 
the force of circumstances, to modify the policy in re- 
spect to Egypt or Morocco," and they promised mutual 
assistance in securing "reforms" in either country. The 
published declaration recognized the interests of Spain on 
the Mediterranean littoral of Morocco, and France was 
bidden to come to terms with her. On 3 October, 1904, 
the French and Spanish Governments, in a public declara- 
tion, stated that they were "firmly attached to the in- 
tegrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the 
Sultan"; but secretly they arranged a treaty of partition 
which, according to agreement, was communicated to the 
British Government and which bound Spain never "to 
alienate or to cede in any form, even temporarily, the whole 
or any part of the territories" awarded to her — a precau- 
tion, perhaps, against a German purchase or lease. 1 ' Thus, 
while the world was led to believe that Morocco's position 
would be maintained intact by France, Spain, and Great 
Britain, those very Powers were privately agreed that the 
Sultan's dominions should be divided among two of their 
number, and the third was pledged to give its diplomatic 
support to the proceedings. 

1 Art. VII. 



236 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

It was not a creditable business for the negotiators. 
True, the possession of Morocco by France was the logical 
corollary of the British occupation of Egypt, and a pub- 
lic announcement might easily have precipitated a war. 
Probably not otherwise could the Western Powers have 
scored at the expense of Germany, but their diplomacy 
was placed in a false light; just as was Germany's by her 
refusal to pursue a consistent policy fairly and squarely. 
Whether or when Germany learned of the secret articles, 
cannot be said; but it has been argued that the sudden 
change of front made by Germany after the battle of 
Mukden was dictated by the knowledge that a partition 
of Morocco was being prepared, 1 and the explanation is 
not unreasonable, as important secrets have more than 
once leaked out of the Quai d'Orsay. In any case, the 
Germans had reason to be alarmed, for in June, 1904, the 
Maghzen, as the Shereefian Government is called, had 
raised a loan of 62,500,000 francs in Paris, and the pro- 
gramme of reforms presented to the Sultan by the French 
minister in February, 1905, would have made Morocco 
practically a French protectorate. 2 

" The Algeciras Conference had, therefore, to decide 
whether it would establish an international control over 
Morocco or recognize the peculiar interests of France and 
Spain. Germany had a strong case, beyond a doubt, but 
the strong-handed methods of her diplomacy militated 
seriously against her. She had raised the question in a 
brutal fashion, and her representatives at the conference 
assumed a domineering and hectoring attitude that was 
most distasteful to the polished agents of the other Powers. 

1 So Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy, p. 98, who bases bis opinion on tbe text of a 
Reuter despatch of October, 1904, 

! According to the German minister to Morocco, his French colleague pressed the 
reforms on the Sultan by the argument that he was acting in the name of the Euro- 
pean concert. M. Saint-Rene Taillandier denied explicitly that he had used such 
language. 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 237 

Hence, in the really vital questions, she enjoyed the sup- 
port only of Austria-Hungary, her ally. Her other ally, 
Italy, consistently voted against her, and even the neutral 
American delegates favored the French contentions. To 
a large extent, the question debated was not so much the 
future of Morocco as the strength of the several Powers. 
An unreserved German victory would have consolidated 
firmly the new position in Europe she had acquired since 
Russia's defeat in the Far East. The result of the con- 
ference, accordingly, was a theoretical acceptance of the 
German doctrine of internationalization, but a practical 
disavowal of it by the grant of a privileged position to 
France and Spain. 

In securing this the assistance of the British Govern- 
ment was invaluable to France. Sir Edward Grey, who 
had just taken over the foreign office, said to the French 
ambassador : 



"If war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco 
— a question which had just been made the subject of agreement 
between this country [England] and France, an agreement extremely- 
popular on both sides — if out of this agreement war was forced on 
France at this time, in his view public opinion in this country 
would have rallied to the material support of France." l 

Sir Edward made no promises, but he conveyed his opinion 
to the German ambassador as well as to the French; he 
used no threats, but the German Government knew that 
it could not break up the entente cordiale by an aggres- 
sive policy toward France. Without committing the Brit- 
ish Government, the foreign secretary also authorized the 
consultation of British and French military experts. Thus 
German policy had succeeded in cementing the entente 
into something more than a mere combination for diplo- 

1 House of Commons, 3 August, 1914. (5 Hansard lxv, c. 1811.) 



238 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

matic manoeuvres, without, as later events showed, taking 
the lesson to heart. 

The Act of Algeciras, in one hundred and twenty-three 
articles, accepted "the threefold principle of the sover- 
eignty and independence of his Majesty the Sultan, the 
integrity of his dominions, and economic liberty without 
any inequality." Apart from regulations for the suppres- 
sion of the traffic in arms and for the better collection of 
taxes, the essential provisions were those concerning the 
organization of a police force and a state bank. The former 
task was intrusted to French and Spanish officers. As 
regards the bank, its capital was divided into fourteen 
equal shares, of which one was allotted to each of the twelve 
signatory Powers, and the other two to the French banks 
interested in the loan of June, 1904; France and Spain, 
therefore, secured two-sevenths of the capital. Also, the 
bank was organized under the laws of France. In theory, 
France and Spain were to act as agents of the Powers, but 
in reality they were awarded a privileged position; and it 
soon became apparent that the authority given them as 
agents of the Powers was not sufficient to cope with the 
problems that arose. 

Prince Billow, in a speech to the Reichstag on 5 April, 
1906, sought to justify his policy. The Morocco question, 
he said, had been "one affecting the prestige of the German 
Government and the dignity of the German Empire," 
and he argued that these had been vindicated and safe- 
guarded by the conference and its decisions. He also 
insisted that Germany did not begrudge France her friend- 
ship with England or her reconciliation with Italy. But 
public opinion in Germany was not so easily satisfied. 
The press, the pamphleteers, and many parliamentarians 
felt that in reality little had been gained for so much effort; 
that the Act of Algeciras would not persuade France to 
abandon her policy toward Morocco, and that other nations 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 239 

were not sympathetic with German ambitions. As one 
writer remarked: 

"We are now isolated, unloved, hated, because we have gradually 
established our right to take part in the settlement of international 
problems, because we have zealously come forward to support our 
interests." ' 

This was in large measure true, and it was much re- 
marked upon at the time that in his Reichstag speech of 
14 November, 1906, Prince Biilow, whose attitude had 
been rather haughty since the beginning of the Russo- 
Japanese War, was at some pains to demonstrate the 
friendliness of Germany with all the Powers of the world. 
But, he went on to say: 

"A policy that aims to hem Germany in, to draw around us a 
circle of Powers for the purpose of isolating us, would be a very 
dangerous policy for the peace of Europe." 

Nevertheless, the year 1907 witnessed a series of agree- 
ments which, avowedly growing out of the Morocco im- 
broglio, went far toward accomplishing the very result 
against which Prince Biilow had delivered his warning. 
On 16 May the French and Spanish Governments, in 
identical declarations, announced their intention to "main- 
tain the status quo in the Mediterranean and that part of 
the Atlantic which washes the coast of Europe and Africa"; 
in case new circumstances necessitated any change in the 
status quo they would consult together with a view to 
common action. Similar declarations were made by Spain 
and Great Britain, for which the way had been prepared 
by the marriage of Princess Ena of Battenberg to King Al- 
fonso the preceding year. 2 Thus Spain, which had long 

1 Diercks, Die Marokkofrage und die Konferenz von Algesiras, p. 170. 

2 About the same time Spain decided to reconstruct her fleet, which had been 
neglected since the war with the United States, and British capitalists arranged to 
provide the necessary loans. 



240 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

been in close relations with the government of Berlin, 
was, by her interests in Morocco, brought within the orbit 
of the entente cordiale, to the intense annoyance of her 
former friend. It should also be noted that the Anglo- 
Portuguese treaty of alliance, which contained a guarantee 
of the integrity of the Portuguese colonies, had been re- 
newed in 1903. From this time an active German policy 
in the Mediterranean was destined to meet with oppo- 
sition from the four Western Powers. 

With these Powers Italy was now, for practical pur- 
poses, closely associated. From the days of unification 
Italy had cultivated and enjoyed the close friendship of 
Great Britain, chiefly as a protection against the hostility 
of France, and she had persisted in this policy even after 
her ally, Germany, had fallen out with England, a fact 
recognized by visits of King Edward to Victor Emmanuel 
III in 1903 and 1907. More important was the rapproche- 
ment with France, which became possible after M. Del- 
casse, in 1901-2, had recognized the "rights" of Italy to 
Tripoli when a convenient season should come for assert- 
ing them. As the Anglo-French entente developed, Franco- 
Italian relations steadily improved, as evidenced by the 
Italian support of the French claims at the Algeciras Con- 
ference. No formal convention between the two countries 
was signed, except an Anglo-French-Italian agreement 
guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Abyssinia, 
but their interests were sufficiently identical to insure a 
harmonious co-operation. Italy, indeed, remained a mem- 
ber of the Triple Alliance, but she was a silent partner, 
whose ambitions in the Adriatic were directly opposed to 
those of her ally, Austria-Hungary. Prince Biilow in- 
sisted that the Triple Alliance was as efficient as ever, but 
he did not succeed in convincing his countrymen by his 
argument. 

The last straw, from the German point of view, was the 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 241 

Anglo-Russian convention of 31 August, 1907. This was 
perhaps the soundest move of British diplomacy for a 
hundred years, for it dispelled the long-imagined bogie of 
a Russian attack on India, whose safety is one of Britain's 
first considerations. But to Germany it was intolerable 
— first because Anglo-Russian rivalry had played an impor- 
tant part in the shaping of her policy; next because it was 
doubtful if the traditional friendship of the German and 
Russian Emperors could stand the strain of Anglo-German 
hostility; and lastly because, as the Russian foreign min- 
ister said, 1 the agreement made possible the re-entry of 
Russia into European politics, from which she had stood 
aloof since the days of Bismarck and her absorption in 
Far Eastern affairs. To be precise, Russia was hence- 
forth to take an active interest in the Balkans, to support 
the policy of reform which Great Britain, to the disgust 
of both Germany and Austria, was urging for Mace- 
donia, and in general to oppose the Drang nach Osten of 
the Germanic Powers. 

Germans had not believed an Anglo-Russian reconcilia- 
tion possible, and the renewal of the Anglo- Japanese alli- 
ance, which was originally directed against Russia, in 
August, 1905, seemed to confirm their view. But Russia 
had stood by England and France at Algeciras; on 10 June, 
1907, France and Japan adjusted their relations by an 
agreement to respect the independence and integrity of 
China and the principle of the open door; on 30 July 
Russia and Japan drew closer together by a formal recog- 
nition of their possessions and treaty rights in China and 
Manchuria. These prehminaries removed the last ob- 
stacle to the accord between London and St. Petersburg, 
which was stimulated by the advance of German influence 
in Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, to be noticed presently. 
Their bargain respecting Tibet and Afghanistan was of 

1 A. Viallate, La Vie politique dans les deux mondes, 1906-1907, p. 7. 



242 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

no interest to Germany. But the practical partition of 
Persia did not augur well for Germany's growing commerce 
in that country, nor was she pleased to see Russia concede 
British supremacy in the Persian Gulf. Henceforth Ger- 
many would not possess a free hand in the Near East, just 
as her activities in the Mediterranean were restrained by 
the agreements between the Mediterranean Powers. 

It must be admitted that the situation was not pleasant 
for Germany. As late as 1904 her influence in Europe 
had been scarcely challenged, and the one check upon it, 
the Dual Alliance, was seriously compromised by Russia's 
reverses in the Far East. By 1907, in addition to the 
Franco-Russian alliance, Germany was confronted by a 
network of agreements involving Great Britain, Spain, 
Italy, and Japan, of which Powers two were closely con- 
nected with the Dual Alliance. The Triple Alliance was 
now opposed by a Triple Entente, which was in a position 
to restrain the policy of Germany and Austria in the very 
regions they regarded as the theatres of their political and 
economic expansion. Indubitably the strength of the new 
combination lay in the support which British sea power 
could give to the military pressure exerted by France and 
Russia. Germans had convinced themselves that Great 
Britain must desire the destruction of Germany before the 
latter forged ahead as a commercial and naval Power: 
they therefore, not unnaturally, argued that the entente 
had been engineered by Great Britain with the object of 
isolating Germany diplomatically and with the ultimate 
purpose of precipitating a war against her. Englishmen, 
on the other hand, insisted that the agreements with France 
and Russia were made merely as means of protection against 
German aggression; they remembered the unscrupulous- 
ness of Bismarck, they regarded the German navy as a 
challenge to their traditional maritime ascendency, and 
they pointed to the recurring diplomatic crises as convinc- 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 243 

ing evidence of German forwardness. As long as Europe 
remained split into two hostile camps, only a miracle could 
avoid war between them. 

The time is far off when we can know the truth about 
the so-called Einkreisungspolitik of England. It became 
"a matter of faith even among those who were her best 
friends," x and Germans will probably never be convinced 
that King Edward VII and Sir Edward Grey were not 
playing a Machiavellian game. The King rather than the 
foreign secretary was held primarily responsible, but the 
latter passed for the arch-type of English hypocrisy, partly, 
it may be suggested, because he spoke but seldom in Par- 
liament and took but little interest in the social life of 
London; his time must, therefore, be consumed in plots 
and intrigues against Germany. The basis of the charge 
against King Edward was his extraordinary fondness for 
travelling. From his coronation to his death not a year 
passed in which he did not pay a round of visits to his 
brother monarchs of Europe, and as he was a man of un- 
common tact and urbanity it was easy to imagine that 
this activity was closely connected with British foreign 
policy. But those who ascribed to him the personal direc- 
tion of that policy overlooked the fact that as a constitu- 
tional ruler he could not initiate a policy of his own; that 
on his many journeys he was accompanied by only officials 
of the foreign office, not by ministers responsible to Parlia- 
ment, who alone could authorize actions binding the Brit- 
ish Government. The King was certainly the agent of 
the foreign office, for he was excellently equipped to ex- 
plain its intentions to Continental sovereigns who did en- 
joy control of their national policies; but as his official 
biographer has said: 

1 R. C. Long, "Germany and the Entente," Fortnightly Review, October, 1909, 
P- 738. 



244 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

"Foreign statesmen and rulers knew that no subtler aim really 
underlay his movements than a wish for friendly social intercourse 
with them and the enjoyment of life under foreign skies quite 
unencumbered by the burden of diplomatic anxieties." 

Some "unguarded remarks" in Paris, in the course of 1905, 
which reached the Emperor William had "an unfriendly 
sound," but "no deliberate hostility to the German peo- 
ple can truthfully be put to the King's credit." In short, 
British foreign policy "was unaffected by the royal prog- 
resses." l 

These progresses, it should be noted, were impartially 
distributed. If he preferred to visit France and the Medi- 
terranean lands, or sometimes journeyed to Russia and the 
Scandinavian countries, he did not neglect the Germanic 
sovereigns. He visited William II in 1904, 1906, 1907, 
1908, and 1909, in the last year as an official guest in Ber- 
lin; Francis Joseph was similarly honored in 1903, 1905, 
1907, and 1908. The real purpose of the King's visits 
was to induce the German Emperor to consider a limita- 
tion of naval armaments — that is, to prepare the ground 
for formal negotiations between the British and German 
foreign offices; and he sought to make use of the tradi- 
tional friendship of England and Austria as a means of 
exerting pressure upon the ally of the latter. The verdict 
of Germany's most fearless publicist, Maximilian Harden, 
deserves to be quoted: 

"Edward VII, son of a Coburger, grandson of a Saxon princess, 
was never an enemy of Germany. As a Briton he knew that Eng- 
land must not abandon the command of the sea and the predomi- 
nant position in Islamic countries, if it did not wish to see the roots 
of its power destroyed. As the patron of Sir John Fisher he knew 
the opinion of English naval experts: 'Dreadnoughts alone, not the 
ships of yesterday, will decide any future war, and Germany may 
soon be devilishly near us in Dreadnought strength.' As a business 

1 Sir Sidney Lee, "King Edward VII," Dictionary of National Biography, second 
supplement, vol. I, pp. 502-596. 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 245 

man he said to himself that the 63,000,000 of Germans would not 
quietly submit to the destruction of their fleet and the loss of their 
colonies, and that Great Britain, the market and clearing-house of 
the inhabited earth, could not sustain a century of constant menace 
of war, even after a great victory. He desired, therefore, an under- 
standing as to extent of naval armaments instead of war." x 

Harden's was a voice crying in the wilderness, except 
for the protests of Social Democrats, who were not heeded. 
The conviction as to British hostility and her policy of is- 
olation subsisted in German minds. Thus Herr Bassermann, 
the National Liberal leader, at Essen, in September, 1905: 

"England works for fresh coalitions against Germany in order 
to get great forces together for a final reckoning with Germany. 
. . . Peace with England will be assured when our fleet is so 
strong that England will not dare fall upon us." 

Or again at Magdeburg, in April, 1907: 

"England is everywhere, England's King is everywhere. . . . 
In every corner of the world England is pursuing a policy which is 
unfavorable to Germany." 2 

In June, 1908, the Emperor himself was full of the idea. 
In a speech at Doberitz he said: 

"It seems likely that people wish to isolate and provoke us. 
We shall be able to put up with it. The Teuton has never fought 
better than when he has been brought to bay. So let them attack 
us; we shall be ready!" 3 

British statesmen endeavored to dispel the illusion that 
their policy was one of encirclement. Sir Edward Grey 
admirably defined his position in a speech made shortly 
before he took over the foreign office: 

"Nothing we do in our relations with Germany," he said, "is 
in any way to impair our existing good relations with France. In 

1 Monarchs and Men (1912), p. 28. 

'Quoted in Annual Register, 1905, p. 293; 1907, p. 306. 

* A. Viallate, La Vie politique dans les deux mondes, 1907-1908, p. 162. 



246 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

other words, it must be, in my opinion, a condition of any improve- 
ment in the public relations between Germany and ourselves that 
the relations of Germany with France on all matters which come 
under the French agreement should be fair and good also." 1 

This attitude he consistently maintained to the very out- 
break of the Great War, and it may be stated that the rela- 
tions of the British and German Governments, from 1904 
to 1914, became strained only when the latter became tru- 
culent in its relations with France. As regards Russia, Sir 
Edward was equally explicit. He warmly supported Sir 
Charles Dilke in deprecating the idea that the Anglo- 
Russian agreement aimed at the isolation of Germany, 
and said that he had no objection to any alliances Ger- 
many might conclude. 2 For this reason, during the Bos- 
nian crisis of 1908-9, which intimately affected the inter- 
ests of Russia, "anything more than diplomatic support 
. . . was never asked from us, more was never given, 
more was never promised." 3 And after the Morocco cri- 
sis of 191 1, Sir Edward Grey declared that "one of the es- 
sential conditions of our friendships with France and with 
Russia in the last few years has been the certain knowledge 
that neither they nor we wished to pursue a provocative 
or aggressive policy." 4 

On the other hand, he made it quite clear that Great 
Britain was willing, even anxious, to enjoy the friendship 
of Germany, provided such a friendship was not at the 
expense of Britain's existing friendships with France and 
Russia; and it will presently be seen that he attempted 
to give concrete expression to such a policy. The diffi- 
culty was explained by Sir Frank Lascelles, who was Brit- 
ish ambassador in Berlin from 1895 to 1908, when he wrote: 

1 London, 20 October, 1905. 

2 House of Commons, 27 July, 1908. (4 Hansard cxciii, cc. 955, 970.) 

3 House of Commons, 3 August, 1914. (5 Hansard lxv, c. 1811.) 

4 House of Commons, 27 November, 191 1. (5 Hansard xxxii, c. 59.) 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 247 

"It became my duty to speak at dinners, and I noticed that 
whilst the expression of a sincere desire for good relations on the 
part of England was cordially applauded a coldness seemed to come 
over my audience when I pointed out that it must be clearly under- 
stood that friendship with one country did not imply hostility to 
any other, and although we desired to be friends with Germany 
we were not prepared to abandon the friendships into which we 
had entered with other Powers and which certainly did not imply 
any hostility toward Germany." 1 

That England adjusted her difficulties with France and 
Russia from fear of Germany, and by so doing created the 
Triple Entente is in large measure true, but no evidence 
has ever been produced to show that the immediate or 
ultimate aim of that policy was war with Germany, or 
that the Entente was ever regarded by England as other 
than a means of defense against the incalculable policy of 
Germany, which managed to challenge British interests 
first in one, then in another, quarter. If Germany has been 
the victim of a conspiracy hatched by Great Britain, she 
has published no evidence which can stand in the court 
of history. Indeed, such facts as are known point to 
Germany as the aggressive Power, for each of the four 
European crises preceding the Great War — 1905, 1908-9, 

191 1, and 191 2-13 — were precipitated by the action of 
Germany or her ally Austria-Hungary; and on each occa- 
sion the crisis was due to the. mailed-fist diplomacy of the 
Teutonic allies. 

The relations of the British and German Governments 
from the Algeciras Conference to the Bosnian crisis of 
1908-9 were chiefly concerned with the question of 
naval armaments, and the result has been noted in the 
chapter entitled "The Admiralty of the Atlantic." On 
the surface the only difficulties were met with in the deli- 
cate question of Macedonian reforms. But at the second 

1 "Thoughts on the Anglo-German Problem," Contemporary Review, January, 

1912, p. 7. 



248 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Hague Conference (summer of 1907) British and German 
policies were poles apart. The atmosphere was somewhat 
cleared by the Emperor's visit to England in the autumn 
of 1907, despite a savage attack on Prince Biilow in the 
columns of the Times} The Emperor was well received 
wherever he went, and he stayed on for some weeks in a 
private capacity. His speech at the Guild Hall made a 
profound impression. Referring to a visit to the same 
place in 1891, he said: 

"I said then, on this spot, that my aim was, above all, the main- 
tenance of peace. History, I venture to hope, will do me justice 
in that I have pursued this aim unswervingly ever since. The 
main prop and base for the peace of the world is the maintenance 
of good relations between our two countries, and I will further 
strengthen them so far as lies in my power. The German nation's 
wishes coincide with them." 

In characteristic fashion the Emperor proceeded to undo 
the effects of these remarks: first, by his letter to Lord 
Tweedmouth; 2 second, by the navy law of 1908; and, above 
all, by the interview which he gave to an English diploma- 
tist and which was published in the Daily Telegraphy on - ; 
28 October, 1908: 

"His Majesty," ran the principal passage of the statement," • 
which was intended "as a message to the English people," "spoke 
with impulsive and unusual frankness, saying: 'You English are 
as mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you 
that you are completely given over to suspicions that are quite 
unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I have 
done? I declared with all the emphasis at my command in my 
speech at the Guild Hall that my heart was set upon peace and 
that it was one of my dearest wishes to live on the best terms with 
England. Have I ever been false to my word? Falsehood and 
prevarication are alien to my nature. My actions ought to speak 

1 10 October, 1007. 

2 See Chap. VIII, "The Admiralty of the Atlantic," p. 183. 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 249 

for themselves, but you will not listen to them, but to those who 
misinterpret and distort them. 

'"This is a personal insult which I resent; to be forever mis- 
judged, to have my repeated offers of friendship weighed and scru- 
tinized with jealous, mistrustful eyes taxes my patience severely. 
I have said time after time that I am a friend of England, and your 
press, or at least a considerable section of it, bids the people of 
England to refuse my proffered hand and insinuates that the other 
hand holds a dagger. How can I convince a nation against its 
will?' 

"Complaining again of the difficulty imposed upon him by Eng- 
lish distrust, his Majesty said: 'The prevailing sentiment of large 
sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not 
friendly to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in the minority 
in my own land, but it is a minority of the best element, just as it 
is in England respecting Germany.' " 

The rest of the interview presented the imperial view of 
recent diplomatic events, and need not be quoted here; 
it ended with the stereotyped justification of the German 
navy. 

As a statement of facts, the interview was to some ex- 
tent justified, for the ill feeling between Germany and 
England was very strong at the time, and was perhaps 
stronger in England than in Germany. 1 But it was sin- 
gularly unsuccessful as a harbinger of better relations, for 
in both England and Germany there was intense indigna- 
tion, which was in no wise diminished by the crisis in the 
Near East and the conflicting policies followed by Great 
Britain and Germany in that matter. Fortunately the 
statesmen of both countries kept their heads. Mr. Asquith, 
Sir Edward Grey, and Prince Biilow made conciliatory 
speeches, and the incident was gradually forgotten. 

In February Edward VII visited Berlin, where he was 

'"The ill feeling seems to me much commoner and more menacing in England 
than in Germany." (Edwin D. Mead, "England and Germany," Atlantic Monthly, 
March, 1908, p. 398.) But he records that the other English papers rebuked the 
Times for its savage attack on Prince Biilow. 



250 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

most cordially received, and it was considered a happy 
augury that during his stay a Franco- German conven- 
tion was signed which promised to give a definitive solu- 
tion to the Morocco question. But the royal visit "exer- 
cised no lasting effect in abating the popular apprehension 
of German designs." * Indeed, shortly after the King's 
return, the naval scare of 1909 was sprung, and Germans 
said that they had been duped. The intervention, there- 
fore, of the Wilhelmstrasse in the Balkan crisis to support 
Austria against the demands of the Triple Entente, and the 
complete rout of the latter were regarded as a fitting reply 
to British duplicity, even though Europe was left in two 
sharply drawn diplomatic groups in which Germany was 
supported only by her ally. 

No amount of official optimism or of private assurances 
could conceal the harsh realities of the situation. Sincere 
efforts were made in both countries. A British Anglo- 
German Friendship Committee, organized in 1905, soon 
had its counterpart in Germany. Visits of representa- 
tive men were arranged on each side. Ministers, journal- 
ists, public officials, workingmen, and students from each 
country visited the other, and professed themselves satis- 
fied that the hostility reflected in the press was artificial 
and did not represent a real conflict of interests. Many 
writers in English reviews argued that each people accused 
the other of the same hostile and diabolical designs, and 
that only the armament firms profited by the insensate 
naval rivalry. Englishmen hailed Germany as the land 
of Goethe, Schiller, and the world's greatest musicians; 
Germans gave fitting recognition to the genius of Shake- 
speare, and acknowledged their indebtedness to England 
in all matters of commerce and industry. But nothing 
could remove the malaise that oppressed the people of both 
countries, and it was precisely this feeling that a conflict 

1 Annual Register, 1909, p. 8. 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 251 

was inevitable which enabled both governments to con- 
struct the huge navies that actually did create an issue 
and materially increased the chances of a fatal outcome. 
Years of hard work by enlightened patriots in each coun- 
try ultimately prepared the way for more cordial relations, 
more especially after the Morocco question was settled. 
But the reconciliation had not been effected when the crisis 
of 1 9 14 arose; the old animosity reappeared, and Sir Ed- 
ward Grey had behind him a practically unanimous nation 
when he called upon Germany to respect the neutrality of 
Belgium, while Germans were at once persuaded that the 
struggle with Great Britain was the real issue of the war. 
Public opinion must bear with diplomacy its share of the 
blame for the Great War, and the historian will be reluc- 
tant to say that in this respect one nation was entirely 
guilty and the other quite blameless. 

Domestic politics in both countries reacted unfavorably 
upon their international relations. The Liberal govern- 
ment of Great Britain was pledged to a costly policy of 
social reform, and many of its supporters in the House of 
Commons were, for various reasons, admirers of Germany, 
with whom they insistently demanded an understanding. 
Under such circumstances the money required to keep up 
the two-Power naval standard was not forthcoming, and 
the foreign office could not, even if it so desired, make a 
formal defensive alliance with France and Russia. Brit- 
ish policy was actually a compromise that was far sounder 
than most people suspected, but in many quarters it was 
not understood, and because devised by a Liberal ministry 
it was supposed to be weak and vacillating. This played 
directly into the hands of Germany, for the elections of 
January, 1907, had been fought on the question whether, 
to quote the North German Gazette, " Germany was at all 
capable of developing from a European Power into a world 
Power." The triumphant vindication of the government's 



252 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

policy and the defeat of the Social Democrats necessitated 
vigorous action, to which the foreign office was nothing 
loath, and whether by accident or design such action in- 
variably involved British interests or British relations with 
the other Powers of the Triple Entente. Hence Anglo- 
German relations were at their worst during the five years' 
life of the Reichstag elected in 1907 ; whereas they improved 
materially after the elections of 191 2 had gone against the 
government and revealed the popular disapproval of the 
Wilhelmstrasse's methods and policy alike. Also, in the 
course of time the German foreign office learned that Sir 
Edward Grey was not a man of wax, but was prepared to 
stand firm when British interests were affected. But again, 
the realization came too late, or the lesson was not taken 
to heart, and the Great War was the result. 

From this analysis of the general situation we may 
proceed to examine the two great questions with regard 
to which Great Britain and Germany were ranged on oppo- 
site sides in the last years of peace: viz., Morocco and the 
aftermath of Algeciras, and the problem of the Near East, 
more particularly the question of the Baghdad railway. 
Chronologically the latter takes precedence and will be 
discussed first. 



CHAPTER X 
THE NEAR EAST 

"The Near Eastern question may be denned as the 
problem of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual 
disappearance of the Turkish Empire from Europe." x 
Beginning with the treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, by which 
Hungary was restored to the Hapsburgs, the process was 
not finally completed by the treaty signed in London on 
30 May, 1 913, which left to the Sultan eastern Thrace 
and Constantinople itself. But down to the Crimean War 
and the treaty of Paris (1853-6), the Turkish posses- 
sions still extended to the Danube River and the Carpa- 
thians, and the animosities bred by their partition was 
one of the main causes of the Great War of 1914. The con- 
viction that the Turk must depart from Europe gradually 
spread among all the European peoples, even the English, 
who fifty years ago believed that the safety of India de- 
pended upon the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. 
But the problem of the Turk was not restricted to Europe. 
His possession of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, 
and, until within a generation, of northern Africa as well, 
determined the policy of more than one Power with re- 
spect to the situation in the Balkans. 

The problem is due to the Turks themselves. A nomadic 
tribe out of the heart of Asia, they conquered their vast 
dominions by the sword, and by the sword they held them. 
Of the arts of peace they knew nothing; in the six centuries 
of their domination they contributed little to the economic, 

1 William Miller, The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913, p. 1. 
253 



254 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

political, religious, or literary life of their subjects. Worse 
than that, they did not even govern, except so far as to 
collect taxes and to raise armies for innumerable wars. 
Furthermore, the Turks proper, who constituted the bulk 
of the governing classes, represented only a minority of 
the total population. In the European provinces the in- 
habitants were almost entirely of European stock, except 
in certain small localities where there was some Turkish 
immigration. In Asia also the bulk of the people was 
anything but Turkish, being Arab, Armenian, Kurdish, 
Jewish, or Greek. Only in Asia Minor was a Turkish peas- 
antry to be found. From time to time clever individuals 
of each of the subject races rose to high place in the Otto- 
man Government; but the main features of Ottoman polit- 
ical life — inefficiency, corruption, inertia, the playing off 
of one race against another — were not counteracted, rather 
they were intensified by the purely selfish ambitions of 
these capable individuals. 

Of recent years, as the doctrine of nationality has gath- 
ered force all over the world, the preservation of the Otto- 
man power has become increasingly difficult. Everywhere 
the subject races have revolted against oppression and 
tyranny, and one frontier province after another has es- 
caped from the control of Constantinople. Indeed, the 
final crash would have come long since but for the weak- 
nesses and jealousies of the Sultan's subjects and the ambi- 
tions of the European nations, and the present war will 
not have been fought in vain if it provides a lasting solu- 
tion of the Near Eastern question. But it is necessary to 
point out that only the Great Powers can furnish an ade- 
quate solution, for much more is involved than the fate of 
the various peoples hitherto or still under Ottoman do- 
minion. 

The vast extent of her territory and the difficulty of 
navigating the Baltic during half the year make Russia's 



THE NEAR EAST 255 

natural outlet the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, over 
which Constantinople stands guard; for the greater part 
of her grain crop, which is the chief item of her export trade, 
is raised on the black lands in the southern provinces of 
her European Empire. The fact that many ships loaded 
with Russian grain were cooped up in the Black Sea when 
Italy attacked the Dardanelles in 191 2, amply justifies 
the national demand for a free passage to the iEgean and 
the Mediterranean. But long before economic considera- 
tions had assumed their present importance, historical and 
political forces were driving the Russians along the chemin 
de Byzance. They ever regarded themselves as the heirs 
of the old Greek Empire, from which they took their two- 
headed eagle. They aspired to plant the Cross once more 
on the church of Santa Sophia, and they cherished warm 
sympathies for those Southern Slavs who were cut off from 
the main Slav stock by a solid barrier of Germans, Mag- 
yars, and Rumanians, and groaned under the oppression of 
the Turk. To reach her goal, Russia resorted to endless 
intrigue, formed diplomatic combinations galore, waged 
nine wars — without, however, advancing her frontier per- 
ceptibly beyond the Rumanian barrier. But if the main 
Russian current made little progress, if Constantinople 
did not become Tsarigrad, — to the great satisfaction of 
other Powers, — Russia's wars were primarily responsible 
for the resurrection of five Christian states which might 
serve as outposts of Russian influence in the Balkans. 

Greece received her independence after the war of 1828- 
9; but she was far away, and until recently too weak to 
be of particular service. Rumania secured autonomy as 
an aftermath of the Crimean War; but when her troops 
had saved the Russians before Plevna, in the war of 1877, 
she was "rewarded" by the seizure of Bessarabia, a trans- 
Danubian province inhabited by Rumanians. Consequent- 
ly, for more than thirty years she cultivated the close 



256 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

friendship of Austria-Hungary, even though the Russian 
victory had secured her independence. 

The war of 1877 also placed Bulgaria, Serbia, and Mon- 
tenegro on the map. New states, with slender resources 
and thoroughly Slav in spirit, they seemed excellently 
suited to serve Russian designs — that is, as a result of their 
expansion and development, Russia might hope to secure 
that access to the sea which had been denied to herself. 
For twenty years after the Congress of Berlin Russia aimed 
to control the domestic politics of Bulgaria; later she trans- 
ferred her attention to Serbia. In each case her policy 
was selfish, often brutal. Nevertheless the Balkan peoples 
did not forget that they owed their freedom to Russian 
arms, and if they resented some features of Russian con- 
duct they showed no enthusiasm for the expansionist 
policy of Austria-Hungary, Russia's great rival. Only fair 
treatment was needed to make the Balkan states devoted 
adherents of Russia's great ideal. 

Sharply opposed to this were the interests of Austria- 
Hungary. Bounded on the north by a nation whose com- 
mercial progress was the wonder of the world, the Dual 
Monarchy found the chief outlet for its trade down the 
Danube and toward the JEgean. Moreover, the tradi- 
tional policy of the Hapsburgs, as revealed in the annals 
of four centuries, was one of territorial expansion, and after 
her expulsion from Italy and Germany fifty years ago, 
Austria regarded the western Balkans as her theatre of 
operations, with probably Salonika as the ultimate goal. 
Accordingly, she was permitted, in 1878, to "occupy and 
administer" Bosnia and Herzegovina, as they constituted 
the hinterland to her Dalmatian provinces. But she could 
not hope to advance farther along the Adriatic coast, be- 
cause Italy, her ally since 1882, also had designs on Al- 
bania and would have resisted an Austrian occupation. 1 

x The Triple Alliance, as renewed in 1887, is said to have contained a clause 
imposing mutual forbearance upon the rival Powers as regards Albania, and in 1897 



THE NEAR EAST 257 

Incidentally Montenegro, whose guns on Mount Lovchen 
commanded the Austrian harbor of Cattaro, had long been 
a Russian protectorate. 

Austria was therefore compelled to regard Serbia, which 
she surrounded on two sides, as the only region open to 
her expansion. A hundred years ago, when the Serbians, 
under Kara George, were seeking to emancipate themselves 
from Turkish rule, they repeatedly asked to be annexed 
to the Hapsburg crown. The request was refused, doubt- 
less to the regret of later Austrian statesmen; but through- 
out the nineteenth century Austrian influence was domi- 
nant in Serbia, for the family of Obrenovitch, which usu- 
ally possessed the throne, needed the assistance of Vienna 
against its rivals the Karageorgevitches. So it was easy 
for Austria to secure a favorable tariff for her goods, in 
return for which Serbia was encouraged to export her live 
stock to Austrian markets, and the Magyars of Hungary 
were able to lord it over the unhappy Croatians, who are 
closely akin to the Serbs, without fear of trouble from Bel- 
grade. The true character of Austrian friendship was 
demonstrated to Serbia in 1885, when the union of Eastern 
Rumelia and Bulgaria was carried through, contrary to 
the Berlin treaty. At Austria's instigation the Serbians 
attacked Bulgaria, only to be badly defeated; the Dual 
Monarchy then intervened, and prevented the victorious 
advance of the Bulgarian army. After that the Belgrade 
politicians were as clay in Austrian hands, and from 1897, 
when Austria and Russia agreed to maintain the status 
quo in the Balkans, Serbia seemed to have become the 
permanent vassal of her great northern neighbor. 

This situation was upset by the Serbians themselves. 
In 1903, King Alexander and his consort were murdered 
in their palace by Serbian officers who resented his sub- 

a special agreement to maintain the integrity of Albania was concluded. See Spec- 
tator, 11 October, 1013; also Dr. Hans F. Helmolt, "La Triplice en Orient," Revue 
Politique Internationale, April, 1914. 



258 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

servience to Vienna and the scandals of his court. As he 
was the last of his line, Peter Karageorgevitch, who was 
Russian in sympathy, was placed upon the throne ; owing 
to the circumstances of his accession he determined to 
rule as a constitutional monarch, and, left to their own de- 
vices, his ministers soon broke with Austria. Meanwhile 
the Bulgarians had tired of the hectoring Russian protect- 
orate and were cultivating the friendship of the Haps- 
burg monarchy. From this time to the outbreak of the 
present war the rivalry of Austria and Russia was acute, 
because the protege of one Power blocked the southward 
expansion of the other. 

This rivalry would become dangerous, however, only 
on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and neither Aus- 
tria nor Russia was prepared to face that eventuality: 
Austria because of her internal racial problems; Russia 
because of her approaching struggle with Japan. So in 
1903 they produced a scheme, known as the Miirzsteg 
programme, for reforming the administration of Turkey 
in Europe, lest the Balkan states should attempt forcibly 
to relieve the lot of their brethren in Macedonia and 
thereby forestall both Austrian and Russian ambitions. 
Such was the Balkan situation when Great Britain and 
Germany were discovered as rivals in another quarter of 
the Sultan's Empire, viz., Mesopotamia and Arabia. 

For a century Great Britain had been the traditional 
upholder of Turkish independence and power. She had 
exhausted the resources of diplomacy in impressing upon 
successive sultans the necessity of setting their house in 
order. In the Crimean War she was the active ally of 
Turkey, and in 1878, when the Russian armies were at 
the gates of Constantinople, she intervened to compel the 
Tsar to revise that treaty of San Stefano which almost 
expelled the Turk from Europe. For the rest of the cen- 
tury British diplomacy, acting upon Lord Beaconsfield's 



THE NEAR EAST 259 

assertion that "Turkey was not a worn-out state," con- 
tinued to urge reforms as the surest means of blocking the 
advance of Russia, and after 1903 the foreign office under- 
took to convert the Miirzsteg programme into a workable 
plan, under the direction of the Powers. 

Nevertheless British policy gradually underwent a pro- 
found change. Its attitude had always been dictated by 
the necessity of guarding, for both political and commercial 
reasons, the Mediterranean route to India. Translated 
into practical politics, this meant that no strong Power 
should establish itself in the eastern Mediterranean, and 
that England should block the advance of Russia in the 
Balkans. But the treaty of Berlin recorded a distinct 
defeat of Russia's plans, and the difficulties experienced 
by the Tsar's Government in controlling the young Bul- 
garian state promised to postpone indefinitely a Russian 
conquest of Constantinople. Moreover, for her services 
to Turkey at the Congress oTTJerlih Great Britain had 
received Cyprus; in 1875 srie had acquired control of the 
Suez Canal and in 1883 she had occupied Egypt; with 
Gibraltar and Malta in her hands her position in the Medi- 
terranean seemed fairly secure. After 1894, when Russia 
began her aggressive policy in the Far East, British in- 
terest in Turkish affairs was limited to demanding, in 
diplomatic terms only, vengeance for the Armenian mas- 
sacres and to providing a solution of the troublesome 
Cretan question. But about 1900 it became evident that 
another Power was assuming the Russian role of adviser- 
in-ordinary to the Sultan, and was securing for itself eco- 
nomic and political advantages which would either guar- 
antee its hold on Turkey when the ultimate collapse 
came or make Turkey a vassal of itself. That Power 
was Germany, and the enterprises she was observed to 
be promoting were considered a direct and serious menace 
to British interests. Thus there was added to the general 



260 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

rivalry of the two countries a specific dispute which was 
typical of the Anglo-German problem as a whole — the 
challenge of a new Power to a nation long established in a 
strong position and determined to yield nothing of its 
just rights or legitimate interests. 

During the crisis that led up to the Congress of Berlin 
Bismarck had made his famous remark that the whole 
Eastern question was "not worth the bones of a Pomeranian 
grenadier." But in 1883 General von der Goltz of the Ger- 
man army was, at the request of the Sultan, despatched 
to Constantinople to reorganize the Turkish army. ( In 
1889, and again in 1898, the Emperor William II visited 
Constantinople, on the latter occasion proceeding to^Da- 
mascus, where at the grave of Saladin he declared: "The 
300,000,000 Mohammedans that are scattered through the 
world may rest assured that the German Emperor will 
eternally be their friend." 1 At the moment this was no 
idle boast. Christians had recently been massacred by 
thousands in Armenia, but with the assistance of Germany 
Abdul Hamid had successfully resisted the British demand 
for administrative reforms. During the Greco-Turkish 
War of 1897 German officers had rendered signal assist- 
ance to the Ottoman forces. That war had been caused by 
an insurrection in Crete; Germany declined to join in 
forcing the Sultan to grant autonomy to the island^ 

Most important of all, perhaps, was the appointment 
of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein as German ambas- 
sador to the Porte. Easily the foremost of the Kaiser's 
diplomatists, a champion of colonial expansion, an expert 
in manipulating the press, and a bitter opponent of Great 

1 Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, one of the greatest authorities on Islam, has re- 
cently pointed out that this appeal made little impression on the Mohammedan 
world, because "in the Mohammedan East Saladin's name has long been forgotten, 
except by the few students of history and literature." Dr. Hurgronje remarks 
that German scholars were disturbed by the incident, which well illustrates the 
dilettanteism of the German Emperor and the unscientific basis of his foreign 
policy. (The Holy War : "Made in Germany" (1915), pp. 70-71.) 



THE NEAR EAST 261 

Britain, he readily obtained the ear of the Sultan, and was 
for fifteen years ( 1897-19 12) the guiding spirit of Turkish 
foreign policy. He seems to have convinced Abdul Hamid, 
who had maintained his position only by setting the Powers 
at odds, that Germany was a sincere and the only friend 
of Turkey; for Germany alone of the Great Powers, it 
was urged, had no designs upon Turkish territory, and 
she was willing, even anxious, to promote the economic de- 
velopment of Asiatic Turkey, in contrast with other Powers, 
who were always clamoring for reforms. Baron von Mar- 
schall also encouraged Abdul Hamid in the hope of recov- 
ering Egypt, and pointed out that with the help of Ger- 
many he could ignore the inevitable Russian demand for 
the opening of the Straits to Russian men-of-war. 

Finally, Germany aided and abetted the Pan-Islamic 
schemes so dear to Abdul Hamid. That wily monarch was 
fully aware that his Empire existed on the sufferance of 
the Great Powers: to their armies and wealth might he 
not oppose the unity of Islam, of which he was the titular 
head? The idea was the more attractive because his two 
greatest enemies (so Germany convinced him) were Russia 
and Great Britain, both Powers with more Mohammedan 
subjects than Abdul Hamid himself could boast of. If 
these millions could be weaned from their allegiance to 
the Tsar of all the Russias and the Raj of India, those 
sovereigns would be restrained from pushing on their de- 
signs of annihilating the Ottoman Empire and its Sultan 
might become the leading prince of the Mohammedan world. 

According to the most competent authorities Pan- 
Islamism was very largely a figment of vivid imaginations. 1 
There was, to be sure, an active Mohammedan propaganda 
in Africa when that continent began to pass under Euro- 

1 In addition to the work of Dr. Hurgronje, just cited, reference may be made 
to a lecture by Professor Edward G. Browne, the distinguished Cambridge scholar, 
"Pan-Islamism," in Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century, edited by F. 
A. Kirkpatrick (1902). 



262 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

pean control, and it met with no little success; also, agents 
of Abdul Hamid were at work throughout the Moham- 
medan world preaching disloyalty to the Christian govern- 
ments. But there was no real danger. The basis of Abdul 
Hamid's schemes was his possession of the title of Caliph, 
which was supposed to be a kind of Mohammedan papacy. 
But the claim of the Ottoman sultans to that dignity was 
never recognized by the whole Mohammedan world. It 
had been wrested from the last Abbasid sultan of Egypt 
when that ruler was defeated by Sultan Selim I in 1517, 
and compelled to give up Egypt and Arabia, with the 
holy cities of Medina and Mecca, to the Ottomans. But 
the sultans of Constantinople were not descendants of 
the Prophet Mohammed, in whom alone the title of Ca- 
liph could vest, according to Mohammedan law, and four 
centuries of de facto possession could not establish their 
claim de jure — a fact which the non-Turkish Mohammedan 
world did not forget, in spite of the practical usurpation 
by the Turkish Sultan. In the second place, the Caliphate 
does not connote the spiritual headship of Islam. In the 
days when the title possessed any reality it implied the po- 
litical overlordship of the Mohammedan world; and even 
in the period of their greatest power, that is, the six- 
teenth century, the Turks never controlled all the lands 
where Islam was the dominant religion, and in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century their dominion was so se- 
verely shaken that its complete extinction was seen to be 
only a matter of time. For such a state to assert its suze- 
rainty over the Mohammedan peoples was clearly absurd. 
Finally, the unity of Islam is a myth. Its political unity 
really ceased within a few years after the death of Mo- 
hammed and has never been restored. More important is 
the century-old schism of the Sunnite and Shiite sects. 
Their theological disputes do not concern us here. But 
Persia, which is the stronghold of the Shiites, lies wedged 



THE NEAR EAST 263 

between the Ottoman dominions and those Mohammedans 
of British India and Russian Central Asia whom Abdul 
Hamid aspired to use for political ends. The Arabs of the 
desert also, who resent the Ottoman assumption of the 
Caliphate, would never allow themselves to be reduced to 
political servitude in the name of Islam by a ruler whose 
very title they questioned. 

Thus, however regarded, Pan-Islamism is seen to have 
been and to be a danger which was not very dangerous. 
To what extent the governments of Great Britain, Russia, 
and France (the last has millions of Mohammedan subjects 
in Africa) considered the matter serious it is impossible 
to say. They were doubtless well informed of any intrigues 
which Abdul Hamid and the Young Turks who succeeded 
him may have carried on; they may have believed that 
the "talk of an organization of Pan-Islamism . . . was 
without foundation," and that Turkey "was little quali- 
fied to lead an international movement"; 1 publicly they 
took no steps to protect themselves. But the French and 
English press were persuaded that Pan-Islamism might 
easily become a grave danger, and soundly berated the 
Germans for encouraging it. The latter, on their side, 
were completely fooled. Their eagerness to involve Tur- 
key in the present struggle, in order that, a jihad, or holy 
war, might be proclaimed, shows how confident they were 
that the Pan-Islamic propaganda had undermined the 
loyalty of the Allies' Mohammedan peoples. In their 
antebellum discussions of Near Eastern problems German 
writers frequently emphasized the identity of interest be- 
tween Pan-Germanism and Pan-Islamism, and there can 
be no doubt that German diplomacy strove valiantly to 
forge an instrument which it believed would deal a hard, 
if not a vital, blow to the probable opponents of German 
ambitions. Whatever strength Pan-Islamism possessed it 

1 Hurgronje, The Holy War, pp. 25, 26. 



264 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

derived from the support of the German Government, 
for the Sultan would never have undertaken a campaign 
against Great Britain, France, and Russia without the 
assurance of support from another Great Power, and that 
Power could be only Germany. 

It is now time to inquire as to what were the motives 
of German policy in Turkey. For what purpose had she 
acquired practical control of the Ottoman Government 
and prevented it from carrying out those reforms which, 
in the opinion of disinterested observers, could alone save 
it from utter collapse? Viewed as part of the national 
Weltanschauung, the object was to provide Germany with 
a route to the Orient, with its teeming commerce, enor- 
mous wealth, and boundless possibilities of a political char- 
acter. The commerce of the Far East has always been 
one of the great prizes for which the European nations 
have struggled, and in this blatantly commercial age Ger- 
many could not afford to be left behind. Great Britain 
bestrode two routes, the one around the Cape of Good 
Hope, the other through the Suez Canal; Russia was 
established in Central Asia at the gates of India; she was 
pegging out another route by the trans-Siberian railway 
and her advance in Manchuria. A Germanized Turkey 
would give the fatherland an outlet on the Persian Gulf, 
from which steamship lines could carry German influence 
farther eastward; Persia might be brought under the 
spell; and even India itself might succumb to Teutonic 
attraction when the sceptre of England should fall from her 
nerveless hands and the sun set at last on her colossal 
Empire. It was a part of this audacious programme, of 
course, that Austria-Hungary should become the dominant 
Power in the Balkans; a consummation that, in the late 
'nineties, when the German vision began to unfold itself, 
seemed not unlikely to be realized; for Serbia was still 
under Obrenovitch rule, Bulgaria was chafing under Rus- 



THE NEAR EAST 265 

sian dictation, Rumania was almost a member of the 
Triple Alliance, and Russia was busy in the Far East. 
To overpower the feeble resistance of Great Britain to 
an energetic Drang nach Osten might well seem like child's 
play to the vigorous, pushing, well-organized Germanic 
Powers, who dominated Continental Europe and who 
had established their ascendency in the councils of the 
decrepit Ottoman Government. 

There was nothing objectionable per se in this German 
Weltpolitik; it was as reasonable as the ambitions of 
Russian or British imperialism, and its successful applica- 
tion would mean the introduction, in some measure at 
least, of European efficiency and order into a region which 
had been the cradle of civilization but which had for cen- 
turies suffered from the blight and inertia of oriental des- 
potisms. England had reformed Egypt amidst the ap- 
plause of the world : would not a German regeneration 
of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia be equally worth while? 
Before suggesting an answer it will be well to examine 
the German plans in detail. 

It is most unlikely that Germany contemplated a con- 
quest of the old-fashioned kind. A few years ago there 
was considerable talk of German colonization in Asiatic 
Turkey, but that was soon seen to be impracticable. Asia 
Minor was already inhabited by Turks — was, indeed, the 
foyer of the race — and the climate of Mesopotamia was un- 
suited for Europeans; nor would such immigrants as might 
be attracted from Germany consent to become Turkish 
subjects, which was the only condition on which the Otto- 
man Government would have encouraged such a settle- 
ment. 1 There is also no reason for believing that Ger- 
many intended to replace the Ottoman Government by a 
full-fledged Prussian bureaucracy. What she did desire 
was a practical protectorate over Turkey and a complete 

'Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Die Bagdadbahn (191 1), p. 10. 



266 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

control of its economic resources. The fiction of sover- 
eignty would be left, just as in Egypt, which remained in 
theory a province of Turkey; but the "advice" of German 
diplomatists and generals would be forced on the officials 
of the Sultan in the fashion adopted by the British in Egypt. 
There would, in short, be a German "occupation" of 
Turkey, but the amour propre of the Powers would be re- 
spected, and, it was asserted, their commercial interests 
would be not only considered but stimulated. By such 
means the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which all the 
European Powers were pledged to respect, would be main- 
tained; Germany's expansionist ambitions would be satis- 
fied; and a fruitful source of international strife would be 
effectually closed. 

This programme was to be realized by penetration paci- 
fique, or commercial exploitation; of which the chief in- 
strument was the Baghdad railway. 1 As far back as 1888 
a German company had received a concession for a rail- 
way, which had been duly built, from Ismidt, on the 
Asiatic mainland opposite Constantinople, to Angora, a 
distance of 301 miles (485 kilometres). By 1896 a branch 
had been constructed from Eski-Shehir, half-way between 
Ismidt and Angora, to Konia. After the second visit of 
the Emperor William to Constantinople (1898), the Ana- 
tolian Railway Company prepared for greater things — for 
nothing less than an extension of its line to the Persian 
Gulf, and in November, 1899, the concession was granted 
by the Sultan. The final step was not taken till 1903, 
when a firman was published constituting the Baghdad 
Railway Company as an Ottoman corporation and author- 
izing the building of a railway from Konia across the 

1 Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Die Bagdadbahn, first published in 1902; Andre Che- 
radame, Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad (1903); Victor Berard, Le Sultan, I' I slam et 
les Puissances (1907); Rene Pinon, L Europe et V Empire Ottoman (1908), chaps. 7, 8; 
David Fraser, The Short Cut to India (1909); T. A. O'Connor, "The Baghdad 
Railway," Fortnightly Review, February, 1914. 



THE NEAR EAST 267 

Taurus range and the Mesopotamian desert to Mossul, 
thence along the Tigris to Baghdad; from that point the 
line was to follow the right bank of the Euphrates to Bas- 
sorah, below the confluence of the two great rivers, and 
terminate at a point on the Persian Gulf. The original 
plan had been to prolong the Angora line through Armenia 
to the upper reaches of the Tigris, but Russia was unwill- 
ing to allow a railway — which could be used for the trans- 
port of troops — brought so near her Caucasus frontier, and 
it was necessary to follow the southern route, which would 
be more costly to construct and would pass through a 
much poorer section of country. 

The estimated length of the line, with various branches, 
was 2,800 kilometres (about 1,740 miles). For purposes 
of construction it was divided into sections of 200 kilo- 
metres, each of which was to be constructed separately and 
the first within eight years. The capitalized value of each 
section was fixed at 54,000,000 francs, for which Turkish 
four-per-cent bonds were to be issued to the company 
before work was started. The company was to receive 
an annuity of 1 1 ,000 francs for each kilometre constructed 
and 4,500 francs additional toward the expenses of opera- 
tion. At the end of ninety-nine years all rights and prop- 
erty of the operating company were to revert to the Otto- 
man Government. No date was fixed for the completion 
of the line. The first section, reaching to Eregli, near the 
foot of the Taurus, was promptly built, to the great profit 
of the promoters, 1 but after 1904 so great were the finan- 
cial difficulties of Turkey that she could not meet any 
further kilometric guarantees, and, owing to British and 
French opposition to the railway itself, it was impossible 
to raise money in the London and Paris markets. 

But before recurring to the main topic — Anglo-German 

1 Fraser, The Short Cut to India, calculates that the promoters were the richer by 
£1,243,000, or more than 21,000,000 francs. 



268 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

rivalry — a word must be said about the general importance 
of the Baghdad railway. The Germans liked to speak of 
"our Baghdad" (unser Bagdad) or to talk of the "BBB" 
— Berlin-Byzantium-Baghdad. Now the railways of Tur- 
key in Europe and the Balkan states were very largely 
owned by German and Austrian banks. When the Bagh- 
dad had been built, the Germanic Powers would control 
the most direct line of communication from Europe to the 
Far East, and by virtue of this control they might hope to 
dominate the economic life of the vast region stretch- 
ing from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf! No wonder 
that they were determined to carry through their plans 
at all cost; no wonder that those plans should be closely 
scrutinized by other nations whose political or commer- 
cial interests might be seriously prejudiced by a German 
monopoly. For, however much the Germans might ex- 
plain their projects, it was clear that they aimed to solve 
in their exclusive interest a question which had from its 
very inception been regarded as an international matter, 
and that their solution would upset, to the detriment of 
other Powers, the balance of power in Europe," which for 
a century has rested on the existence of an independent 
Ottoman Empire. 

If the history of the Baghdad railway be considered 
from its inception in 1899 to the outbreak of the European 
War in 1914, it is evident that the opposition of France, 
Russia, and Great Britain was due not to the project it- 
self but to certain features and details, the proof being 
that in 1910 Russia came to terms, and that on the eve of 
the war an agreement was initialed by London and Berlin 
according to which the former withdrew its opposition 
in return for certain concessions by Berlin. 

The first British objection was concerned with the financ- 
ing of the railway. Not even its promoters contended 
that the line would pay its way until many years after its 



THE NEAR EAST 269 

construction. Ultimately cotton might be grown along 
the Anatolian sections; northeast of Baghdad there are 
naphtha wells which can be developed; in the lower Tigris 
valley, below Baghdad, the irrigation schemes of Sir Wil- 
liam Willcocks will restore millions of acres to cultivation. 
But the essential condition of success is a great increase in 
the population, at present very meagre, and, considering 
the climate, the only source of immigration is India or 
China ! The concessionaires of the line, therefore, insisted 
on the kilometric guarantees and drove a hard bargain. 
By the terms of the agreement the charge upon Turkish 
revenues would amount annually to 43,400,000 francs — a 
sum utterly beyond the paying capacity of Turkey. Some- 
thing could certainly be raised by increasing the customs; 
but in this matter Turkey does not enjoy a free hand, for 
the tariff is fixed by international agreement. Among the 
nations having commercial relations with Turkey, Great 
Britain had for a century enjoyed the supremacy, but here 
as elsewhere considerable German competition was devel- 
oping. 1 Under such conditions it cannot be seriously 
argued that the British Government should consent to an 
increase in the Turkish customs, the object of which was 
to enable a German company to pocket handsome profits! 
Moreover, there was no little feeling that any increase 
in the revenues of Turkey should be devoted, not to the 
building of. an unprofitable railway, but to the improve- 
ment of the internal administration of the Empire, es- 
pecially in Macedonia, in which business Great Britain 
had come forward as the leader of the Powers and the 
promoter of a genuine scheme of reform. 

1 German imports to Turkey: German exports from Turkey: 

1890 34,000,000 marks 9,600,000 marks 

1895 39,000,000 " 22,100,000 " 

1900 34,200,000 " 30,000,000 " 

1905 70,800,000 " 51,500,000 " 

1910 104,900,000 " 67,400,000 " 



270 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

The other recourse for raising money was to the bourses 
of London and Paris. This solution was boldly put for- 
ward by Germany, for if the moneyed classes of England 
and France could be persuaded to invest in the Baghdad 
railway they would have an interest in its success, and 
would exert such pressure on their respective governments 
that the latter would not dare oppose the German plans 
upon which success depended. In 1903, accordingly, 
Germany proposed that she, France, and England should 
each raise thirty per cent of the required funds, the remaining 
ten per cent being left to Russia, or the smaller states if 
the latter would not participate. But at the same time 
the Sultan's firman enabled Germany to appoint six of 
the eleven directors of the Baghdad company; so that, 
although France and England were to contribute sixty per 
cent of the money, they would be effectually debarred from 
any voice in the management of the line. The bonds to 
be taken up were Turkish government securities, but the 
general financial situation of Turkey and the certainty 
that the railway would not be self-supporting made a de- 
preciation almost inevitable; the Deutsche Bank, which 
was the financial backer of the grand project, would then 
buy in the bonds at a small figure, and Germany would 
acquire for a song the ownership of a railway which 
might do infinite damage to the very Powers whose money 
had been used for building it. Here again it is impossible 
to take seriously the German contention that France and 
Great Britain refused their help to a great economic enter- 
prise out of jealousy and fear; quite apart from the fact 
that neither government exerted the slightest diplomatic 
pressure on Turkey to prevent the granting of the Baghdad 
concession, 1 they were both bound to safeguard the inter- 

1 In 1899 British influence would seem to have been exerted at Constantinople 
in favor of the concession, for this was the period when Joseph Chamberlain was 
advocating an Anglo-German alliance. Count Billow's visit to London and the 
grant of the concession synchronized nicely. 



THE NEAR EAST 271 

ests of their investors and if possible to insure Turkey 
against a financial collapse. Sound business and sound 
politics alike demanded that London and Paris should 
decline the German offer. Germany could not build the 
Baghdad railway herself because she lacked capital; that 
was her misfortune, but she could not expect other coun- 
tries to build it for her and at the same time retain all the 
advantages for herself. 

In the second place, the British were not unnaturally 
suspicious of the political aspects of the situation. They 
understood thoroughly that the Baghdad line would place 
Turkey under the tutelage of Germany; that they might 
concede, under certain conditions, but surely they were 
entitled to protect their own interests. Long before Ger- 
many had put the issue in the forefront of her policy her 
diplomacy had opposed that of Great Britain in all quarters 
of the globe; she had definitely challenged British naval 
supremacy; and in 1905 she made a demonstration against 
France, with the double object of breaking up the newly 
formed entente cordiale and of establishing a hold on Mo- 
rocco. She was not successful, but she might return 
to the charge and another time she might gain her point: 
that is, she would isolate England and she would establish 
herself in Morocco. In view of this possibility, it was 
unthinkable that Germany should be allowed a free hand 
in the Baghdad railway, for she would then become the 
mistress of the Mediterranean, and she could at her leisure 
prepare to destroy the lonely British Empire by attacking 
it in Egypt and the Persian Gulf. 

It may not, at first sight, be clear how a line across 
Asia Minor to the gulf could menace Egypt, protected as 
it would be by the Arabian Desert and the Red Sea. To 
begin with, a Turkey which was the vassal of Berlin would 
offer no objections to the use of its Mediterranean ports 
by German men-of-war. Still, a land attack would be 



272 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

necessary for the recovery of Egypt. Now, in 1900 Abdul 
Hamid had determined . to construct a railway from Da- 
mascus southward to Medina and Mecca. The ostensible 
object of the line was to facilitate pilgrimages to the holy 
cities, and the Sultan cleverly appealed to the Moham- 
medan world for money and materials to build it; with 
such success, indeed, that in 1908 the rails reached Medina. 
Yet the real purpose of the line was political. The tribes 
of the Hedjaz and the Yemen had for years resisted the 
efforts of the Turkish Government to exercise real author- 
ity in western Arabia, and in this policy they had unques- 
tionably been encouraged by the British Government, 
which feared that the strengthening of Turkish influence in 
Arabia would react unfavorably upon Egypt. The Hedjaz 
railway could now be used for transporting troops to the 
disturbed regions; connected with the Baghdad line, when 
the latter should reach Aleppo, it would enable the Sultan 
to concentrate large military forces along the eastern fron- 
tier of Egypt. And behind the wjiole enterprise England 
saw the hand of Germany, even though the line had been 
rather ostentatiously constructed by the Turks without 
foreign assistance. The German attitude was frankly re- 
vealed by Dr. Paul Rohrbach in the second edition of his 
book, Die Bagdadbahn: 

"England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from 
Europe in one place only — Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean 
for England not only the end of her control of the Suez Canal and 
/ her connections with India and eastern Asia, but probably the loss 
of her possessions in Central and East Africa as well. The conquest 
of Egypt by a Mohammedan Power like Turkey would react most 
dangerously upon England's 60,000,000 Mohammedan subjects in 
India and would prejudice her position in Afghanistan and Persia. 
Turkey, however, cannot dream of recovering Egypt until she pos- 
sesses a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and 
until, through the progress of the Anatolian railway to Baghdad, 
she can withstand a British attack on Mesopotamia; until her army 



THE NEAR EAST 273 

is increased and improved, and her economic and financial situation 
advanced." 

For these reasons, Dr. Rohrbach says, Germany must 
give Turkey every assistance, and, though he insists that 
the German policy is defensive, he remarks: 

"Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would well be worth the risk 
of taking sides with Germany in a war with England." 1 

The possibilities of the situation were foreseen in an in- 
cident of the year 1906. By that time the Hedjaz railway 
had been built considerably beyond Maan, a point just 
east of Akaba, which is at the head of the gulf of that 
name and lies within striking distance of Suez. In Feb- 
ruary a detachment of Turkish troops suddenly appeared 
at Akaba, and proceeded to occupy Tabah, on the other 
side of the gulf, with the object of pushing the Turkish 
frontier westward to the southern entrance of the canal. 
Needless to say, the British foreign office lost no time in 
asserting the rights of Egypt, which rested on the corre- 
spondence exchanged between Constantinople and Cairo, 
in 1892, upon the accession of the Khedive Abbas II. 
The Porte yielded, but not until a British squadron had 
been despatched to the eastern Mediterranean. "The 
diplomacy of the Emperor William II was officially disin- 
terested in the Tabah incident, but the power of insinuation 
was stronger than the wishes of statesmen: German in- 
fluence was so preponderant at Constantinople, the advice 
of the imperial ambassador was so heeded and so complete, 
so general was the dovetailing of Turkish and German 
interests, that public opinion in all countries was bound 
to regard the occupation of Tabah by Ottoman troops as 
the result of advice or encouragement from Berlin. . . . 
Great Britain and the whole of Europe were persuaded 
that behind the Turko-Egyptian dispute there must neces- 

1 Pp. 18-19. 



274 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

sarily be lurking an episode of Anglo-German rivalry, a 
preliminary skirmish foreshadowing the harsh struggle for 
influence waged by the two great European empires over 
the ruins of Turkey." x Passing from surmises to facts, 
it is sufficient to recall, in justification of British appre- 
hensions, that in the autumn of 1914 Turkey went to war 
with England at the behest of Germany, and actually used 
the Hedjaz railway in preparing for her attack on the Suez 
Canal. 

The third and most important aspect of the Baghdad 
question was concerned with the Persian Gulf. The con- 
cession of 1903 authorized the building of the railway from 
Baghdad to Bassorah, and thence to some point on the 
gulf. Bassorah, the only commercial town south of Bagh- 
dad, was the logical terminus of the line, but owing to the 
bar at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab (as the fusion of 
the Tigris and Euphrates is called) it could be reached only 
by small ships. A gulf port was therefore desirable, and 
Koweit was the logical choice. But the Sheikh of Koweit 
denied that he was a vassal of the Sultan, 2 and when in 
1900 the Germans endeavored to buy terminal facilities 
and lease a large concession he politely refused; for in 
January, 1899, he had secretly accepted the protection of 
the British Government in return for a promise not to 
cede any territory without the consent of Great Britain. 
For the next few years the Sheikh had to be protected by 
British cruisers against German intrigues and Turkish at- 
tempts to use force; but in 1901 an Anglo-Turkish agree- 
ment practically confirmed his independence and secured 
for him an increase of territory. The question came to 

1 Pinon, L'Europe et VEmpire ottoman, pp. 387, 389. 

5 In 1870, in return for his assistance to Midhat Pasha, he was given the title of 
kaimakam (the head of a sanjak) by the Sultan, but the duties were quite honorary, 
and no recognition of Turkish suzerainty was ever made by the sheikh, who through- 
out the nineteenth century was an independent potentate in fact quite as much as 
in theory. 



THE NEAR EAST 275 

a head with the announcement by Lord Lansdowne, then 
foreign secretary, in May, 1903, that Great Britain "would 
regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port 
in the Persian Gulf as a very grave menace to British in- 
terests, and would certainly resist it by all means at her 
disposal." x By what right did Great Britain thus pro- 
claim a Monroe Doctrine for a body of water which washed 
the shores of independent countries (Turkey and Persia) ? 
Did the Baghdad railway threaten the interests of England 
in the gulf so severely that she was justified in vetoing 
that section of the line from Baghdad to the gulf? 

The British flag was first flown in the Persian Gulf in 
161 8, the year that saw the opening of the Thirty Years' 
War in Germany. In 1622 a treaty was concluded with 
Persia by which the British undertook "to keep two men- 
of-war constantly to defend the gulf"; 2 the number was 
subsequently increased to five, and ever since Great Britain 
has enjoyed paramountcy in those waters. It is not gen- 
erally realized that the British were in the gulf some two 
hundred and fifty years before the Turks. The latter ac- 
quired nominal control of Mesopotamia and Arabia early 
in the sixteenth century, and their flag was hoisted at 
Bassorah in 1668; but until Midhat Pasha became governor 
of Baghdad, in 1869, no effort was made to assert Turkish 
authority on the western shores of the gulf. Even then 
Arabia was never reduced, and after Midhat's recall in 
1873 Turkish interest again languished until stimulated 
by German ambitions. 

During this long period the East India Company, and 
later the British Government, undertook the work that 
properly belonged to Turkey and Persia. At a consider- 

1 House of Lords, 5 May, 1903. (4 Hansard cxxi, c. 1348.) 

'Quoted in The Times History of the War, 1914, vol. Ill, p. 84. The story of 
British policy in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden, and Arabia is well told by 
Dr. Rouire, La Rivalite anglo-russe au XlXme siecle en Asie (1908), part 1. 
Only the barest outline has been given in the text. 



276 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

able expenditure of blood and treasure both piracy and the 
slave-trade were suppressed and gun-running reduced to 
a minimum. A hydrographic survey was begun as early 
as 1785. The lighthouse service was established by the 
British. Their sanitary measures helped exterminate the 
plague, which was for long endemic. Finally, the British 
resident at Bushire, on the Persian side, was the arbiter 
of local disputes and the guarantor of peace and security, 
especially during the date and pearling seasons, when local 
notables were apt to get out of hand. Great Britain may 
fairly claim to have discharged her duty as policeman with 
reasonableness and honesty. 

Such a policy was, of course, dictated by enlightened 
self-interest, for disorder was prejudicial to British trade, 
and British trade has enjoyed almost a monopoly in the 
region, amounting to some £7,000,000 a year. The local 
products — wool, dates, barley, rice, and pearls— are ex- 
changed for the cottons of Manchester and the coal of 
Wales, and English or Indian money is almost the medium 
of exchange. These goods are carried almost exclusively 
in British ships. Since 1834 the navigation of the Tigris 
as far as Baghdad has been controlled by Messrs. Lynch, 
whose steamers are better, faster, and infinitely more reg- 
ular in their sailings than any which the Turkish Govern- 
ment has placed in service. Baghdad is also important 
as a distributing centre for the trade of Persia, and a Brit- 
ish consul was appointed in 1798. 

Germany began to invade this preserve of British, com- 
merce in the last decade of the nineteenth century. There 
is no need of repeating the familiar story of her success, 
which rested upon the cheapness of German goods, the fore- 
sight of her bankers, and the capacity of her local rep- 
resentatives. After the Hamburg-America Line estab- 
lished a monthly service to Bassorah, in September, 1906, 
German progress was steady and rapid, and, although her 



THE NEAR EAST 277 

trade remained far behind that of Great Britain, the out- 
look was distinctly favorable when the Great War began. 
With the coming of the Baghdad railway greater things 
were hoped for, because the railway was to make Meso- 
potamia once more a garden of prosperity, and would 
provide a direct connection with Germany and western 
Europe. 

"It may be argued that Germany had an entire right to estab- 
lish and extend her trade around the shores of this inland sea [the 
Persian Gulf]. Of course she had. No one has ever dreamed of 
questioning her right to trade or to build railways. . What was 
questioned were her motives and some of her acts. It was the com- 
bination of commercial effort with political action, so lucidly ex- 
plained by the Berliner Tageblatt, which roused British hostility 
to the doings of Germany in the Persian Gulf. On innumerable 
German platforms the ultimate aims of Germany in the Middle 
East were expounded with arrogance and without reserve. Count- 
less German books dealt with the same theme. The intention was 
to supplant and replace British influence in these regions, and not 
to supplement it. To that great end all the German efforts were 
in reality directed." * 

No one ever denied that from the economic point of view 
the Baghdad railway was a laudable enterprise, although 
objections were raised to its financial methods. Its com- 
petition was recognized as desirable, for the freight rates 
charged by British shipping companies engaged in the 
gulf trade were outrageously high. It might carry the 
Indian mails and much of the Indian passenger traffic, 
especially if the trans-Persian line were built. In short, 
British trade was bound to benefit by an improvement in 
local economic conditions, and this fact was fully recog- 

. l The Times History of the War, 1914, vol. Ill, p. 101. The reference to the Ber- 
liner Tageblatt is to a statement made in 1907, that "commerce and politics can no 
longer be divided," and that Germany could attain commercial success only by 
"energetic political action." 



278 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

nized in both England and India. British capitalists were 
quite ready to invest their money in the Baghdad line 
as soon as their government withdrew its opposition. 

On account of the danger to India from a hostile naval 
force in the Persian Gulf, Great Britain has always insisted 
that no European Power should secure a foothold there. 
She made no political conquests for herself (except the 
Bahrein Islands); she enforced the same rule on others. 
The Germans, however, were fully determined to acquire 
a port on the gulf, and secured the right in Article XXIII 
of the convention of 1903. From the Sheikh of Koweit 
they tried first to secure Koweit itself, and later the is- 
land of Bubian, which belonged to him. They persuaded 
Abdul Hamid to grant a pearl monopoly on the island of 
Halul, which did not belong to him, but which might be- 
come an oriental Heligoland; but only a sharp word from 
London was required to quash the scheme. The Germans, 
who worked through the commercial house of Wonckhaus, 
in Bahrein, next endeavored to secure the island of Abu 
Musa, where there were deposits of red oxide. The Sheikh 
of Shargah, to whom the island belonged, objected to 
Wonckhaus acquiring the concession, and with the help 
of a British cruiser removed the invaders; whereupon the 
German Government formally protested and publicly 
challenged the position of Great Britain in the gulf. 
Finally, great pressure was put upon the Sheikh of Moham- 
merah, who was nominally a vassal of the Shah of Persia 
but in reality a dependent of Great Britain, to allow his 
lands to be irrigated by a German company. It cannot 
be doubted that if these several schemes had matured, 
Germany would promptly have sent war-ships to the gulf 
to protect her interests, and that the range of Anglo- 
German rivalry, already sufficiently large, might have been 
extended to the Indian Ocean. As soon as the Germans 
and the Turks renounced any political ambitions in the 



THE NEAR EAST 279 

gulf, Great Britain, as will presently be seen, withdrew 
her opposition to the Baghdad railway; but to imagine 
that she would abdicate a position obtained at such great 
sacrifices merely at the behest of another Power — and this 
the Germans expected her to do — illustrates admirably the 
fact already referred to, that the Germans do not under- 
stand the fine art of politics. 1 

In spite, however, of the British opposition, the Bagh- 
dad company was able to sign a second convention with 
the Ottoman Government in June, 1908, which provided 
for the construction of the four sections beyond Eregli 
and would bring the line within one section of Mossul. 
The work was actually carried as far as Burgulu, only to 
be stopped by the Young Turk revolution and financial 
difficulties. But Anglo- German differences were not al- 
layed by the suspension of the Baghdad enterprise, and 
were further envenomed by the Young Turk revolution. 

On 24 July, 1908, the absolute power of the Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II was overturned by a revolution engineered by 
the officers of the army, who saw that the policy of the 
Sultan was conducting Turkey toward a general collapse 

1 Dr. Paul Rohrbach ascribes to British policy the twofold purpose of con- 
structing a railway from Damascus to Baghdad, and thence to the gulf along the 
Tigris (the German line was to follow the Euphrates), and of transferring the Cali- 
phate either to a British puppet ruler of Egypt or to one of the Arabian sheikhs 
under British influence. The first idea is an old one, having been much ventilated 
in the middle of the nineteenth century and being in all probability responsible for 
the acquisition of Cyprus in 1878. Then the matter was dropped until Sir William 
Willcocks, the famous irrigation expert, began the reclamation of the valley of 
the Euphrates. In igoo-11 the Horns-Baghdad railway was projected by French 
and British financiers, with the approval of their governments. They proposed 
that the Baghdad should be diverted from its original route and follow the Tigris, 
and that the Anglo-French line should join it at Deir or Anna. Thus the Horns- 
Baghdad line was to be not the rival but the complement of the Baghdad railway. 
The Anglo-French promoters, however, could not come to terms with the Ger- 
mans, and the question never became a matter of practical politics. As to the Cali- 
phate, Dr. Rohrbach ascribes too much importance to the institution, and ought 
to know that a caliph under the control or influence of a Christian Power would 
not be acceptable to the Mohammedan world. 



280 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

that must end in a partition among the Great Powers. 
In the march of events Anglo- German rivalry played a 
part which must now be examined. 

The intolerable misgovernment of Macedonia at the 
hands of Abdul Hamid produced a general insurrection in 
the summer of 1902, and still another in 1903. Austria 
and Russia, the Powers most directly interested, drew up 
a programme of reforms which was accepted by the Sul- 
tan, but which was not applied, for Abdul Hamid was sure 
of the support of Germany. It became increasingly likely 
that the Near Eastern question would be reopened forci- 
bly by the Balkan states, and that a general conflagration 
might ensue. 1 

True, therefore, to the policy adopted after the Boer 
War, and in strict conformity with her own interests, 
Great Britain in 1903 came forward as the advocate of 
an international regime in Macedonia. She desired the 
maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as the surest means 
of protecting her vital interests in the Mediterranean and 
the Persian Gulf; at the same time it was essential that 
the lot of the subject peoples should be so improved that 
constant rebellion would not shake and destroy the entire 
edifice. Her policy, accordingly, was to rehabilitate the 
European concert and through it to exert a pressure on 
the Sultan which he could not resist. On paper consider- 
able success was achieved. Civil, military, and financial 
agents of the Powers were appointed to assist the Ottoman 
authorities in Macedonia, and a three-per-cent increase in 
the Turkish customs was allowed in order that funds might 
be available for the work of reform. As the next step it 
was proposed to place the judiciary under international 
control, and the details of this reform had been prepared 

1 On the question of reforms: Victor Berard, La Revolution turque (ioog), parts 
3 and 4; Rene Pinon, L' Europe et l' Empire ottoman, chaps. 3-6. The extensive 
Blue and Yellow Books of the British and French Governments are carefully digested. 



THE NEAR EAST 281 

by the Powers of the Triple Entente when the revolution 
of July, 1908, occurred. 

Nevertheless, this sweeping programme had effected 
little change in the condition of Macedonia, for the agents 
of the Powers were not possessed of the authority to act — 
they could merely advise and report. For this half-measure 
of internationalization Germany must be held responsible. 
She did not oppose, in principle, the doctrine advocated 
by the other Powers, but she adopted an attitude essen- 
tially conservative. In brief, she opposed any diminution 
of the Sultan's authority in his own dominions, and until 
his authority could be controlled no reform was possible. 
Her policy was at least consistent. If she abandoned Adbul 
Hamid in his time of trouble, she could not hope for a con- 
tinuance of those economic and political concessions which 
were rapidly making the Ottoman Empire a preserve of 
her influence and commerce; in particular, the Baghdad 
railway depended upon the good will and favor of the Porte, 
and a real internationalization of Ottoman affairs would 
introduce other influences which would undermine the 
prestige that she had acquired by the hard work of many 
years. Moreover, autonomy, such as England proposed 
for Macedonia, would be the prelude to independence, if 
Turkish history furnished any basis for prophecy. Ger- 
many, with her hard-and-fast ideas of government, could 
not understand how a loosening of the central power would 
contribute to the security and strength of the Ottoman 
Empire; she much preferred the autocratic and central- 
ized system of Abdul Hamid, which corresponded to her 
own institutions. Turkey was fast becoming a German 
protectorate; when that process was completed Germany 
could then undertake a thorough reorganization of its gov- 
ernment and finances, and such a reformed Turkey would 
make Germany the dominant Power in the Near and 
Middle East. Lastly, the Anglo-Russian convention of 



282 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

1907 had an important bearing on the situation. That 
agreement, by its virtual partition of Persia, dealt German 
influence a severe blow in the latter country. It also fore- 
shadowed Anglo-Russian co-operation in the affairs of 
Turkey, in a sense not palatable to Germany. 1 All the 
more, therefore, was she constrained to stand by Abdul 
Hamid in his resistance to the repeated representations of 
England and Russia, who were regularly accused of plotting 
his destruction. 

The Young Turk revolution was undoubtedly precipi- 
tated by the meeting of Edward VII and Nicholas II at 
Reval, in June, 1908. Among the topics discussed was the 
Anglo-Russian programme of judicial reform in Macedonia, 
which was, indeed, given its final shape, and the two Powers 
were expected to exert great pressure in presenting it to 
the Porte. German writers go so far as to say that the 
reforms were a blind and were devised to provide an 
excuse for declaring war on Turkey, whose partition had 
been carefully arranged by the King and the Tsar. 2 This 
is most unlikely, and no proof has ever been presented of 
such a conspiracy; but the Young Turks were alarmed, 
and believed that the acceptance of the reform programme 
would put their country in the grip of the Powers. Their 
prompt action took Europe by surprise and, not least of 
all, their proclamation of the old constitution of 1876, 
which, by setting up a full-fledged constitutional system, 
went much farther in the direction of reform than the 
Powers had proposed in their most zealous moments. 

1 "From the moment England and Russia arrived at an understanding the fate 
of Turkey in Europe was in jeopardy, and any ambitions which Germany had in 
Turkey were doomed to sterility." (Sidney Whitman, Turkish Memories, 1014, 
p. 277.) Mr. Whitman remarks that German influence in Turkey was not popular 
with the masses, who regarded the concessionaires as usurers and as the harbingers 
of German political control; nor did the Turkish character respond to the systematic 
training of the German officers who were sent to reorganize the army. 

2 E. g., Dr. Rohrbach, "L'Evolution de l'Allemagne comme puissance mondiale," 
Revue Politique Internationale, July, 1914, p. 30. 



THE NEAR EAST 283 

The latter, for their part, were so pleased to be quit of 
the business of reform that they withdrew the agents 
which they had hitherto maintained in the Balkans for ad- 
vising the Turkish authorities — with what disastrous re- 
sults the Balkan wars of 191 2-13 presently revealed. 

Englishmen hailed the overthrow of Abdul Hamid with 
enthusiasm, not only because a hateful tyranny was sup- 
planted by constitutional government, but because German 
ascendency in Turkish politics was destroyed, at least for 
the moment. The British ambassador in Constantinople 
was lionized in the streets; King Edward telegraphed his 
felicitations to Kiamil Pasha, a life-long Anglophile, who 
became grand vizier; and for a time it seemed as if Great 
Britain would resume her ancient position, maintained un- 
til the days of Abdul Hamid, of chief friend and protector 
of Turkey. And there can be no doubt that if Turkey 
had fulfilled the promises of the first glorious days of the 
revolution, when all races and religions fraternized for joy 
over the disappearance of the Hamidian despotism ; if the 
new government had persevered in the policy of equality, 
toleration, and the rule of law enshrined in the revived 
constitution; and if international complications had not 
arisen — then, British influence might have regained a per- 
manent ascendency and have directed the reforming move- 
ment to a successful issue. 

But Germany was not disposed to surrender her posi- 
tion without a struggle. When Abdul Hamid, in April, 
1909, attempted to overthrow the Young Turk Committee 
of Union and Progress, it was Germany who urged them to 
march on Constantinople with the army of Salonika, it 
was Germany who outlined the plan of campaign and 
financed the expedition. 1 Abdul Hamid deposed, the mili- 
tary element of the Committee took charge of the govern- 

1 Sir William Ramsay, The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey (igog), pp. 
42-44- 



284 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

ment, and they were mainly men who had received their 
education in the German army. Determined to reform 
the Turkish army, they naturally turned to Germany for 
assistance, which was readily granted in the shape of Baron 
von der Goltz, who returned to his old functions in Con- 
stantinople. As soldiers they looked askance upon con- 
cessions to subject nationalities which might in any way 
weaken the military resources of the state, and they soon 
returned to the centralizing system of Abdul Hamid; as 
financiers they found the bourses of London and Paris 
closed to them because the reorganized Turkish army was 
suspected of being at the disposal of Germany in case of 
a European war. 

Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the German ambas- 
sador to the Porte, also made the most of the international 
situation. Scarcely was the July revolution over when 
Austria proceeded to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Bulgaria proclaimed her independence. These affronts to 
Turkey came from Germany's ally and her friend, and 
they were carried through only by the aid of Germany. 
None the less German diplomacy persuaded the two cul- 
prits to pay damages to the amount of 179,000,000 francs, 
which were sorely needed by the Turkish Government; 
and it helped to prevent the Cretan question from being 
raised. It was easy for so experienced a diplomatist as 
Baron von Marschall to point out that Great Britain, the 
supposed friend of the new regime, had done nothing to 
help it, in spite of many professions, and that she was the 
most formidable opponent of Pan-Islamism, with which 
the Young Turks, largely freethinkers, were already co- 
quetting. If Turkey wished to avoid future international 
difficulties, she must reorganize her army and provide 
railways for its service: in each case German advice and 
assistance could be had for the asking. 

So it came about that the influence of England was 



THE NEAR EAST 285 

speedily shattered, and Germany became as ardent a sup- 
porter of the Young Turks as she had been of the Hamidian 
system which they had overturned. Henceforth the Com- 
mittee ignored the criticisms of the British press upon their 
ruthless policy, and went serenely to their doom, trusting 
in the diplomacy and strength of Germany — after the man- 
ner of Abdul Hamid, and with similar results. For just as 
in 1908 the old Sultan was left to the mercy of the Young 
Turks, so in 191 2 Germany did not raise her finger to stay 
the Balkan states from the campaign which cost Turkey 
her European provinces. Yet, in spite of these bitter ex- 
periences, the Turks allowed themselves in the autumn of 
1 9 14 to be dragged into war with England by the intrigues 
of Germany ! 

In the early days of October, 1908, Austria-Hungary 
announced that she would annex the provinces of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which she had "occupied and admin- 
istered" since the Congress of Berlin thirty years before, 
and Bulgaria proclaimed her independence, thereby repu- 
diating the suzerainty of Turkey laid upon her by the same 
Congress. Neither act involved any real change in the 
Balkan situation, except to dispose of any hopes which 
the Young Turks might have cherished of recovering the 
provinces in question; and had the European Powers been 
consulted, they would doubtless have consented to the 
procedure of the Dual Monarchy and the principality of 
Bulgaria. As it was, the Powers were taken by surprise, 
and were entitled to protest that the treaty of Berlin could 
not be amended without the consent of the signatory 
Powers. Out of this situation there arose a crisis which 
had an important bearing on the relations of England and 
Germany. 

. The conversion of the Bosnian occupation into a perma- 
nent annexation had been a project of Austrian diplomacy 
for many years, but Count Goluchowski, foreign minister 



286 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

from 1895 to 1906, was loyal to the Austro-Russian agree- 
ment of 1897 f° r preserving the status quo in the Balkans. 
His successor, Baron von Aerenthal, was a man of different 
caliber. Secretive, ambitious, and nimble-witted, he in- 
augurated a forward policy which, in the hands of Count 
Berchtold, culminated in the Great War of 19 14. Aeren- 
thal resented the role of "brilliant second" 1 to Berlin, 
which the Ballplatz had played ever since the conclusion 
of the Austro- German alliance, and planned to score a 
victory of his own, which could be won only in the Balkans. 
He regarded the liberalizing and reforming policy of Lord 
Lansdowne and Sir Edward Grey in Macedonia with dis- 
gust, and affected to believe that British influence in the 
Near East was negligible. He therefore endeavored to 
reconstitute the old Three Emperors' League, with the 
difference that its centre was to be Vienna and not Berlin. 
Russia was to be bribed by the opening of the Straits, 
and France also might be bought off by a free hand in 
Morocco, provided she would consent to finance the Bagh- 
dad railway. Then the Drang nach Osten could be resumed 
in earnest. 

Unfortunately for the Austrian statesman, M. Isvolsky, 
the Russian foreign minister, had other plans, to wit, a 
reconciliation with England, and the Anglo-Russian con- 
vention was signed on 31 August, 1907. Aerenthal now 
prepared to break with Russia, and did so with character- 
istic duplicity. In September-October, 1907, he drafted 
with M. Isvolsky the judicial reform scheme for Mace- 
donia (an English project, which he detested!), and then, 
by promising not to support it, secured from the Porte in 
January, 1908, a concession for a railway through the san- 
jak of Novi-Bazar and western Macedonia to Salonika. 
As the proposed line had been condemned by the Austrian 

x This was the left-handed compliment addressed to Count Goluchowski by the 
German Emperor in a telegram after the Algeciras Conference. 



THE NEAR EAST 287 

general staff and, being longer than the existing route 
through Belgrade, was useless from a commercial point of 
view, it was believed that Aerenthal's purpose was so to 
discredit his Russian colleague that his resignation would 
follow, and then the Anglo-Russian entente would collapse. 
This did not happen: on the contrary, Russia promptly- 
secured from the Porte the promise of a railway from 
Nish, Serbia, across Albania to the Adriatic, and M. Isvol- 
sky and Sir Edward Grey proceeded to draft their own 
programme of reforms, which, as noted above, was the 
immediate occasion of the Turkish revolution. Thus 
Aerenthal's diplomacy had secured no positive advantage; 
in addition, it merited the censure of Sir Edward Grey, 
that an international project had been utilized by Austria 
to further her private interests. 1 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that in the crisis produced by the annexation of 
Bosnia, Sir Edward Grey did not see eye to eye with Baron 
von Aerenthal, and that he was disposed to support the 
contentions of Russia. 

The Russian Government had accepted the annexation 
of Bosnia, in principle, in June, 1908, and again in Sep- 
tember, after the Turkish revolution made such a trans- 
formation desirable. 2 But M. Isvolsky had stipulated for 
advance notice of such action: the matter would have to 
be approved by a European conference, and Russia could 
then claim her compensation— the opening of the Straits. 
Nevertheless Aerenthal contented himself with sending 
M. Isvolsky a private letter two days before the annexa- 
tion was proclaimed, and the Russian foreign minister felt 
that he had been tricked. So did the British Government. 

1 House of Commons, 25 February, 1908. (4 Hansard clxxxiv, cc. 1700-01.) 

2 An impartial view of the controversy is presented by Rene Pinon, L' Europe el 
lajeune Turquie (191 1), chaps. 4, 5 ; the Russian and Austrian versions by two articles 
in the Fortnightly Review, September, November, 1909; the British position in H. 
W. Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy (1913), chapter on "Foreign Policy." The 
fullest account of the negotiations is given in A. Viallate, La Vie politique dans les 
deux mondes, 1908-9, pp. 156-187. 



288 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

For when King Edward paid his annual visit to the Emperor 
Francis Joseph in August not a word was said about the 
contemplated action of Austria-Hungary. This was doubt- 
less Aerenthal's revenge for the Anglo-Russian agreement 
of the year before, which he had tried to forestall; but his 
conduct did not smooth the way. for a prompt recognition 
of the fait accompli in Bosnia. 

M. Isvolsky and Sir Edward Grey at once agreed to de- 
mand the summoning of a European conference, in which 
they were supported by France. Their position was thor- 
oughly sound, for to admit the Austrian right to tear up 
a solemn treaty at her convenience was to consign the public 
law of Europe to the scrap-basket. They went farther 
— they claimed compensation for Serbia. For that little 
state saw its cherished ambitions rudely and decisively 
crushed by the annexation. As long as the provinces in 
question were even nominally parts of the Ottoman Empire, 
there was. the chance that some day, when Francis Joseph 
should die, they might be incorporated in a Greater Serbia, 
which was perhaps the only permanent solution of the 
Southern Slav problem. To this end an extensive propa- 
ganda had been carried on for years in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and with no little success : all such hopes now seemed per- 
manently extinguished. The Serbian Government, there- 
fore, formally protested against the annexation, began to 
mobilize its army, and assumed a warlike attitude. It 
counted upon the assistance of Russia, both on account 
of Russia's particular interest in Serbia and because of the 
enthusiasm aroused in all walks of Russian life by the ap- 
peal of a Slav nation. M. Isvolsky can scarcely be blamed 
for accepting the Serbian contention and for trying to 
extricate Russia from a difficult situation which was not 
of her choosing. 

Yet it must be admitted that the Serbian case was open 
to question. Politically, the situation recalled the Austro- 



THE NEAR EAST 289 

Sardinian complications of fifty years before. Serbia 
aspired to unite under her rule those Slavs of the Dual 
Monarchy who were of the Serb race, even though a major- 
ity of the Serbo-Croatian race already lived in Austria- 
Hungary. In 1859 the kingdom of Sardinia stood for- 
ward as the champion of Italian unity against Austrian 
oppression, and readily conquered the sympathies of Europe 
and America. In 1908 Serbia could point to the discon- 
tent of the Southern Slavs of the Dual Monarchy, whose 
treatment of them had been disgusting, as an adequate 
reason for refusing to recognize the annexation of Bosnia, 
which was considered the forerunner of the conquest of 
Serbia. None the less, the Serbian claim rested on no 
treaty, no promise, no sanction of international law. 
True, the Austrian action was a violation of international 
law; but the pressure of other Powers might persuade her 1 
to allow that action to be formally approved by the signa- 
tories of the Berlin treaty, and thus legalized. 

But by supporting the Serbian demands for compensa- 
tion, a purely political consideration, the British Govern- 
ment weakened its legal right to demand the observance 
of the violated treaty. Sir Edward Grey might argue 
that as Austria had broken the law she must be punished, 
but after all that law prescribed no scale of punishments 
for its infraction. Doubtless, if Sir Edward had been will- 
ing to concede the opening of the Straits, which M. Isvol- 
sky requested and to which Austria was practically pledged, 
the Serbian controversy would not have arisen, or would 
have been speedily adjusted, for Russia would have achieved 
the great goal of her policy. As it was, in default of the 
greater promise, England made the lesser concession, and 
with the diplomatic support of England, France, and 
Russia, the Serbian Government held out against Austria I 
for six months, to the great derangement of the latter's 
finances and economic life. 



290 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

The story of those six months need not be told here. 
Suffice it to say that in March, 1909, the Russian Govern- 
ment decided not to go to war, and consented to the an- 
nexation of the provinces to Austria-Hungary. British 
support of Serbian claims, promised only "so long as they 
should be seconded by Russia," was also withdrawn, and 
Sir Fairfax Cartwright, the British ambassador at Vienna, 
exerted himself to find a satisfactory formula to which 
Serbia might subscribe. Inasmuch as her declaration of 
31 March, 1909, was the basis of the Austrian ultimatum 
of 23 July, 1914, it is well to give the full text: 

"Serbia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has 
not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the 
decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with the treaty 
of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Bowers Serbia 
undertakes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest 
and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annex- 
ation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the 
direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live 
in future on good, neighborly terms with the latter." 

The humiliation of the little kingdom was complete; but 
it saved its dignity by presenting the note to the Powers, 
and not to Austria, a fact which clearly emphasized the 
international "character of the Balkan problem. 

In this fashion the peace of Europe was, for the moment, 
preserved, but in the end at an excessive cost. Austria 
had indeed scored a distinct diplomatic success. In the 
fulness of time, however, the wheel came full circle. The 
defiance of the public law of Europe was profoundly re- 
sented in Italy, where it was regarded as the first step 
toward that Austrian advance along the Adriatic which 
Italy was determined never to permit. 1 Hence the Italian 

1 Italy, with Russian help, secured the retrocession to Turkey of the sanjak of 
Novi-Bazar and the release of Montenegro from those limitations of sovereignty 
over her territorial waters imposed by Article XXIX of the treaty of Berlin. 



THE NEAR EAST 291 

overtures to Russia, which led to a cordial meeting between 
the Tsar and Victor Emmanuel III at Racconigi, in Octo- 
ber, 1909, thus indicating Italy's distrust of the Triple 
Alliance. And when the opportunity came Italy went to 
Tripoli, thus shattering the alliance, because her new col- 
ony was at the mercy of the French and British fleets in 
the Mediterranean. When the Turkish resistance proved 
stubborn, she encouraged, if she did not abet, the forma- 
tion of the Balkan League, which practically extinguished 
the Turkish power in Europe. Out of that conflagration 
arose the new Serbia which provoked Austria to bring on 
the present war. Thus for the sake of an unreal triumph, 
the Dual Monarchy was compelled, after five years, to 
stake its very existence in a conflict which must raise for 
— let us hope — a last settlement those problems which it de- 
sired to postpone indefinitely. 

In the second place, Europe was left divided into two 
diplomatic camps pursuing conflicting policies and deeply 
suspicious of each other. For this state of affairs Ger- 
many and England were chiefly responsible, for by inter- 
vening in disputes not of primary concern to themselves, 
each gave countenance to the charge of the other that 
ulterior motives and deep-laid plots had prompted its in- 
tervention. To Germany Sir Edward Grey's support of 
Serbia was explicable only on the ground that England 
was practically an ally of Russia. Germany therefore 
acted vigorously in support of her ally. But by so doing 
she bound Austria so closely to herself that the consolida- 
tion of the Entente, against which Germany was constantly 
protesting, became more necessary than ever as a protec- 
tion against the Austro-German combination. 

Baron von Aerenthal did not take the advice of Berlin 
upon the annexation of Bosnia; he boldly proclaimed it, 
and then notified his ally. For the moment the German 
Government was indignant, because the stroke threatened 



292 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

to injure German interests in Turkey. But Prince Biilow 
at once decided to stand by Austria, who would not be able 
to resist the pressure of Great Britain, France, and Russia 
on behalf of a conference, and on 13 October notified Sir 
Edward Grey that "Germany could not, any more than 
Austria-Hungary, allow the discussion of the annexation 
by the conference." 1 For the rest, she endeavored to 
keep out of the discussion, except that she helped effect 
the Austro-Turkish accord which enabled Aerenthal to 
maintain his intransigent attitude toward Serbia. Then 
on 21 February, 1909, when the French and British Gov- 
ernments proposed that the Powers should take joint 
action at Vienna and Belgrade — for Austrian and Russian 
mobilizations had made the situation very tense — Berlin 
flatly refused and demanded that pressure be exerted at 
Belgrade to compel an acceptance of Austria's terms. 
This was rejected by Russia, and the danger of war in- 
creased. But about 21 March, M. Isvolsky prepared to 
capitulate. Suddenly, on the 23d, the German ambas- 
sador in St. Petersburg was instructed to make represen- 
tations in favor of Austria, who was neither aware of the 
proceedings nor needed such assistance. The published 
statement declared that Count Pourtales had merely of- 
fered some "friendly advice" (avis amical), but in May, 
1 9 10, on the occasion of his visit to Vienna, the German 
Emperor boasted that he had supported his ally "in shin- 
ing armor," and M. Isvolsky always described the incident, 
to those entitled to inquire, as une mise-en-demeure peremp- 
toire, which marks a serious stage in diplomatic negotia- 
tions. 2 M. Isvolsky may have preferred yielding to Ger- 
man pressure rather than Austrian stubbornness, but the 
German action created a profoundly disagreeable impres- 
sion on Russian public opinion, and in considering the events 
of July, 1914, when German policy followed the prece- 

1 Reichstag, 29 March, 1909. 2 Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 262. 



THE NEAR EAST 293 

dents of 1908-9 with considerable exactness, it is well to 
remember that the Russian Government could not be ex- 
pected to undergo such a humiliation a second time. 

Germany's diplomatic support of Austria-Hungary was, 
of course, as justifiable as the assistance given Russia by 
Great Britain. But Prince Billow's explanation of his 
policy reads as follows: 

"The German sword had been thrown into the scale of European 
decision, directly in support of our Austro-Hungarian ally, indi- 
rectly for the preservation of European peace, and above all for 
the sake of German credit and the maintenance of our position in 
the world. It would now be made manifest whether Germany 
really had been checkmated by the policy of isolation and whether 
the Powers that had been drawn into the circle of anti-German 
policy would find it consistent with their vital interests in Europe 
to take up a hostile attitude toward the German Empire and its 
allies. The course of the Bosnian crisis, in point of fact, made an 
end of the policy of isolation. . . . The policy of isolation, which 
seemed likely to endanger our safety, was directed against the in- 
ternational trade and the sea power of Germany. By means of 
our strength as a Continental Power, we tore the web which en- 
compassed us." 1 

The German sword had been thrown into the scale . . . for 
the sake of German credit : this does not sound like peace- 
ful or disinterested diplomacy anxious to resolve a dim- 
cult question that might unchain a general war. Rather, 
it is the policy of the mailed fist, which succeeded because 
no one was prepared to resist it. As to the isolation of 
which Prince Biilow complains, it is sufficient to quote 
his own remarks in the Reichstag in December, 1908. 
Adverting to an interview with M. Isvolsky at the begin- 
ning of the crisis, he said: 

"M. Isvolsky and I were agreed that Russian policy could have 
no point against Germany, and vice versa; in addition, that the 

1 Imperial Germany, pp. 62-63, 65. 



294 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

old friendly relations must be maintained. The Russian minister, 
on that occasion, renewed the assurance that there existed no un- 
derstanding between Russia and England, either public or secret, 
which could be directed against German interests." 

If, as the prince has argued at length in his Imperial Ger- 
many, Germany's undertakings in the field of world diplo- 
macy depended on her position as a Continental Power, 
and that was secured by "the hard facts of the Triple 
Alliance," 1 why should Germany protest against an agree- 
ment of the other three Powers? Great Britain, for her 
part, never objected to the Triple Alliance, and Sir Edward 
Grey condemned the allegation that any British differences 
with Austria had been provoked by hostility to Germany. 2 
On the other hand, British policy during the crisis was 
not very happily inspired. Mr. Asquith declared that its 
attitude was "entirely disinterested," 3 and, according to 
Sir Edward Grey, "the knowledge that Italy and Germany 
were working for peace removed all risk of friction with 
them." 4 As M. Isvolsky had declared from the first that 
there would be no war, 5 the danger of an explosion came 
from the intransigeance of Serbia, and, apparently to fore- 
stall such a calamity, Sir Edward Grey promised British 
diplomatic support to the Serbian claims for compensation. 
That, as has been seen, prolonged the crisis, and almost 
brought on the war it was intended to avoid. Also, it 
enabled Germany to put forward her theory of a policy 
of isolation, because England certainly had no direct in- 
terest in Serbia. But instead of crediting Sir Edward 
with a Machiavellian scheme to injure Germany, it is 
much simpler and more in keeping with his straightforward 
character to say that he misjudged the situat3oh"and made 

■P. 66. 

2 House of Commons, 29 March, 1909. (5 Hansard iii, cc. 57-58.) 

3 Guild Hall, London, 9 November, 1908. 
* Coldstream, 22 January, 1909. 

5 Interview in the Temps (Paris), 8 October, 1908. 



THE NEAR EAST 295 

a mistake; as, in fact, he practically confessed when he 
refused to express any opinion on the merits of the Austro- 
Serbian controversy of July, 19 14, and valiantly endeav- 
ored to find a solution by means of the European concert. 1 
Great Britain subsequently re-established cordial relations 
with Austria, but Germans clung to the idea that the oppo- 
sition of views in 1908-9 had been dictated by the considered 
(or ill-considered) prejudice of the British foreign office 
against themselves, and the good effects of King Edward's 
visit to Berlin in February, 1909, before the crisis was ad- 
justed, were undone by the British naval programme for 
1909-10. 

Thus the Bosnian crisis illustrates admirably the remark 
of the French writer, quoted on the first page of this book, 
who described Anglo- German rivalry as "the essential 
fact which dominates the whole policy of our time, which 
thrusts itself into all events to embitter and warp them, 
and which is to be found at the bottom of all the political 
crises by whose succession Europe is periodically agitated." 
England and Germany, theoretically, had only a secondary 
interest in the controversy about two provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire. A mistake on the part of England en- 
ables Germany to intervene as a principal; she boasts that 
she has dealt a death-blow to the policy of the former; 
England resents the accusation that her policy has been 
directed against Germany, and strengthens her navy; this 
Germany regards as sure proof of England's unremitting 
hostility; and finally each country is convinced that the 
crisis arose through the machinations of the other, which 
must be thwarted by more diplomacy or more armaments, 
either of which is bound to increase the suspicions already 
cherished on the other side of the North Sea ! 

In the opinion of the writer, Germany has made out a 

1 Cf. Great Britain and the European Crisis (1914), no. 5, Sir Edward Grey to Sir 
M. de Bunsen, 24 July, 1014. 



296 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

poor case for her intervention "in shining armor," and 
Baron von Aerenthal was not grateful for her assistance. 
Not only did it deprive him of the credit for the annex- 
ation, to which he was entitled; it showed Germany's un- 
willingness to let Austrian diplomacy pursue its own course 
and her determination to assert her own power at all costs. 
Until the end of his life Aerenthal had to combat the in- 
trigues of the German ambassador at Vienna, whose in- 
fluence steadily increased until, with his connivance, if 
not under his direction, the fatal ultimatum to Serbia was 
drafted in July, 1914. Not until the archives are opened 
will the truth be fully known, but it is perfectly clear that 
the seed of distrust which produced the catastrophe of 
1914 was sown in the crisis of 1908-9, and that the policies 
of the three eastern empires were determined in 19 14 very 
largely by their recollections of what had happened five 
years before. 

For several years after the Bosnian crisis Near Eastern 
politics reflected the diplomatic schism of Europe. In ap- 
pearance normal relations were restored by an Austro- 
Serbian treaty of commerce (31 March, 1909) and a re- 
sumption of regular intercourse between Austria and Russia 
(March, 19 10). Actually there was little cordiality. The 
Powers of the Entente labored to bring about a union of the 
Balkan states which might raise an effective barrier to 
Teutonic influence. To offset this, Germany and Austria 
gave their unreserved support to the Young Turk govern- 
ment at Constantinople, and in the summer of 1910 there 
were well-defined rumors of a Turco-Rumanian alliance 
directed against Bulgaria. About the same time Turkey 
applied to the French Government for permission to raise 
a loan of 150,000,000 francs on the Paris bourse; this was 
refused because the Turks would not give guarantees that 
the money would not be used against the political interests 
of France and Russia. For similar reasons the British 



THE NEAR EAST 297 

foreign office persuaded Sir Ernest Cassel, the great Lon- 
don financier, not to float the loan. German banks then 
raised the money, but on conditions decidedly more oner- 
ous than those offered in Paris and London; the money 
was spent on the Turkish army then being reorganized by 
a German mission, and this was held to justify the refusal 
of the Entente to participate in the loan. 

Germany also succeeded in selling two old battleships 
to Turkey (August, 1910), a transaction not popular in 
England because these gaps in the German navy were 
filled by Dreadnoughts. As it turned out, the Turkish 
Government subsequently ordered two Dreadnoughts in 
England, and these were taken over by the British authori- 
ties at the beginning of the Great War. The incident did 
not, therefore, affect the superiority of the British navy, 
although the resentment of the Turks at the seizure of the 
ships seems to have aided the Young Turks in joining Ger- 
many against Great Britain. It may also be noted that, 
as an offset to the German control of the Turkish army, the 
reorganization of the navy was intrusted to British officers 
and that the customs were placed under the direction of 
Sir Richard Crawford, who managed them, to the great 
profit of the Porte until Turkey joined the European War. 

This chapter may conclude with ar statement of the 
progress of the Baghdad railway. The Young Turks, as 
noted above, very soon discarded all notions of liberty 
and equality, and embarked upon a policy of centraliza- 
tion and "Turkification." That brought its reward in the 
shape of constant rebellions, from Albania to Arabia. So 
it became imperative to establish railway communication 
with the disturbed regions, and the Baghdad negotiations 
were resumed. A series of new conventions was signed 
in the spring of 191 1, but not before German diplomacy 
had obtained the support of Russia to the project, which 
had hitherto been unpopular in St. Petersburg. 



298 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

The Anglo-Russian convention of 31 August, 1907, 
practically closed Persia to German influence, except in 
the central zone that was supposed to be excluded from 
British or Russian designs. In the face of the virtual 
Russian protectorate over northern Persia, the German 
school at Teheran lost its importance, and German bankers 
could not for the future hope to participate in the frequent 
loans to the bankrupt Persian Government. Germany at 
first tried to upset the new arrangements by inciting the 
Turks to occupy Persian territory in the province of Azer- 
baijan, to which they had some sort of claim, and by lend- 
ing some support to the constitutional movement directed 
against the worthless Shah. But he was amenable to Rus- 
sian gold, the constitutionalists were incapable, and the 
British Government raised no objection to a Russian occu- 
pation of northern Persia, because it was threatening to 
interfere in the south in the interests of British trade. In 
other words, the partition of Persia was an accomplished 
fact, carried out partly from the selfish ambitions of Russia 
and England, partly as a protection against the Drang 
nach Osten. In order that the Baghdad railway might not 
be blocked indefinitely, Germany determined to come to 
terms with Russia and England, who were not opposed 
to the line if their own interests were adequately protected. 

Accordingly, in November, 19 10, the German Emperor 
received the Tsar at Potsdam, and a bargain was struck. 
Germany withdrew her opposition to Russian railway 
schemes in northern Persia, where she recognized the polit- 
ical, strategic, and economic interests of Russia, and Russia 
accepted the Baghdad railway, on condition that no branch 
lines were built into Armenia and Kurdistan — a common- 
sense agreement, for neither Power could prevent the con- 
struction of the other's railway. The Russian and German 
systems were then to be linked up by a spur from Baghdad 
to Khanikin on the Persian frontier, which would enable 



THE NEAR EAST 299 

Germany to share in the trade of northern Persia, where 
Russia promised to maintain the open door. At the time, 
this Russo- German accord created an unfavorable impres- 
sion. The Turks complained that they had been ignored. 
France feared that Germany was trying to weaken the 
Dual Alliance. English publicists alleged that Russia had 
abandoned the Triple Entente, and that German policy 
would have a free hand against British interests in the 
Persian Gulf; some looked askance upon the proposals 
for a trans-Persian railway which once more began to be 
mooted in connection with the probable completion of the 
Baghdad line. The German press, it may be remarked, 
paid glowing tributes to Russia on account of what was 
momentarily regarded as a blow to France and England, 
which countries were then the chief target of German 
diplomacy. No talk then of "the Slav peril" ! 

As a matter of fact, none of these apprehensions seem 
to have been justified. The railway situation in the Near 
and Middle East had reached an impasse, from which an 
escape could be found only by mutual concessions. The 
Potsdam negotiations, which were definitely recorded in a 
Russo-German convention of 19 August, 191 1, may be 
regarded as the first step toward an equitable solution of 
the whole difficulty. They were followed by the agree- 
ment between the Turkish Government and the Baghdad 
railway company, the terms of which can now be under- 
stood. 1 

By the first of the three conventions, signed in March, 
191 1, the construction of the fine from Halif to Baghdad 
was provided for, the section over the Taurus being tem- 
porarily abandoned. The company renounced any claim to 
share in the increased revenues expected from the raising of 

'Victor Berard, "Off res allemandes," "La Choix de Londres," Revue de Paris, 
1 and 15 April, 1911; R. Said-Ruete, "Anglo-German Relations in the Near East," 
England and Germany (1012), pp. 66-71, a pro-English statement by a former 
officer in the German army. 



300 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

the customs from eleven to fifteen per cent, and contented 
itself with the revenues already allocated for the Anatolian 
section of the line; this was, of course, a distinct conces- 
sion to the British point of view. The second convention 
leased to the company the railway already running from 
Alexandretta, on the Mediterranean, to Osmanye, and per- 
mitted it to exploit Alexandretta as a commercial port; 
this gave the company an excellent harbor in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Finally, the company surrendered its right 
to construct the section from Baghdad to Bassorah, for 
which a new international company, under Turkish con- 
trol, was to be formed; the Germans retaining only the 
right to as large a share of the capital as was accorded to 
any other Power. This, again, was a virtual acceptance 
of the British contention that British interests were not 
protected in the original concession. There remained the 
section from Bassorah to the gulf, which depended upon a 
satisfactory arrangement with Great Britain as regards 
the Sheikh of Koweit. Hakki Pasha, a former grand 
vizier, therefore repaired to London and opened negotia- 
tions with Sir Edward Grey. The discussions dragged on 
at inordinate length, and were interrupted by the Agadir 
crisis of 191 1 and the Balkan Wars of 191 2-13 ; but an agree- 
ment was finally reached, and was about to be published 
when the Great War and Turkey's participation therein 
translated the question from the field of diplomacy to the 
arbitrament of force. The details of the agreement, so 
far as they are known, will be more appropriately noticed 
in the chapter entitled "The Eve of the War." 

From the above narrative of events the following con- 
clusions appear to be warranted: (1) The policies pursued, 
by England and Germany with respect to Turkey were 
the expression of their national needs and ambitions, and 
the conflict of these policies gave additional stimulus to 



THE NEAR EAST 301 

the rivalry bred by the race for naval supremacy. (2) 
The Triple Entente, evolved out of the Dual Alliance by 
British diplomacy as a protection against Germany, ac- 
quired real vitality under the pressure exerted by Germany 
in the interest of her Near Eastern policy, because that 
policy, if pushed to its logical conclusion, would severely 
prejudice the position of the several Entente Powers. Thus 
the Near Eastern question, instead of being dealt with by 
the European concert as the lessons of history required, 
became a shuttlecock in the game being played by two rival 
groups of Powers, whose differences were so great that they 
neglected the opportunity afforded by the Balkan Wars of 
191 2-13 to make a permanent settlement; with the inevita- 
ble result that the new situation was unsatisfactory to all 
of them and was the immediate occasion of the Great 
War. (3) Great Britain did not object to the economic 
enterprises of Germany in the Ottoman Empire except 
when they promised to make that Empire a political sat- 
ellite of Germany,, but she was willing to withdraw her 
opposition in return for tangible concessions which secured 
her own interests. (4) Great Britain feared the political 
designs of Germany in the Near East, partly because they 
threatened to undermine the position and prestige gained 
through generations of successful commerce and diplomacy; 
partly because they seemed intimately connected with 
other phases of German policy which had to do with the 
balance of power and the affairs of western Europe. This 
last consideration brings us to the Morocco crisis of 191 1. 



CHAPTER XI 
AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 

On i July, 191 1, the German gunboat Panther cast 
anchor in the harbor of Agadir on the Atlantic coast of 
Morocco. This incident produced the most serious crisis 
in Anglo- German relations before the actual outbreak of 
war three years later, and very nearly provoked war at 
the time. To the world at large, and probably to the Euro- 
pean governments, the news of the German action came 
as a bolt from the blue, although such precipitancy was 
endemic in German diplomacy; but events were to show 
that if the Wilhelmstrasse reckoned on presenting Europe 
with a fait accompli, it had, as usual, calculated badly, 
and that neither France nor England could be cajoled or 
threatened. In the reaction which followed the peaceful 
solution of the difficulty, England got the credit for block- 
ing the designs of Germany, although the real blame be- 
longed to the stupid procedure of the German foreign 
office. This in turn led to much searching of heart in 
England, and for a brief period a reconciliation seemed 
possible, only to be shattered by the Great War. Hence 
the importance of the crisis. 

In the early summer of 191 1 Anglo-German relations, if 
not cordial, had lost much of the animosity engendered 
by the Bosnian troubles of 1908 and the naval scare of 1909. 
The German Emperor had been well received when he at- 
tended the obsequies of his uncle Edward VII, and again 
on the occasion of the dedication of the national monument 
to Queen Victoria in May, 191 1. On 13 March of the 
same year Sir Edward Grey had remarked upon the friendly 

302 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 303 

relations obtaining with all the Powers; 1 on 6 February 
Mr. Asquith had declared that British friendships were not 
exclusive, and had no hostile tendency or ramifications. 2 
For a year negotiations had been in progress for a limitation 
of naval armaments, and the British Government had "as- 
sented to the German view that some wider agreement of a 
political nature should be a condition precedent to a naval 
arrangement." 3 In Germany the death of Edward VII, 
who passed for the inspirer of the Einkreisungspolitik, 
caused a feeling of relief, for King George was not re- 
garded as a diplomatist; 4 at any rate, the crop of pamphlets 
in denunciation of British policy, which had been of large 
volume from 1904 to 1910, fell off considerably. Above all, 
perhaps, the struggle over the Parliament Bill, then at its 
height, seemed to render England a negligible quantity 
in international affairs. The first of a series of strikes 
among the transport workers had also begun. In India 
and Egypt the native unrest was still evident, and Canada 
was absorbed by the reciprocity treaty with the United 
States. That Great Britain should intervene decisively 
in a European quarrel was as surprising to German public 
opinion and to the German Government as the forcing of 
that quarrel was to the British public. 

* The Act of Algeciras, it will be remembered, conferred 
upon France and Spain the task of organizing an inter- 
national police force in those ports of Morocco which were 
open to European commerce. Inaugurated in November, 
1906, this reform was distasteful to the Moorish popula- 
tion, who rightly feared the loss of their national inde- 
pendence, and numerous outbreaks followed, in which 

1 5 Hansard xxii, c. 1983. 2 S Hansard xxi, c. 65. 

3 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, p. 26. 

4 "With the death of King Edward VII the English policy of isolation, which 
he introduced with much adroit statesmanship against Germany, has broken down." 
(Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, p. 33.) 



3<H ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

several Frenchmen were killed. Finding a naval demon- 
stration ineffective, the French Government occupied first 
Udja, in the northeast, just over the Algerian frontier, and 
then Casablanca and its environs, the Shawia, on the At- 
lantic coast. This in turn led. to a rebellion against Sultan 
Abdel Assiz, headed by his brother Mulai Hafid, who finally 
succeeded in usurping the throne and in getting himself 
recognized as Sultan by the Powers, this last at the instiga- 
tion of Germany (May, 1907-December, 1908). 

The French had observed an impartial neutrality be- 
tween the warring brothers, but when the civil strife was 
over they pressed upon Mulai Hafid both a programme of 
reforms and their own bill of expenses for the occupation 
of Casablanca. M. Pichon, the French foreign minister, 
frequently denied that France was aiming to upset the 
Act of Algeciras and to establish a protectorate de jure or 
de facto; 1 nevertheless his application of the act was bound 
to make French influence predominant in Morocco and to 
reduce the Sultan to a condition of vassalage. Mulai 
Hafid saw this clearly enough. Moreover, unlike the 
brother whom he had deposed, he was not receptive to 
European ideas, and he had risen to power by the help of 
the anti-foreign party. So it was not until 4 March, 19 10, 
that he signed the treaty presented to him by the French 
minister, by which he recognized certain westward exten- 
sions of the Algerian frontier and accepted the French 
offer to provide funds for liquidating his debts. The French 
were also to remain in occupation of Udja and the Shawia 
pending the creation of a Moroccan constabulary that 
should be trained by a French military mission; and they 
were to be indemnified for the Casablanca expedition by 
a yearly payment for seventy-five years. This convention 
did not destroy the sovereignty of the Sultan, but it was 
scarcely in keeping with the letter of the Algeciras Act. 

1 Chamber of Deputies, 13 November, 1907. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 305 

On the other hand, that act, representing an attempt to 
reconcile two incompatible theories, 1 was clearly in need of 
revision, and — what is of vital importance — had been prac- 
tically set aside by a Franco-German agreement entered 
into at the behest of Germany, the Power originally re- 
sponsible for the act.j 

German opinion, it was noted above, had regarded the 
proceedings at Algeciras as a pis alter. When the French 
began their armed intervention in the spring of 1907 the 
press of the fatherland was not long in manifesting its dis- 
content, and the following year it took up the cause of 
Mulai Hand with enthusiasm, advocating his recognition 
by the imperial government as a means of checking the 
growing influence of France. The new Sultan, for his part, 
confidently expected German assistance in his struggle for 
independence; and with no little reason, if the incident of 
Casablanca were any index of German policy. 

At the end of September, 1908, some deserters from the 
Foreign Legion, some of whom were German subjects, 
were forcibly taken from the hands of a German consular 
official at Casablanca as he was embarking them on a 
German steamer en route to Europe. As he had provided 
all the fugitives, including the non-Germans, with safe- 
conducts, the French Government could not admit his 
diplomatic immunity from molestation, and feared that the 
incident had been provoked for an ulterior purpose. Ger- 
many was, indeed, willing to arbitrate the matter, but on 
conditions intolerable to France. In October and Novem- 
ber the tension between Paris and Berlin was so grave that 
Great Britain and Russia promised support to France. 
The Bosnian crisis was also in full swing, and all kinds of 
rumors filled the air, especially when certain military pre- 
cautions were taken. As Germany had pretended rather 
ostentatiously to disinterest herself in the Bosnian ques- 

1 Cf. Chap. IX, "The Triple Entente," pp. 236-238. 



306 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

tion, she seemed disposed to reopen the Morocco contro- 
versy afresh. This would, of course, be Mulai Hand's 
opportunity. 

Suddenly the Wilhelmstrasse yielded, accepted the 
French contentions as to the details of the arbitration, and 
presently reversed its traditional attitude. The German 
ambassador in Paris proposed to settle the Morocco issue 
on a new basis, the offer was accepted, and on 9 February, 
1909, while King Edward VII was the guest of the German 
Emperor in Berlin, the agreement was signed in that city. 
The German Government frankly recognized "the special 
political interests of France" in Morocco, and declared 
itself "resolved not to impede those interests"; in return, 
the French Government, "firmly attached to the main- 
tenance of the independence and integrity of the Shereefian 
Empire," was "resolved to safeguard the principle of eco- 
nomic equality, and consequently not to obstruct German 
commercial and industrial interests in that country." 
Both governments, "being equally anxious to facilitate the 
execution of the Algeciras Act," agreed not to "pursue or 
encourage any measure of a nature to create in their favor 
or in that of any Power an economic privilege," and "to 
associate their nationals in affairs for which the latter may 
obtain a concession." 

Thus Germany, the supposed champion of an interna- 
tionalized Morocco, went behind the Powers and made a 
special agreement with France, conceding the vital point 
\ — the political interests of France — that could not be recon- 
ciled with the Act of Algeciras, to which lip-homage was 
bnce more rendered. The bargain was not understood at 
the time. Frenchmen assumed that they now possessed a 
free hand in dealing with the Sultan, and indeed Germany 
did not seek to hamper the French political programme. 
It might well seem that Germany, convinced by the reso- 
lute stand of France in the Casablanca matter that she 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 307 

could gain little by a policy of bluster, had experienced a 
change of heart, and would henceforth be content with 
the satisfaction of a steadily increasing commerce in the 
Shereefian Empire. Imbued with this idea, the French 
proceeded in leisurely fashion to secure from Mulai Hand 
the convention of March, 1910, which was intended as 
the entering wedge of their political control. For them, 
therefore, the German intervention of July, 191 1, came not 
only as a rude awakening, but in the light of a broken 
promise. 

From the German point of view, however, the essential 
feature of the February agreement was the reciprocal pledge 
of the two governments to associate their nationals in affairs 
for which the latter might obtain a concession. 1 In a com- 
munication of 2 June, 1909, the imperial government pro- 
posed that, in order to avoid "sterile and injurious competi- 
tion," all concessions in Morocco should be reserved to 
certain French and German groups of financiers and cap- 
tains of industry who enjoyed the confidence of their re- 
spective governments, third parties being admitted only 
at the expense of the French group. In other words, 
France and Germany would establish an economic condo- 
minium and secure a virtual monopoly, in spite of the open 

idoor supposedly guaranteed by Article CVII of the Act of 
Algeciras ! Germany was now suggesting the very proce- 

Idure the possible application of which by France alone 
had been one of her bases of action in 1905-6. If one re- 
members also that in German eyes commerce and politics 
were inseparable, one may well ask whether the political 
ascendency of France, theoretically recognized by Ger- 
many, would not have been found illusory and meaningless. 
Not until the Morocco question was finally solved by the 

1 The Moroccan question from 1909 to 191 1 is fully discussed by Andre Tardieu, 
Le Mystere d'Agadir (1912); cf. also, Felicien Challaye, three articles in Revue de 
Paris, 15 January, 1912, 1 February, 1912, 1 February, 1913. 



308 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

agreements of November, 191 1, was it realized that Ger- 
many had set a trap into which France walked most un- 
suspectingly. "Only a few perspicacious observers saw 
in it a first successful move on the part of Germany to fulfil, 
by a roundabout but effective method, her fixed purpose 
of destroying the entente between France and England, 
and the economic subjection of both peoples." x • The com- 
mercial and industrial conquest of Morocco by Germany 
would nullify the political influence of France, to secure 
which had been the object of the entente cordiale: if the 
German economic designs were not successful, the Wil- 
helmstrasse could then reopen the whole question, on the 
ground that the convention of 1909 had remained a dead 
letter. In the light of events, this interpretation of Ger- 
man policy appears more reasonable than the view which 
ascribed to it the desire to be reconciled with France or 
the immediate exigencies of the Near Eastern question. 2 

No sooner was the German proposal of 2 June, 1909, re- 
ceived than the Quai d'Orsay perceived the danger that 
other Powers would object to the Franco-German mon- 
opoly; yet it was impossible to repudiate the agreement. 
In his reply M. Pichon insisted that British and Spanish 
groups should be admitted to any concessions, but he agreed 
that all enterprises should be reserved to the groups offi- 
cially supported by the two governments, and nothing 
was said about the other signatories of the Act of Algeciras. 
An entire homogeneity of view was never established be- 
tween the two foreign offices, so that only a miracle could 
have produced a satisfactory result, even if the principle 
of the scheme had been far sounder than it really was. 

It is not necessary here to set forth the details of the 
three enterprises promoted by international finance in the 

1 Fullerton, Problems of Power, p. 244. 

s This was the view taken by Andre Tardieu in Le Prince de Billow, written in 
1909. He did not then understand the true purpose of the convention of 1909, 
one of whose advocates he long was. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 309 

eighteen months preceding the coup of Agadir. The Union 
des Mines marocaines, a company formed to exploit the 
mineral resources of Morocco, failed because the German 
Government was unable to effect a compromise between 
two rival German groups, one of which, the Mannesmann 
Brothers, claimed to have received from the Sultan a con- 
cession prior to that granted to the Union. In the case of 
the Societe marocaine de Travaux publics, which proposed 
to undertake all public works for the whole country, the 
blame for its collapse rested with the French Government, 
which, by refusing to guarantee the loans of Morocco with 
the credit of France, prevented the raising of funds which 
could be put into public utilities. 

The third matter had an important bearing on the crisis 
ofi9ii. L11910 the French authorities decided upon the 
construction of two railways in Morocco — one in the Udja 
region, the other out of Casablanca. They alleged military 
necessity, and the German Government raised no objec- 
tion. But it demanded "compensation" for German in- 
dustry, which could not participate in the construction of 
a military railway, and stipulated that French companies 
should be forbidden to compete with the Societe de Travaux 
publics. At this point Sir Edward Grey intervened to 
protest that the British Government could not recognize 
any such economic condominium, and that it would sup- 
port the claims of any English companies put forward under 
the Act of Algeciras. M. Pichon had relinquished the 
foreign office with the fall of the Briand ministry (27 Feb- 
ruary, 191 1). M. Cruppi, the new incumbent, with the 
approval of the Monis cabinet, decided not to proceed 
further with the question, and this gave the German Gov- 
ernment an opening. M. Jules Cambon, the ambassador 
in Berlin, began to send warnings that "if we give Germany 
reason to believe that we are going back on our word and 
shirking our responsibility with her in Morocco, as confirmed 



310 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

by our agreement of 9 February, we shall be creating for 
ourselves endless trouble." 1 The situation was still further 
complicated by a new German request that Germans should 
be employed on the railways after they were built — a re- 
quest so impossible for the French to grant that Germany 
must have been seeking a quarrel; all the more categori- 
cally and repeatedly did M. Cambon urge an agreement. 
But in vain. M. Cruppi would not accept the German 
thesis, and the projects were abandoned. From this time 
the ill humor of the Wilhelmstrasse became more apparent 
from day to day. The Panther, as it were, began to load 
its guns. 

It will not be contended that the Franco-German agree- 
ment of 1909 had secured for Germany that economic 
position in Morocco which had been anticipated, although 
her commerce had developed handsomely in the interval, 
or that the French Government had gone out of its way to 
facilitate the German designs. Even if the Germans had 
tried to impose unacceptable conditions on their rivals, 
they might complain that all their energy had only led to 
the payment of two claims against the Moroccan Govern- 
ment for certain public works constructed by German firms 
before the agreement of 1909. They were further cha- 
grined by the failure of another enterprise similar to those 
attempted in Morocco. 

In July, 1909, M. Pichon determined to apply the prin- 
ciple of joint exploitation to other Franco-German diffi- 
culties. For some years the frontier between the French 
Congo and the German Cameroons had been the theatre 
of incessant wrangling between the French company of 
Ngoko-Sangha and the Sudkamerungesellschaft; on one 
occasion actual fighting took place. The difficulties of the 

1 This and other quotations from the French Yellow Book on Morocco are taken 
either from Tardieu, Le Mystere d'Agadir, or Georges Bourdon, The German 
Enigma. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 311 

situation were not diminished by the activities of English 
merchants or the protests of French and English humani- 
tarian societies against the harsh treatment of the natives. 
M. Pichon thought to solve the problem by inviting the 
rival French and German companies to form a consortium, 
by which he hoped to stop the encroachments upon French 
territory systematically practised by the Germans. After 
eighteen months of negotiation the agreement was signed 
in Paris, in the presence of M. Pichon and the German am- 
bassador. In the French Parliament, however, to which the 
contract was referred for approval, great opposition was 
manifested by the personal opponents of M. Briand, the 
prime minister, and the strong party opposed to the exist- 
ing regime in the French Congo. The consortium was there- 
fore negatived, and the Briand-Pichon ministry resigned. 
In such circumstances the new government could not pro- 
ceed farther with the scheme, but that fact did not ap- 
pease the natural indignation of the German ambassador, 
who remarked that France must display good will in some 
business arrangement with the Germans. Whatever the 
merits or demerits of the Ngoko-Sangha enterprise, its 
rejection, though having no bearing on the convention of 
February, 1909, added fuel to the flame of discontent 
evoked by the failure of the schemes based on that con- 
vention. 
I While affairs were in this parlous state, the French Gov- 
ernment announced that the lives of Europeans in Fez 
were endangered by a revolution in the Shereefian Empire, 
and that a French column would proceed to the relief of the 
city. In the two years that had elapsed since Germany 
recognized the predominant political interests of France in 
Morocco, the government of the Republic had done little 
toward consolidating its position. The convention with 
the Sultan, of March, 1910, intended as the entering wedge, 
had not been followed by any active measures. In par- 



312 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

ticular, the Sultan had not been supplied with the funds 
urgently required to equip an adequate army and police 
force, and no railways had been built. Only the taxes had 
been increased, and a French supervision of the customs 
established. In January, 191 1, the discontent came to 
a head in the revolt of some tribesmen near Rabat, and the 
murder of a French officer. Soon a brother of Mulai Hand 
set himself up as rival Sultan, and began to march on Fez. 
Mulai Hand thereupon appealed to the French for assist- 
ance. The French consul in Fez reported that the rebels 
were quite out of hand, the Sultan being unable to raise a 
force to meet them, and that if Fez were taken European 
lives would be sacrificed. Accordingly, a French force 
was despatched from Casablanca. It met with no opposi- 
tion, and entered Fez on 2 1 May, where all was found quiet. 
No objection having been raised by either Great Britain 
or Germany to this expedition, the French declared their 
intention of withdrawing when the country had been paci- 
fied: actually their occupation of Fez precipitated the de- 
spatch of the Panther to Agadir^ 
K The full history of the march to Fez is not yet available. 
Writers like M. Andre Tardieu represent it as the logical, 
if extreme, conclusion of the convention of February, 1909, 
as the step absolutely necessary for the establishment of 
French political ascendency. Their criticisms are directed 
against the vacillating policy of the French Government, 
which allowed two years to slip by without repressing the 
anarchy of Morocco; in their eyes the expedition would 
not have been necessary had France pursued an active 
Moroccan policy. The opponents of a French Morocco — 
Mr. E. D. Morel, 1 the Socialist press of Paris, and German 
publicists generally — declare that the French deliberately 

1 Morocco in Diplomacy (191 2) . For a brief answer to his book, see Philippe Millet, 
"The Truth about the Franco-German Crisis of 191 1," Nineteenth Century, June, 
1912. 1 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 313 

neglected to take up a firm attitude toward Moroccan af- 
fairs in order that they might one day discover an excuse 
for a military occupation. The Europeans in Fez were in 
no danger, the need of intervention existed only in the 
imagination of the forward colonial party and the unscru- 
pulous financiers who would profit from French political 
control. The expedition was intended as the death-war- 
rant of the Act of Algeciras, and was recklessly embarked 
upon without considering the possibility of tension with 
Germany, who was bound to resent such an infringement 
of the international status of Morocco. 

The German Government adopted the latter view. No 
sooner did the news of the troubles in Morocco begin to 
reach Europe than the German press sought to minimize 
them. It denied that the Europeans in Fez were in any 
danger, accusing the French Government of withhold- 
ing reassuring despatches, and the chancellor himself told 
M. Jules Cambon that the reports of the German consul 
gave no cause for alarm. When informed of the intended 
expedition to Fez, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, the foreign 
secretary, said to M. Cambon: "If you go to Fez, you will 
not depart. It raises the whole question of Morocco." 
And a week later: "If the Act of Algeciras goes by the 
board, we shall reserve our liberty of action." The chan- 
cellor was equally explicit. The French were going be- 
yond their rights. "I see," he said, "that this question 
is fraught with very grave difficulties, which makes me fear 
for the future." He did not object to the expedition, but 
he let it be understood that Germany was not to be ignored 
in the development of affairs. 

Thus France had full and ample warning of the ap- 
proaching storm. From the German point of view, the 
agreement of 1909 had broken down, while the French 
were about to establish their influence in Morocco once 
for all (the chancellor told M. Cambon that even if the 



314 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

French evacuated Fez they would have to go back within 
a year, and he did not expect them to retire at all). There- 
fore Germany was entitled to reopen the whole question. 
Undoubtedly. But the logical basis of her claims was the 
convention of 1909, not the Act of Algeciras, which she had 
endeavored to set aside in her own interest. She could not 
have it both ways. She could not ignore the stipulations 
of Algeciras, and then, when her policy had borne no fruit, 
complain that France had violated them. On paper the 
Act of Algeciras was still the public law of Europe as re- 
gards Morocco, but every chancery knew that it had 
ceased to exist and that, as Mr. Asquith said later in the 
House of Commons, "a new situation had arisen." As a 
matter of fact, although Germany appealed to the Act of 
Algeciras in sending the Panther to Agadir, her action soon 
made it clear that she regarded the act with no more 
loyalty then than in the two years preceding. \ If Germany 
attached such importance to it, why did she not protest 
against the Spanish operations in the Riff in 1909 and their 
occupation of Larache and El-Kasar on the heels of the 
march to Fez? Granted that the French had practically 
nullified the agreement of Algeciras, and that Great Britain 
connived at this proceeding, Germany was equally guilty. 
It is quite clear, therefore, that the crisis of 191 1 was not 
produced by the French violation of an international agree- 
ment, but that the issue was what the Germans call a 
Machtfrage — a question of force — in the solution of which 
not law but expediency must prevail. 

When M. Cruppi realized, from the reiterated warnings 
of the ambassador in Berlin, that Germany was determined 
to make capital out of the expedition to Fez, he cast about 
for a sop of one kind or another. Efforts to reopen the 
abortive railway negotiations, support of a long-considered 
Horns-Baghdad railway, a proposal (subsequently with- 
drawn) for a Congo-Cameroon railway, offers to adjust cer- 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 315 

tain customs difficulties of which German exporters had long 
complained — anything, in short, except the real issue — 
Morocco. That France was most unwilling to discuss, 
yet that was unmistakably the German goal. From the 
beginning of April the German press, irrespective of party, 
supported the thesis that a partition of Morocco was im- 
minent; that Germany must have her share. Agadir was 
mentioned by the Berliner Tageblatt. Herr von Kiderlen 
spoke to M. Cambon of Mogador. On 12 June, at the 
Grunewald races, the ambassador was invited to the im- 
perial box; there he encountered the Crown Prince, who 
referred to Morocco as u un joli morceau" adding, "Give 
us our share and all will be well." Clearly, then, it was 
wise "to go to Kissingen and see Kiderlen," as the chan- 
cellor advised. 

The interview at Kissingen between M. Cambon and 
Herr von Kiderlen — who had retired thither partly for his 
annual cure, partly to escape the unwelcome overtures of 
M. Cruppi — occurred on 22 June, 191 1. It partook not a 
little of high comedy. The ambassador wished to "pene- 
trate the intentions of Germany"; if, as he feared, she was 
intent on a partition of Morocco, then "France must pay 
her," for, as he told the secretary, France would never dis- 
cuss a partition of Morocco. Yet he was unwilling to ad- 
mit this. He therefore tried to narrow the discussion to 
the convention of 1909, which Herr von Kiderlen promptly 
dismissed as a vain effort at "plastering up" (repldtrage). 
Brought to bay, the ambassador suggested "looking else- 
where"; but he hastened to add that this was a "new 
idea," and he would have to consult people in Paris, whither 
he was bound. "Bring back something with you," con- 
cluded Kiderlen. The ambassador was satisfied that Ger- 
many intended to reopen the whole question, but he made 
no definite offer of "compensations." Before he could 
"take something back" to Berlin, the Monis cabinet gave 



316 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

place to that of M. Caillaux,. and M. de Selves became 
foreign minister. Also, on i July, the German ambassador 
announced the arrival of the Panther at Agadir. 

The French bluff had failed. The Republic might have 
taken its stand on the Act of Algeciras, and have given 
guarantees that the occupation of Fez would be temporary; 
it did pretend to do so, but it did not convince Germany 
that a protectorate was not the ultimate goal of its policy. 
In the known temper of the Wilhelmstrasse, it would have 
been wiser to open negotiations as soon as the expedition 
to Fez was launched, and to learn what price Germany 
demanded. As it was, by waiting until the Panther ap- 
peared on the scene, the French Government added mate- 
rially to the difficulties of an amicable settlement, for it 
had to negotiate under pressure, and it had to "pay" 
dearly for the withdrawal of the insignificant man-of-war. 
At the same time, the cavalier action of Germany preju- 
diced the rest of Europe against her. A sorry business, 
from first to last. 

A new situation, then, had arisen in Morocco. The 
vital point in the controversy which followed was the in- 
tention of Germany. Was she bent on a partition of the 
Shereefian Empire in which she should have a part ? Was 
she merely seeking "compensation" from France in re- 
turn for a French protectorate ? Or did she still cherish the 
design of destroying the Triple Entente, which was the 
essential preliminary of a campaign against England? 
Did she propose to "square her account with France," as 
General von Bernhardi advised a little later? Upon the 
answer to these questions depends any judgment of British 
policy in its relation to Germany. Unfortunately the evi- 
dence is not such as to warrant any positive conclusion, 
but such evidence as there is suggests that Germany did 
not desire a simple transaction of payment for a French 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 317 

protectorate in Morocco. Yet that was the ultimate goal 
of French policy, however much concealed by the Act of 
Algeciras and the hesitations of the five years following. 
And by the agreement of 8 April, 1904, Great Britain was 
pledged to support France in the execution of her policy. 
The engagement may have been unwise or immoral; it 
existed, and in all probability the German Government 
was aware of it. A crisis was inevitable. 

On 1 July, at midday, the German ambassadors pre- 
sented to the Powers the following communication: 

"Some German firms established in the south of Morocco, no- 
tably at Agadir and in the vicinity, have been alarmed by a certain 
ferment which has shown itself among the local tribes, due it seems 
to the recent occurrences in other parts of the country. These 
firms have applied to the imperial government for protection for the 
lives of their employees and their property. At their request the 
imperial government has decided to send a war-ship to the port 
of Agadir, to lend help and assistance, in case of need, to its sub- 
jects and employees, as well as to protect the important German in- 
terests in the territory in question. As soon as the state of affairs 
in Morocco has resumed its former quiet aspect the ship charged 
with this protective mission will leave the port of Agadir." 

This demonstration was as legitimate as the French expedi- 
tion to Fez, or the Spanish occupation of Larache and 
El-Kasar. It was not a valid objection, raised in some 
quarters, that under the Act of Algeciras Agadir was a 
closed port, for, as the German ambassadors said in several 
capitals, the Act of Algeciras had lost all force. Expediency 
must prevail, and Germany was the sole judge of her own 
interests. 

But why should Agadir be selected for a display of force 
which was sure to arouse suspicions? To lend help and 
assistance, in case of need, to German subjects and employees, 
said the official notification. It is pretty clearly established 
that there were no Germans in Agadir, and that there was 



318 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

no unrest in the region. To protect the important German 
interests in the territory in question. What interests? 
None existed at the moment: the words must refer to the 
future, a significant deduction. Nor would a closed port 
have been chosen without some definite purpose. The best 
answer is supplied by the statement of the editor of the 
Rhenisch-Westfalische Zeitung on 19 January, 191 2, in a 
suit for libel against the Grenzboten. 



"Herr Class, the president of the Pan-German League, is pre- 
pared to state upon oath before this court that the secretary of 
state for foreign affairs, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, writing to 
him from Kissingen, requested Herr Class to meet him at the Hotel 
Pfalzer Hof in Mannheim. During the interview, which lasted 
several hours, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter stated: 'The Pan- 
German demand for Morocco is absolutely justified. You can rely 
upon it that the government will stick to Morocco. M. Cambon 
is wriggling before me like a worm. The German Government is 
in a splendid position. You can rely upon me, and you will be very 
pleased with our Morocco policy. I am as good a Pan-German as 
you are.' 

"On 1 July Herr Class called at the German foreign office 
and, failing to find Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, was received by 
Herr Zimmermann, the under-secretary. Herr Zimmermann told 
him: 'You come at a historic hour. To-day the Panther appears 
before Agadir and at this very moment (12 o'clock midday). The 
foreign cabinets are being informed of its mission. The German 
Government has sent two agents- provocateurs to Agadir, and these 
have done their duty very well. German firms have been induced 
to make complaints and to call upon the government in Berlin for 
protection. It is the government's intention to seize the district, 
and it will not give it up again. The German people absolutely 
require a settlement colony. Please prevent, wherever in the press 
you have influence, the raising of claims for compensation elsewhere. 
Possibly France will offer us the Congo. However, the German 
Government does not want compensation elsewhere, but a part of 
Morocco.' " l 

1 Quoted by J. Ellis Barker, "Anglo-German Relations and Sir Edward Grey," 
Fortnightly Review, March, 191 2. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 319 

The authenticity of these interviews was never denied. 
And it is significant that shortly afterward Herr Class 
published his brochure West-Marokko Deutsch!, in which 
he demanded for Germany western Morocco from above 
Rabat to Cape Juby. M. Georges Bourdon, who inter- 
viewed Herr von Kiderlen at length in the summer of 191 2, 
says that he "wished for Agadir, and he wished it in the 
teeth of everything." 1 The British Government, as will be 
noted presently, suspected this to be the German design, 
and early manifested its uneasiness. Yet it was not until 
24 July that the ambassador in London gave Sir Edward 
Grey the positive assurance that no acquisition of territory 
in Morocco was intended. In the absence of such ambi- 
tions, why this delay in reassuring Great Britain? Does it 
not look as if the German Government, having learned that 
Great Britain would oppose a German acquisition in Mo- 
rocco, was counting the cost, and finally decided to capitu- 
late ? The course of the negotiations with France confirms 
this view. There is, accordingly, good reason for believing 
that at the opening of the crisis Germany aimed at a parti- 
tion of Morocco, and was prepared to claim its share. If 
the German press reflected the sentiments of the foreign 
office, there can be no doubt of it. 

On the other hand, the German ambassador told M. de 
Selves, the French foreign minister, on 7 July that Ger- 
many had no territorial aspirations in Morocco and would 
be content with compensation in the Congo. M. de Selves 
subsequently stated to a commission of the French Sen- 
ate that from the first the German Government had 
said: "Take Morocco, establish therein your protectorate." 
On this basis — a French protectorate in return for cessions 
in the Congo — an agreement was soon reached in principle 
between the Quai d'Orsay and the Wilhelmstrasse. Why, 
then, any question of Morocco ? First, because in the nego- 

1 The German Enigma, p. 18. 



r 



320 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

tiations which followed, the Germans showed every dispo- 
sition to limit the scope of the French protectorate, and to 
seek for themselves especial economic privileges. Second, 
the price asked by Germany was originally so large that 
France would pay it only under duress. As presented to 
M. Jules Cambon oil 15 July, the German terms included 
the whole of the French Congo from the river Sangha to 
the sea, Germany offering, as a sop, to cede Togoland; 
later France was requested to transfer her right of pre- 
emption to the Belgian Congo to Germany. In other 
words, France was to surrender a large territory in exchange 
for an ill-defined position in Morocco. France rejected 
the German scheme of compensation. Might not the nego- 
tiations fail? If so, the question would be thrown back 
upon Morocco. The French certainly feared that this 
might be the case — that it was even the German design. 
And, unfortunately for them and for Europe, M. de Selves, 
while an excellent administrative official (he had been pre- 
fect of the Seine), was inexperienced in the ways of diplo- 
macy, and seemed unable to make the negotiations take 
positive form. Throughout the month of July, therefore, 
complete uncertainty reigned as to the result of the nego- 
tiations. It was this which prompted the intervention of 
Great Britain. 

In notifying the British Government of the despatch of 
the Panther Count Wolff-Metternich, the German am- 
bassador in London, had let it be understood that Ger- 
many desired a direct negotiation with France, which 
Sir Edward Grey took to mean "a definite' solution of the 
Moroccan question." l On 3 July Count Metternich was 
informed that, in the view of the British Government, 



1 The narrative which follows is based on the speeches of Herr von Kiderlen- 
Waechter to the budget committee of the Reichstag, 17 November, 1911, and of 
Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, 27 November, 1911. The context will 
indicate from which speech the various quotations are taken. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 321 

"the situation was serious and important," and on the fol- 
lowing day, after a meeting of the cabinet: 

"Our attitude could not be a disinterested one with regard to 
Morocco. We must take into consideration our treaty obligations 
to France and our own interests in Morocco. We were of opinion 
that a new situation had been created by the despatch of a German 
ship to Agadir. Future developments might affect British inter- 
ests more directly than they had hitherto been affected, and there- 
fore we could not recognize any new arrangements that might be 
come to without us." 



The position here taken was explained by Sir Edward Grey, 
speaking in Parliament on 27 November, 191 1, in these 
words : 

"I think in the German mind it has sometimes been assumed that 
our agreement made with France in 1904 entirely disinterested us 
with regard to Morocco, and, if Germany wished to make a new set- 
tlement with regard to Morocco, it was going out of our way and 
intrusive for us — having given, by our agreement of 1904, a free 
hand to France in Morocco as far as we are concerned — to interfere 
with any other Power wishing to make her own arrangements. . . . 

"It is quite true we disinterested ourselves in Morocco politically, 
but we did it on conditions laid down both strategic and economic. 
What were the reasons of our being disinterested in Morocco? 
We have no jealousy of other Powers. It is obvious, if the Moroccan 
question was to be reopened, and a new settlement made, unless 
we were consulted, unless we knew what was going on, unless we 
were in some way parties to the settlement, the strategic and eco- 
nomic conditions stipulated for between ourselves, France, and 
Spain in 1904 might be upset." 

This attitude was entirely 'defensive, for Sir Edward, after 
consulting the cabinet, declined to fall in with a French 
proposal that French and British cruisers should be sent 
to Agadir as company for the Panther. In Parliament 
(6 July), however, Mr. Asquith announced that "a new 



322 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

situation had arisen" which was engaging the "serious at- 
tention" of the government. 1 

A silence of eight days ensued. "On 12 July the British 
ambassador in Berlin had occasion to see the German for- 
eign secretary on some minor matters, and took the oppor- 
tunity to say that there had been at one time mention of 
a conversation a trots between Germany, France, and Spain, 
the inference being that we were to be excluded from it. 
The German foreign secretary told our ambassador to in- 
form us that there had never been any such idea." Ac- 
cording to the German version, "the ambassador received 
a reply on the same day, as an official statement of the 
German Government, that such an intention had never 
existed." "Except for this negative communication" 
Great Britain "had no further information from the Ger- 
man Government of their views." 

Sir Edward Grey evidently meant that this "negative 
communication" did not exclude a conversation a deux 
between Germany and France, which was not impossible 
in view of the tension between France and Spain result- 
ing from the Spanish occupation of Larache and El-Kasar. 
None the less, he made no effort to sound the German 
Government further until 21 July. His reasons for in- 
tervening on that date can best be told in his own words: 

"It appeared in the press, and indeed it was the case, that the 
German Government had made demands with regard to the French 
Congo of an extent to which it was obvious to everybody who 
thought of it that neither the French Government nor the French 
Chamber could agree. If Germany was going to negotiate with 
France an agreement by which Germany received from France 
something in the French Congo and left France in Morocco, as she 
was under our agreement of 1904, then, of course, we were prepared 
to stand aside and not to intrude. If, however, Germany, starting 
negotiations with France on that basis, made demands, not for a 
portion but for the greater part of the French Congo, or anything 

1 s Hansard xxvii, c. 1341. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 323 

of that kind, it was quite clear that France must refuse those de- 
mands, the negotiations would be thrown back on some other basis, 
and the question of the possible partition would arise again. That 
is why I became anxious. I therefore asked the German ambassador 
to come to see me again." 

The French had refused the German demands. Suppose 
a deadlock were the result, and in such a case a conference, 
which it was Sir Edward's intention to propose, was not 
found practicable. 

"Then you would have had this situation: You would have had 
France, Germany, and Spain in occupation of parts of Morocco; 
a German ship at Agadir, because, of course, the German ship could 
not leave Agadir with negotiations unsettled; you would have had, 
at any rate at the beginning, a partition of Morocco without agree- 
ment between the three parties, France, Germany, and Spain, who 
were in occupation of different parts of Morocco; you would have 
had us no party to the negotiations at that time; and you would 
have had on record the statement made publicly by the prime 
minister and the statement made to the German Government on 
4 July, that we could not recognize any settlement come to unless 
we were consulted. You had at any rate the prospect, if negotia- 
tions broke down, of a very strained diplomatic situation." 

In other words, Great Britain was not sure of the inten- 
tions of Germany. 

"The German foreign secretary . . . has stated that the inten- 
tion of taking a part of Morocco had never existed in Germany, 
as he stated distinctly at the time to a well-known Pan-German. 
Unfortunately, the gentleman in question did not believe it. If, 
after we had made the cabinet statement to the German ambas- 
sador on 4 July, that intention had been confided to us as definitely 
as that, I think a good deal of misunderstanding might have been 
avoided." 

This language explains in clear-cut fashion why Sir 
Edward Grey had hitherto not sought a definite statement 
as to German policy, as he was later criticised for not doing. 



324 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

If France and Germany could reach a friendly agreement, 
England had no title to interfere, for her interests in Mo- 
rocco were secured under the convention of April, 1904. 
But if Germany were aiming to impose on France condi- 
tions which in themselves, or as a result thereof, would prac- 
tically nullify the entente cordiale — and it is abundantly 
clear that Sir Edward Grey was haunted by this fear — then 
both her interest and her obligation to France required 
Great Britain to intervene. In subsequent discussions of 
the crisis, Sir Edward was blamed for not requiring France 
to live up to the Act of Algeciras, but such criticism ignores 
the express German declaration that the act no longer 
applied to the situation. The question, in short, was: 
Should England stand aside and allow Germany to extort 
from France such concessions as her superior military 
strength would permit her to dictate? Was the entente 
a mere settlement of ancient quarrels, or was it a co-opera- 
tion of France and England to resist excessive pressure 
from a third Power? 

Lord Lansdowne had concluded the entente in 1904 with 
the former end in view: the force of circumstances had 
caused it to approach what was practically a defensive 
alliance. If Germany was a peace-loving Power, intent 
only on its own rights, then British intervention in the dis- 
pute with France was a gratuitous affront and could be 
explained only by the desire to block the expansion of Ger- 
many at every turn. But if the main thesis of this book 
is . sound, if Germany was a kind of Dick Turpin (the 
phrase was the Times'), 1 then a far-sighted statesmanship 
could give only one answer to the problem before Sir Ed- 
ward Grey. Britain must take her place by France so long 
as the latter was willing to negotiate a reasonable settle- 
ment with Germany. But her policy was in no way ag- 
gressive: she insisted only that France must act as a free 

1 22 July, 1911. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 325 

agent, and that if the settlement affected British inter- 
ests England must be consulted. History may record 
that Sir Edward Grey committed an error of judgment, 
that he should have allowed Germany a free hand and, by 
helping her secure a "place in the sun" — at the expense 
of another Power — have laid the foundations of an under- 
standing with Britain's great rival. But, as he remarked: 
"One does not make new friendships worth having by 
deserting the old ones." He could not foresee the future, he 
had to be guided by the events of the past ten years, and 
he could not await the indefinite development of an obscure 
situation. 

In his interview on 21 July Sir Edward Grey reminded 
Count Wolff-Metternich that Great Britain was "taking 
in the Moroccan question the interest which had been in- 
dicated by the statement of the 4th." Developing his 
fears as to a collapse of the negotiations between Germany 
and France, he pointed out that "the Germans were in the 
closed port of Agadir; that, according to native rumors, 
they were landing and negotiating with the tribe, so that 
for all we knew they might be acquiring concessions there, 
and that it might even be that the German flag had been 
hoisted at Agadir, which was the most suitable port on 
that coast for a naval base. . . . The longer the Germans 
remained at Agadir, the greater the risk of their develop- 
ing a state of affairs which would make it more difficult 
for them to withdraw and more necessary for us to take 
some steps to protect British interests." He wished to 
say this now, "in the hope that the negotiations with France 
would succeed," for, if he did not, "it would cause resent- 
ment later on if the German Government had been led to 
suppose . . . that England did not take an interest in the 
matter." 

"The German ambassador was not in a position to give 
any information" — this nearly three weeks after Sir Edward 



326 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Grey had indicated his uneasiness. The equivocal nature 
of Count Wolff-Metternich's reply can be gauged from the 
German version of the interview. 

"He could not admit that the demands [upon France] were un- 
acceptable, as otherwise Germany would not have put them for- 
ward. Sir Edward Grey had stated, though not officially, that 
as British interests were involved, the time had now come for nego- 
tiations a trois and he had based this pretension on the idea that 
Germany might eventually establish a naval base in Agadir and 
cut off the hinterland. These were suppositions of which the am- 
bassador had no knowledge, and on mere suppositions no claim 
could be founded. Should, however, British interests have been 
injured by the German proceedings, perhaps the minister would be 
so good as to name them. As he was not in a position to do so, it 
would be more correct to wait until he could show that an Eng- 
lish interest or right was affected. The ambassador repeated that 
Germany had not the slightest intention of injuring English rights 
or interests. He could not admit that this had been done by the 
despatch of a war-ship to Agadir. He had communicated to the 
minister the object and intention of this act when he made his first 
statement to him on the subject, namely, the protection of the in- 
terests of German subjects by the presence of a war-ship until peace 
and quiet were restored. Hitherto it had been a generally recog- 
nized principle that a European nation is justified in personally 
undertaking the protection of its interests in a semibarbaric coun- 
try which does not belong to a third party. No third Power was 
bound by the Anglo-French convention of 1904. Since this con- 
vention Germany was bound only by the Algeciras Act and one 
treaty with France of 1909. Both the act and convention assumed 
as a condition for everything else the independence of the Sultan 
and the integrity of Morocco. After the lasting occupation of the 
Shawia and after the recent French expedition of conquest in a 
great part of Morocco, no one could seriously maintain that the 
territory had not been violated and that its Sultan was still inde- 
pendent. Germany had made no complaint on this score, as had 
been stated in the first conversation. Owing to the course events 
had taken, however, the moment had arrived when Germany was 
compelled to come to an understanding with France on the Moroc- 
can question. Germany had now undertaken this step. If, as 
Sir Edward Grey assumed, German proposals in other directions 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 327 

were considered unacceptable, this merely showed that France ap- 
peared to attach less importance than might have been expected 
to a free exercise of those pretensions of hers in Morocco which had 
not obtained international recognition. 

"A glance at the map would show that a North African colonial 
Empire, extending from the Tripolitan frontier to the Senegambia, 
together with supremacy in Morocco, was no small thing. England 
had obtained compensation from France in Egypt, which was no 
small thing; Germany, however, had obtained nothing. If France 
desired that Germany, like England — but always subject to the 
protection of our commercial interests — step into the background 
in Morocco, she must offer some compensation approximately 
equivalent in value to the great goal she had in view. If not, 
Germany would know how to safeguard her independent position 
in Morocco. The minister appeared to attach great importance 
to the fact that Germany had despatched a war-ship to a closed 
port of Morocco, and that this port should have been Agadir, the 
appearance at which of a French war-ship last autumn had led us 
to address an inquiry to the French Government. To this the am- 
bassador had to observe that last autumn the French expedition 
of conquest (Eroberungszug) had not yet been decided upon. He 
could not conceal from the minister that he seemed to be applying 
two standards — one standard for France and another for Germany. 
According to his conception, a situation had arisen by the despatch 
of a German war-ship to Agadir, which, looked at from the stand- 
point of English interests, demanded an explanation. If he attached 
so much importance to the inviolability of Moroccan territory, he 
should apply first and foremost to France for explanations. The 
occupation of the Shawia territory, the fact that a French army 
was spreading itself over the interior of Morocco meant, undoubt- 
edly, a more active intervention in Moroccan affairs than the Ger- 
man action, so far as it went." 



The ambassador's inability or unwillingness to appreciate 
the frankness of Sir Edward Grey, always a barrier to con- 
fidence between the two men, is evident. He gave a rea- 
soned statement of Germany's grounds for reopening the 
Moroccan question, to which Sir Edward Grey raised no 
objection, and which was, indeed, sound enough; but he 
did not answer the questions put to him by the British 



328 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

foreign secretary, and his attitude was far from con- 
ciliatory. Sir Edward's reply, according to the German 
version, was sufficiently explicit. 

"The minister [Grey] replied that he would in no wise stand in 
the way of an extension of German colonial possessions in the heart 
of Africa; he could not, however, shut his eyes to the fact that 
English interests might be most seriously affected by the Moroccan 
question itself. He had, therefore, honestly hoped for an under- 
standing between France and Germany. It was only in the un- 
wished-for possibility of the failure to arrive at such an under- 
standing that he was compelled forthwith to make it clear that the 
demarche in Agadir would lead to an exchange of views between 
Germany and England. He considered that the situation would 
become less acute if an exchange of views took place before fresh 
events occurred at Agadir, which would compel England to take 
up a definite attitude in regard thereto. He had always hoped 
for an understanding between Germany and France on Moroccan 
questions, and had, therefore, also welcomed the agreement of 
1909." 

The justice of the British position was recognized by 
the German Government itself. Realizing, if tardily, that 
Great Britain would not sanction a German establishment 
in Agadir, Herr von Kiderlen, immediately on receipt of 
Count Wolff-Metternich's report of the interview, tele- 
graphed the desired assurances. 

" Not a man had as yet been landed. . . . Germany had never 
thought of procuring a naval harbor on the coast of Morocco, nor 
would ever think of such a thing. She also had no design on Mo- 
roccan territory, though she had to insist that France should either 
observe strictly the Algeciras Act, or, if she thought she could not 
do so, come to an understanding with Germany." 

This information was conveyed to Sir Edward Grey on 
24 July, but Sir Edward was refused permission to in- 
form Parliament that not a man had been landed, pend- 
ing instructions from Berlin to the ambassador. Some 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 329 

critics of Sir Edward Grey's policy have argued that he 
ought not to have objected to a German naval base at 
Agadir. Only the expenditure of much money could have 
made it a suitable base, and the result would have been to 
divide the naval energies of Germany. All depends on 
the view taken of the German navy, and as that question 
has already been discussed, no repetition here seems neces- 
sary of the reasons why England was justified in opposing 
an extension of German naval power to the western At- 
lantic and the Mediterranean. In all probability the ten- 
sion between England and Germany over the matter would 
have been ended by the German communication of 24 
July but for the speech delivered by Mr. Lloyd George, 
the chancellor of the exchequer, on 21 July. 

British public opinion had followed the Agadir crisis 
from the beginning with great anxiety, for the very reasons 
given later by Sir Edward Grey to Parliament. On 20 
July the Times published an account of the German terms, 
although the negotiations were supposed to be carried on 
in secret. The worst was at once feared, the Times adopt- 
ing an intransigent tone which Sir Edward Grey was care- 
ful to avoid in his interview with the German ambassador. 
The foreign secretary felt that some public statement was 
desirable, and Mr. Lloyd George, who was scheduled to 
speak before the Bankers' Association on 21 July, was com- 
missioned by Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey to give 
assurances that British interests would be guarded, for it 
was known that Germany desired a direct transaction with 
France. To a conference of financiers, Mr. Lloyd George 
not unnaturally spoke of the blessings of peace, but he 
added : 

"But I am also bound to say this — that I believe it is essential 
in the highest interests, not merely of this country but of the world, 
that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her pres- 
tige amongst the Great Powers of the world. Her potent influence 



330 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

has been many a time in the past, and may yet be in the future, 
invaluable to the cause of human liberty. It has more than once 
in the past redeemed Continental nations, who are sometimes too 
apt to forget that service, from overwhelming disaster and even 
from international extinction. I would make great sacrifices to 
preserve peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturb- 
ance of international good will except questions of the gravest 
national moment. /But if a situation were to be forced upon us 
in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the 
great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of 
heroism and achievement — by allowing Britain to be treated, where 
her interests are vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the 
cabinet of nations — then I say emphatically that peace at that price 
would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to 
endure. National honor is no party question. The security of 
our great international trade is no party question; the peace of the 
world is much more likely to be secured if all nations realize fairly 
what the conditions of peace must be. And it is because I have the 
conviction that nations are beginning to understand each other 
better, to appreciate one another's point of view more thoroughly, 
to be more ready to discuss calmly and dispassionately their differ- 
ences, that I feel assured that nothing will happen between now 
and next year which will render it difficult for the chancellor of the 
exchequer in this place to respond to the toast proposed — of the con- 
tinued prosperity of the public peace." 

According to Sir Edward Grey, the speech was made 
"in quite general terms." The chancellor of the exchequer 
"claimed no pre-eminence, no predominance, for England 
in international affairs. It contained no menace, such as 
the saying of ' Hands off ! ' to any one anywhere. It did 
not say that there was any particular demand or claim on 
the part of Germany that was inconsistent with British 
interests. Its purport and its point was that where Brit- 
ish interests were affected we must not be treated as if 
we were of no account. If the time ever comes when this 
cannot be said by a minister speaking in the position the 
chancellor of the exchequer was in then, we shall have 
ceased to exist as a great nation." Nevertheless, the re- 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 331 

marks of Mr. Lloyd George were everywhere construed 
as a warning ad hoc to Germany, and were responsible 
for a more serious tension between England and Ger- 
many than had existed hitherto. There was, apparently, 
no truth in certain rumors then current that the speech 
was intended as a protest against Germany's having left 
a British despatch unanswered for more than two weeks, 
for, according to Sir Edward Grey himself, he had ad- 
dressed no despatches to Germany, and Herr von Kider- 
len explicitly denied that such a breach had occurred. 
But it was regrettable that, at a moment when the German 
Government had been officially asked for a statement of 
its policy, but before a reply could be received, a new ele- 
ment should have been introduced into the discussion. 
The comment of the German Government was quite perti- 
nent. 

"If the English Government," Herr von Kiderlen instructed 
Count Wolff-Metternich to say to Sir Edward Grey, "had intended 
to complicate the political situation and to bring about a violent 
explosion, it could certainly have chosen no better means than 
the speech of the chancellor of the exchequer, which took into so 
little account for us the dignity and position of a Great Power 
which was claimed by him for England." The speech "had given 
rise to violent attacks against Germany on the part of a large por- 
tion of the English press and the whole of the French press. It 
might remain an open question as to how far the British minister 
had intended to produce this effect. The British Government 
could not, in any case, fail to perceive that this effect of a speech 
delivered by one of its ministers was bound to produce a bad im- 
pression in Germany." 

Sir Edward Grey's sincere desire to promote a Franco- 
German understanding cannot be doubted, but the Lloyd 
George speech was a blunder. 

For on 25 July the German ambassador made to Sir Ed- 
ward Grey a communication "exceedingly stiff in tone," to 



332 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

the effect that, "in view of the speech of the chancellor of 
the exchequer," the German Government could not consent 
that the assurances as to Morocco, given the day before, 
should be used in Parliament. Sir Edward replied that, 
"as the speech of the chancellor of the exchequer seemed to 
[him] to give no cause for complaint, the fact that it had 
created surprise in Germany was in itself a justification of 
the speech, for it could not have created surprise unless 
there had been some tendency to think that England might 
be disregarded." Thus the real issue — Agadir, which had 
been adjusted — was converted into an affair of prestige, a 
most dangerous stage at any time, and particularly so in 
view of the inflamed state of public sentiment on both sides 
of the North Sea. 

Herr von Kiderlen : It was not possible for us to comply with the 
request made in the meantime by the British minister that we 
should authorize him to make use in Parliament of our notification 
that we had no designs on Moroccan territory. This would have 
made it appear as if the explanation had been given as a result 
of Mr. Lloyd George's speech. 

Sir Edward Grey : The German Government had said that it 
was not consistent with their dignity, after the speech of the chan- 
cellor of the exchequer, to give explanations as to what was taking 
place at Agadir. I said to the ambassador that the tone of their 
communication made it inconsistent with our dignity to give ex- 
planations as to the speech of the chancellor of the exchequer. 

The two days from 25 July to 27 July were very difficult, 
although Sir Edward Grey had reiterated his desire for a 
Franco- German settlement. For Sir Edward "sounded 
the German Government as to whether a proposal for a 
conference would be acceptable if negotiations reached a 
deadlock, and the reply . . . , though not absolutely con- 
clusive, pointed to the fact that a proposal for a conference 
might not be acceptable." For this reason, doubtless, the 
British Government stopped shore leave from the fleet, 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 333 

which was ordered to Portsmouth, and took other military 
precautions. The responsibility for this dangerous situa- 
tion rested with both governments, as the narrative of 
events clearly establishes, for if Germany had shown her- 
self unduly reticent, Great Britain had taken too little 
account of German susceptibility. The Germans probably 
expected the constitutional crisis to keep England quiet; 
the English were too anxious to present a united front in 
the face of an international difficulty. 

Suddenly the atmosphere cleared, supposedly because 
Germany perceived that Great Britain would support 
France at all costs. On 27 July Count WolfT-Metternich 
made another communication, which Sir Edward Grey 
described as "exceedingly friendly." The German Gov- 
ernment, appealing to the "minister's great loyalty," re- 
quested him to state in Parliament that the German pour- 
parlers with France did not touch British interests. Owing 
to the pledge of secrecy, no details could be vouchsafed, 
even to Sir Edward Grey, but the territories to be exchanged 
were exclusively German and French— that is, Morocco 
was not involved. "Adverse criticisms from the English 
side must obviously render the negotiations more difficult. 
On the other hand, a public statement that England would 
be pleased to see a successful conclusion of the Franco- 
German pourparlers would have a most beneficial influence 
on an auspicious result for which Germany most earnestly 
hopes." The ambassador and the secretary easily agreed 
that "the new German communication might be taken as 
a new point of departure, and that [they] need not go back 
on things which might lead to mutual recrimination." 

On the afternoon of the same day Mr. Asquith made 
the following statement in Parliament: 



"Conversations are proceeding between France and Germany; 
we are not a party to those conversations; the subject-matter of 



334 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

them may not affect British interests. On that point, until we 
know the ultimate result, we cannot express a final opinion. But it 
is our desire that those conversations should issue in a settlement 
honorable and satisfactory to both the parties and of which His 
Majesty's Government can cordially say that it in no way preju- 
dices British interests. We believe that to be possible. We ear- 
nestly and sincerely desire to see it accomplished. The question of 
Morocco itself bristles with difficulties, but outside Morocco, in 
other parts of West Africa, we should not think of attempting to 
interfere with territorial arrangements considered reasonable by 
those who are more directly interested. Any statements that we 
have interfered to prejudice negotiations between France and 
Germany are mischievous inventions without the faintest founda- 
tion in fact. But we have thought it right from the beginning to 
make quite clear that, failing such a settlement as I have indicated, 
we must become an active party in discussion of the situation. 
That would be our right as a signatory of the treaty of Algeciras; 
it might be our obligation under the terms of our agreement of 1904 
with France; it might be our duty in defense of British interests 
directly affected by further developments." 1 

This statement was well received in Germany, and, accord- 
ing to Sir Edward Grey, "from that date onward there 
were no further difficulties between the German Govern- 
ment and ourselves about the Morocco negotiations." 

Those negotiations may be briefly summarized. On 2 
August, after several changes of front on both sides, it was 
agreed that France, without surrendering any of the coast- 
line, should afford Germany access to both the Congo and 
the Ubangi Rivers. But no progress was made. On 13 
August the French Government was alarmed by the report 
that the German general staff was studying a plan to land 
troops in Morocco, and on the 16th the French foreign 
minister and the German ambassador in Paris were agreed 
that the situation was "grave." Two days later the nego- 
tiations were suspended in Berlin, Herr von Kiderlen going 
off to see the Emperor, M. Jules Cambon returning to 

1 5 Hansard xxviii, cc. 1827-28. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 335 

Paris for further instructions. The rupture was probably 
not unconnected with the strike of the railway servants 
in England, for as soon as the strike was settled a more 
hopeful view of the situation was taken. It is certain 
that the intervention of the British Government in the 
railway dispute (15-23 August) was prompted largely by 
the fear of renewed international complications, due to the 
revival by Herr von Kiderlen of certain pretensions with 
respect to Morocco. 

M. Jules Cambon returned to Berlin at the end of August, 
and on 4 September reopened his "conversations" with the 
German foreign secretary. He was instructed first of all 
to secure a definite agreement on the subject of Morocco; 
then, and then only, was he to treat of compensation in 
the Congo. The only serious difficulty arose in the second 
week, when Herr von Kiderlen proposed to revive the eco- 
nomic condominium embodied in the convention of 1909, 
which, with certain political privileges to be accorded to 
Germans, would have seriously hampered the protectorate 
that Germany had accepted in theory. Saturday, 9 Sep- 
tember, witnessed a great crash on the Berlin bourse. 
Various rumors began to circulate, and the situation was 
not without danger. 

It is known that coal was shipped across England in 
large quantities for the use of the navy. Later it was al- 
leged that the German fleet, then in Norwegian waters, 
was watched by British destroyers, and that the British 
fleet, at Cromarty Firth, was cleared for action. Still 
another story was that an Anglo-French military co-opera- 
tion had been worked out, and that the admiralty had 
refused to guarantee the transport of the British ex- 
peditionary force because the battle squadrons were not 
concentrated. 1 It was also at this time, perhaps, that the 
German Government gave a prehminary warning to men 

1 Annual Register, 191 1, passim. 



336 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

and officers of the reserve; * certainly the press of the 
United States was rilled with reports of the readiness of 
the German armies for any eventuality. But, in the ab- 
sence of authentic information, it would be dangerous to 
say that a rupture was imminent. Fortunately, good 
sense prevailed. On 4 October the two negotiators in- 
itialed the convention which gave France a protectorate 
de facto in Morocco, although the term protectorate was 
not used; in return, she pledged herself most explicitly 
to observe the principle of the open door in letter and in 
spirit. With the assistance of Great Britain, the goal of 
French colonial policy had been won at last. 

The Congo negotiations lasted from 15 October to 2 
November. They resulted in the curious solution by 
which Germany received two prongs of French territory 
that brought the Cameroons in touch with the Congo and 
the Ubangi at Bonga and Mongumba respectively, surren- 
dering in exchange part of the Duck's Beak in the Chad 
region. The outbreak of the Tripolitan War between It- 
aly and Turkey hastened the agreement, for Germany re- 
quired all her energy to conserve her position in Turkey, 
now the victim of attack from Germany's ally. The only 
difficulty arose over the German demand that France 
transfer to Germany her right of pre-emption to the Bel- 
gian Congo, but with the assistance of Russia a formula 
was found by which any change in the status of the Congo 
was reserved to the decision of the Powers signatory to 
the Berlin African Act of 1885. Sir Edward Grey stated 
that Great Britain did not interfere in these negotiations, 
and it may safely be said that no one was more pleased 
by the signature of the Moroccan and Congo conventions 
on 4 November, 1911. 

The settlement was a great triumph for France, which 
was all the more notable for the fact that since 1870 her 

1 M. Jules Cambon to M. Pichon, 6 May, 1913, no. 3 in French Yellow Book (1914). 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 337 

relations with Germany had usually found her in the posi- 
tion of suppliant. Now, as a result of the unqualified 
manifestations of national unity and determination and 
with the assistance of British diplomacy, the Republic 
had debated with Germany as an equal. More than that, 
it had driven an exceedingly profitable bargain. By sur- 
rendering certain lands in the heart of Africa, the loss of 
which might be resented for reasons of sentiment, it had 
secured control of the most desirable region of the globe 
not already in the possession of a European nation. The 
price paid to Germany for a definitive solution of the Mo- 
roccan question was not excessive; it was scarcely greater 
than the concessions made to England, Italy, and Spain. 
France, then, had scored, and scored heavily. 

Nowhere was this better understood than in Germany. 
When the treaties of 4 November were made public, a 
chorus of indignation swept over the fatherland. A few 

• leagues of marsh land in Africa were a poor compensation 
for a prolonged international crisis, the renunciation of all 
ambitions in Morocco, and the open hostility of England. 
The discontent was aggravated by the resignation of the 
colonial secretary, Herr von Lindequist, who declined to 
defend the treaties before the Reichstag, and by the lack 
*of precise information as to the course of events. But one 

/ thing seemed certain: the intervention of England, proved 
f by the Lloyd George speech, had compelled Germany to 
/ grant France better terms than she deserved. Probably 
few could have quoted or had ever read the exact words 
of Mr. Lloyd George; but, as was reported to Sir Edward 
Grey, "what was objected to was not the speech itself, 
but the fact that it had been made at a moment when 
France and Germany were coming to terms and that it 
upset the negotiations." All over Germany, even in circles 
hitherto friendly to England, a bitter feeling of hostility 
began to manifest itself, and the task of the chancellor, 



338 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

when he rose in the Reichstag on 9 November to justify 
the treaties, was, indeed, a difficult one. 

The position taken by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg was 
entirely accurate. He pointed out that Germany had 
obtained "a considerable increase of its colonial domain" 
without giving up anything in Morocco that had not al- 
ready been surrendered; that "an important dispute with 
France had been settled peacefully." Declaring that by 
substituting "Germany" for "England" right through 
the Lloyd George speech, a German statesman might have 
made that speech with equal propriety, he denied that as 
a result of Mr. Lloyd George's utterance, Germany had 
"retreated before England." His only criticism was that 
"a great portion of the English press interpreted the speech 
in a chauvinistic sense, and in a manner spiteful toward 
Germany, and that this interpretation was not repudiated 
from the English side." But the British Government had 
not taken part in the negotiations with France, an agree- 
ment with France had been reached, and, "on the basis 
of this agreement, not only better relations with France 
can be built up in the future, but it will also be possible to 
clean the slate in regard to our relations with England." 
Let bygones be bygones, was the chancellor's thought; on 
this basis a rapprochement between the three great nations 
of western Europe was not impossible. 

This appeal was coldly received by the Reichstag, whose 
sentiments were thus expressed by Herr von Heydebrandt, 
the Conservative leader: 

"Like a flash in the night all this had shown the German people 
where the enemy is. We know now, when we wish to expand in 
the world, when we wish to have our place in the sun, who it is 
that lays claim to world-wide domination. . . . We shall secure 
peace not by concessions, but with the German sword." 

This harangue, bitterly anti-English from start to finish, 
and applauded by the Crown Prince, who was a spectator 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 339 

in the gallery, merited the censure bestowed upon it by 
the chancellor the following day. But the tide of Anglo- 

r phobia continued to ebb. On 17 November Herr von 
Kiderlen-Waechter gave a confidential report of the nego- 
tiations with England, which was soon made public, and 
for the first time people learned how serious the situation 
had been in the summer. The German complaint was that 
Great Britain had stood in the way of German expansion, 
and by its diplomatic support encouraged the French to 
revive their dying hopes of a war of revenge to recover 
the lost provinces. For what other reason could Britain 
have interfered in a dispute which concerned solely France 
and Germany? 

So far as Morocco was concerned, the German charge 
was perfectly true. England did intervene to keep the 
Germans out of Morocco, and the vehemence of their re- 
sentment indicates how keenly they aspired to a share of 
Morocco. And the renaissance of French national senti- 
ment, so conspicuous in the last few years and directed 
solely against Germany, owed not a little to the entente 
cordiale. Yet the Germans never admitted, and probably 
they never will, that the policy of their own government 
was primarily responsible for transforming a simple settle- 
ment of colonial disputes between England and France 
into an informal alliance for mutual protection. Never- 
theless the Kaiser's speech at Tangier in 1905, and the 
despatch of the Panther to Agadir in 191 1 were at the bot- 
tom of Anglo-French co-operation, which would have been 
avoided by a less brutal and more consistent diplomacy. 

For Morocco was lost to Germany as much by her incon- 
sistency as by her rattling of the sabre. 1904: acceptance 
of the Anglo-French convention; 1905: promise to the 
Sultan that he should remain free and independent; 1906: 
admission, in the Act of Algeciras, that France and Spain 
should enjoy a privileged position in Morocco; 1909: com- 
plete abandonment of the Act of Algeciras; Franco-German 



34© ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

economic exploitation; 191 1, 1 July: determination to ef- 
fect a partition of Morocco; 24 July: denial of such in- 
tention; September: efforts to restrict French protectorate, 
and revival of old German demands. Is it any wonder 
that, pursuing a policy everything by shorts and nothing 
long Germany was able to make no headway against the 
diplomacy of France, bent on establishing French influ- 
ence in Morocco, and the resolution of England to stand 
by France as the agreement of 1904 postulated? Germany 
might have raised no objection to a French absorption of 
Morocco in return for compensation elsewhere; she might 
have insisted on a share for herself; or she might have clung 
to the theory of an internationalized Morocco. She tried, 
at one time or another, to do all three, and the incalculable 
character of her policy justly laid her open to the charge 
of cherishing some deep-laid plan not necessarily involving 
Morocco at all. 

That plan, apparently, was to destroy the entente cordiale, 
and then to force upon France a collaboration in Germany's 
schemes for economic and political expansion in Africa, 
the Near East, and China. As the vassal of Germany, 
France would be free from attack and could abandon the 
Russian alliance. Then Germany would be master of 
Europe, and could throw down the gauntlet to England at 
her convenience. Incidentally, the wealth of France could 
be invested in the building of more Dreadnoughts for the 
German navy. Perhaps Germany had not thought out 
the details just specified, and there are no documents to 
prove them; but such would have been the result had 
Germany won the diplomatic bout of 191 1. For that rea- 
son Morocco assumed an extreme importance in the eyes 
of both France and Great Britain; for that reason they 
subordinated all other considerations to the maintenance 
of the entente; for that reason Germans were, from their 
point of view, righteously angry against England, without 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 341 

whose assistance the French must have been defeated. 
Thus, when Germany ascertained, as she did on 21 July, 
that the entente would stand the strain to which she had 
subjected it, she perceived that she must modify her tone 
and her demands, and she did so. From first to last the 
Moroccan question can be understood only if it is viewed 
in its largest aspect. The details are important for deter- 
mining the justice of French or German claims, but the 
real issue was whether Germany was to lord it over France, 
and thereby break both the Dual Alliance and the Triple 
Entente. Statesmen and ministers could not put it so 
baldly, but they understood the situation none the less 
clearly, and after Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr 
von Kiderlen-Waechter had expounded their views to Ger- 
mans, it was imperative for Sir Edward Grey to justify 
himself to English opinion, which had been somewhat 
impressed by the German revelations and was becoming 
restive. 

Had they followed the German example, Englishmen 
would have visited most of their wrath upon the foreign 
secretary of the government with which their own had 
been in conflict, and the conduct of Herr von Kiderlen was 
by no means ignored. But the most bitter criticisms were 
reserved for Sir Edward Grey, who did not then enjoy the 
prestige he subsequently acquired as the peacemaker of 
Europe. 1 It was unfortunate for him that at the moment 
the Russians should have been busy getting rid of Mr. 
Morgan Shuster as treasurer-general of Persia, for British 
opinion would have welcomed a strong stand by Sir Edward 
Grey against the Russian pretensions. Indignant at his 
refusal, publicists and politicians began to complain of his 
violent prejudice against Germany, which alone could have 

1 The case against Sir Edward Grey is presented by G. H. Perris, Our Foreign 
Policy and Sir Edward Grey's Failure (1912); Diplomaticus, "Sir Edward Grey's 
Stewardship," Fortnightly Review, December, 191 1; Sidney Low, "An Anglo-French 
Alliance," ibid. 



342 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

dictated his interference in the Morocco controversy. 
He had taken office in December, 1905; in the course of 
six years he had not improved but aggravated Anglo- 
German relations. In helping France to tear up the Act 
of Algeciras, he had almost led England into war with Ger- 
many. France had made an agreement with Germany in 
1909, another in 191 1; Russia had gone to Potsdam in 
1 9 10; England alone had not held out the hand of friend- 
ship. Rather she had been drawn into the net of Conti- 
nental politics, with the burden of increased military and 
naval expenses, with all the obligations of an alliance and 
none of its advantages. The case against Sir Edward Grey 
seemed to be complete, and his resignation was demanded 
by those Radicals who, opposed to further expenditure on 
armaments, desired an understanding with Germany at any 
cost. 

There was also a considerable feeling that British foreign 
policy was too much the preserve of a few officials at the 
foreign office and the more important members of the 
diplomatic service. 1 Parliament exercised no control over 
policy, treaties being presented to it as accomplished facts 
and not for ratification, as was the democratic practise. 
This criticism seemed well taken when the secret clauses 
of the Anglo-French convention of 1904, the real basis of 
the British support of France in the Morocco controversy, 
were published by a Paris newspaper several days before 
Sir Edward Grey's speech. Parliament knew nothing of 
negotiations, either pending or intended, and could not 
easily force the publication of documents if the foreign 
office demurred. Sir Edward himself spoke but seldom in 
Parliament or on the platform, so that little was known 
of the man or his policy, except by results, which were 
not considered satisfactory. Thus a strong-willed foreign 

1 The demands of the Radicals are presented by the committee of the House of 
Commons, "Our Foreign Policy and Its Reform," Contemporary Review, April, 1012. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 343 

secretary might give a direction to British policy which 
Parliament would not approve, and it was alleged that 
Sir Edward Grey had displayed a hostility to Germany out 
of all proportion to the feeling of Parliament and the wishes 
of Englishmen. 

The speech of 27 November, 191 1, 1 delivered nominally 
to the House of Commons — in reality to the world — was a 
memorable effort. In lucid English and with great detail, 
Sir Edward Grey explained his attitude toward the Morocco 
controversy, and described his interviews with the Ger- 
man ambassador; his account, supplementing rather than 
contradicting the version of the German Government, 
forms the basis of the narrative set forth earlier in this 
chap_ter. 

More important was the attitude toward the future. 
The main points were: first, that the British Government 
had no secret agreements with any Powers; 2 second, that 
no member of the Triple Entente would pursue "a provoc- 
ative or aggressive policy toward Germany"; and third, 
that Britain could not pursue a policy of splendid isolation 
without being felt "a public nuisance," against whom all 
other Powers would be building war-ships. With respect 
to Germany, he repeated publicly the assurance given pri- 
vately to Count Wolff -Metternich, that England would not 
stand in the way of a legitimate German expansion: 

"If there are to be big territorial changes in Africa, brought 
about, of course, by the good will of and negotiation with other 
Powers, then we are not an ambitious competing party; and being 
not an ambitious competing party ourselves, if Germany has friendly 
arrangements to negotiate with other foreign countries with re- 
gard to Africa, we are not anxious to stand in her way any more 
than in theirs." 

1 s Hansard xxxii, cc. 43-65. 

2 On 6 December, 191 1, and again on 24 March, 1913, Mr. Asquith stated ex- 
plicitly in Parliament that the British Government was bound by no military 
engagements which would compel it to go to war without the consent of Parlia- 
ment. (5 Hansard xxxii, c. 1400.) 



344 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

He recognized that the German chancellor, in his recent 
speeches, had been "studiously careful to avoid saying any- 
thing that might offend British public opinion," and wel- 
comed the fact that "the German understanding with 
France as to Morocco had also cleaned the slate in re- 
spect of German relations with England." He did not 
conceal the difficulties of an Anglo- German understanding: 

"Do not let us imagine that we can force the pace at this mo- 
ment in improving the relations with Germany. We cannot com- 
pel suddenly, after the friction of the last few months, a favorable 
breeze of public opinion either in Germany or here. At present 
the breeze is anything but favorable . . . but what we want is 
not to cease to steer a favorable course, and to steer it straight ahead, 
whenever we can." 

But Germany must do her part. If her policy was not 
aggressive, then he was sure that "in two or three years the 
talk about a great European war will have passed away, 
and there will have been a growth of good will, not only 
between Germany and England, but between those coun- 
tries and the friends of both." These noble words have 
been mocked by the events of 1914, but at the time they 
gave grounds for hope that the great calamity of which 
Sir Edward Grey spoke would be spared Europe and the 
world. We shall see that he did his best to fulfil his own 
prophecy. 

In the course of the debate which followed, Mr. Asquith 
confirmed what Sir Edward Grey had said. • 

"We do not want," said the prime minister, "to stand in the 
way of any Power that wishes to find a place in the sun. We have 
no sort of quarrel with any of the Great Powers of the world. The 
first of all British interests remains, as it has always done, the peace 
of the world, and to the attainment of that great object diplomacy 
and our policy will still with single-mindedness be directed." 1 

1 5 Hansard xxxii, c. no. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 345 

To complete the account, the remarks of the German chan- 
cellor in the Reichstag on 5 December may be appended: 



"English ministers and other speakers in the House of Com- 
mons have expressed a desire for the betterment of Anglo-German 
relations. For myself, I am in accord with that wish, but I re- 
member that the same wish has been expressed repeatedly by both 
sides for a number of years. Nevertheless, we have obtained ex- 
perience through what has occurred. My phrase, 'a, clean slate,' 
has been taken up in England, but the slate of the recent past has 
been written on with a hard pencil, leaving permanent scratches, 
which cannot be written over in the future if suspicion holds the 
pencil. 

"The English foreign minister rightfully sees that Germany's 
growing strength covers no aggressive plans. We wish sincerely 
not only for peace and friendship, but for the actual betterment 
of relations tending to keep the peace. This is our wish — only, so 
far as England is concerned, she needs to demonstrate her desire 
in a positive manner in her policy." 

The most immediate result of the Morocco crisis was an 
outburst of recrimination on both sides of the North Sea 
which did not burn itself out for several months. The 
Germans took exception to the entire policy of Great 
Britain, considering that the charge of "encirclement" 
had been thoroughly proved by the events of July, 191 1. 
They were further irritated by Mr. Churchill's description 
of the German fleet as a "luxury," a remark which was 
useful to Admiral von Tirpitz in securing the assent of the 
Reichstag to the navy law of 191 2. It was at this time 
that General Friedrich von Bernhardi's famous book Ger- 
many and the Next War made its appearance. In Eng- 
land the new navy law provoked the usual criticisms. 
At the same time sober men and the two governments 
perceived that Anglo-German relations must become either 
better or worse — they must be mended or ended. 

Early in the year 191 2 positive efforts were made in the 



346 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

direction of an Anglo- German reconciliation. In Janu- 
ary Dr. Solf, the German colonial minister, came to Lon- 
don with the object, so it was believed, of discussing the 
secret treaty made between Great Britain and Germany, 
in 1898, for a disposition of the Portuguese colonies. Noth- 
ing however, was disclosed as to either the treaty or any 
negotiations that may have been begun. But the Eng- 
lish press received the idea sympathetically, because it 
evinced British good will toward German colonial expan- 
sion. 

In February, at the request of the German Emperor, 
Lord Haldane, then lord high chancellor of Great Britain, 
journeyed to Berlin to discuss Anglo-German relations with 
the German Government. Such a discussion, desirable in 
any case, was the more feasible because the Franco-Ger- 
man convention of 4 November, 191 1, had materially 
altered the diplomatic situation. As Lord Morley had re- 
marked in the House of Lords, it would have been intol- 
erable if Great Britain had refused France her share of 
the profits of the entente cordiale, that is, Morocco. 1 But 
now that the Moroccan question had been liquidated, and 
the immediate purpose of the entente fulfilled, Great Britain 
was free to resume her liberty of action, and might even 
disinterest herself in Continental politics, provided always 
that the friendship with France developed during the diplo- 
matic rough weather of the past eight years was not chal- 
lenged and provided the peace of Europe was not disturbed. 
This was the view of British publicists and, so far as one 
can tell, it was the attitude of the British Government. 

If any one British statesman could have effected an 
Anglo-German understanding, that person was Lord Hal- 
dane. Educated in Germany and unusually appreciative of 
German culture, he was persona grata to the court of 
Berlin, without being any the less a stanch British patriot. 

1 28 November, 1911. (5 Hansard x, 382.) 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 347 

The navy law of 191 2 was under consideration when he 
arrived in Berlin on 9 February, 191 2. In the course of 
his visit he saw the Emperor and the leading German states- 
men. What happened may be gleaned from documents 
and statements given out since the Great War began. 

The German chancellor submitted a draft treaty of six 
articles to Lord Haldane. 1 Assuring each other "mutually 
of their desire for peace and friendship," and pledging 
themselves that they would not, "either of them, make 
or prepare to make any unprovoked attack upon the other, 
or join in any combination or design against the other for 
the purpose of aggression," the two Powers were to agree, 
in Article III: 

"If either of the high contracting parties becomes entangled in 
war with one or more Powers [in which it cannot be said to be the 
aggressor], the other party will at least observe toward the Power 
so entangled benevolent neutrality, and will use its utmost endeavor 
for the localization of the conflict. [If either of the high contract- 
ing parties is forced to go to war by the obvious provocation of a 
third party, they bind themselves to enter into an exchange of 
views concerning their attitude.]" 

According to the German version, 2 the words placed in 
brackets were omitted in the first German proposal. 
Article IV provided that the duty of neutrality would have 
no obligation in so far as it was not reconcilable with the 
existing obligations of the contracting parties ; and Article 
V pledged them not to make any new agreements. In the 
last article, the two governments declared that they would 
"do all in their power to prevent differences and mis- 
understandings arising between them and other Powers." 
With respect to this "unconditional neutrality agree- 
ment," "Lord Haldane put some pertinent questions to the 
Emperor, the chancellor, and Admiral von Tirpitz. What 

1 Statement by the British foreign office, 31 August, 1915. 
1 Norddeulsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 July, 1915. 



348 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

would be the use of entering into a solemn agreement of 
amity, if Germany was going at the same moment to in- 
crease her battle fleet as a precaution against Great Britain, 
in which case Great Britain would have to increase hers 
as a precaution against Germany? Would not an agree- 
ment for introducing a better spirit into the relations of 
the two countries be received with world-wide derision if 
it were to be followed immediately by an increased German 
shipbuilding programme?" 1 In reply the chancellor 
seems to have asked 

"whether an open agreement with us, which would exclude not 
only an Anglo-German war, but any European war whatsoever, 
did not seem to him of more importance than a couple of German 
Dreadnoughts , more or less. Lord Haldane appeared inclined to 
this view. He asked me, however, whether, if we were assured of 
security in regard to England, we would not fall upon France and 
destroy her. I replied that the policy of peace which Germany 
had pursued for more than forty years ought really to save us 
from such a question. If we had planned robber-like attacks we 
could have had the best opportunity during the South African War 
and the Russo-Japanese War to show our love of war. Germany, 
which sincerely wished to live in peace with France, would just as 
little think of attacking another country." 2 

The negotiations were conducted in London. In the 
opinion of Sir Edward Grey, Articles IV and V of the pro- 
posed treaty were "one-sided and unfair," for whereas 
Germany was permitted to fulfil all obligations arising 
under the Triple Alliance, Great Britain, which had no 
alliances except those with Japan and Portugal, would be 
effectually excluded from taking part in a European war. 
If Germany were actually attacked by France or Russia, 
England would stand aside; but the reservation in Article 
III, "if either party is forced to go to war by the open pro v- 

1 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, pp. 30-31. 

2 Reichstag, 19 August, 1915. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 349 

ocation of a third party," had a sinister ring, and in the 
light of the German declaration of war on Russia in 19 14, 
it is well that England did not bind herself on the German 
terms. Sir Edward Grey therefore rejected the German 
offer. But he proposed the following formula: 

"England will make no unprovoked attack on Germany and 
pursue no aggressive policy toward her. Aggression upon Ger- 
many is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, under- 
standing, or combination to which England is now a party, nor 
will she become a party to anything that has such an object." 

Count Wolff-Metternich thought this formula inadequate, 
and suggested two alternative additional clauses: 

"England will therefore observe at least benevolent neutrality 
should war be forced upon Germany"; or 

"England will therefore, as a matter of course, remain neutral if 
war is forced upon Germany." 

The ambassador added that this would not be considered 
binding unless the British wishes were met with in the naval 
question; but it subsequently appeared that the German 
Government would not do more than modify, without 
giving up, the navy law of 191 2. To the end of the nego- 
tiations Germany would not agree to any limitations of 
armaments unless Great Britain would pledge herself to 
an unconditional neutrality, and this Sir Edward Grey 
refused to do. Moreover, the chancellor objected to the 
term "unprovoked attack"; "among civilized Powers it 
was not the custom to attack other Powers without provo- 
cation or to join combinations which were planning such 
things" (!) Therefore the promise to refrain from such 
attacks could not form the basis of an agreement. 

Sir Edward Grey eventually proposed the following 
formula: 

"The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and 
friendship between them, England declares that she will neither 



35° ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

make nor join in any provoked attack upon Germany. Aggression 
upon Germany forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or com- 
bination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a 
party to anything which has such an object." 

Beyond this England could not go. As Sir Edward ex- 
plained to Count Wolff-Metternich, "there was no aggres- 
sive design in British policy, and France knew perfectly 
well that if she acted aggressively against Germany no 
support would be forthcoming from the British Govern- 
ment or be approved by British public opinion." Great 
Britain could not bind herself in advance to remain neutral 
whatever might happen, for she could not forget that in 
recent years Germany had threatened both France and 
Russia with the use of force. 1 Sir Edward Grey went so 
far as to say that His Majesty's Government would not 
make the continuance of the negotiations dependent upon 
the withdrawal of the new German navy law, but the Ger- 
man Government insisted upon its own terms, and the 
negotiations presently collapsed. With them ended "the 
hope of a mutual reduction in the expenditure for arma- 
ments by the two countries." 

The German version says that Sir Edward Grey based 
his refusal of an unconditional neutrality agreement on 
"the fear of otherwise endangering the existing friendly 
relations of Great Britain with other Powers," but there 
is no such argument in the British account. On the evi- 
dence produced, Mr. Asquith's remarks appear justified: 

"[The British formula] was not enough for German statesmen. 
They wanted us to go farther. They asked us to pledge ourselves 
absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged 
in war, and this, mind you, at a time when Germany was enor- 
mously increasing both her aggressive and defensive resources, and 
especially on the sea. They asked us — to put it quite plainly — for 
a free hand, so far as we were concerned, when they selected the 

1 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, p. 32. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 351 

opportunity to overbear, to dominate, the European world. To 
such a demand but one answer was possible, and that was the 
answer we gave." ' 

Count Wolff-Metternich admitted to Sir Edward Grey 
that "the chancellor's wish amounted to a guarantee of 
absolute neutrality." Is it not fair to conclude that Ger- 
many was seeking, in a new and unexpected fashion, to 
shatter the Triple Entente? She had tried to wean France 
away, and had failed; England might be more amenable, 
although the Entente was the creation of British diplomacy. 
The British reply to the German offers came, as will be 
seen, in November, 191 2. 

In May, 1912, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the 
German ambassador at Constantinople, was transferred 
to London, for Count Metternich had not succeeded in 
allaying British apprehensions. English opinion was 
somewhat suspicious that the famous diplomatist might 
attempt to dominate the British Government as he had 
the impressionable officials of the Sublime Porte, and to 
seduce the British press by the arts of which he was ad- 
mittedly a master. Such fears were probably groundless, 
even unworthy of a free people. As it was, the new am- 
bassador died in September, before he had really entered 
upon his duties. Sir Edward Grey was evidently not 
alarmed, for on 10 July he qualified Anglo-German rela- 
tions, hitherto "correct," as "excellent." 2 

Theoretically, the international situation remained un- 
changed. The entente cordiale was not disturbed by the 
British negotiations with Germany, as Sir Edward Grey 
repeatedly made perfectly clear. 3 Also the visit of M. 
Poincare, the French premier, to St. Petersburg in August, 

1 Cardiff, 2 October, 1014. 

2 5 Hansard xl, c. 1995. 

3 Both the British Government and British public opinion looked coldly on the 
agitation conducted by the Morning Post and the Spectator in favor of a formal 
Anglo-French alliance. 



352 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

with a view to consolidating the Dual Alliance by a naval 
convention, necessarily brought England and Russia into 
greater intimacy. And curiously enough the German 
Government, after many years' protest against the Triple 
Entente as an anti-German combination, suddenly gave it 
an unexpected recognition. The Tsar and the Emperor 
William met at Port Baltic on 4 July, and in the official 
communique occurred these interesting words: 

"The political conversations, which extended to all questions of 
the day, strengthened on both sides the conviction that it still 
remains of the highest importance for the interests of the two 
neighbor Empires and of the general peace to maintain the mutual 
contact, based on reciprocal confidence. There could be no question 
either of new agreements, because there was no particular occasion 
for them, or of producing alterations of any kind in the grouping 
of the European Powers, the value of which for the maintenance of 
equilibrium and of peace has already been proved." 

In this statement Germany confessed her inability to 
destroy the Triple Entente and admitted that it was an 
arrangement for peace, not an incentive of war; an admis- 
sion which the Germans seem to have forgotten since their 
propagandists set out to convince the world that the 
fatherland was innocent of provoking the Great War. 
But it would be a great mistake to suppose that by recog- 
nizing the Triple Entente as a legitimate combination, 
Germany desired to see it become a permanent institution 
of European politics. It is impossible to say whether 
Germany sincerely desired to arrange a permanent under- 
standing with Great Britain, but, if so, she must satisfy 
the condition laid down by Sir Edward Grey: she must 
demonstrate that her policy was pacific and well-inten- 
tioned. As for England, on the basis of the German decla- 
ration, she could negotiate an agreement with Germany in 
good conscience, and, as a matter of fact, public opinion 
in England was crystallizing in favor of an understanding, 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 353 

which would have forced the hand of Sir Edward Grey, 
even if he himself had not been anxious to promote such 
an arrangement. If circumstances warranted it, Great 
Britain desired nothing better than to withdraw from the 
maelstrom of Continental politics and concentrate her en- 
ergies on the varied problems of her far-flung Empire. 

In the movement for better relations with Germany, the 
Liberal party in England was especially active. In a 
series of articles in the Westminster Gazette, 1 the editor, 
Mr. J. A. Spender, a close political friend of Sir Edward 
Grey, described the German as well as the British view 
of the situation, and urged that Great Britain must not 
oppose the legitimate ambitions of Germany. In another 
place he wrote: 

"If we had 'left it alone' in recent years; if we had refrained from 
publishing inelegant extracts from each other's leading articles; 
... if we had left men of good will to work peacefully and grad- 
ually for the removal of misunderstandings, and, in the meantime, 
had silenced our own chorus, might we not by now have been in a 
better position ? . . . After all, the worst has been said, . . . and, 
having 'liberated our souls,' we can approach each other without 
malice." 2 

The University of Manchester organized a series of lectures 
by eminent scholars who treated German problems in a 
sympathetic spirit; their discourses were published in a 
small volume entitled Germany in the Nineteenth Century. 
The reviews ceased to be full of anti-German articles, and 
the Times, long the most bitter critic of all things German, 
paid a respectful tribute to the Emperor William II on 
the twenty-fifth anniversary of his accession to the throne. 3 
In October, 191 2, the Labor party in Parliament and the 

1 Republished in pamphlet form under the title The Foundations of British Policy 
(1012). 
* England and Germany (1912), pp. 14-15. 20 June, 1913. 



354 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Socialists of the Reichstag published a joint manifesto pro- 
testing against the increased naval expenditure and alleging 
that a war between the two countries would only further 
the interests of capital. The appointment of Prince Lich- 
nowsky as German ambassador was welcomed in England; 
for, although he was known as a stanch advocate of the 
German navy, he was a man of moderate opinions and 
believed that a reconciliation was possible. He stated 
frankly that his business in London would be to work for 
an understanding. 1 At a conference of the National Liberal 
Federation in November Sir John Brunner, the president, 
declared that the naval rivalry was the product of the 
armor-plate press, that the English and German peoples 
knew too little of each other, and that the first step to be 
taken was the exemption of merchant shipping from cap- 
ture in time of war. 2 Finally, the moderation of Ger- 
man policy from the outbreak of the Balkan War created 
an excellent impression in England. It may fairly be said 
that the country had been converted to the necessity and 
possibility of an agreement with Germany. 

In Germany the attitude, if more reserved, was hope- 
ful. Lord Haldane's visit had been greeted with a flood 
of anti-English pamphlets, 3 and the press was rather cool. 
But Herr Eduard Bernstein, the eminent Socialist, in a 
little brochure, Das deutsche Volk und die englische Gefahr, 
mercilessly flayed both the German Government for its 
aggressive policy and the German press for its ignorance 
and its pugnacity. He quoted the conciliatory statements 
of Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey, and remarked that 
Germany was well-nigh friendless in the world. "Ger- 
many has not so many friends that the hostility of England 
is a matter to be taken lightly." And the continuation 
of Anglo- German tension was the greatest possible stimulus 

1 Times, 18 October, 1012. 2 Times, 22 November, 1912. 

3 A brief list is given in the Spectator, 30 March, 191 2. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 355 

of French ideas of revenge. The book might well have 
been written by an Englishman. 

In the June and July (191 2) issues of his magazine Nord 
und Stid Dr. Ludwig Stein had the happy idea to col- 
lect a large number of opinions from eminent states- 
men, business men, and thinkers in both countries; an 
English translation was promptly published under the 
title England and Germany. The discussion, if it did not 
touch upon all the issues, was not only frank, but valu- 
able for its freedom from jingoism, for the sincerity with 
which a settlement was advocated. Dr. Ernst Sieper of 
Munich began the publication of a series of monographs 
entitled Die Kultur modemen Englands, which would pro- 
vide accurate and impartial information. On the other 
hand, the doctrines of Mr. Norman Angell, as set forth in 
The Great Illusion, which found a ready welcome in Eng- 
land, did not rouse a corresponding echo in Germany. 
But in general, if there were fewer organized visits of clergy- 
men, workmen, and journalists between the two countries, 
the number of tourists certainly increased, and in the end 
such intercourse was bound to encourage friendliness. 

A promising experiment was the lecture tour under- 
taken by Sir Harry Johnston, the eminent African explorer 
and administrator, who was favorably known in Germany 
for his advocacy of the Baghdad railway and his support 
of the German pretension to ascendency in the Near East. 
Indeed, no English writer had presented the German case 
for expansion more fairly than Sir Harry Johnston; he 
was also in close touch with official circles throughout the 
British Empire. No one was better fitted to expound 
British foreign policy to Germans. So in 191 2, with the 
good will of the foreign office, he travelled through Ger- 
many and discussed international problems before all 
kinds of audiences. In south Germany particularly he 
met with a cordial reception, and his suggestion that Fran- 



356 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

co-German enmity might be buried by the retrocession of 
Metz and French-speaking Lorraine was respectfully re- 
ceived. The Prussian spirit was more intractable, but on 
the whole the results of his visit were encouraging. 1 The 
substance of his remarks may be found in a book entitled 
Common Sense in Foreign Policy, which, in spite of its some- 
what arbitrary suggestions for transfers of territories, well 
deserves to be studied in connection with the treaties 
which will end the Great War. 

Finally, there must be some reference to a remarkable 
little book published anonymously in Germany during the 
year 19 13, Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg! In brief, 
it is an eloquent answer to General von Bernhardi, and 
a plea for the revival of Bismarck's Continental policy. 
The idea of a "preventive war" arouses the bitter derision 
of the author, and he is not impressed by the need of a 
place in the sun. If Germany must expand, let it be in 
Africa, not in the Near East, where the hostility of Russia 
will ultimately prove fatal. He accepts completely Sir 
Edward Grey's promise not to stand in the way, and de- 
clines to believe in the implacable hostility of England. 
He laughs to scorn the idea that German interests require 
Germany to support an Austrian expansionist policy in the 
Balkans, for such a policy will benefit the Slavs, not the 
Germans. It is Germany's business to see that Austria and 
Russia do not come to blows, and to cultivate the friendship 
of England, whose geographical position gives her a latent 
control of German commerce and whose power must not 
be underestimated. England, the author argues, wishes to 
withdraw from Continental politics, and leave the Triple 
and Dual Alliances confronting each other. Then she can 
assume the position of a mediator between them, as she 
did in the days of Salisbury; she can become the leader of 
the European concert, which is the great hope of Europe. 

1 The writer is indebted to Sir Harry Johnston for this account of his tour. 



AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 357 

Sir Edward Grey's achievements during the Balkan Wars 
are warmly praised as an index of future possibilities. 
Finally, it is pointed out — quite prophetically — that if 
Germany goes to war in support of Austrian ambitions, 
"we shall once again be regarded as the disturber of the 
public peace, who, in the endeavor to carve out a sphere of 
influence in Asiatic Turkey, has conjured up a universal 
conflagration"; 1 which means that England will at once 
join with France and Russia for the annihilation of Ger- 
many. One would like to know who is the author of this 
book, and what he thinks of the war which he did not 
succeed in averting. 

Thus, within a year after the crisis of 191 1, sober-minded 
persons in both Germany and England had come to talk 
seriously of an understanding, and to discuss its terms. 
The relations of the two governments were more cordial 
than they had been for many years; in the Balkan Wars 
they were to become even friendly. The next chapter will 
give even greater point to the tragedy of August, 1914. 

1 p. 76. 



CHAPTER XII 
THE EVE OF THE WAR 

The European war of 1914 was the direct result of the 
Balkan conflagration of 191 2-13. For thirty-five years the 
Ottoman Empire had been a potent cause of international 
rivalry, for its ultimate collapse was confidently expected, 
and the inability of the Great Powers to devise a satis- 
factory partition had operated as an incentive to ambitious 
and mischievous diplomacy. For a brief interval the 
Young Turk revolution promised to relieve Europe of its 
insoluble problem. Such anticipations, however, were not 
realized, partly because the Young Turks soon became the 
instruments of German designs, partly because their han- 
dling of the Balkan situation revived the unrest latent 
among the Christian populations. For the latter resented 
the policy of Turkification adopted by Constantinople in 
the supposed interest of military efficiency and, suppress- 
ing their racial animosities, began to make common cause 
against the Young Turk regime (February, 191 2). It be- 
came apparent that only an effective measure of decen- 
tralization would prevent the reopening of the Macedonian 
question, and this was not forthcoming. In August, 191 2, 
therefore, Count Berchtold suggested an exchange of views 
between the Powers. 

If intended to stem chauvinistic tendencies, its effect 
was to render war inevitable. For in the spring of the 
year, the four Balkan kingdoms, — Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, 
and Montenegro, — weary of the constant disturbances in 
Macedonia, formed an alliance to drive the Turk out of 

358 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 359 

Europe and seize his territories for themselves. But the 
successful application of such reforms as Count Berchtold 
was supposed to favor would deprive them of their expected 
booty. They therefore hastened to provoke the Turks, 
and in October declared war, in spite of some feeble efforts 
by European diplomacy to keep the peace. 

The dramatic campaign which followed aroused the most 
intense emotions in a Europe which dared not interfere. 
Within six weeks the Ottoman Empire in Europe had 
ceased to exist, except for three beleaguered cities, — Adria- 
nople, Scutari, and Janina, — which were gradually reduced 
by superior armies. The ambitions of the Balkan allies 
and the procrastinations of Turkey delayed the treaty of 
peace until 30 May, 1913, when the Sultan formally sur- 
rendered all the territory west of a line drawn from Enos 
on the iEgean to Midia on the Black Sea. This treaty, 
as the Times fittingly remarked, ''closed a great chapter 
in the history of the world," and was "an event so mo- 
mentous in possible results that it stood beyond the reach 
of imagination and of judgment." l At the same time, it 
belied several of the most cherished maxims of contem- 
porary politics. 

In the first place, because the Turk had for centuries 
enjoyed an enviable reputation for fighting, and because 
the Balkan nationalities were considered the tools of the 
Great Powers, it was taken for granted that the liquida- 
tion of the Macedonian problem would be effected by 
the European concert at the conclusion of a general war. 
Again, any solution hitherto predicted had involved terri- 
torial aggrandizement for certain Great Powers. Finally, 
the question of Constantinople and the Straits had always 
seemed an integral part of the whole Near Eastern problem. 
Yet the Balkan states waged a campaign against the Turks 
with little interference from nations mightily armed for 

'30 May, 1913. 



360 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

that purpose; no Great Power was enriched; and the Sul- 
tan remained the lord of Constantinople. 

To this happy result, as it then seemed, the restraint 
of all the Powers contributed; but the. most potent factor 
in the preservation of peace between the Powers was 
unquestionably the moderating influence of Sir Edward 
Grey, who very early in the development of the situation 
perceived the danger of isolated action by one or more 
Powers. It was everywhere understood that the victories 
of the Balkan League were a blow to Germany's position 
in Europe, and had the Triple Entente been desirous of 
unchaining a war against Germany and Austria the oppor- 
tunity then offered would not have been neglected. In- 
stead, Sir Edward Grey revived the 'European concert 
through a conference of ambassadors in London, and with 
their assistance skilfully adjusted the conflicting claims of 
those Powers directly interested in the Balkans. In this 
task he received great assistance from Germany, which 
seemed to confirm the impression already abroad, that an 
Anglo- German rapprochement was actually taking shape. 
Indeed, both Herr von Kiderlen, before his death (Decem- 
ber, 191 2), and Herr von Jagow, his successor, publicly 
testified to the unexpected intimacy and friendliness which 
had developed between London and Berlin; and Sir Ed- 
ward Grey spoke in the same vein. Thus, not only was 
the peace of Europe preserved, but the greatest danger 
to its disturbance, Anglo-German rivalry, had been dimin- 
ished by the confidence that both England and Germany 
had worked for peace. 

If the Balkan League, resting on the valor of a million 
veteran soldiers, could have been preserved intact, it would 
have been impossible for either Austria or Russia to pre- 
cipitate a general war in pursuit of a Balkan policy. With 
this contingency eliminated, with England and Germany 
on the road to reconciliation, the peace of Europe might 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 361 

have endured indefinitely. Unfortunately, the members 
of the Balkan League quarrelled among themselves. To 
some extent the revival of ancient jealousies that had been 
laid aside for the struggle with Turkey was responsible for 
the fratricidal war of July, 19 13. But the real cause was 
the meddling of the Powers directly interested. 

The Ballplatz had allowed the war against Turkey to 
proceed on the assumption that the hated Serbians would 
be promptly trounced. Instead, they marched everywhere 
to victory and occupied western Macedonia; in revenge 
Austria supported the extravagant claims of Bulgaria in 
the division of the spoils. Russia, of course, backed up the 
pretensions of Serbia. The London conference of am- 
bassadors declined to interfere, and Bulgaria, trusting in 
the support of Vienna, appealed to the sword. She was 
defeated, because Greece and Rumania joined Serbia, and 
Turkey attacked her in the rear. But the treaty of Bu- 
charest, signed 10 August, 1913, which deprived Bulgaria 
of most of her gains, did not settle the Balkan question; 
rather it left Bulgaria sullen and discontented, and it regis- 
tered a second defeat for the Dual Monarchy, which was 
now confronted by an enlarged Serbia, in alliance with 
Greece and on cordial terms with Rumania. Unless the 
labors of a generation were to be thrown away Vienna 
must destroy this new Balkan alliance as it had the original 
league. That is to say, the new Serbia must be crushed 
by force of arms, and since the speech of Signor Giolitti, 
in the Italian Parliament, 1 we know that Austria would 
have gone to war in August, 19 13, had not Italy, her ally, 
refused to countenance an aggression upon Serbia. 

In the west also Austria had interfered with sinister 
results. When, on 28 November, 191 2, a Serbian army 
occupied Durazzo on the Adriatic coast, Count Berchtold 
demanded its withdrawal, and in April, 19 13, he required 

1 5 December, 1914. 



362 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

the Montenegrins to evacuate Scutari, which they had 
conquered after a long siege. Not only did this policy 
compel Serbia to seek compensation in Macedonia at the 
expense of Bulgaria and thus make certain the Serbo- 
Bulgarian quarrel; of far greater moment was it that the 
issue was fairly joined between Austria and Russia, the 
latter of whom seemed disposed to take up the cudgels 
for her proteges. Austria mobilized 900,000 men in order 
to carry through her policy, and brought Europe to the 
verge of war, which was averted only by the patience of 
Russia and the mediation of Great Britain. In passing, 
it should be noted that Sir Edward Grey repeatedly ac- 
cepted the Austrian view, even going so far as to send 
British cruisers to help overawe the Montenegrins in the 
matter of Scutari; which was scarcely the act of a man 
committed to an anti-German or anti-Austrian interpreta- 
tion of all events, as we are asked to believe. The net 
result of the tension was the creation of an independent 
Albania, but Austria paid dearly for her success — the open 
hostility of Russia and the certainty that Italy would 
never consent to an Austrian control of the new state. 

The unsatisfactory nature of the Balkan settlements was 
generally admitted, but men consoled themselves with the 
thought that a European war had been avoided, and with 
the hope that when the question was reopened diplomacy 
would once more rise to the occasion. The genuineness 
of this feeling was attested by the universal meed of praise 
accorded to Sir Edward Grey, who seemed to have acquired 
an ascendency in the councils of Europe that no statesman 
had enjoyed since the days of Bismarck. His speech in 
the House of Commons on 12 August, 19 13, reviewing the 
work of the concert and expressing his fervent belief in 
its efficacy, was received with applause in all the Euro- 
pean capitals, and nothing seemed more unlikely than that 
within a year he would have to confess the bankruptcy 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 363 

of European statesmanship and the failure of his own 
policy. 

The success of the concert, however, depended upon the 
continuance of existing conditions — that is, upon a Triple 
Alliance balanced by a Triple Entente — and, from the Ger- 
man point of view, the balance had been upset to the dis- 
advantage of the Triple Alliance, especially in the Balkans. 
The new Serbia blocked the march of the Austrian "white 
coats" to Salonika, and the defeat of the Turks seriously 
diminished the support which they had been expected to 
furnish against the Entente. In case of war Austria would 
be forced to leave a large covering force on her southern 
frontier as a protection against Serbian hostility, which 
in turn would compel Germany to use against Russia troops 
that she would need for her campaign in France. The 
Triple Alliance, although formally renewed in December, 
1912, was a broken reed, 1 for by her expedition to Tripoli 
Italy had given hostages to fortune, and her jealousy of 
Austrian designs in Albania would almost preclude sincere 
co-operation in an Austro-German enterprise. Thus, at 
the hands of the Balkan states, Germany had suffered a 
potential defeat, and it was these military considerations 
which prompted her military law of 1913. By this measure 
she made a supreme effort to preserve the ascendency she 
had enjoyed since 187 1; but when France, Russia, and 
Belgium had followed her example, and added to their 
military establishments, no real advantage had been gained, 
except that Germany, with her superior organization, 
promptly gave effect to her new programme while her 
rivals were maturing their plans — and was accordingly 
tempted to strike before it was too late. 

Diplomatically, the situation was changing rapidly. 

1 This was notoriously the opinion of General von Bernhardi, and was confirmed 
not only by the events of 19 14 but by the refusal of Italy to take active measures 
against Serbia in August, 19 13. 



364 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

First in point of. time and foremost in importance was the 
agreement between England and France. On 22 Novem- 
ber, 191 2, when the Austro-Serbian dispute over Albania 
was taking on the character of an Austro-Russian quarrel 
and was threatening the peace of Europe, Sir Edward Grey 
and M. Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London, 
by an exchange of letters, agreed that 

"if either government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked 
attack by a third Power, or something which threatened the general 
peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both 
governments should act together to prevent aggression and to pre- 
serve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to 
take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of 
the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration and 
the governments would then decide what effect should be given to 
them." » 

No flight of imagination could construe this agreement as 
more than a defensive alliance, even if positive proof were 
not furnished by the pacific policy of both England and 
France throughout the Balkan crisis. But Germany was 
not pleased. "From a trustworthy source" the Wilhelm- 
strasse secured copies of the letters in March, 1913, as well 
as information respecting the arrangements for Franco- 
British naval co-operation under which the French fleet 
was concentrated in the Mediterranean. "England has 
by this agreement and the existing military arrangements 
already given herself up beyond salvation to the French 
revanche idea," declared the informant of the German 
Government, which, since it has published his despatch, 2 
must have accepted his interpretation. 

After the treaty of Bucharest there was a succession 

1 Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, 3 August, 1014 (5 Hansard Ixv, c. 1813); 
also in Great Britain and the European Crisis, no. 105. 

2 Documents published by the Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeitung, 17 October, 1914, 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 365 

of incidents distasteful to Germany. A visit of President 
Poincare to Spain in the autumn of 19 13 indicated that 
the Franco-Spanish jealousies generated by the Moroccan 
troubles had evaporated, and that Spain was now ranged 
with the Entente Powers; hence France would be free to 
withdraw her troops from the Spanish frontier in case of 
war. In May, 1914, an agreement was reached between 
Great Britain and Italy respecting Italian ambitions in 
Asia Minor, which would further cement the traditional 
friendship between those countries. Then, in June, the 
Tsar paid a visit to the King of Rumania, the first hos- 
pitality of this kind ever arranged. Described by the 
Rumanian foreign minister as "an event of the greatest 
importance," 1 it was understood to foreshadow the mar- 
riage of the Grand Duchess Olga of Russia to Prince Carol, 
the heir presumptive of the Rumanian throne. In striking 
fashion the Bucharest Government had announced the 
abandonment of that pro-Austrian policy consistently main- 
tained since the Congress of Berlin. Bulgaria remained 
the sole outpost of Teutonic influence in the Balkans. 

In May King George and his consort visited Paris, where 
they were splendidly received. The official communique 
anent the conversations between Sir Edward Grey and the 
French foreign minister said: 

"While placing on record the results of the policy pursued by 
the two governments together with the imperial Russian Govern- 
ment, Sir Edward Grey and M. Doumergue are completely agreed 
upon the necessity that the three Powers should continue their 
constant efforts for the maintenance of the balante of power and 
of peace." 

According to the documents published by the Norddeut- 
sche Allgemeine Zeitung, on 17 October, 1914, the visit was 
regarded by German diplomatists as the preliminary to 

1 Times, 15 June, 1914. 



366 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

"transforming the Triple Entente into an alliance of the 
type of the Triple Alliance," and as another of " the numer- 
ous proofs of British diplomacy's entire lack of power to 
resist the influence of the Entente"; 1 although it passes the 
wit of man to discover why an agreement comparable to 
the much-vaunted Triple Alliance should be of such con- 
cern to Germany, unless, of course, the latter alliance was 
intended for an offensive policy. 

The German story, as developed in the same documents, 
is that during Sir Edward Grey's visit in Paris, M. Isvolsky, 
the Russian ambassador, proposed an Anglo-Russian naval 
convention; that the British minister "received this sug- 
gestion in a sympathetic manner" and "warmly recom- 
mended" it to the British cabinet, which accepted his 
views; and that the negotiations were promptly begun in 
London between the admiralty and the Russian naval 
attache, whose instructions were published as part of the 
evidence. Early in July Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
the German chancellor, "caused it to be intimated to the 
English Government that its secret negotiations with 
Russia over a marine treaty were known to" him, and 
"directed earnest attention to the dangers for the peace 
of the world which lay in this English policy." 2 Was this 
a warning for England to keep clear of the storm that was 
about to break? 

Questioned in the House of Commons about this con- 
vention, rumors of which were freely circulating, Sir Ed- 
ward Grey denied that the British Government had con- 
cluded any agreement which would hamper the decision 
of Parliament on the outbreak of war as to British partici- 
pation therein. 3 The German diplomatist who reported 
this to Berlin complained that Sir Edward had not answered 
the question put to him, and that his answer did not pre- 

1 No. s. ! Reichstag, 2 December, 1914. 

3 11 June, 1914. (s Hansard lxiii, c. 458.) 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 367 

elude such a convention. But the same gentleman quoted 
"a person of the minister's immediate entourage" to the 
effect that "no naval agreement had been concluded with 
Russia, nor was any going to be concluded." He also 
quoted an equally explicit statement of the Westminster 
Gazette, which "left nothing to be desired," and which was 
supposed to be inspired by Sir Edward Grey himself. 1 In 
July, when President Poincare visited St. Petersburg, M. 
Sazonof, the Russian foreign minister, assured the Ger- 
man ambassador that such a naval convention existed 
only "in the mind of the Berliner Tageblatt and in the 
moon." 2 For the present it would be rash to dogmatize, 
but, on the evidence produced by the Germans, no one will 
be convinced that an Anglo-Russian naval convention was 
under way. It is possible that consultations were being 
pursued between the British and Russian naval experts 
similar to those engaged in by the general staffs of the 
French and British armies since the year 1906. But it 
is improbable that Great Britain had bound herself to Rus- 
sia: not only did her attitude during the momentous days 
of July, 1 9 14, consistently belie such a theory, but she had 
practically consummated an agreement with Germany 
which marked the triumph of the policy of adjustment 
adopted after the Boer War. This does not mean that 
Great Britain was ready to sacrifice the Entente on the 
altar of German friendship, or that she would cease to 
support the balance of power. If, however, Germany 
accepted the bargain as evidence of British good will and 
made no effort to disturb the peace of Europe, then the 
British Government, having settled its various disputes 
with all the Great Powers, would naturally withdraw 
from purely Continental politics and would be able in 
good faith to act as the "honest broker" between the two 
alliances. 

1 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, nos. 7, 8. 2 Ibid., no. 11. 



368 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

The Anglo-German rapprochement had been made pos- 
sible by the pacific conduct of Germany during the Balkan 
crisis. The great obstacle hitherto had been the utter lack 
of confidence on the part of England in the German pro- 
fessions of peaceful ambitions, and her suspicions of the 
German navy. The recurring difficulties over Morocco 
and the circumstances in which the German fleet was built, 
justified these apprehensions. But when Admiral von 
Tirpitz accepted, even conditionally, the sixteen-to-ten 
ratio for the construction of Dreadnoughts ; when Germany 
co-operated with England to localize the Balkan Wars, 
and when public opinion on both sides of the North Sea 
seemed sincerely to desire the end of the long quarrel, then 
it was possible to negotiate a settlement of such issues as 
had in the past, or might in the future, give rise to diffi- 
culties. The agreement was not made by Great Britain 
from fear of Germany, for such a feeling would have dic- 
tated the conversion of the Triple Entente into an alliance, 
and, indeed, the persistent refusal of British statesmen to 
adopt the latter policy is the most conclusive proof of their 
willingness to cultivate the friendship of Germany. It is 
well to remember that at any time during the ten years 
preceding the Great War, England could have had the 
alliance of France and Russia by adopting the Continental 
military system. She declined all such offers because such 
a policy would have fatally compromised her relations with 
Germany, and have laid on her shoulders the responsibility 
for a war of revenge undertaken by France or a war of 
prestige begun by Russia. For ten years England kept a 
middle course. In the summer of 19 14 she appeared to 
have reaped her reward in the shape of the long-desired 
understanding with Germany. 

German statesmen are entitled to their share of the 
credit for this achievement, which augured so well for the 
peace of the world. During the negotiations of July, 1914, 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 369 

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg assured the British ambas- 
sador in Berlin that "ever since he had been chancellor 
the object of his policy had been to bring about an under- 
standing with England"; 1 he said the same thing in the 
Reichstag on 2 December, 1914. Certainly he was re- 
garded with less distrust in England than Prince Biilow, 
who was supposed to be distinctly anti-English. More 
important still was the attitude of Prince Lichnowsky, 
who succeeded Baron Marschall von Bieberstein in the 
London embassy. He seemed to have taken sincerely and 
seriously the mission of reconciliation with which his com- 
ing had been heralded. He and his wife revived the social 
traditions of the embassy, which had faded away under the 
long regime of Count Metternich, and easily conquered 
the affections of London society. The ambassador spoke 
frequently to commercial and financial organizations; he 
always emphasized the identity of British and German 
economic interests, and argued that war would be disas- 
trous to the prosperity of the fatherland. 2 Leaving the 
past alone, he talked only of the future, in a spirit of good 
will and encouragement. With Sir Edward Grey he was 
persona grata. 

Thus the road was opened to an understanding, in spite 
of what Prince Lichnowsky called " the seemingly irrecon- 
cilable forces at work in both countries to prevent it." 
On 4 February, 19 14, Herr von Jagow told a committee of 
the Reichstag that Anglo- German relations were "very 
good" (recht gut). According to Sir Edward Grey, they 
had "sensibly improved" since the Balkan troubles. 3 
For some months before the war negotiations were known 
to be in progress, with respect to which Herr von Beth- 

1 Great Britain and the European Crisis, no. 85. Sir Edward Goschen to Sir 
Edward Grey, 29 July, 1014. 

1 New York Times, i February, 1014. 

» Great Britain and the European Crisis, no. 101. Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward 
Goschen, 30 July, 1014. 



370 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

mann-Hollweg expressed the hope that they would "bring 
the relations of the two countries permanently back into 
the quiet paths which for a time they had threatened to 
leave." * At the least they were expected to inspire the 
two governments with mutual confidence, which might 
be the forerunner of a wider political agreement. By the 
early summer of 19 14 the agreement had been initialed, as 
well as an accord between England and Turkey. Publi- 
cation was withheld pending the conclusion of a comple- 
mentary arrangement between Germany and Turkey, but 
for all practical purposes the bargain had been sealed 
when the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia ushered in the 
final crisis. 

None of the three interested governments has revealed 
the precise terms of the three-cornered agreement. Its 
general scope, however, can be established from several 
sources. According to the statement of Sir Edward Grey 
in the House of Commons on 29 June, 1914, Great Britain 
withdrew her claim to participate in the construction of 
the Baghdad-Bassorah section of the Baghdad railway; 
in return the section from Bassorah was not to be built 
without British approval. British trade was to enjoy the 
same privileges as Germany's on all sections of the line, 
as a guarantee of which two Englishmen were admitted to 
the board of directors. The navigation of the Tigris was 
recognized as a substantial British interest. Great Brit- 
ain admitted the suzerainty of Turkey over the Sheikh of 
Koweit, on condition that his autonomy was not inter- 
fered with, and that the status quo in the Persian Gulf, 
that is, the predominance of British interests, was ac- 
cepted. In return the British Government agreed to the 
increase of the Turkish customs to fifteen per cent. 2 Dr. 
Paul Rohrbach gives a slightly different account: "Exten- 
sive recognition was given to the German point of view in 

1 Reichstag, 9 December, 1913. 2 5 Hansard lxiv, cc. 116-120. 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 371 

the Baghdad railway question, but also in the matters con- 
nected with it— the exploitation of the Mesopotamian oil- 
fields and the navigation of the Tigris." 1 Each party- 
gave up some of its previous contentions, yet managed to 
retain what was essential to itself. In any case, the agree- 
ment removed the most serious dispute then outstanding 
between England and Germany. It also showed, as argued 
in an earlier chapter, that England's objection to the Bagh- 
dad railway lay not in the line itself, but in certain details 
which could be adjusted by mutual concessions. 

Less is known about the African clauses of the Anglo- 
German agreement. Dr. Rohrbach contents himself with 
the remark that "English policy showed itself surpris- 
ingly accommodating." Sir Edward Grey did not refer to 
the subject. But on 31 December, 1913, the New York 
Times published despatches from its Berlin and London 
correspondents to the effect that England and Germany 
had agreed to purchase and divide the Portuguese col- 
onies in Africa. There could be no question of pressure 
on Portugal, for by the treaty of alliance between that 
country and Great Britain — which was first concluded 
in the fourteenth century, and in its present form was 
renewed at the outset of the Boer War — the possessions 
of Portugal were guaranteed by the full strength of the 
British Empire. But of recent years the Government of 
Portugal, whether monarchical or republican, has been in 
such financial straits that it could not develop its vast 
overseas dominions and might very well wish to dispose 
of them for a good price. The London correspondent of 
the New York Times stated that the Portuguese authori- 
ties were only waiting for public opinion to show itself re- 
ceptive to a sale. The Berlin version, however, was that 
neither England nor Germany desired to "interfere with 
the sovereignty of Portugal," but desired merely to mark 

1 Grossere Deutschland, n August, IQ14; Zum Wellvolk hindurchl (1914), p. 47- 



372 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

out "trading spheres" for itself. In any case, Angola, 
which was contiguous with German Southwest Africa, 
would become a German protectorate; England would 
take the part of Mozambique south of the Zambesi River, 
for the port of Delagoa Bay was the natural outlet for the 
Rand mines. The region north of the Zambesi would be 
added to German East Africa, which might also be increased, 
according to the Frankfurter Zeitung, by the Kagera River 
district of Uganda. 1 This division would be in keeping 
with the secret Anglo-German treaty of partition arranged 
in 1898, when the late Joseph Chamberlain was anxious 
for the good will of Germany. 

Certain railway enterprises were also contemplated. 
Germany obtained the right to build a line across Angola 
to a point in Rhodesia where it would join the Cape to 
Cairo railway. This latter project had always been op- 
posed by Germany, who saw that it would block her own 
designs for a Central African Empire stretching from ocean 
to ocean, but the Frankfurter Zeitung expressed the opinion 
that the continuation of the Rhodesian railway north- 
ward through the country west of Lake Tanganyika (the 
Belgian Congo) would not be injurious to the German 
railway east of Tanganyika. So far as is known, the ques- 
tion of the Congo was not involved in the negotiations, 
although German ambitions in that direction were clearly 
revealed by the Morocco treaty of 191 1 with France and 
were actually admitted in a conversation between Herr von 
Jagow and M. Jules Cambon in March, 1914, in which the 
German foreign secretary "developed the opinion that only 
the Great Powers were in a position to colonize." 2 

It is quite impossible to say how far the Anglo-German 
agreement would have satisfied German public opinion. 
Would the complaint have been made that England re- 

1 25 February, igi4- 

2 Second Belgian Grey Book, no. 2. 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 373 

ceived quite as much as she gave? Writing in June, 1913, 
Dr. Rohrbach boldly set up the thesis that "Germany 
could not content herself with the r61e of registering in- 
creases of England's power, and must take up the very 
self-evident position that the principle of compensation 
should be given a certain retroactive force." * In other 
words, England must recompense Germany for the enor- 
mous extension of the British Empire in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century, beginning with the occupation 
of Egypt. Professor Hans Delbriick took practically the 
same view in March, 191 2, as noted in another chapter. 
If such doctrines were cherished by official Germany, then 
no peace was possible between England and Germany. 
For these conditions could be satisfied only if England was 
willing to surrender part of her own Empire or to give 
Germany carte blanche to take what she liked from weaker 
Powers — France, Portugal, Belgium, Holland. To this 
England would never consent. And it is surely significant 
that, when making his bid for British neutrality on the 
eve of the war, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg refused to 
guarantee the integrity of the French colonies; just as in 
his Reichstag speech of 2 December, 1914, he complained 
that England would not permit "the free development of 
Germany's powers." On these grounds there is much to 
be said for the view current in England after the war began 
that Germany's purpose in making the agreement was to 
throw dust in England's eyes, to persuade her that German 
policy was peaceful, and to lull her into a false sense of* 
security. 

Nevertheless, whatever Germany's motives may have 
been, the fact remained that in July, 1914, Anglo-German 
relations were more cordial than they had been at any time 
since the Boer War. England had tried by her action to 
prove that she was not opposed to German expansion; 

1 Preussische Jahrbiicher, July, 1913; Zum Weltwlk hindurcht, pp. 15-16. 



374 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Germany had been willing to negotiate an agreement with 
England on the basis of give and take. When the Arch- 
duke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated at Serajevo, on 
28 June, talk of an Anglo-German war had been relegated 
to the limbo of those prophecies which twenty years before 
had represented an Anglo-French or an Anglo-Russian war 
as the inevitable outcome of irreconcilable ambitions. 
In his interesting book, The War of Steel and Gold, Mr. 
H. N. Brailsford ridiculed the idea that any Power — least 
of all Germany — would unchain a general war, and roundly 
belabored British statesmen for ever assuming that she 
would do so. To all outward appearances England and 
Germany had "cleaned the slate." 

The collapse of this auspicious beginning is the most 
tragic feature of the war. There were only two outstand- 
ing questions in Europe: the Near East and Alsace- 
Lorraine. The definitive solution of the former was not 
imperative at the moment. For, besides the Anglo-German- 
Turkish arrangement, other agreements were under way be- 
tween Germany, France, Russia, Italy, and Turkey, which 
would have divided the Ottoman Empire into economic 
spheres of interest, each reserved for a particular Power. 
The outlook for Armenian reforms, under international 
auspices, was hopeful. The Turk, in short, was to be given 
a final chance, and, if he failed, the Great Powers might 
solve his problem peacefully by keeping the territories 
they were now staking off for purposes of exploitation. 

As regards the other question, were London reconciled 
with Berlin, it might play the mediator between Paris and 
Berlin. Frenchmen certainly had not forgotten Alsace- 
Lorraine, but they were tired of militarism, and they had 
shot their last bolt in the revival of three years' service. 
If the Republic could have been guaranteed against at- 
tack, perhaps by the retrocession of Metz; if Germany could 
have brought herself to concede genuine self-government 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 375 

to the disputed provinces, one cannot help thinking that 
in time France would have abandoned the Russian alliance. 
Certainly her peasants and bourgeoisie could invest as 
profitably in German commercial enterprises as in Russian 
state bonds. In spite of all the difficulties — and they were 
many — a peace league of France, Germany, and England 
was not more unthinkable than was a few years ago the 
reconciliation of England with France and Russia, or the 
more recent rapprochement between England and Ger- 
many. In such a case good will is everything, and in each 
of the three countries forces were at work to break down 
the age-old barriers of hatred and suspicion. Not in a 
day would the task have been accomplished, but could 
the peace of Europe have been preserved ten years longer, 
the democracies of France, Germany, and England, one 
likes to believe, would not have been unresponsive to the 
idea which their more enlightened leaders had already put 
before them. 

An outsider would consider it a clever stroke on the part 
of Germany to have allayed the suspicions of England 
at a time when Russo- German relations were becoming 
strained. Curiously enough, the German Government did 
not take this view at all. In describing the situation of 
Germany at the outbreak of the war, Herr von Bethmann- 
Hollweg said in the Reichstag on 2 December, 1914, that 
"the circle was closed," and that Germany therefore "as- 
sumed the consequences arising out of this whole state of 
affairs" — language which can only mean that Germany was 
determined to shatter the Entente at all costs. "A people 
of the greatness and capacity of the Germans," said the 
chancellor, "will not allow itself to be smothered in its 
free and peaceful development." The root of the evil was 
that the Entente had been designed by England to serve 
the principle of the balance of power. "Therein lay the 
aggressive character of the Triple Entente as compared 



376 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

with the purely defensive tendencies of the Triple Alliance; 
therein lay the germ of a powerful explosion." 

In the course of his speech Herr von Bethmann-Holl- 
weg baldly admitted that the aim of his policy had been 
to break up the Entente by means of separate agreements 
with the different members. There was the Morocco 
treaty with France, and "some agreements with Russia 
had been arrived at"; but the French revanche idea and 
the Russian alliance with France, together with the Pan- 
Slavic aspirations, "rendered impossible any agreement 
that would have excluded the danger of war in the case of 
political crises." 

England, however, had repeatedly declared that her 
hands were free. The chancellor believed that "the grow- 
ing power of Germany and the increasing risk of war" 
would persuade England to make "a friendly compromise 
with Germany." His hopes seemed to have been realized 
in part. "By dint of long, hard work an understanding 
was reached as to various contested questions of economic 
interests respecting the Near East and Africa," by which 
"the number of possible political friction-points was to 
be reduced." But, all the time, "England was increasingly 
intent upon making its relations with Russia and France 
steadily closer. . . . She was, indeed, ready to reach 
understandings with Germany concerning separate ques- 
tions, but the chief and first principle of the English policy 
was the same — the free development of Germany's powers 
must be held in check by the balance of power. That is 
the boundary line for friendly relations with Germany. 
And its purpose is: to strengthen the Triple Entente to 
the uttermost." 

It is, of course, perfectly true that Great Britain is fight- 
ing to preserve the balance of power. But is not the 
chancellor's charge an admission that Germany is aiming 
at world dominion? Moreover, when he claimed that 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 377 

England had engineered the Entente to serve the balance 
of power, he forgot that in the documents published by 
the N orddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung England was rep- 
resented as the dupe of France and Russia. Once again, 
Germany cannot have it both ways. England could not 
engineer the Entente and at the same time be the dupe of 
her partners. Nor can Germany, with complete freedom 
of action, make an agreement with England, and then, 
when it leads to unexpected results, blame England that 
it did not go far enough. As has been pointed out in 
previous pages of this book, Inconsistency, thy name is Ger- 
many! 

The Anglo- German understanding was a by-product of 
the Balkan revolution; so also was the bitterness which 
characterized Russo- German relations in the last six months 
of peace. Hitherto, as joint abetters of the partition of 
Poland, Russia and Germany had considered their inter- 
ests identical in restraining the schemes of the Poles to re- 
cover their independence. They also regarded themselves 
as the bulwarks of monarchical absolutism against the tide 
of democratic progress, so much so, in fact, that during the 
Russian revolution the authorities of Berlin afforded every 
facility to the Russian Government for tracking down and 
capturing Russian revolutionaries in Germany. 

Likewise, in the domain of high policy, co-operation was 
long the order of the day. At the time of the Crimean War 
Prussia steadfastly resisted the urgings of France and Eng- 
land to join them, and was rewarded by Russian neutrality 
in the wars of 1866 and 1870 against Austria and France, 
without which the Prussian triumphs would have been im- 
possible. Bismarck, regarding the friendship of Russia as 
the keystone of his policy, always "kept the wire open to 
St. Petersburg"; and if William II abandoned this policy 
as being "too complicated," he managed to preserve ex- 
cellent personal relations with the Tsar by supporting 



378 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Russian designs in the Far East. As recently as 1910, it 
will be remembered, Russia accepted the German proposals 
for the Baghdad railway and was enthusiastically praised 
in the German press for what appeared to be an abandon- 
ment of France and Great Britain, which countries were 
then the chief antagonists of German diplomacy. 

Russo- German intimacy was shattered by two circum- 
stances. In the first place, Russian opinion gradually 
became convinced that the road to Constantinople lay 
through Berlin. 1 Bismarck's conduct at the Congress of 
Berlin, where he supported England and Austria in demand- 
ing the revision of the treaty of San Stefano, dictated as 
it was by the Russians at the gates of Constantinople, 
caused profound resentment throughout the Tsardom, and 
was never forgotten. Thanks to this, the Russian Govern- 
ment had no little difficulty in restraining the popular de- 
mand for war in 1908-9, when Germany supported Austria- 
Hungary in the annexation of Bosnia, and again in 1912-13, 
in the creation of an independent Albania. Moreover, for 
twenty years Germany had done her best to regenerate 
Turkey, with the purpose of checking the Russian advance, 
and to keep Russia in leading-strings, in order that Austria 
might have a free hand in the Balkans. The liberal elements 
in Russia regarded Prussia as the chief prop of the Tsar's 
autocratic system, and Berlin was credited with making 
threats which prevented justice being done to Russian 
Poland. The commercial treaty dictated by Germany dur- 
ing the Japanese War was rather unfavorable to Russia, 
and Germany was expected to insist upon its renewal. 
In short, all the evils from which Russia was suffering — 
political, economic, social — were ascribed to the malign 
influence of Germany, whose culture had been unpopular 

1 Professor Mitrofanof, of the University of St. Petersburg, in Preussische Jahr- 
biicher, June, 1014. This letter to Professor Hans Delbriick and his reply are in- 
valuable for the study of Russo-German relations. 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 379 

with the mass of Russians since the very day when Peter 
the Great first tried to foist it upon his barbarous subjects. 

On the other hand, Germany had been suspicious of 
Russia ever since the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, 
for that agreement, along with a Russo-Japanese under- 
standing, gave Russian policy a free hand in the Near East, 
without fear of irritation from Manchuria or Persia. 
German publicists convinced themselves that Russia was 
at last preparing in earnest for the subversion of Turkey, 
and that Germany would not receive her share. The diffi- 
culties that arose over the Bosnian crisis have been discussed 
at length in an earlier chapter; we have also seen how the 
Balkan revolution upset the existing situation, entirely to 
the disadvantage of the Dual Monarchy — whose Balkan 
policy Germany had made her own, in spite of Bismarck's 
warning — and therefore of Germany. It was also prob- 
lematical how long Turkey could survive the operation 
performed by the Balkan states. In German eyes the 
danger was increased when the Russian Government pro- 
tested, in January, 19 14, against the appointment of 
General Liman von Sanders as reorganizer of the Turkish 
army. 

Russian opinion had been decidedly irritated by the 
German chancellor's prediction, made anent the German 
army bill of 1913, of an approaching struggle between 
Germanentum and Slaventum. When, therefore, on 2 
March, 19 14, the Kolnischer Zeitung, imitating its fanfare 
of a year before, to the effect that France was "the dis- 
turber of the peace," now declared that Russia would have 
struck at Germany during the Balkan Wars if she had been 
strong enough, the Russian press was allowed to reply 
in kind. With remarkable unanimity the organs of all 
parties declared that Russia would proceed with her mili- 
tary plans regardless of German remonstrances, and that 
Russian diplomacy would not submit to further humilia- 



380 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

tions. The government gave ample warning. It hinted 
that a practise mobilization would be carried out in the 
autumn of 1914, and actually mobilized one corps on the 
Austrian frontier. Then, on 23 May, M. Sazonof re- 
affirmed in the Duma the policy of the Balkans for the 
Balkan peoples. Finally, in the same month, the Duma 
passed a bill which levied duties on rye, peas, and beans 
imported through the western frontier, thereby dealing a 
hard blow at German agriculturists; for the cultivation of 
rye had assumed large proportions in Prussia, where it 
was amply protected, and the surplus output had been 
sold almost entirely in Russia. Russo- German friendship 
had, in brief, become a legend. 

The German press now began to discuss freely the de- 
sirability of a "preventive" war with the Russian colossus. 
There seems to have been a general conviction that Russia 
was seeking an opportunity to attack Germany. 1 It was 
universally believed that the Balkan League of 191 2 had 
been created by Russia for a flank attack on Austria; that 
only an accident had diverted it against Turkey; and that 
it was being reformed with Rumania in the place of Bul- 
garia. It was alleged that France had returned to the 
three years' service at the demand of Russia, and that 
Germany's huge military increases in 1913 were called 
forth as a reply. It was known that the last Russian loan 
in Paris, amounting to 2,500,000,000 francs, would be ap- 
plied to the construction of strategic railways in Poland, 
to the purchase of new equipment, and to a considerable 
increase of the army. The Kolnischer Zeitung calculated 
that the entire scheme of army reorganization would be 
worked out by 191 7: then the Russian attack would begin. 
Was it not better to anticipate while Germany was ready 
and her opponent was not? 

1 Paul Rohrbach, Zum Weltwlk hindurch I, pp. 24-33; Der Krieg und die deutsche 
Politik (1914), pp. 54-69. 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 381 

No doubt there was a military party in Russia. The 
desire to retrieve the humiliations of the Manchurian cam- 
paign was strong among the higher officers, and there was 
an indisposition to admit the much-vaunted superiority 
of the German military machine. Also, the official world, 
troubled at the spectre of revolution which was again 
raising its head, was not unwilling to provide a diversion 
by a war against the national enemy. But there is no 
evidence to show that the direction of Russian policy was 
not in the hands of the Tsar and M. Sazonof, the responsible 
foreign minister, both of whom were convinced supporters 
of peace. Nor has there been developed in Russia that 
cultivation of the martial spirit, that constant appeal to 
the doctrine of force which is the essence of militarism. 
Militarism, some one has remarked, is a state of mind, a 
particular view of life which tests all things and all men 
by the standards of power and subordinates to its own ends 
all the finer instincts. As means to its ends it demands 
order, discipline, efficiency — all foreign to the Russian char- 
acter; it is the negation of Russian life, as for that matter 
the Germans have boasted when they compared their own 
army to the huge, seemingly unwieldy mass of the Tsar's 
subjects. 

A Russo-German war may have been inevitable, for the 
ambitions of the two countries were as conflicting as na- 
tional policies well can be. But so were once the designs 
of England and France, England and Russia, England and 
Germany, and rapprochements had been effected. And, 
even if it be assumed that Russia would one day have 
called Germany to account in order that she might reach 
the ultimate goal of her policy, it must be admitted that 
Russian policy has never been directly oriented against 
Germany, whereas in the years 1907-14 German diplomacy 
went out of its way whenever possible to administer doses 
of disagreeable medicine to its eastern rival. Of course 



382 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

neither side was entirely free from blame, but, historically 
considered, the major responsibility for the Russo-German 
rupture must be assigned to Germany, primarily because 
here as elsewhere she insisted on having her way and de- 
manded instant obedience from Russia, which no self- 
respecting nation could render. It is but another illustra- 
tion of German loose thinking, when we are desired to 
believe that because Russia might have loosed the dogs of 
war in 1 91 7, she is, in consequence, responsible for their hav- 
ing got loose in 19 14. The real question is: which Power 
worked for peace in the last days of July, 1914, Germany 
or Russia? 

The time is probably far off when a definitive account 
can be given of the events of 1 913-14 in their proper per- 
spective and true inwardness. Scarcely any documents 
relating to that period have been published by the bellig- 
erent governments, and the information at present avail- 
able must be culled from the press, the occasional speeches 
of statesmen, and the mass of ephemeral literature evoked 
by a great crisis. But gradually evidence of one kind or 
another is accumulating to show that the Teutonic Powers 
were preparing for war long before the murder of the Arch- 
duke Francis Ferdinand at Serajevo. Granted that this 
testimony proceeds entirely from the Allied countries, or 
from sources favorable to their cause, it is noteworthy that, 
in all the strenuous propaganda conducted by Germany 
and her agents, no effort has been made to disprove the 
evidence against her. The historical student will not ac- 
cept the scattered charges here assembled as conclusive 
proof of a German conspiracy to provoke a war, but he 
can set up a case which Germany cannot demolish by the 
asseveration, Es ist nicht wahr. 1 In the absence of official 

1 This method — the reiteration of the phrase, "It is not true," was adopted in the 
manifesto of the ninety-three German intellectuals issued shortly after the begin- 
ning of the war. 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 383 

information, he is entitled to formulate opinions on the 
basis of such circumstantial stories as may be told. 

The case against Austria-Hungary may be examined first. 
How the unexpected results of the Balkan Wars prompted 
her to invoke the casus foederis of the Triple Alliance in 
August, 1913, and how she failed to secure the approval 
of Italy, is known from the revelations of Signor Giolitti, 
already noted. In April, 1914, Count Tisza, the Hungarian 
premier, published an article in the Jgazmondo of Budapest, 
in which he cautioned Russia to keep her hands off the 
Balkans if she wished to maintain friendly relations with 
the Dual Monarchy. 1 In the same month, according to 
the Bucharest correspondent of the Morning Post, "the 
Marquis Pallavicini, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at 
Constantinople, made a stay of three days at Bucharest, 
during which he sounded various political personages 
whether Rumania would follow Austria and Germany in 
the event of the former declaring war, the Marquis affirm- 
ing that Austria would be obliged to proceed to this ex- 
tremity." 2 A pretext would easily have been found, for 
Serbia had just concluded a concordat with the Vatican 
which challenged the traditional claim of Austria to pro- 
tect Catholics in the western Balkans. And it has been 
asserted that when the German Emperor visited the Arch- 
duke Francis Ferdinand at Konopischt, two weeks before 
the tragedy of Serajevo, the latter secured from his guest 
the promise of Germany's assistance for an aggressive 
policy in the south. 3 Certain it is that the idea of "direct 
action" had become increasingly popular with the German 
and Magyar elements of the Monarchy since Count Berch- 
told had failed to obtain any positive advantages from the 
collapse of Turkey in Europe. His own character did not 
inspire confidence in his conservatism, and the chief of the 

1 New York Times, 26 April, 1914. 2 Ibid., 7 December, 1914. 

3 Politicus, Fortnightly Review, September, 1914, p. 450. 



384 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

general staff, General Conrad von Hotzendorf, was notori- 
ously reckless and belligerent. At no time, in short, since 
the disposition of other peoples and others' lands became 
the chief industry of the European chanceries had the Dual 
Monarchy shown such willingness to embark on a career 
of adventure and aggression. 

As to Germany, the most striking evidence is afforded by 
the French Yellow Book. In a secret report on the strength- 
ening of the German army, dated 19 March, 19 13, and 
"received from a reliable source" by the French minister 
of war on 2 April, occur these words: 

"We must accustom the people to think that an offensive war 
on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of 
our adversaries. We must act with prudence, so as not to arouse 
suspicion, and to avoid crises which might injure our economic ex- 
istence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight 
of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained polit- 
ical relations, an outbreak should be considered as a relief, because 
after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. 
We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is 
much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the dis- 
trust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot 
be concealed." 

The writer of the report then emphasizes the necessity 
of creating diversions for Germany's enemies in their 
colonial possessions, and continues: 

"Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to 
be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break 
out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communi- 
cation; they must have a controlling head to be found among the 
influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian school is 
particularly suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a 
bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan world." 1 

Even more illuminating is the report of a conversation be- 
tween the German Emperor and the King of the Belgians, 

1 No. 2, part 2. 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 385 

in November, 1913. What actually passed between the 
two monarchs is not divulged, but it is not difficult to 
imagine the purport: 

"The person addressed by the Emperor," wrote the French am- 
bassador in Berlin, "had thought up till then, as did all the world, 
that William II, whose personal influence had been exerted on 
many critical occasions in support of peace, was still of the same 
state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The 
German Emperor is no longer the champion of peace against the 
warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William II has 
come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must 
come sooner or later. . . . 

"During the course of the conversation the Emperor, moreover, 
seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II advances in 
years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, 
and especially the impatience of the soldiers obtain a greater em- 
pire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the 
popularity acquired by his son, who natters the passions of the 
Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by 
the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. . . . 

"Whatever may have been the object of the conversation re- 
lated to me, the revelation is none the less of extreme gravity. . . . 
It would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the 
Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were for- 
merly repugnant to him, and that to borrow from him a phrase 
which he likes to use, 'we must keep our powder dry.'" : 

General utterances of this kind, however, are scarcely 
sufficient to establish the thesis that a war was in immedi- 
ate preparation. Much more to the point is the succes- 
sion of curious incidents which filled the first six months 
of 1914. In January the Krupps endeavored to take up 
£2,000,000 worth of new shares offered by the Poutiloff 
Arms Factory of St. Petersburg, which executes orders 
for the Russian Government; this transaction would have 
transferred the control to the German company. As the 
concern possessed the secrets of the French artillery, which 

»No. 6. 



386 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

the Russian army had adopted, the change of ownership 
might have had far-reaching effects, and was, in fact, pre- 
vented by the government. 

In March the British admiralty announced that instead 
of the usual annual manoeuvres a practise mobilization of 
the entire fleet would be carried out. It is believed that 
this measure was taken as a precaution against the event 
of war; according to one account Mr. Churchill was 
warned by an ambassador of one of the Triple Alliance 
Powers at a Continental court that stirring days were 
ahead. 1 

The month of June witnessed the forced sale on the 
London stock exchange of large quantities of German 
securities. Though not understood at the moment, it was 
later interpreted as an effort to throw British credit out 
of gear, and at the same time to increase the amount of 
gold in Germany. 

A curious letter, written on 20 July, 1914, was published 
in the Petit Parisien on 10 January, 191 5. The writer, a 
Dr. Magnan, Director of the French School of Advanced 
Research, spent the spring and early summer in the Rhine 
provinces studying the German treatment of typhoid. 
He learned that lists had been made of " typhoid bearers" — 
persons who might distribute germs among large numbers 
of men; these persons were to be deported to central Ger- 
many "immediately on the outbreak of war." Luxemburg 
was asked to furnish similar lists but refused. Dr. Ma- 
gnan also saw work on six new strategic railways be- 
tween Treves and Karthaus being feverishly concluded, 
and in Luxemburg was told that war was imminent. 

On 14 June secret instructions, subsequently intercepted, 
were addressed to the commander of the German cruiser 
Eber, then in dock at Cape Town. They "revealed a com- 

1 Nation (New York), 27 August, 1014, p. 245. (London correspondence of 11 
August.) 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 387 

plete system for coaling the German navy on the outbreak 
of war through secret service agents in Cape Town, New 
York, and Chicago," the commander being given the names 
of shippers and bankers with whom he could deal confi- 
dentially. 1 

On 1 August the German liner Cap Trafalgar arrived 
at Buenos Aires, bringing extra guns, which were trans- 
ferred by night to other German ships in port. In the same 
city Germans were said to display letters from their govern- 
ment ordering them to hold themselves in readiness. Both 
the liner and the letters must have left Germany not later 
than 1 July. 2 

Of great interest is the letter published by El Liberal of 
Madrid on 7 September, 19 14. It is a series of questions 
said to have been addressed on 8 July by the German con- 
sul in Palma, Majorca (in the Balearic Isles) to the president 
of the works committee of the port, who, instead of for- 
warding the letter to the naval authorities, answered the 
inquiry directly. Among the points on which information 
was desired were: the amount of Welsh coal available, 
size of quays and docks, depth of port, number of tugs 
available, and many other details. 3 This document derives 
its interest from the presence of the German cruisers Goeben 
and Breslau in the Mediterranean at the opening of hostili- 
ties. If they could seize the islands as a naval base, the 
main German fleet, then off the coast of Norway, could 
sweep around the north of Scotland into the Atlantic, and 
then, bursting into the Mediterranean, prevent the French 
from transporting troops from Africa — a scheme apparently 
abandoned when the British fleet was not dispersed after 
its mobilization. 

The cumulative effect of these various facts, stories, or 
allegations — whatever one may choose to call them — cer- 

1 Times (weekly edition), 9 October, 1014. 2 Ibid., 7 August, 1014. 

3 New York Times, 8 September, 1914. 



388 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

tainly favors the view that the murders of Serajevo merely 
furnished the excuse for an aggressive move definitely and 
carefully planned for the summer of 1914. 

That season promised well for the success of a war 
suddenly sprung and rapidly conducted. On 13 July a 
startling indictment of the deficient organization and equip- 
ment of the French army was made by M. Charles Hum- 
bert in a report to the Senate. The forts on the frontier 
were alleged to be poorly constructed; guns lacked ammuni- 
tion; there was a bad shortage of boots. The French artil- 
lery was falling behind that of Germany, in numbers at 
least; in heavy guns especially did the Germans have a 
distinct superiority. The essential truth of these charges 
was proved in the early days of the war, and the Germans, 
with their elaborate spy system, may well have known of 
this state of affairs. Furthermore, France seemed ab- 
sorbed by the Caillaux trial. The political situation was 
obscure, owing to the confusion of parties resulting from 
the recent general election and the kaleidoscopic minis- 
terial changes. Toward the end of the month the Presi- 
dent of the Republic and the prime minister proceeded on 
a visit to Russia, and did not return until the crisis was 
well developed. 

In Russia revolution seemed to have raised its head 
again. The forcible suppression of earlier strikes, the per- 
secution of the labor press, the frequent dissolution of trade- 
unions, taken with the hard conditions of living, had pro- 
voked general unrest. Rioting began in St. Petersburg at 
the time of President Poincare's visit; the tram and rail- 
way services were soon disorganized, and for a while the 
days of 1905 seemed to have returned. German and Aus- 
trian inspiration of this outbreak has been charged, but 
nothing definite has leaked out. German diplomacy may 
have hoped by this means to paralyze the Russian army 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 389 

temporarily, or it may have argued that the Tsar's Govern- 
ment would be the more inclined to try the arbitrament 
of war as a solution of domestic difficulties. In either case 
Germany had nothing to lose by the intrigue. 

Across the North Sea the very stars in their courses 
seemed to be fighting for the German cause. In far-away 
Vancouver the deportation of some would-be Hindu immi- 
grants by the Canadian authorities had provided the Lon- 
don Government with a thorny problem that showed no 
disposition to solve itself on the traditional basis of com- 
promise. In the middle of July the Times military corre- 
spondent had adverted to the deficit of recruits for the 
regular army since 1907, averaging nearly 5,000 a year. 
It was notorious that the territorials were far below the 
stipulated establishment. Spies were also said to have 
predicted a strike of the transport workers when mobiliza- 
tion was proclaimed. 1 

But, above all, there was Ireland. Now, if ever, would 
the old adage be remembered: "England's danger is Ire- 
land's opportunity." King George himself had said that 
the danger of civil war was present to all responsible and 
sober-minded people. Gun-running in Ulster and an in- 
cipient mutiny of the army officers had gone so far without 
punishment that in the third week of July riots had oc- 
curred in Dublin, and the whole island was one vast powder 
magazine, only awaiting the spark of ignition. Baron von 
Kuhlmann, the councillor of the London embassy, who was 
more trusted by his government than the ambassador him- 
self, is believed to have reported to Berlin that effective 
action could not be taken by a government in such straits 
as the Asquith ministry; his intimate relations with Lord 
Morley, Mr. John Burns, and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald 
may have persuaded him that Great Britain would not 
intervene in a European war. 

l New York Times, 23 October, 1014. 



390 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

It is commonly asserted that Germany laid her plans 
on this- last assumption, and the theory is plausible. A 
Liberal government was in power, was rated as favoring 
peace at any price, and had recently been cultivating good 
relations with Germany. The pro-German party was 
vigorous and respected. The colonial agreement about to 
be published had disarmed old suspicions of German am- 
bitions. The pacifists were aghast at the naval estimates. 
If only the bribe were high enough, England would stand 
aside, for the nation of shopkeepers had lost the martial 
spirit and looked sordidly to its commerce and its pleasures. 

Doubtless the German Government hoped to keep Eng- 
land neutral until it had settled its account with France 
and then dealt the Russians a sharp blow sufficient to 
render them harmless for a time. But it is inconceivable 
that the Emperor and his advisers seriously expected Eng- 
land to stand aside permanently. They knew Sir Edward 
Grey as the firm friend of France and the ardent advocate 
of the balance of power; the chancellor later admitted 
that he had never hoped to break down the British obses- 
sion of a Europe in equilibrium. 1 If the past history of 
England meant anything, it postulated intervention sooner 
or later against a Power about to dominate Europe. 
The German fleet had not been constructed for nothing; 
the decision to make war had not been postponed to no 
purpose until the summer of 1914, when the deepening of 
the Kiel Canal, just finished, permitted the use of the fleet 
in either the Baltic or the North Sea. During the negotia- 
tions the Wilhelmstrasse was repeatedly warned that in 
certain conditions Great Britain would be drawn into the 
conflict, in spite of which the declaration of war was 
launched against Russia. Above all, there was Belgium, 
whose neutrality the general staff was determined to vio- 
late. Now, since the fourteenth century England has con- 

1 Reichstag, 2 December, 1914. 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 391 

sistently opposed the absorption of the Low Countries by 
a strong Power; this was the issue in her struggle with 
Louis XIV, and she entered the lists against the French 
Revolution precisely because the First Republic was bent 
on extending its frontier to the Rhine. At the Congress 
of Vienna in 181 5, on the occasion of the Belgian revolu- 
tion of 1830, in the War of 1870, she had manifested the 
same inflexible determination to keep Belgium a free and 
independent state. So in 1914. The truth is, so inevita- 
ble was the intervention of England if Belgium was mo- 
lested that Germany must actually have desired to see 
England drawn in — or else her statesmen and diplomatists 
were the sorriest or most incapable that ever directed the 
destinies of a great nation. 

After all, why should Germany fear English intervention ? 
The " contemptible little army" that might be sent over 
to help the French was an inconsequential muster of hire- 
lings and would probably arrive too late to be of service. 
Civil war in Ireland would paralyze action on a grand scale. 
The colonies would revolt, to the accompaniment of open 
sedition in Egypt and India. There would be the usual 
attempt to "muddle through," but against German effi- 
ciency it would be of no avail. The colossus with feet of 
clay would fall like its namesake at Rhodes, and on the 
wreck of the British Empire victorious Germany would 
dictate the terms of peace which would make her the mis- 
tress of the world. 

When General Botha returned to Cape Town, in July, 
191 5, after his conquest of German Southwest Africa, he 
made a speech which bears out these contentions: 

"One of the most interesting discoveries in German Southwest 
Africa was a map showing the redistribution of the world after the 
'Peace of Rome, 1916.' It placed the whole of Africa south of 
the equator as a greater German Empire. There was a small por- 
tion segregated as a Boer reserve. 



392 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

"This and other indications of the same character showed the 
German designs upon the Union of South Africa, and what faith 
could be placed in their word ? It was established that Maritz [the 
leader of the unsuccessful rebellion] had sent a delegate to German 
Southwest Africa in 19 13 and had received an encouraging reply. 
Before the war broke out the rebellion was brewing, and in these 
circumstances Maritz sent a delegate to inquire how far the rebels 
would be able to obtain assistance in artillery, arms, and ammuni- 
tion, and how far the independence of South Africa would be 
guaranteed." 

Then, according to information which General Botha re- 
ceived, correspondence took place between the governor of 
German Southwest Africa and the Kaiser. The Kaiser's 
answer was as follows: 

"'I will not only acknowledge the independence of South Africa, 
but will even guarantee it, provided the rebellion is started imme- 
diately.'"! 

If one remembers how delicate the international situation 
was in 1913, during the Balkan crisis, one cannot help 
wondering whether behind the support given by Germany 
to Sir Edward Grey's mediation there did not lurk a secret 
design to precipitate the war then if France, Russia, or 
England, separately or together, should make a false step. 
The story of the South African intrigue is the most dam- 
aging evidence yet produced against Germany. 

So Germany's hour of destiny had come. Never again 
could she hope for so favorable an opportunity. Her army 
was at the highest absolute and relative efficiency; her war- 
chest was full; she believed herself invincible; and her peo- 
ple could be expected to respond magnificently to the call. 
The long years of preparation and education had not been 
in vain. "Your Majesty can have no conception," said 
General von Moltke to the King of the Belgians, in the 

1 Times (weekly edition), 30 July, 1915. 



THE EVE OF THE WAR 



393 



presence of the Emperor, "of the irresistible enthusiasm 
with which the whole German people will be carried away 
when the day of war comes." J It merely remained so to 
shuffle the cards that the fatherland might appear the victim 
of an unprovoked aggression. As it happened the gods 
could not have provided a better opportunity for this ex- 
ercise of kingcraft than the catastrophe of Serajevo. 

1 French Yellow Book, no. 6. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE CRISIS OF 1914 1 

On 28 June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the 
heir to the Austrian throne, and his wife, the Duchess of 
Hohenberg, were assassinated at Serajevo, in the province 
of Bosnia. The assassins were subjects of the Dual Mon- 
archy, but it was charged by the Austrian Government that 
they had procured their arms from the Serbian state arsenal 
at Kragujevacz and had received other assistance from 
Serbian government officials. They were, in fact, members 
of the Narodna Odbrana, the Serbian secret society which 
was carrying on an active propaganda in Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, with the object of detaching those provinces from 
the Hapsburg dominions and effecting their incorporation 
in the Kingdom of Serbia. Gavril Princip and Nedeljko 
Gabrinovitch, the actual murderers, assuredly had no 
thought of producing a world-wide war : they were impres- 
sionable students imbued with intense hatred for the Aus- 
trian regime, and would seem to have been the obedient 
tools of men higher up in the Narodna Odbrana, more 
especially one Milan Ciganovitch, of the Serbian state 

1 This chapter and the two following have been written almost entirely from the 
documents published by the belligerent governments, which have been collected 
by the British Government in a single volume, under the title Collected Diplomatic 
Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War (igis). The documents 
are referred to by nationality and number, as "British, no. 101." The German 
White Book is quoted from the Collected Diplomatic Documents ; also certain other 
documents published after the original Papers and Books. The British White Paper 
("Correspondence Respecting the European Crisis") was republished as a Blue 
Book ("Great Britain and the European Crisis"), to which was prefixed an "In- 
troductory Narrative of Events, "of great interest. Unfortunately this ' ' Narrative ' ' 
was not included in the Collected Documents : reference must therefore be made 
to the Blue Book itself, and as the pagination differs in the various editions, only 
to the sections of the "Narrative." 

394 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 395 

railways, and Major Voija Tankositch, who secured the 
six bombs and six pistols used by Princip and his associates, 
instructed them in the use of these weapons, and arranged 
for the secret crossing of the Serbo-Bosnian frontier. It 
was the alleged complicity of these men which enabled the 
Austrian Government to charge that the Narodna Odbrana 
was "entirely dominated by the Belgrade foreign office," 
and that its policy of agitation, together with the enlist- 
ment of volunteers "for the coming war with the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy," represented the ambitions of the 
Serbian Government, which had also "permitted its press 
to disseminate hatred against the Dual Monarchy." ! 

In its broad outlines this indictment was undoubtedly 
true. The Serbian people and their government ardently 
desired the disintegration of Austria-Hungary in order 
that their ideal might be realized of a Greater Serbia coter- 
minous with the boundaries of the Serb race. To this am- 
bition, which aimed not only at her dismemberment but 
would also cut her off from the sea, Austria-Hungary, a 
Great Power with a long history and a traditional policy 
of territorial expansion, was bound to oppose the resistance 
of all her forces. For at least a decade the fight had been 
waged on both sides with all the ferocity and cunning ever 
associated with Balkan politics, and the assassination of 
the archduke was merely the culminating incident. It is 
not yet possible to form an impartial opinion of the con- 
troversy. Serbia's throne was blood-stained, and her peo- 
ple the most backward in the Balkans except, of course, 
the Albanians; their record in the past was not such as 
to inspire excessive confidence in their liberating mission. 
Since their triumphs over Turkey and Bulgaria they had 
become somewhat conceited and demanding. On the other 
hand, the whole trouble was due very largely to the treat- 
ment meted out to their Slav subjects by Austria and Hun- 

1 Austrian, no. ig (the dossier of evidence against Serbia). 



396 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

gary alike, which had been a perversion of justice, a denial 
of the most solemn legal obligations. Nor, as was brought 
out in the famous Agram and Friedjung trials, had the 
Ballplatz hesitated to manufacture documents for the pur- 
pose of incriminating the Serbian Government in plots 
which did not exist. Clearly, therefore, Austria, no more 
than Serbia, came into the "court of civilization" with 
clean hands. 

There was a solution of the difficulty: the incorporation 
of the Kingdom of Serbia in the Hapsburg Monarchy, and 
the complete reorganization of that monarchy on the basis 
of trialism or federalism — that is, all the Southern Slav 
provinces would be formed into a single kingdom, analogous 
to the Empire of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, 
or there might be established local self-government for 
each of the provinces — Slav, Magyar, or German — under 
the supreme authority of a single parliament. Such a 
solution would effect the unity of the Serb race, and Would 
at the same time preserve to the monarchy its outlet on the 
Adriatic. But it would come within the realm of practical 
politics at the present time only if both Russia and Serbia 
were reduced to military impotency; and even then its 
feasibility may well be doubted, for the hatred of the Serbs 
for all things Austrian is now too deep to be reconciled 
by belated concessions. 

The assassination of the archduke was not without its 
grim irony. Francis Ferdinand was one of the few Haps- 
burg statesmen who perceived the necessity of a new policy 
toward the Slav peoples of the Monarchy. His precise 
views were unknown, for he talked little, but he passed 
for a federalist, and he was certainly a true friend of the 
Slavs. Yet, as the embodiment of Hapsburg policy, he 
was disliked by them and was murdered by one of them. 
But because of his Slavophile leanings his death would 
seem to have caused profound satisfaction in German and 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 397 

Magyar circles, and it solved one pressing problem. When 
he married the Countess Sophie Chotek, he had been com- 
pelled to renounce for her children all claims to the Aus- 
trian throne; in Hungary, however, their rights were fully 
admitted. A confused succession thus loomed in the future. 
But with the disappearance of Francis Ferdinand the 
Archduke Charles Francis Joseph became the undisputed 
heir to all the Hapsburg lands. It has been charged that 
the political enemies of the archduke, though warned of 
the plot against him, deliberately neglected to take proper 
precautions at Serajevo, as he himself complained when the 
first attempt to assassinate him failed. 

The importance of the Serajevo tragedy was immediately 
recognized in every corner of Europe, and the verdict may 
be given in the words of Sir Edward Grey: 

"No crime," says the " Introductory Narrative of Events," pre- 
fixed to the British Blue Book, "has ever aroused deeper or more 
general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. 
Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the governments and 
the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any 
measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to 
take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices." 1 

The only question was whether she would observe the re- 
straint incumbent upon a Great Power in dealing with a 
small and weak nation, no matter how great the provoca- 
tion. As the Serbian minister in Vienna pointed out, Aus- 
tria had to choose one of the following courses : "Either to 
regard the Serajevo outrage as a national misfortune and 
a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with 
the evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's co-operation 
in the work would be requested in order to prevent the 
perpetrators escaping the extreme penalty ; or to treat the 
Serajevo outrage as a Pan-Serbian, South-Slav and Pan- 

1 Sec. 1, par. 2. 



398 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Slav conspiracy, with every manifestation of the hatred, 
hitherto repressed, against Slavdom." 1 

Austria chose the latter alternative, thereby dispensing 
with her rights, under international law, to demand the 
assistance of a neighboring state in the apprehension of 
criminals, and frankly placing the question on the plane 
of political expediency. It may be admitted that her 
position was difficult. The Serbian Government claims 
to have warned the Austrian authorities that Ciganovitch 
was a dangerous person, and to have received the reply 
that he was under Austrian protection. It repeatedly de- 
clared its willingness to conduct an investigation of the 
murder, and, in reply to Austrian complaints that no such 
investigation had been undertaken, asserted, on 19 July, 
that "not once did the Austro-Hungarian Government 
apply to the Serbian Government for their assistance in 
the matter." 2 The studiously correct attitude of Bel- 
grade afforded no pretext for that decisive action which 
the Monarchy desired, for the Vienna foreign office did 
not establish, before or since the war began, the complicity 
of the Serbian Government in the crime of Serajevo. The 
elaborate dossier of evidence published in the Austrian 
Red Book proves only — what nobody denied — that the po- 
litical ambitions of Serbia were subversive of Austria's in- 
tegrity. And it is inherently improbable that the Serbian 
Government was privy to the conspiracy hatched by Prin- 
cip and his associates. 

Serbia had not recovered from the Balkan Wars. Her 
army was depleted; the stock of munitions and uniforms 
had not been replenished; the finances were heavily bur- 
dened; the territory acquired in Macedonia had not been 
organized. To the west the new Albanian kingdom was 

1 Serbian, no. 17. 

2 Great Britain and the European Crisis, "Narrative," sec. 2, par. 3; Serbian, 
no. 30. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 399 

a source of constant trouble. With the Government of Vi- 
enna delicate negotiations were in progress for the trans- 
fer to Serbia of that part of the Oriental railway within 
her frontiers. Every consideration demanded for Serbia 
a period of recuperation, and her statesmen may surely 
be credited with enough wisdom to see that any untoward 
incident directed against Austria must, in the temper of 
Austro-Serbian relations, lead to reprisals that were likely 
to be disastrous to Serbia. 

For these very reasons, however — the impossibility of 
convicting the Serbian Government and the very weakness 
of the little kingdom— Austria was constrained to bring a 
general indictment against the Serbian nation, although 
Baron Macchio, one of the under-secretaries at the Ball- 
platz, had said to the Serbian minister that Austria did 
"not accuse the Serbian Government and the Serbian na- 
tion but the various agitators." * After all, the oppor- 
tunity to place Austro-Serbian relations on a new basis was 
too precious to lose; and in fairness one will not blame 
Austrian statesmen for making the most of a situation 
which was not of their invention. They were right, from 
their point of view, in proceeding to measures which would 
relieve them once for all of trouble with their southern 
neighbor; nor was any Power disposed to interpret in a 
narrow sense the measures which might be decided upon. 

At the same time Austria had a duty complementary to 
her "right," and that duty was to consider the interests 
of Europe. Indeed, she affected to do so, for she argued 
that Belgrade was the focus of European disturbance and 
that the peace of Europe would be infinitely more secure 
if the Serbian propaganda was exterminated at its source; 
hence the statement of Count Mensdorff, the Austrian am- 
bassador in London, that "before the Balkan War Serbia 
had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere 

1 Serbian, no. 12. 



400 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

of influence." x But no diplomatist seriously imagined 
that Austria could undertake a political action against 
Serbia without bringing Russia into the field and reopening 
the whole Balkan question. For more than a hundred 
years the international character of this question had been 
unreservedly admitted by all the Great Powers, and Aus- 
tria herself had been the consistent champion of that idea. 
For no reason whatsoever could she expect to be permitted 
to dictate a solution imposed by herself alone, any more 
than she could expect Russia to disinterest herself in the 
fate of a Slav people. These things were commonplaces 
in European diplomacy. "They were the facts of the 
European situation, the products of years of development, 
tested and retested during the last decade. Patient work 
might change them, but the product of years could not be 
pushed aside in a day." 2 

Yet, in spite of this, which was as apparent to Count 
Berchtold as to Sir Edward Grey, the Austrian minister 
embarked upon a policy which, as he himself admitted, 
"might develop into a collision with Russia." 3 This will- 
ingness to provoke a quarrel with Russia is the chief item 
in the bill against Austria and the most convincing reason 
for believing that she desired to settle her account with 
Russia. Otherwise, why should she present to the Ser- 
bian Government an ultimatum the rejection of which 
was desired 4 and which was bound to arouse Russian pub- 
lic opinion to irresistible indignation? It is quite beside 
the point, as it seems to the writer, to argue, as did both the 
Austrian and German Governments, that the affair was 
no concern of Russia, that she had no right to interfere, 
that Serbia must be left to her fate, etc. The fatal flaws 
in such reasoning are: first, the admission by both those 

1 British, no. 91. 

2 Great Britain and the European Crisis, " Narrative," sec. 2, par. 5. 

3 Austrian, no. 26. 4 British, no. 20, 161; French, no. 27. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 401 

governments that they expected Russia to take a hand; 
and second, the ultimate, if belated, acceptance by Count 
Berchtold of the Russian claim to interfere. The comment 
of Sir Edward Grey is pertinent : " There was nothing doubt- 
ful in the general international situation, no incalculable 
element which Austria could not take into full considera- 
tion. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the 
consequences of her action." * Austria had a case against 
Serbia, and the other Powers were ready to help her obtain 
satisfaction; she declined their assistance, and held to her 
own course until too late, when it was absolutely certain 
that an international conflagration would ensue. When a 
state decides upon a line of policy, and resolves to enforce 
that policy to the last detail, regardless of any obstacles 
which may arise, even at the point of the sword, it cannot 
absolve itself from responsibility by saying that the ob- 
stacles had no business to be in the way. That is the man- 
ner, however, in which Austria-Hungary "took the road 
pointed out by honor and duty." 2 

A word as to the thesis developed in the " Introduc- 
tion " to the Austrian Red Book : 

"There can be no doubt that the small Serbian state would 
never have ventured, with an animosity which was scarcely con- 
cealed, to work for the separation from the great neighboring Mon- 
archy of the territories which were inhabited by Southern Slavs, 
if she had not been sure of the secret approval and protection of 
Russia, and if she had not been able to depend on the powerful 
Pan-Slavist tendency in the Empire of the Tsar forcing the Russian 
Government, if necessary, to come to the aid of the Kingdom in 
its struggle for the realization of the Great-Serbian projects." 

The charge is in great measure true, but it is not the 
whole truth. The Great-Serbian agitation had been very 
strong during the crisis of 1875-8, but Russia then con- 

1 Great Britain and the European Crisis, " Narrative," sec. 2, par. 5. 
8 Austrian Red Book, "Introduction," last sentence. 



402 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

sen ted to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina. Nothing was heard of it for the next twenty-five 
years. What led to its recrudescence after 1903? Partly 
Russian inspiration, no doubt, but Austrian policy toward 
Serbia, which aimed to keep that kingdom in economic 
and political subjection to the Dual Monarchy, was also 
to blame. In fact, the Serbs turned to Russia for help, 
because life under the Austrian protectorate was intoler- 
able. At the same time they received no particular assist- 
ance from the great Slav empire until Count Aerenthal 
broke the Austro-Russian agreement to maintain the status 
quo and began a policy of adventure. Granted that Russia 
has done everything in her power to thwart the ambitions 
of Austria in the Balkans and has abetted the Serbs at 
every turn, it seems clear, from the historical point of view, 
that the latter has herself to blame, and that she was driven 
to make war on Serbia because she saw no other way to 
revenge herself for the mistakes of the past. 

Exactly one month after the archduke's death the Dual 
Monarchy declared war on Serbia, and the events of that 
interval merit a close scrutiny. In the first place, the 
press of both Austria-Hungary and Serbia indulged in a 
wild orgy of mutual vituperation, full reports of which 
were duly sent to each government by its representatives 
in the other country. Twenty-six samples of Serbian opin- 
ion are collected in the Austrian Red Book; 1 the Serbian 
Government took refuge behind the legal freedom of the 
press, but asserted that it had issued warnings and that 
the papers quoted in Austria were neither representative 
nor "the organs of any party or corporation." 2 But it is 
probable that, as was reported to Count Berchtold, the 
news of the archduke's death was received throughout 
Serbia "with evident satisfaction"; that it "evoked before 
the Serbian people visions of the impending disintegration 

1 No. 19, appendix 9. 2 Serbian, no. 20. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 403 

of the Hapsburg Empire"; and that the electoral campaign 
was " waged under the watchword of battle against Austria- 
Hungary." 1 The fact that London, Paris, and St. Peters- 
burg emphatically urged calmness upon Belgrade indicates 
their uneasiness lest the inflamed public opinion of Serbia 
might aggravate an already difficult situation. 2 

In Vienna and Budapest discretion was thrown to the 
winds. The press, with two exceptions, clamored for the 
condign punishment of Serbia, and fed its readers on the 
most exaggerated specimens of Serbian journalism. The 
reports of the Serbian minister testify to a campaign care- 
fully organized to excite the passions and patriotism of 
the polyglot inhabitants of the Dual Monarchy. The 
climax was reached when the Militarische Rundschau threw 
off the mask, saying: 

"If we do not decide for war, that war in which we shall have to 
engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less 
propitious circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests 
with us; Russia is not ready; moral factors as well as right are on 
our side." 3 

Nor was the excitement confined to the press. "The crime 
of Serajevo," wrote the French ambassador on 2 July, 
''arouses the most acute resentment in Austrian military 
circles, and among all those who are not content to allow 
Serbia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she 
has acquired." 4 According to the Serbian minister, "high 
Catholic circles" were also advocating strong measures. 
The old Emperor was believed to be against war, but his 
power to stem the flood was doubted, for "official German 
circles" were reported "especially ill disposed." 5 

The German press was also active. As early as 4 July 
the Hamburger Fremdenblatt spoke of an attack on Serbia 

'Austrian, nos. 1, 3, 5, 6. 'Serbian, nos. 10, 13, 14; British, no. 30. 

3 French, no. 12. * French, no. 8. '" Serbian, nos. 17, 22. 



404 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

as a settled thing, and added that if Russia interfered 
"there cannot be a particle of doubt that the German am- 
bassador in St. Petersburg would notify the Tsar that 
Germany would consider it a Biin&nisjall" The Germania 
of Berlin accused "the whole Serbian nation"; the Tage- 
blatt (which Herr von Jagow later described as "pestilen- 
tial") immediately raised the Serajevo crime to the dignity 
of an international matter. 1 

"Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion 
in Austria, and to a less degree in Germany, was plain, the 
intentions of the Austrian Government remained almost 
equally obscure." 2 All the Books agree as to the impene- 
trable mystery surrounding the Ballplatz in the first three 
weeks of July. No intimation of the impending storm 
was conveyed even to the Duke of Avarna, the ambassador 
of the allied Italian kingdom, much less to the British, 
French, and Russian ambassadors. 3 The last, "in conse- 
quence of the reassuring explanations made to him at the 
ministry of foreign affairs," left Vienna on 21 July for his 
own country. 4 "On n July the Serbian minister at Vienna 
had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication 
from the Austrian Government, and as late as 22 July, 
the day before the Austrian ultimatum was delivered at 
Belgrade, the minister-president of Hungary stated in 
Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion 
that a serious turn of events was necessary or even prob- 
able." 5 The French ambassador called at the Ballplatz 
at the very moment when the ultimatum was being pre- 
sented, and was told nothing of it. 6 

Counsels of moderation were not lacking. The French 
ambassador was "instructed to use all his influence with 

1 Nation (New York), 30 July, 1914, p. 121. 

' Great Britain and the European Crisis, " Narrative," sec. 2, par. 3. 

' British, no. 161; Serbian, no. 52. 4 French, no. 18. 

6 Great Britain and the European Crisis, "Narrative," sec. 2, par. 3. 

« Serbian, no. 52. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 405 

Count Berchtold" in that direction. 1 From St. Peters- 
burg came the warning that Austria must not attempt a 
search by her own officials on Serbian soil for the insti- 
gators of the Serajevo outrage. 2 Sir Edward Grey promised 
Prince Lichnowsky to preach conciliation at St. Petersburg, 
but he "assumed that the Austrian Government would 
not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public 
their case against Serbia, founded presumably upon what 
they had discovered at the trial." 3 But "both the British 
and the German Governments knew that peace might be 
disturbed." 4 

We now know that the Austrian attitude was a blind. 
The story has been told once for all by the German Gov- 
ernment. 

"It was clear to Austria," says its White Book, "that it was not 
compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of 
the Monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the 
border. The imperial and royal government appraised [sic] Ger- 
many of this conception and asked for our opinion. With all our 
heart we were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, 
and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the 
movement in Serbia directed against the conservation of the Mon- 
archy would meet with our approval. . . . We permitted Austria a 
completely free hand in her action toward Serbia, but have not 
participated in her preparations." s 

On the basis of the published evidence, it is not open to 
doubt that, as the British Government has charged, it 
was "the deliberate intention" of Germany and Austria 
"to take both Serbia and Europe by surprise." 6 Not 
until 20 July did M. Dumaine, the French ambassador in 
Vienna, secure a resume of the projected note "from a 
person specially well-informed as to official news." 7 Sir 

1 French, no. 17. * French, no. 10. 3 British, no. 1. 

4 Great Britain and the European Crisis, " Narrative," sec. 2, par. 2. 

* Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 406. 

• Ibid., p. vi. T French, no. 14. 



406 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Edward Grey received "a forecast of what was about to 
happen" from Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British ambas- 
sador, on 1 6 July, 1 but he felt constrained to ask Prince 
Lichnowsky on the 20th "if he had any news of what was 
going on in Vienna with regard to Serbia." 2 Meanwhile, 
the Austrian Government had mobilized eight army corps 
in Hungary, with which to begin military operations, 3 and 
the pessimism on the bourses of Berlin and Vienna indi- 
cated pretty clearly the trend of events. 

It is probably true, as Herr von Jagow repeatedly as- 
serted, 4 that in a technical sense the German Government 
had no precise or official knowledge of the Austrian note 
beforehand. If so, its responsibility is only the greater, 
for Austria would scarcely have dared present such a 
communication of its own initiative. M. Jules Cambon 
justifiably expressed "surprise at seeing [the foreign secre- 
tary] undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope 
he was ignorant," 5 and the British charge was equally 
astonished "at the blank check given by Germany to 
Austria." 6 

But not all official Germany was ignorant, for the presi- 
dent of the Bavarian council was acquainted with the terms 
of the note. 7 Sir Maurice de Bunsen later reported that 
he had "private information that the German ambassador 
(in Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to 
Serbia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the 
German Emperor." 8 That he "was kept informed of the 
note even in its minutest details" and "co-operated in 
drafting it" was the Serbian minister's account. 9 Herr 
von Tschirscky himself avowed that " Germany knew very 
well what she was about," 10 thereby practically convicting 

1 British, no. 161. t British, no. i. 3 French, no. 18. 

4 French, nos. 15, 30, etc.; British, nos. 18, 25, etc.; White Book, p. 406 ; Rus- 
sian, no. 18. 

6 French, no. 30. 6 French, no. 41. 7 French, no. 21. 

8 British, no. 05. 9 Serbian, no. 52. 10 British, no. 32. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 407 

his government of bad faith. For, unless the Berlin for- 
eign office knew what was going on, how could the German 
chancellor, on the very day that the ultimatum was pre- 
sented, inform the German ambassadors in the Entente 
capitals that "the action as well as the demands of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as 
justifiable"? 1 Why should Prince Lichnowsky have ex- 
pressed to Sir Edward Grey, as early as 20 July, the opinion 
that the situation was "very uncomfortable"? 2 Why 
otherwise should "the preliminary notices for mobilization, 
the object of which is to place Germany in a kind of 'at- 
tention' attitude in times of tension, have been sent out 
to those classes which would receive them in similar cir- 
cumstances" ? 3 Such conduct is not that of a government 
anxious to keep the peace and ready to negotiate in a deli- 
cate matter, but the resolute expression of a policy which 
can have only one end — war. 

Austria-Hungary, then, was under no restraints in what- 
ever policy she might elect to pursue. The driving force 
in her calculations was the desire to exalt her prestige. 

"If we neglect to clear up our relations with Serbia, we shall 
lay ourselves open to blame for increased difficulties and disadvan- 
tages in a future conflict which is bound to come. In the view of 
an official representative of the Austro-Hungarian Government, 
who is observing events on the spot, the realization is inevitable 
that we cannot afford to permit any further diminution of our 
prestige." 4 

So wrote Baron von Giesl, the minister at Belgrade, on 21 
July. So also the secretary-general of the Italian foreign 
office, who remarked upon "the conviction of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary 
for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the 

1 German, no. i; British, no. g; French, no. 28; Russian, no. 18. 

2 British, no. 1. 3 French, no. 15. * Austrian, no. 6. 



408 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

turn of events in the Balkans had occasioned, to score a 
definite success." * Hence the necessity of surprise tactics. 

On only one matter does there seem to have been any 
divergence of opinion between the Teutonic allies — the 
probable conduct of Russia. Granted that " Count Berch- 
told and the diplomatists desired at the most localized 
operations against Serbia," 2 neither he nor the Austrian 
military party was under any illusion as to the likelihood 
of Russian intervention: they fully expected it, and were 
simply anxious to face it under conditions advantageous to 
themselves. For a moment, indeed, after the Russian 
mobilization there was a show of yielding, but Count 
Berchtold was well aware that Germany would make the 
Russian mobilization a casus belli* and that Austria would 
receive the first blows of the Russian attack. The forward 
march once begun, there could be no drawing back. 

In the German White Book there is this admission: 

"We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of 
Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the 
field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance 
with our duty as allies." 4 

At the same time, several of the German representatives 
abroad let it be known that they expected Russia to stand 
aside. Herr von Tschirscky, at Vienna, expressed the "con- 
fident belief" that "Russia would keep quiet during the 
chastisement of Serbia" 5 — but Sir Maurice de Bunsen 
thought he "desired war from the first." 6 Count Pour- 
tales, at St. Petersburg, told the Serbian minister that the 
Austro-Serbian dispute "did not concern any one else." 7 
According to Sir Edward Goschen, many people in Berlin 
shared the opinion that "Russia neither wanted nor was 

1 British, no. 38. i French, no. 14. * Austrian, no. 28. 

4 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 406. 

5 British, no. 32. 6 British, no. 141. 7 Serbian, no. 36. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 409 

in a position to make war." 1 In the French Yellow Book, 
also, there are several reflections of the same idea. After 
all, the point is a minor one. Germany's conduct from 
first to last was that of a Power that was prepared to use 
her entire strength to gain her ends; she knew that Russia 
would not yield except to a show of force, and when Russia 
did not yield she instantly declared war. The Russian posi- 
tion was specified with such precision, immediately after the 
presentation of the Austrian note, that German under- 
estimates, if genuine to begin with, must have been based 
on a doubt not as to her policy but as to her courage. All 
things considered, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, 
as M. Sazonof said, "Austria's action was in reality directed 
against Russia," 2 and, since Germany, on her own admis- 
sions, stood resolutely behind her ally, that her policy was 
also from the first intended to provoke Russia. If Germany 
did not wish war, she willed peace on impossible terms — 
the complete humiliation of Russia and the submission of 
the Balkans to Austria-Hungary; after which she could 
proceed at leisure to that attack on France which she was 
surely meditating. 

Thus the ground had been carefully prepared by both 
Austria and Germany. Sir Edward Grey made a last 
effort to bring Austria to reason. Informed by Count 
Mensdorff of the character of the ultimatum on the day 
of its delivery, he "could not help dwelling on the awful 
consequences of the situation." He spoke quite plainly 
of the prospect of war involving Austria, France, Russia, 
and Germany, and of the "complete collapse of European 
credit and industry." He also remarked that "it required 
two to keep the peace." 3 In other words, the British 
Government dissociated itself from the view taken in Ber- 
lin the day before, that "the question at issue was one 
for settlement between Serbia and Austria alone, and that 

1 British, no. 71. » British, no. 17. * British, no. 3. 



410 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

there should be no interference from outside in the discus- 
sions between those two countries." 1 The warning passed 
unheeded. At 6 p. m. of the same day Baron von Giesl 
presented to the Serbian Government an ultimatum, of 
which Sir Edward Grey said that he "had never before 
seen one state address to another independent state a 
document of so formidable a character." 2 

The ultimatum 3 began by quoting the Serbian declara- 
tion of 31 March, 1909, in which Serbia had promised to 
"modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria- 
Hungary and to live on good, neighborly terms with the 
latter." This promise, said the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment, had not been fulfilled: on the contrary, the Ser- 
bian Government had connived at "a subversive move- 
ment," that aimed to detach certain provinces from the 
Dual Monarchy. It had "permitted the criminal machina- 
tions of various societies and associations directed against 
the Monarchy"; had "tolerated unrestrained language on 
the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators 
of outrages, and the participation of officers and function- 
aries in subversive agitation"; it had "permitted an un- 
wholesome propaganda in public instruction — in short, . . . 
all manifestations of a nature to incite the Serbian popula- 
tion to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its 
institutions." It was held responsible for the crime of 
Serajevo, concerning which the findings of the Austrian 
investigation were communicated in a brief summary. 

For these reasons the Serbian Government was required 
to publish in its Official Journal of 26 July, 1914, a declara- 
tion in a prescribed form, by which it condemned all 
propaganda against Austria-Hungary, expressed its regret 
that public officials should have been involved in such 

1 British, no. 2. i British, no. 5. 

'Austrian, no. 7; German White Book, pp. 414-417; Serbian, no. 32; British, 
no. 4; French, no. 24; Russian, no. 2; Belgian, no. 1. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 411 

propaganda, and promised henceforth to punish all per- 
sons guilty of such machinations. This declaration was 
also to be communicated to the army as an order of the 
day. Moreover, the Serbian Government had to under- 
take: 

1. To suppress any publication directed against Austria- 
Hungary. 

2. To dissolve the Narodna Odbrana, and to prevent 
the formation of similar societies in the future. 

3. To eliminate from the public schools all persons and 
all methods of instruction calculated to foment the propa- 
ganda. 

4. To remove all army officers and civil functionaries 
whom Austria should indicate as being guilty of propa- 
ganda against the Monarchy. 

5. To accept the collaboration of Austrian representatives 
in the suppression of the subversive movement. 

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to 
the Serajevo plot on Serbian territory; "delegates of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the in- 
vestigation relating thereto." 

7. To arrest Major Voija Tankositch and Milan Cigano- 
vitch. 

8. To prevent the illicit traffic in arms, and to dismiss 
and punish severely those officials who had assisted the 
Serajevo conspirators to cross the frontier. 

9. To explain the hostile utterances of Serbian officials, 
at home and abroad, concerning the crime of Serajevo. 

10. To notify the Austro-Hungarian Government of the 
execution of the above measures. 

Forty-eight hours were allowed for a reply. 

On the following day, 24 July, the ultimatum was com- 
municated to the Great Powers for their information, 
together with an explanation of the Austrian attitude 
and the statement that a dossier of evidence was held at 



412 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

the disposal of the various governments. 1 As Count Berch- 
told believed that "Great Britain might be most easily 
led to form an impartial judgment on the step we are 
taking at Belgrade," 2 it is well to record the opinion of 
Sir Edward Grey. Admitting that "Austria was under 
provocation," for "she had to complain of a dangerous 
popular movement against her government," he said that 
"the merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia 
were not the concern of His Majesty's Government": he 
would consider the matter "simply and solely from the 
point of view of the peace of Europe," and he was "very 
apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situa- 
tion." 3 The attitude of St. Petersburg was, indeed, for 
the moment, all-important, for the Prince Regent of 
Serbia had promptly telegraphed to the Tsar, "praying 
his Majesty to be pleased to interest himself in the fate 
of the Kingdom of Serbia." 4 

In the thirty-one hours at its disposal 5 before the ulti- 
matum would expire, the Russian Government gave over- 
whelming proof of its pacific and reasonable attitude. 
First, not only did it not reply to the Prince Regent's tele- 
gram, but it urged Belgrade to make all concessions pos- 
sible which were compatible with the dignity of Serbia. 6 
Second, it requested Vienna to extend the time limit of 
the ultimatum, in order that the Powers might have the 
opportunity to study the demands and advise Serbia; 7 
and it desired the British, French, Italian, and German 
Governments to support this request at Vienna. 8 Third, 
M. Sazonof, evidently not convinced by the assurances of 

1 Austrian, no. 8; British, no. 5; French, no. 25; Russian, no. 3. 

2 Austrian, no. 9. 

1 Great Britain and the European Crisis, sec. 3, par. 3; British, no. 5. 
* Serbian, no. 37; Russian, no. 6. 

6 The text of the ultimatum was not communicated to the Russians for seventeen 
hours after its presentation at Belgrade. (Russian, no. 77.) 

6 British, no. 22. 7 Russian, no. 4; French, no. 38. 

•Russian, no. 5; French, no. 39; British, no. 13. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 413 

Count Berchtold to Prince Kudachef, the Russian charge 
at Vienna, 1 held long interviews with Count Szapary and 
Count Pourtales, the Austrian and German ambassadors 
at St. Petersburg. He listened to their explanations, but 
insisted that the question was international; Austria, he 
said, "had certainly created a serious situation," and 
Russia "could not accept it with indifference." 2 And this 
warning was followed up by a public announcement: 

"Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Serbia by 
Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the great- 
est anxiety. The government is closely following the course of the 
dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain 
indifferent." 3 

At the same time, there was nothing intransigent in this 
attitude. For, fourth, as M. Sazonof said to the British 
ambassador: 

"If Serbia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite 
ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, 
France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that 
Serbia might propose to submit the question to arbitration." 4 

Finally, the Russian foreign minister begged Great Britain 
to "proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France": she 
would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break 
out, and should have rendered war more likely if she did 
not, from the outset, make common cause with France 
and Russia. 8 

'Austrian, no. 18; German, no. 3; British, no. 7. 

•Austrian, nos. 14, 16; German, no. 4. 

* Russian, no. 10; Austrian, no. 15. 

4 British, no. 17. On 29 July the Tsar, in a telegram to the Emperor William, 
said: "It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to The Hague 
tribunal." (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. S4 2 -) No further reference to this 
proposal appears in the published correspondence. The German press subsequently 
characterized it as "unimportant." 

6 British, no. 6. 



414 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

It must always redound to the credit of Russia that she 
took her position promptly, openly, fearlessly, and that she 
maintained it consistently to the end. "She made no 
parade of pacific intentions; she played on no weaknesses; 
she counted on no doubtful factors ; she took refuge neither 
in silence nor in catchwords. She stated openly the cir- 
cumstances under which war would become inevitable. 
But she gave every chance to international action; she 
shunned no discussion; she was ready to accept any com- 
promise provided only that the Austrian troops paused 
on the Serbian frontier. She steered her policy throughout 
by the light of the guiding fact that the Austro-Serbian 
conflict could not be localized even by her own abstention, 
for that conflict was not a simple attack on Serbia, but a 
recommitment of the whole Balkan question. Her action 
during the whole crisis is entitled to the respect which is 
due to honesty and openness in international relations." 1 

In the same interval Great Britain took four steps look- 
ing to the preservation of peace. Before learning of M. 
Sazonof's demarche, Sir Edward Grey requested of Count 
Mensdorff an extension of the time limit, 2 and the next day 
he instructed Sir Maurice de Bunsen to support the formal 
representations addressed to Vienna by Russia. 3 Next, he 
advised Serbia to avoid an absolute refusal of the Aus- 
trian demands and to reply favorably to as many points 
as the time limit allowed. 4 In both of these steps he was 
supported by France. Third, he at once appealed to Ger- 
many. He said to Prince Lichnowsky that, "in view of the 
extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the 
shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the 
demands upon Serbia," he felt "quite helpless" to exercise 
moderating influence at St. Petersburg; but he proposed 
that "the four Powers — Germany, Italy, France, and Eng- 

1 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. xiv. 2 British, no. 5. 

* British, no. 26; French, no. 49; Russian, no. 16. * British, no. 12. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 415 

land — should work together, simultaneously at Vienna and 
St. Petersburg, in favor of moderation in the event of the 
relations between Austria and Russia becoming threaten- 
ing." In any case, "it would be very desirable to get 
Austria not to precipitate military action." l Finally, 
being informed by Count MensdorfT that the Austrian note 
should be considered not as an ultimatum but as "a 
demarche with a time limit," by which it was understood 
that military operations would not immediately follow a 
diplomatic rupture, 2 Sir Edward Grey promptly telegraphed 
this information to Paris and St. Petersburg, as "it made 
the immediate situation rather less acute." 3 

Since Russia had already requested the international 
action which Sir Edward Grey proposed, since his sugges- 
tion was cordially received by France and Italy, 4 only 
Germany's acceptance was needed, for no one doubted the 
ability of the Wilhelmstrasse to restrain Austria if it wished 
to do so. Now, on 24 July, the German Government had 
addressed a note to London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, in 
which it justified the attitude of its ally, and characterized 
the demands upon Serbia as "equitable and moderate." 
The note concluded: 

"The imperial government wants to emphasize its opinion 
that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be 
settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that 
the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those 
two immediately concerned. The imperial government desires ur- 
gently the localization of the conflict, because every interference of 
another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be 
followed by incalculable consequences." 5 

The last sentence might almost be construed as a threat; 
at the very least it intimated that Germany was not in- 

1 British, no. u; Russian, no. 22. s Austrian, no. 17. ' British, no. 14. 

4 Great Britain and the European Crisis, sec. 4, par. 4. 

5 British, no. 9; French, no. 28; German, no. 1. 



41 6 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

clined to exert pressure on her ally to alleviate the tension 
already evident. Consequently, although Herr von Jagow 
told Sir Horace Rumbold, the British charge at Berlin, 
that "he was quite ready to fall in with the suggestion as to 
the four Powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna 
and St. Petersburg," 1 and Prince Lichnowsky believed that 
"Austria might be able with dignity to accept" mediation 
between herself and Russia, 2 the German foreign secretary 
contented himself with merely "passing on" Sir Edward 
Grey's suggestion for an extension of time limit, inciden- 
tally remarking that Count Berchtold was absent from 
Vienna and that it would be too late. 3 And he seems to 
have put off receiving M. Broniewsky, the Russian charge, 
who desired German support for M. Sazonof's proposal, 
until it was too late. 4 Thus Germany's conduct during 
the first two days of the crisis was not such as to inspire 
confidence in either her disinterestedness or her intentions. 
At Vienna there was a complete refusal to make any 
concessions. Count Berchtold departed for Ischl, where 
the Emperor Francis Joseph was staying, perhaps to avoid 
the representations which were to be expected from the 
other Powers. Prince Kudachef had, therefore, to address 
him by public telegrams en route, and to repeat verbally 
to Baron Macchio his government's request for an exten- 
sion of time. 5 From both Austrian officials he received 
an absolute refusal, on the familiar ground that the issue 
concerned only Austria and Serbia and that "action had 
been forced upon Austria by the developments of a situa- 
tion which compelled her to defend her most vital inter- 
ests." 6 Owing to the delay in receiving their instructions, 
the French and British ambassadors were not able to sup- 
port the Russian demarche? They could only report to 

1 British, no. 18. . s British, no. 25; French, no. 37. 

3 British, no. 18; French, no. 43; Russian, no. 14. 

4 French, no. 42. 6 Russian, no. 11; French, no. 45. 
6 Austrian, nos. 20, 21; Russian, no. 12. 7 French, no. 50. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 417 

their governments that the "language of the press leaves 
the impression that the surrender of Serbia is neither ex- 
pected nor really desired." x 

A few hours before the expiration of the time limit Sir 
Edward Grey received from Belgrade a forecast of the 
Serbian reply, which indicated an almost complete sur- 
render to the Austrian demands. 2 He immediately com- 
municated it to Prince Lichnowsky, and expressed the hope 
that "the German Government would feel able to influ- 
ence the Austrian Government to take a favorable view of 
it." 3 Once again Herr von Jagow was content to "pass 
on" a British suggestion: 4 the efficacy of this proceeding 
may be gauged from the fact that Herr von Tschirscky, 
whose duty it was to convey Berlin's opinions to the Ball- 
platz, described the Serbian concessions to his British col- 
league as "all a sham." 5 

The Serbian reply was handed to the Austrian minister 
at 5.58 p. m. on 25 July. 6 He left Belgrade on the regular 
train at 6.30. 7 In those thirty- two minutes, some of which 
were required for getting from the legation to the station 
and into the train, Baron von Giesl could scarcely have 
done more than read the Serbian note and break off dip- 
lomatic relations. He certainly could not have formu- 
lated in his mind the elaborate and technical reasons which 
the Austrian Government subsequently adduced as its 
grounds for considering the Serbian reply unsatisfactory. 
There is no better reason for believing that the ultimatum 
of 23 July was intended, not to secure the punishment of 
the criminals of Serajevo, but to effect the humiliation of 
Serbia and to deal a resounding blow at the new settle- 
ment of the Balkans, to which, as we have seen, the blun- 
dering diplomacy of Austria had very largely contributed. 

1 British, no. 31. * British, no. 21. * British, no. 27. 

* British, no. 34. 6 British, no. 32. 

•Austrian, no. 24. Serbian, no. 41, gives 5.45 as the hour of the reply. 
7 British, no. 23; Austrian, no. 22. 



4i 8 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

International courtesy demanded that Baron von Giesl 
explain to the Serbian Government the reasons for his re- 
jection of its reply; there is no record that such an ex- 
planation was given, even if time had permitted. However, 
as Baron Macchio remarked to Prince Kudachef, "one's 
interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous." l 

The Serbian Government, which had already mobilized 
its army, withdrew to Nish the same evening, and was 
followed by the diplomatic corps. Henceforth, unless in- 
ternational action could be started, either by Russia or the 
other Powers, war between Austria and Serbia was inevita- 
ble. The question of the next three days, 25-28 July, 
was, therefore : Could Austria be kept quiet pending some 
agreement with Russia? 

During those three days four distinct efforts were made 
to effect some adjustment of the Austro-Serbian dispute 
which would obviate the necessity of Russian intervention. 
Three of these were inspired by Russia. First, M. Sazonof 
telegraphed to Rome that "Italy might play a part of the 
first importance in favor of preserving peace, by bring- 
ing the necessary influence to bear upon Austria, and by 
adopting a definitely unfavorable attitude toward the dis- 
pute on ground that it could not be localized." 2 Nothing 
more is heard of this in any of the Books, but in his speech 
to the Italian Parliament, on 2 June, 1915, Signor Salandra 
stated that on 25 July, 1914, he warned the then German 
ambassador, Herr von Flotow, that Italy would not stand 
with Austria if the latter found herself at war with Russia 
on account of her aggressive action at Belgrade. On the 
same day, when he appealed to Italy, M. Sazonof advised 
Serbia to ask for the mediation of England. 3 This also 
disappears from view, but, curiously enough, Austria her- 
self subsequently invoked the same mediation. 

Much more important was the action of Sir Edward 

1 French, no. 45. 2 Russian, no. 23. 3 French, no. 53. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 



419 



Grey. On 26 July he converted into an official proposal 
the idea already ventilated to Prince Lichnowsky. He 
invited the French, German, and Italian Governments to 
instruct their ambassadors in London to meet with him 
"in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering 
an issue which would prevent complications." l He fur- 
ther suggested that Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburg 
should be requested to "suspend all active military opera- 
tions pending results of the conference"; and the follow- 
ing day, when informed by Prince Lichnowsky that the 
German Government accepted mediation between Austria 
and Russia "in principle," he proposed that the "Serbian 
reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion 
and pause." 2 

Meanwhile the Russian foreign minister had come for- 
ward with a new scheme. In an interview with the Austrian 
ambassador he proposed that Count Szapary "should be 
authorized to enter into a private exchange of views in 
order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of 
23 July," 3 which proposal was formally made to Vienna 
by M. Schebeko, who had returned hurriedly to his post, 
on the following day (27 July). 4 M. Sazonof admitted to 
Count Szapary that the intention of Austria to put a stop 
to a dangerous agitation was legitimate, but he objected 
to the procedure. "Take back your ultimatum," he con- 
cluded, "modify its form, and I will guarantee you the 
result." 5 Since he objected to only three of the ten Aus- 
trian demands, his offer can scarcely be regarded as un- 
reasonable. 

From this plethora of suggestions and proposals one 
must surely have been acceptable, had there been a general 
will to peace and a sincere desire to avoid war. As it was, 

1 British, no. 36. 2 British, no. 46. 

'Russian, no. 25; Austrian, no. 31; German, no. 5; British, no. 45. 
* Russian, no. 41; British, no. 56. 6 French, no. 54. 



420 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

the French and Italian Governments immediately accepted 
Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a conference of ambas- 
sadors; 1 and M. Sazonof, though preferring "direct ex- 
planations with the Vienna cabinet," was "ready to accept 
the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that 
would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict." 2 
In the same spirit the Tsar replied to the telegram of the 
Prince Regent of Serbia: 

" My government is using its utmost endeavor to smooth away 
the present difficulties. I have no doubt that Your Highness and 
the royal Serbian Government wish to render that task easy by 
neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement. ... So long 
as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all our eSorts 
must be directed to that end." 3 

Obviously, therefore, "the key of the situation was to be 
found at Berlin," 4 for it was everywhere understood that 
Austria would not listen to any advice but that of her ally. 

The conduct of the German Government during these 
three days was nothing if not equivocal. From the White 
Book we know that it had given Austria "a free hand" 
and the promise of all necessary support. Yet it could 
not then avow this to the other Powers, beyond stating 
that the Austro-Serbian dispute must be localized. In 
other words, it had to gain time in order that the Austrian 
measures against Serbia might be set on foot without in- 
terference. Such is certainly the impression left from a 
study of Berlin's attitude from 25 to 28 July. 

To begin with, the Berlin press refrained from publish- 
ing the text of the Serbian reply, doubtless "because of the 
calming effect it would have on German readers." 5 Next, 
the Wilhelmstrasse endeavored to set up a distinction 

1 British, nos. 49, 51, 52; French, nos. 61, 70. 

'British, no. 53; Russian, no. 32. 3 Russian, no. 40; Serbian, no. 43. 

4 Russian, no. 43; British, no. 54. 6 Russian, no. 46. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 421 

between the Austro-Serbian dispute and the Austro-Rus- 
sian tension produced by that dispute. 1 Theoretically, of 
course, the distinction is sound; but it was not raised in 
the crisis of 191 2-13 and it is made ridiculous by the admis- 
sion in the White Book that "a possible warlike attitude of 
Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon 
the field." 2 Nevertheless, on this ground Herr von Ja- 
gow rejected the proposed conference, which "would prac- 
tically amount to a court of arbitration" between Aus- 
tria and Serbia. Sir Edward Goschen rightly replied that 
Sir Edward Grey's "idea had nothing to do with arbi- 
tration, but meant that representatives of the four nations 
should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a danger- 
ous situation." 3 Both he and M. Jules Cambon, however, 
had to be content with Herr von Jagow's statement that 
"he was ready to join England and France in a common 
effort," the form of which would have to be found by the 
cabinets. 4 This tallied with Prince Lichnowsky's accept- 
ance of mediation "in principle," but it offered nothing 
definite, and it did not stop the march of events, which 
was the sine qua non of a peaceful settlement. To gain 
time for the operations of diplomacy was imperative; Herr 
von Jagow's attitude made it well-nigh impossible for diplo- 
macy to act before it was too late. 

In fairness, no one will wish to press this point against 
the German foreign secretary, for the ways of diplomacy 
are often devious. But did he carry out in good faith the 
role of mediator between Vienna and St. Petersburg, of 
which the chancellor was making such a parade ? 5 For the 
third time he "passes on" a British proposal to Vienna, 
this time the suggestion that the Serbian reply should be 
taken as a basis of discussion: 6 with the usual result — that 

1 German White Book, p. 409; German, no. 13. 

1 German White Book, p. 406. 3 British, no. 43; French, no. 73. 

♦French, no. 74. 8 German, nos. 14, 15. 

• German White Book, p. 409; British, no. 67; Austrian, no. 43. 



422 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

it was too late to stay the hand of the impetuous ally. 1 
At St. Petersburg, however, there is no trace of such 
timidity. On 26 July Count Pourtales is instructed to 
make the following declaration: 

"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to 
counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army. 
But mobilization means war. . . . We are of the opinion that 
Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting." 2 

In addition the military attache tells the Russian minister 
of war that mobilization against Austria would be in itself 
"very menacing." 3 The basis of these threats is a report 
that Kovno has been declared in a state of war, the belief 
of the military attache that mobilization has been ordered 
for Kiev and Warsaw, and the "impression that complete 
preparations for mobilization against Austria are being 
made": 4 to indulge in open threats on such flimsy excuses 
is, to say the least, not very pacific, and is quite likely to 
make the situation more rather than less strained. Ger- 
man mediation between Austria and Russia is to take the 
form of pressure on Russia to prevent any interference with 
Austria, who is to go ahead with impunity ! 

On a par with this were the efforts to deprive Russia 
of the diplomatic support of her associates in the Triple 
Entente. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg requested Sir Ed- 
ward Grey "to act at St. Petersburg with all possible em- 
phasis" to keep Russia from mobilization and interference. 5 
At Paris Herr von Schoen twice besought the Quai d'Orsay 
to "exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favor of 

1 Austrian, no. 44: "The imperial and royal government ... is no longer 
in a position to adopt an attitude toward the Serbian reply in the sense of the 
British suggestion, since at the time of the demarche made by Germany a state of 
war between the monarchy and Serbia had already arisen, and the Serbian reply 
has accordingly already been outstripped by events." Cf. also Austrian, no. 38; 
British, no. 76. 

2 German White Book, p. 408. 3 German, no. n; Austrian, no. 28. 
* German, nos. 6, 7, 8. 5 German, no. 10. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 423 

peace," and proposed to communicate a statement to the 
press to the effect that France and Germany were acting 
together "in a spirit of peaceful co-operation." l The 
French not unnaturally regarded these demarches as a plan 
to compromise them with their ally and to create an im- 
pression of Franco-German solidarity "which might have 
been misinterpreted." In both capitals the German am- 
bassadors were informed that France and England could 
not make representations at St. Petersburg unless Ger- 
many would do the same at Vienna: the danger lay in 
precipitate action by Austria, whereas Russia had shown 
herself conciliatory and pacific. The logic was irrefuta- 
ble, but neither Herr von Schoen nor Prince Lichnowsky 
would promise that Germany would preach moderation 
at Vienna. 

How little disposed Germany was to do her share of con- 
ciliation is best seen from the fate of a proposal made by 
M. Jules Cambon. On 27 July he suggested that Great 
Britain, Germany, Italy, and France should advise Vienna 
"to abstain from all action which might aggravate the 
existing situation." Herr von Jagow "refused point-blank 
to accept this suggestion, in spite of the entreaties of the 
ambassador, who emphasized, as a good feature of the sug- 
gestion, the mixed grouping of the Powers, thanks to which 
the opposition between the Alliance and the Entente — a 
matter of which Jagow himself had often complained — 
was avoided." 2 For all the German talk about mediation, 
are we allowed to see the substance? 

The idea of a conference having been rejected and no 
other form of international action being under considera- 
tion, the only hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis lay 
in direct conversations between Russia and Austria on the 
basis of the Serbian reply. Now M. Sazonof had proposed 

1 German, no. ioa; French, nos. 56, 57, 62; Russian, nos. 34, 35. 

2 Russian, no. 39. 



424 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

this discussion at the suggestion of Count Pourtales, the 
German ambassador at St. Petersburg. 1 But when the 
Russian charge in Berlin desired Herr von Jagow to support 
the proposal at Vienna the latter replied that "he could 
not advise Austria to give way." 2 No wonder that M. 
Sazonof telegraphed to London that "this attitude of the 
German Government is most alarming" and that "the 
Berlin cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of 
this crisis from developing, appear to be exerting no in- 
fluence on their ally." 3 Once again the actual conduct of 
Germany, as opposed to her professions, fails to disclose 
even the shadow of mediation. On 28 July the German 
chancellor telegraphed to St. Petersburg: 

"We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in 
St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Ser- 
bia in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia." 

But it was not explanations which Russia wanted; she in- 
sisted that Austria refrain from "action in Serbia," and to 
that demand the chancellor can only reply with astonish- 
ing naivete: "The declaration of war which has mean- 
while ensued alters nothing in this matter "! 4 Mediation 
which does not restrain an ally from making war had 
better be called "benevolent neutrality." 

Sure of Germany's support, Austria would make no 
concessions. The Serbian reply was published on 28 July, 
but in such a way as to make it an indictment of Serbia. 
For in a running commentary the Austrian Government 
elaborated at great length the reasons, often concerning a 
matter of phraseology, why it could not regard the reply 
as satisfactory. In an official communique of the press 
bureau, it was charged that Serbia recognized her reply 
to be "insufficient" because it proposed to submit one of 

1 British, no. 78. s Russian, no. 38. 

3 Russian, no. 43; British, no. 54. * German, no. 14. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 425 

the Austrian demands to arbitration ! ! To the Russian 
ambassador Count Berchtold represented the mobilization 
of Serbia, before the reply was given, as "a hostile act"; 
he also said that "there was a deep feeling of general ex- 
citement which had already mastered public opinion." It 
was not surprising, therefore, that Count Berchtold de- 
clined M. Schebeko's proposal that Count Szapary should 
be instructed to discuss the Serbian reply with the Russian 
foreign minister. 2 He also refused to entertain Sir Maurice 
de Bunsen's representations in favor of Sir Edward Grey's 
project of a conference of ambassadors. 3 To both ambas- 
sadors he explained that their actions were belated, for the 
Monarchy had already declared war on Serbia, and that 
that war was "just and inevitable"; and he paid no atten- 
tion to their warnings that by her action Austria was 
endangering the peace of Europe. The Austrian action, 
however, was at least consistent. War had been deter- 
mined upon; the assistance of Germany was promised; a 
fortunate accident had provided a plausible case. There- 
fore nothing must be allowed to prevent that "energetic 
action" which had been announced to the chanceries, and 
nothing was allowed to prevent it. We may disapprove 
of the policy adopted; we may doubt whether the aims of 
that policy were those communicated to the other govern- 
ments; but we must recognize that there was no assump- 
tion of a pacific attitude in order to conceal other intentions, 
which is such a formidable item in the case against German 
diplomacy. 

With the Austrian declaration of war, which was con- 
veyed to Serbia in the form of an open telegram from 
Count Berchtold to the Serbian foreign office, 4 the crisis 
entered on a new phase. Russian intervention now be- 

1 French, no. 75 (2). J Russian, no. 45; Austrian, no. 40. 

•Austrian, no. 41; British, no. 62; French, no. 83. 
* Austrian, no. 37; Serbian, no. 46. 



426 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

came a certainty unless the Austrian troops could be 
stopped before they crossed the frontier. But before nar- 
rating the events that led up to the declaration of war upon 
Russia by Germany it will be advisable to examine the 
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and the Serbian reply thereto, 
together with the assurances of Austria that she cherished 
no designs against the territorial integrity of Serbia. For 
if the ultimatum was justified and the Serbian reply was 
really inadequate, then assuredly Russia had no title to 
intervene and is in very truth responsible for the Great 
War. 

Of the ten demands practically all involved some dimi- 
nution of the sovereignty of Serbia, although numbers 6-8 
may be, to some extent, regarded as police measures incum- 
bent upon any law-abiding government and not without jus- 
tification in the circumstances of the Serajevo outrage. 
Number i involved a change in both the law and the con- 
stitution of Serbia; the second part of number 6 was con- 
trary to the constitution. With every allowance for the 
necessity of Austria to put a stop to the great Serbian 
agitation, it is evident that her demands were such as an 
independent state would be expected to grant only after a 
complete military defeat. Furthermore, the despatches of 
the French and British ambassadors in Vienna leave no 
doubt that the rejection of the Austrian ultimatum was 
both expected and desired. Prince Lichnowsky's remark to 
Sir Edward Grey is also illuminating: 

"Speaking privately, his excellency suggested that a negative 
reply must in no case be returned by Serbia; a reply favorable on 
some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immedi- 
ate action might be afforded to Austria." 1 

But most conclusive of all are the admissions of Herr von 
Jagow, who "confessed privately that he thought the note 

1 British, no. n. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 427 

left much to be desired as a diplomatic document." He 
admitted that " the Serbian Government could not swallow 
certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands," that the Aus- 
trians " wished to give the Serbians a lesson, and that they 
meant to take military action." x In spite of this the 
German Government was officially of the opinion that 
the Austrian demands were "moderate and equitable!" 
Equitable, perhaps, because they promised to make a gen- 
eral war inevitable ! Nor must the extremely short in- 
terval allowed for the reply, forty-eight hours, be over- 
looked. To the Austrian contention that a short time 
limit was needed to avoid Serbian procrastination, it is 
sufficient to reply, with Sir Edward Grey, that a time limit 
could be introduced later. 2 

By general consent the Serbian reply went very much 
farther toward an accommodation than was anywhere 
expected — was, in short, an almost complete acceptance 
of the Austrian programme. The Belgrade Government 
denied the charge that it had abetted the anti-Austrian 
propaganda, in violation of the declaration of 31 March, 
1909, but agreed to publish the desired declaration in the 
Official Journal condemning such propaganda. It prom- 
ised to amend its press laws and the constitution; to sup- 
press the Narodna Odbrana; to purge its schools of the 
propaganda; to remove those of its servants who might be 
proved guilty of propaganda at the request of the Austrian 
Government; to accept such collaboration of Austrian of- 
ficials "as agrees with the principle of international law, 
with criminal procedure, and with good, neighborly rela- 
tions"; to open an inquiry against the criminals of Sera- 
jevo; to arrest Ciganovitch (Tankositch had already been 
arrested) ; to reform the administration of the frontier serv- 
ice; to give explanations of such utterances of officials as 
should be brought to its attention; and to give due notice 

1 British, no. 18. 2 British, no. 5. 



428 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

of the execution of the above-promised measures. It de- 
clined to accept the participation of Austrian officials in 
the judicial inquiry, but it offered to refer the entire dis- 
pute to the arbitration of The Hague or the Great Powers 
which took part in drawing up the declaration of 31 March, 
1909. 1 

The governments and the public opinion of the countries 
of the Entente and the press of the United States regarded 
this reply not only as a remarkable concession to an aston- 
ishing demand but also as a satisfactory settlement, or 
at least as the basis of a settlement. According to the 
Russian charge in Paris, the Austrian ambassador in that 
capital, when informed of the Serbian reply, "did not con- 
ceal his surprise that it had failed to satisfy Giesl." 2 Herr 
von Jagow, who put off reading it for several days, finally 
admitted that it constituted "a basis for possible nego- 
tiation." 3 Obviously, therefore, its reasoned and sum- 
mary rejection by the Austrian Government calls for close 
inspection. The Austrian criticisms 4 give the appearance 
of having been composed with the view of justifying the 
fait accompli of Baron von Giesl; still, they must be ex- 
amined impartially. 

The main objection seems to be contained in the follow- 
ing passage: 

"Our grievance is that the Serbian Government has omitted to 
suppress the agitation directed against the territorial integrity of 
the Dual Monarchy, notwithstanding the obligations it entered 
into under the terms of the note of 31 March, 1909. . . . The 
contention of the royal Serbian Government that utterances of 
the press and the activities of associations are of a private character 
and are beyond the control of the state, is plainly at variance with 
the institutions of modern states, even of those which have the 

1 Serbian, no. 39; Austrian, no. 25; German White Book, pp. 417-423; Russian, 
no. 13; British, no. 39; French, no. 49; Belgian, no. 4. 

2 Russian, no. 27. 3 French, no. 92. 
* Austrian, no. 34; German White Book, pp. 417-423. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 429 

most liberal regulations in this respect; these regulations, designed 
to safeguard public polity and right, impose state supervision upon 
both press and associations. Moreover, the Serbian institutions 
themselves provide for such supervision." 

It is not the first time that Austrian statesmen have put 
forward this argument. The student of Italian history- 
will recall that when Cavour was arousing the sentiment of 
Italians against the Austrian regime by means of the Sar- 
dinian press, Buol, the Austrian foreign minister, demanded 
the suppression of the offending papers and received much 
the same answer as was given to Count Berchtold. His- 
tory has passed judgment on that controversy. In the 
present cases there emerges the fundamental difference be- 
tween Teutonic and English or American conceptions of 
the press. Shall public opinion be made to order, or shall 
it reflect the will and wishes of a free people? A nation 
and a government may be offended by what is said of 
them in the press of another country — Englishmen and 
Germans complained bitterly of the tone of each other's 
newspapers, but it is not recorded that either government 
made such outpourings a cause for war. Austria was en- 
titled to warn the Serbian Government that it would be 
held responsible for any attempts to carry out the territo- 
rial aspirations involved in the Great-Serbian propaganda, 
but in the absence of any overt act (and let it be remembered 
that the complicity of the Serbian Government in the mur- 
ders of Serajevo has not been established) she had no 
claim to exact punishment for a possible future offense. 
And when we read, in the criticism of the Serbian reply to 
demand number 1, that the passage of a new press law 
would be "immaterial," and that an amendment to the 
constitution "of no use," we are persuaded that the object 
of the Austrian policy was simply to stifle the intellectual 
and political life of Serbia. 
With respect to the declaration to be published in the 



43 o ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Official Journal, the Austrian Government complained that 
by inserting the words "according to the communication 
of the Austro-Hungarian Government," Serbia was dis- 
avowing the existence of propaganda in the past and keep- 
ing its hands free for the future. The point seems a mere 
quibble, for the Serbian Government actually disavowed 
and repudiated "all idea of interfering or attempting to 
interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part 
whatsoever of Austria-Hungary," and promised to prose- 
cute all propagandists. 

For the rest, some flaw was found with the reply to nine of 
the ten demands. As regards number 7, it was stated that 
Ciganovitch's arrest had been prevented by the chief of 
the Belgrade police: this is a fair complaint, if true. But 
a dispassionate reading of the ultimatum, the reply, and 
the Austrian comments will not convince one that the reply 
was conceived in a spirit of deceitfulness and evasion, as 
the Austrian Government alleged. Granted that there 
were points of difference, it was surely open to the Austrian 
Government to indicate those points to Serbia, to Europe, 
or to The Hague, and to give Serbia a chance to amend her 
reply if the decision went against her. The refusal of the 
Ballplatz to allow any such reference cannot be explained 
away by phrases about "the most peace-loving Power in 
the world" (Count Szapary) and the "well-known pacific 
character of the Emperor, as well as his own" (Count 
Berchtold). 1 

Count' Mensdorff admitted to Sir Edward Grey that 
"on paper the Serbian reply might seem to be satisfac- 
tory; but the Serbians had refused the one thing — the 
co-operation of Austrian officials and police — which would 
be a real guarantee that in practise the Serbians would not 
carry on their subversive campaign against Austria." 2 
Demands numbers 5 and 6 required Serbia to accept the 

1 Austrian, no. 14; British, no. 62. 2 British, no. 48. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 431 

" collaboration " of Austrian officials in suppressing the prop- 
aganda, to open a judicial inquiry {enquete judiciaire) as to 
the plot at Serajevo, and to allow Austrian delegates to 
take part in the investigations {recherches) . Serbia replied 
that she did not understand what was meant by the first, 
and must reject the third because it was contrary to the 
constitution. The Austrian comment was that the Ser- 
bian attitude was "unintelligible," and that "if the Ser- 
bian Government misunderstood this point, it must do 
so deliberately, for the distinction between enquete judiciaire 
and simple recherches must be perfectly familiar to it." 
Now it is curious that statesmen as experienced as the Brit- 
ish, French, and Russian foreign ministers were at once 
alarmed by these Austrian demands; 1 and more curious 
still is it that Count Berchtold deemed it wise to inform 
M. Sazonof "in confidence" that the Austrian collaboration 
would involve the establishment in Belgrade of a private 
bureau de surete analogous to Russian secret police estab- 
lishments in Paris. 2 If the matter was so patent, why this 
secret communication to Russia? And why was the in- 
formation given too late to influence the Serbian reply? 
Moreover, France, as the ally of Russia, might make cer- 
tain concessions in matters of police which Serbia, as the 
enemy of Austria, could not tolerate. As to the confusion 
between enquete judiciaire and recherches, the Serbian Gov- 
ernment may have been guilty of misrepresentation, al- 
though there is no proof of this; but the objection to the 
appearance of Austrian officials in Serbia is not removed 
by the Austrian explanations. Since, however, Serbia was 
willing to admit such collaboration as was consonant with 
international law, the Austrian criticisms cannot be ac- 
cepted as showing good cause for the rejection of the Ser- 
bian reply. The German White Book remarks that the 

'Austrian, nos. n, 14; British, no. 5; French, no. 25. 
1 Austrian, no. 27. 



432 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

reply was "entirely a play for time." 1 Precisely: in order 
that diplomacy might effect a peaceful settlement honor- 
able to both parties. But that was, apparently, the last 
thing that Austria wanted. 

When Austria rejected the Serbian reply, a war with 
Serbia became inevitable, failing international action. 
But, in the expectation of Russian interference, Austrian 
and German statesmen began to pour forth assurances that 
Austria would not disturb the territorial integrity of the 
little Slav kingdom. The idea runs through all the com- 
munications emanating from Vienna and Berlin, and is put 
forward as a sufficient reason why Russia should stand 
aside in an Austro-Serbian conflict. At first sight, Count 
Berchtold's remark to Prince Kudachef, "I pointed out 
that we did not aim at any increase of territory, but only 
at the maintenance of what we possess," 2 seems conclusive 
evidence of good faith. But presently qualifications are 
introduced. The British and Russian Governments were 
informed that Serbia "will have to make good the military 
expenses" incurred by Austria in enforcing her demands. 3 
Sir Rennell Rodd telegraphed from Rome "reliable in- 
formation that Austria intends to seize the Salonika rail- 
way," which runs through Serbia. 4 The British charge at 
Constantinople gathered from a remark let fall by the 
Austrian ambassador that "the designs of Austria may 
extend considerably beyond the sanjak and a punitive oc- 
cupation of Serbian territory." 5 

Of course, the essential point was that Austria might 
not annex any Serbian territory and at the same time re- 
duce Serbia to a state of vassalage. "This," as M. Sazonof 
pointed out, "would upset the equilibrium in the Balkans, 
and this was how Russian interests became involved." 6 

1 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 423. 2 Austrian, no. 18. 

3 Austrian, nos. 17, 20. * British, no. ig. 

6 British, no. 82. e Austrian, no. 47. 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 433 

Yet the Austrian Government did not, until its negotia- 
tions with Russia had been overtaken by the Russo-German 
quarrel over mobilization, offer any guarantees on the sub- 
ject of Serbian independence and sovereignty. On the 
contrary, the German ambassador in Paris, though stating 
that " Austria would respect the integrity of Serbia," 
"gave no assurance" that "her independence would also 
be respected." 1 Similarly Count Pourtales, according to 
the German White Book, declared on 29 July that "there 
would be time at the peace conference to return to the 
matter of forbearance toward the sovereignty of Serbia." 2 
It is entirely improbable that if Austria had been allowed 
to proceed without interference against Serbia, she would 
have done no more than compel Serbia to accept her note 
of 23 July in toto, even if that itself would not have seriously 
compromised the independence of Serbia. In spite of the 
fact that an annexation of Serbia would have increased 
the Slav population of the Monarchy, and have made more 
difficult the maintenance of German and Magyar ascend- 
ency in the Monarchy, it is against the logic of Austrian 
history and the expansionist spirit of the age to believe 
that Hapsburg statesmen could have been content with a 
demonstration of their power and have left Serbia to her 
own devices. To secure the payment of the indemnity 
which Count Berchtold spoke of would have required the 
occupation of Serbian territory for an indefinite period; nor 
is it open to doubt, in the light of the past, that a harsh 
commercial treaty would have been forced upon a helpless 
Serbia. 

M. Sazonof exposed the root of the difficulty when he 
pointed out, as he did several times, 3 that the Serbian 
declaration of 31 March, 1909, to which Austria appealed 
to justify her ultimatum, had been drafted by the Great 

1 British, no. 59. s German While Book, p. 409. 

•British, no. 17; Austrian, no. 16. 



434 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Powers. If Serbia had failed to observe the promise made 
at that time, then it was the duty of those Powers to see 
to it that she did mend her ways and "live in good, neigh- 
borly relations" with Austria. But for Austria to under- 
take single-handed to impose her solution of the problem 
was to cut away the whole framework which European 
diplomacy had erected around the Balkan question by 
the laborious effort of more than a century. If Russia 
and the other Powers had refused to admit the necessity 
of some satisfaction to Austria, she would have been jus- 
tified in going ahead alone; but, in the face of the repeated 
assurances of M. Sazonof that Serbia would meet all the 
reasonable demands of Austria, the extraordinarily sub- 
missive tone of the Serbian reply, and the strenuous en- 
deavors of Sir Edward Grey to discover a modus vivendi, 
little or no sympathy can be accorded to a policy which 
we cannot doubt was devised to prevent a settlement, 
to take Europe unawares, and to forestall any interna- 
tional action. Whether viewed in the light of history or 
from the angle of diplomatic procedure, the conduct of 
Austria and the connivance of Germany must be held re- 
sponsible for the situation which, from 28 July, 19 14, 
made Russian intervention a matter of course and caused 
Russia and Austria to begin the mobilization of their 
armies. 



CHAPTER XIV 
ARMAGEDDON 

When the news of the Austrian declaration of war 
reached St. Petersburg, which, as it happened, preceded 
a telegram from M. Schebeko to the effect that Count 
Berchtold had declined the Russian proposal for direct 
conversations, M. Sazonof took prompt action. To Lon- 
don he telegraphed: 

"The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea 
of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by 
London cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to 
suspension of military operations of Austria against Serbia is now 
most urgent." x 

At the same time he informed the German Government 
that on the next day (29 July) Russia would order the 
mobilization of the military conscriptions of Odessa, Kief, 
Moscow, and Kazan — that is, of the thirteen army corps 
intended to operate against Austria. 2 He insisted upon 
"the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against 
Germany," but the announcement was intended as a clear 
warning that Russia could not be ignored. Count Berch- 
told at once construed the mobilization as "a threat against 
Austria-Hungary," and " urgently" requested the German 
Government to inform Russia that "these measures would 
be answered by the most extensive military counter- 
measures, not only by the Monarchy but by the German 
Empire"; he preferred that Germany should take this 
step alone, but Austria was also "ready." 3 From this 

1 Russian, no. 48. 2 British, no. 70 (1). 8 Austrian, no. 42. 

435 



436 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

time on military considerations assume an increasing im- 
portance, and the effort of diplomacy becomes daily more 
difficult. 

On Wednesday, 29 July, the Russian foreign minister, 
foreseeing, perhaps, what Count Szapary called "the mili- 
tary competition which now threatened to ensue on account 
of false news," endeavored to reassure the German and 
Austrian ambassadors. He told Count Szapary that the 
Russian troops were not intended to attack Austria, and 
"would stand to arms only in case Russian interests in the 
Balkans should be in danger": Count Szapary intimated, 
for the first time, that Austria "had no idea of touching 
the sovereignty of Serbia." x To Count Pourtales Mr 
Sazonof denied that the Russian military preparations 
could be taken as aggressive measures against Austria, 
"their explanation being the mobilization of the greater 
part of the Austro-Hungarian army." He proposed that 
parallel conversations should be conducted between Aus- 
tria and Russia, and in a conference of the four Powers not 
directly interested; he thought that "it should not be diffi- 
cult to find a compromise . . . provided that Austria 
showed some good will and that all the Powers used their 
entire influence in the direction of conciliation." Count 
Pourtales, however, "could merely undertake to report 
the conversation, and took the position that, after Russia 
had decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every 
exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not 
impossible." 2 It is worth noting that whereas the Aus- 
trian ambassador had yielded a little, the attitude of his 
German colleague indicated a certain stiffness that boded 
ill for the delicate negotiations ahead. 

M. Sazonof was evidently alarmed by the development 
of the situation, for he renewed the request for British 

1 Austrian, no. 47. 

2 Russian, no. 49; British, no. 93 (2); German White Book, p. 409. 



ARMAGEDDON 437 

mediation which he had made the day before. He tele- 
graphed to Count Benckendorff, the Russian ambassador 
in London: 

"From now on nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely 
on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps 
which it may consider advisable." x 

As a further inducement, he told Sir George Buchanan, 
the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, that "he would 
agree to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it 
was acceptable to Serbia." 2 And, indeed, it was only 
through the mediation of Sir Edward Grey that the preser- 
vation of peace seemed possible. 

For Count Berchtold had informed Berlin that unless 
the Russian partial mobilization measures were stopped 
without delay, a general mobilization of the Austro-Hun- 
garian forces would follow at once. He added that "in 
their military operations against Serbia they would not 
allow themselves to be diverted from their path," 3 a fact 
which was duly reported to their respective governments 
by the British, Russian, French, and Italian ambassadors 
in Vienna. 4 More ominous still were the complaints which 
Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr von Jagow at 
Berlin, and Count Pourtales at St. Petersburg, began to 
make of the Russian mobilization, 5 for this, they asserted, 
would put it out of their power to preach moderation at 
Vienna. Hitherto the argument had been that pressure 
could not be exerted because it would encourage Austria 
to present Europe with a fait accompli; but now, in the 
presence of the fait accompli, mediation would be difficult 
because of the Russian mobilization, which the very fait 
had produced ! However, by this time the reader has 
learned not to expect consistency in German diplomacy. 

1 Russian, no. 50; British, no. 93 (3). 2 British, no. 78; French, no. 86. 

3 Austrian, no. 48. * British, no. 79; French, no. 93. 

'British, nos. 71, 76, 78; Russian, no. 51. 



438 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Nevertheless, as if to pile Pelion on Ossa, the Wilhelm- 
strasse, which was regretting its inability to preach con- 
ciliation at Vienna, would actually seem to have been giv- 
ing Austria the advice to come to an agreement with Russia. 
The chancellor assured Sir Edward Grey, through Sir 
Edward Goschen, that "he was doing his very best both at 
Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two governments 
to discuss the situation directly with each other, and in a 
friendly way." x This was on July 28. The following day 
the chancellor said that he had asked Austria specifically 
to state her intentions, as this would facilitate her conver- 
sations with Russia. 2 On the same day Herr von Jagow 
told M. Jules Cambon that he had asked Vienna to resume 
direct conversations with St. Petersburg, and he answered 
in the affirmative the ambassador's question whether "he 
did not think that common action could be exercised by 
the four Powers by means of their ambassadors." 3 At 
Paris Herr von Schoen declared that his government was 
"still continuing its efforts" at Vienna, 4 and M. Isvolsky 
reported the opinion of the French foreign minister that 
"Germany now inclines toward mediatory action both at 
St. Petersburg and at Vienna." 5 Finally, the first tele- 
gram of the Emperor William II to the Tsar, dated 28 
July, 10.45 p - M -> promised the "entire influence" of the 
Emperor "to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank 
and satisfactory understanding with Russia." 6 It seems 
probable, therefore, although there is only one despatch 
in the German White Book (exhibit 14) to corroborate the 
statement, that for about twenty-four hours after the 
Austrian declaration of war Berlin did, as the White Book 
claims, "advise Vienna to show every possible advance 
compatible with the dignity of the Monarchy." 7 

1 British, no. 71. 2 British, no. 75. ' French, no. 92. 

* French, no. 94. 6 Russian, no. 53. 6 German, no. 20 (1). 

7 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 409. 



ARMAGEDDON 439 

In these circumstances the chances for mediation in some 
form or another seemed decidedly favorable. Nor was 
there any lack of suggestion. Sir Edward Goschen, M. 
Jules Cambon, M. Viviani, the French premier, and the 
Marquis di San Giuliano, then Italian foreign minister, 
urged Sir Edward Grey to let Herr von Jagow propose the 
form which mediation should take, for he had accepted 
the idea "in principle." 1 So, at four o'clock on the after- 
noon of 29 July, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Berlin 
an account of his interview with Prince Lichnowsky: 

"The German Government had said that they were favorable 
in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. 
They seemed to think the particular method of conference — con- 
sultation or discussion, or even conversations a quatre in London — 
too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should 
suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers 
could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. 
France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or medi- 
ating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method 
that Germany could suggest if mine were not acceptable. In fact, 
mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that 
Germany thought possible, if only Germany would 'press the but- 
ton' in the interests of peace." 2 

This despatch is one of the most important in the entire 
correspondence of the belligerent governments, for it proves 
conclusively that France, Italy, Great Britain, and Russia 
(M. Sazonof had appealed for mediation) were willing to 
give Germany the lead in any move by which the existing 
difficulties might be resolved. The problem was not more 
serious than that created by the Balkan revolution eighteen 
months before; no military operations, as distinct from mili- 
tary preparations, had been begun; there was needed only 
good will; but no time could be lost. 

This telegram was answered by one of even greater im- 

1 British, nos. 60, 80; French, nos. 81, 97. 

2 British, no. 84; French, no. 98; Russian, no. 54. 



440 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

portance, in which Sir Edward Goschen described an in- 
terview with the German chancellor. Under the presi- 
dency of the Emperor, who had returned to Berlin on 27 
July, a council of the highest authorities of the Empire 
was held at Potsdam on the night of the 29th. It is not 
known what happened on that fateful occasion, but the 
events of the next twelve hours suggest that the decision 
to make war was practically taken. Otherwise the return 
of the chancellor to Berlin that night, his haste in seeing 
the British ambassador, and the tenor of his remarks are 
inexplicable. 

"He said," reported Sir Edward Goschen, "that should Austria 
be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, 
become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's 
ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then 
proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. 
He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main 
principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would 
never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there 
might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany 
aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, 
every assurance would be' given to the British Government that 
the imperial government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the 
expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that 
might ensue. 

"I questioned his excellency about the French colonies, and he 
said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that re- 
spect. As regards Holland, however, his excellency said that, so 
long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neu- 
trality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's 
Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended 
upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced 
to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian in- 
tegrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany." l 

That Germany should thus cynically avow to Great Britain 
her resolution to make war, at a moment when other Powers 

1 British, no. 85. 



ARMAGEDDON 441 

were straining to secure a peaceful settlement, is not only 
the crowning proof of the ineptness of her diplomacy, but 
an adequate commentary on her professions that she strove 
valiantly for peace to the end of the controversy. From 
this time on the efforts she made for peace took the form of 
threats which she can scarcely have expected to be heeded. 
The explanation of the chancellor's appeal to Sir Edward 
Goschen is found in the demarche of Count Pourtales at 
St. Petersburg, which is itself highly significant. On the 
afternoon of 29 July, or about twenty-four hours after the 
Russian Government had informed Berlin of its intention 
to mobilize against Austria, he declared to M. Sazonof 
that if Russia did not stop her military preparations Ger- 
many would mobilize her army. If it is recalled that three 
days before Count Pourtales had announced that "mobili- 
zation meant war," and also that Herr von Jagow had 
promised both the British and the French ambassadors 
that Germany would not respond to a Russian mobiliza- 
tion against Austria alone, it is clear that Germany was 
not only breaking faith but threatening Russia with war. 
The ambassador's communication was practically an ulti- 
matum without the name, and was so understood by M. 
Sazonof, who telegraphed as follows to the Russian am- 
bassadors in the great capitals: 

"We only began these preparations in consequence of the mobil- 
ization already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident 
unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settle- 
ment of her dispute with Serbia. As we cannot comply with the 
wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten on our 
own military preparations and to assume that war is inevitable." l 

As a matter of fact, the mobilization against Austria had 
not yet been ordered at the time of Count Pourtales's inter- 
view, for the French ambassador informed his government 

1 Russian, no. 58 



442 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

that " the tone in which Count Pourtales delivered his com- 
munication has decided the Russian Government this very 
night to order the mobilization of the thirteen army corps 
which are to operate against Austria." 1 The German 
ambassador may have assumed that the intention to mo- 
bilize, which the Russian Government did not conceal, was 
identical with the order to mobilize; but inasmuch as the 
whole German case against Russia rests upon the Russian 
mobilization, it was surely his business to ascertain whether 
mobilization was a fact before making threats which would 
certainly precipitate mobilization. Of course, it is alleged 
in the German White Book that while the Russian minister 
of war had given his "word of honor" that "nowhere had 
there been a mobilization up to three o'clock in the after- 
noon" of 29 July, actually extensive measures were under 
way. 2 Then why did not Count Pourtales complain to 
M. Sazonof of this "attempt to mislead" Germany? It 
may therefore be reasonably asserted that the demarche 
of Count Pourtales was unprovoked and uncalled for; it 
can be explained only on the assumption that Germany 
wanted war, for if persisted in it would make the Russian 
mobilization inevitable and, according to the German con- 
ception of international relations, that meant war. It is 
suggestive that no mention of this incident, or of the one 
immediately following it, occurs in the White Book. Why? 
Obviously because it is destructive of the German thesis 
that Russia " spoiled everything " by her premature mobili- 
zation, for it would have provided Russia with the best 
of all reasons for mobilizing. 

As it happened, the German Government decided not 
to proceed a outrance for the moment. Its attitude re- 
mained the same, as may be seen from the Emperor's 
telegram dated 30 July, 1 A. m. 3 But it may have per- 

1 French, no. ioo. 2 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 410. 

3 German, no. 23. 



ARMAGEDDON 443 

ceived the weakness of the case it was setting up; or it 
may have had its zeal tempered by the warning conveyed 
by Sir Edward Grey to Prince Lichnowsky, that Germany 
must not count upon England's standing aside in all cir- 
cumstances. 1 At all events, Count Pourtales visited M. 
Sazonof again at 2 a. m. on 30 July, and instead of form- 
ally requiring the cessation of Russian mobilization, which 
was the logical step after his communication of the after- 
noon before, asked upon what conditions Russia would 
consent to demobilize. After the usual statement by Count 
Pourtales that Austria would not infringe upon the terri- 
torial integrity of Serbia, and the familiar complaint from 
M. Sazonof that Germany was refusing to intervene at 
Vienna in order to gain time for the Austrian advance into 
Serbia, the Russian foreign minister dictated the following 
formula to the German ambassador: 

"If Austria, recognizing that her dispute with Serbia has assumed 
the character of a question of European interest, declares herself 
ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which are dam- 
aging to the sovereignty of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop all 
military preparations." 2 

According to Sir George Buchanan, Count Pourtales "com- 
pletely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable," 
and M. Paleologue, the French ambassador, stated that 
"Count Pourtales promised to support this proposal with 
his government," although, in point of fact, it involved 
absolutely no change in the attitude which the Russian 
Government had consistently upheld from the very begin- 
ning of the crisis. The sincerity of M. Sazonof in making 
this proposal is seen from his remark to M. Paleologue, 
that in the course of the night "the general staff had sus- 
pended all measures of military precaution, so that there 

1 British, nos. 89, 102. 

1 Russian, no. 60; British, no. 97; French, no. 103. 



444 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

should be no misunderstanding," 1 the reference, of course, 
being to the mobilization against Austria, which had been 
ordered on the evening of 29 July. The reception of the 
Russian formula merits the most careful study, because it 
represented the last effort to preserve peace and for a brief 
space promised to be successful. 

Count Berchtold at once showed himself more concilia- 
tory than at any time since the beginning of the crisis. 
In an interview with the Russian ambassador he explained 
that his refusal to allow Count Szapary to continue the 
conversation was due to a misunderstanding; he did not 
say that he would allow the ambassador in St. Petersburg 
to discuss the Austrian ultimatum and the Serbian reply, 
but he was willing to "discuss what settlement would be 
compatible with the dignity and prestige for which both 
empires had equal concern." He also gave positive assur- 
ances that Austria would not infringe the sovereignty of 
Serbia, and he did not manifest any alarm over the Russian 
military measures, to which Austria would have to reply 
as a measure of precaution. The Entente ambassadors in 
Vienna were encouraged by the friendly tone of the inter- 
view, which took place on 30 July. 2 The next day Count 
Berchtold practically abandoned the position he had hith- 
erto maintained, for he telegraphed to London that "we 
are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir Ed- 
ward Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia." 3 Even 
though he posited the conditions that "our military action 
against Serbia should continue to take its course," and 
that the Russian mobilization should be brought to a 
standstill, "in which case we will also at once cancel the 
defensive military counter-measures in Galicia," the offer 
approximated the Russian formula sufficiently to warrant 
negotiations. 

1 French, no. 102. . J Austrian, no. 50; British, no. 96; French, no. 104. 

8 Austrian, no. 51. 



ARMAGEDDON 445 

How very different was the attitude of Berlin ! The 
Russian ambassador was informed by Herr von Jagow that 
"he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our pro- 
posal." l The French ambassador, recalling the promise 
that "Germany would only consider herself obliged to 
mobilize if Russia mobilized on her German frontiers," 
was told that "the words . . . did not constitute a firm 
engagement." 2 Herr von Jagow justified this repudiation 
on the ground that the heads of the army were clamoring 
for mobilization, "for every day was a loss to the strength 
of the German army." As a matter of fact, the military 
party had got the upper hand at the council on 29 July, 
as evidenced by the fact that at 1 p. m. on the 30th the 
Lokal Anzeiger published a special edition announcing the 
mobilization of the German army. 3 The news turned out 
to be premature, but the newspaper would not have acted 
thus without official inspiration. The next day the chan- 
cellor "was so taken up with the news of the Russian meas- 
ures along the frontier that he received without comment" 
Sir Edward Grey's reply to the bid for British neutrality; 
he also said to Sir Edward Goschen that "it was quite 
possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the 
German Government would take some serious step." 4 
As this conversation occurred before Berlin learned of the 
Russian general mobilization, it is obvious that Germany 
was preparing to take the situation into her own hands, in 
imitation of her procedure of March, 1909. 

The position of Sir Edward Grey was now difficult in 
the extreme. The German Government "had not had 
time to send an answer" to his proposal that it should 
indicate the form mediation should take, and Herr von 
Jagow practically evaded it by stating that he would com- 
municate directly with Austria. 5 The chancellor's bid for 

1 Russian, no. 63; French, no. 107. ' French, no. 109. 

8 French, no. 105; Russian, nos. 61, 62. 4 British, nos. 108, 109. 

'British, no. 107; French, no. 109. 



446 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

British neutrality and the demarche of Count Pourtales 
at St. Petersburg evidently convinced Sir Edward that 
Germany was bent on war. Hence his stinging reply to 
the chancellor's "infamous proposals" and his negotia- 
tions with M. Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in 
London. 

The reply to the chancellor reveals at once the intense 
indignation of Sir Edward Grey and his capacity of re- 
strained expression. 

"His Majesty's Government," he wrote, "cannot for a moment 
entertain the chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves 
to neutrality on such terms. 

"What he asks us, in effect, is to engage to stand by while French 
colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does 
not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. 

"From the material point of view such a proposal is unaccept- 
able, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken 
from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great 
Power, and become subordinate to German policy. 

"Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace to us to make 
this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace 
from which the good name of this country would never recover. 

"The chancellor also, in effect, asks us to bargain away whatever 
obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. 
We could not entertain that bargain either. . . . 

"We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may 
seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable de- 
velopment of the present crisis as the chancellor contemplates." 1 

On the same day (30 July) Sir Edward discussed with the 
French ambassador the question whether the agreement 
made in November, 191 2, would not now come into op- 
eration, that is, whether the French and British Govern- 
ments should not discuss what they would do if the peace 
of Europe was threatened. The ambassador did not press 
for a promise that Great Britain would intervene, but for 

1 British, no. 101. 



ARMAGEDDON 447 

a statement of intentions under certain circumstances, in 
this case an aggression by Germany on France. Sir Ed- 
ward Grey promised to consult the cabinet the next morn- 
ing and to see the ambassador in the afternoon. 1 In other 
words, so alarmed were England and France two days be- 
fore the German declaration of war on Russia that they 
were making preparations to meet all eventualities. 

That is one side of the picture. On the other hand, Sir 
Edward Grey did not cease from his endeavors to keep the 
peace. On 29 July he had suggested to Prince Lichnowsky 
that Austria might be persuaded to stop her military action 
with the occupation of Belgrade. 2 The Wilhelmstrasse 
seemed to approve of the suggestion, and promised to sup- 
port it at Vienna: Sir Edward accordingly, on 30 July, 
communicated it to St. Petersburg, with the hope that on 
this basis "Russia would consent to discussion and suspen- 
sion of further military preparations, provided other Powers 
did the same." 3 He also pointed out that "if the Russian 
Government object to the Austrians mobilizing eight army 
corps, this is not too great a number against 400,000 
Serbians." 4 

The German Government was informed of this overture 
through the regular diplomatic channel, and also by a 
telegram from King George to Prince Henry of Prussia, 
which contained the additional information that England 
was asking France to postpone her military preparations. 5 
The length to which Sir Edward Grey was willing to go 
can be measured from his two memorable offers of 30 and 
31 July: 

"If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis 
safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrange- 
ment to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be 

1 British, no. 105. 2 British, no. 88. 3 British, no. 103. ' British, no. 1 10. 
6 Second German While Book (published in Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 
August, 1914), no. 2, in Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 539 



448 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against 
her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or sepa- 
rately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, 
through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a correspond- 
ing object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto 
been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if 
the present crisis, so much more acute than Europe has gone through 
for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and 
reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite 
rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto." x 

This proposal came at the end of Sir Edward Grey's refusal 
to barter away British neutrality, and it envisaged a Europe 
organized for peace on the basis of a reduction of armaments 
by all the Powers. Statesmanship has never risen higher, 
and this vision of Sir Edward Grey may yet be realized. 
But in July, 1914, the German chancellor received the 
proposal "without comment" ! 2 

More specific and more practical was the second offer: 

"I said to the German ambassador this morning (31 July) that 
if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which 
made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve 
European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreason- 
able if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and 
Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not 
accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do 
with the consequences ; but otherwise, I told [the] German ambas- 
sador that if France became involved we should be drawn in." 3 

Here was the opportunity that Germany had been seeking 
for many years : to shatter the Entente and lay the founda- 
tions of an alliance with England. For England to make 
such an offer was to strain almost to the breaking-point her 
most cherished friendships and obligations; it was her su- 
preme effort for peace. Yet there is no record in the diplo- 
matic correspondence that the German Government gave 

1 British, no. 101. 2 British, no. 109. 8 British, no. in. 



ARMAGEDDON 449 

the least consideration to this invitation or hesitated a mo- 
ment in the course upon which it had embarked: Herr von 
Jagow said "it was impossible for the imperial government 
to consider any proposal until they had received an answer 
from Russia to their communication" demanding demobili- 
zation of the Russian army. 1 

The mobilization of both the Russian and the Austrian 
armies was ordered on 31 July. Nevertheless the situa- 
tion, as between those two countries, seemed to be clearing 
on that and the following day. Immediately upon re- 
ceiving Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a discussion on the 
basis of the Austrian occupation of Belgrade, M. Sazonof 
combined it with his own suggestion, and produced the 
following formula: 

"If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian 
territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has 
assumed the character of a question of European interest, she ad- 
mits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which 
Serbia can afford to the Austro-Hungarian Government, without 
injury to her sovereign rights as a state and to her independence, 
Russia agrees to preserve her waiting attitude." 2 

Austrian troops had already bombarded Belgrade when this 
offer was forwarded to Vienna and Berlin. Nevertheless, 
the Tsar telegraphed to the German Emperor: 

"It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations be- 
tween Austria and Serbia [sic] continue, my troops will undertake no 
provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon." 3 

Finally, the Russian ambassador in Vienna declared that 
"Russia would be satisfied even now with assurance re- 
specting Serbian integrity and independence," 4 and that 
"his government would take a much broader view than 

1 British, no. tax. J Russian, no. 67; British, no. 120; French, no. 113. 

* German White Book, p. 411. "Serbia" is obviously a misprint for "Russia," 
as Austro-Serbian relations were broken off on 25 July. 
4 British, no. 141. 



450 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

was generally supposed of the demands of the Monarchy." 1 
It is surely fair to say that the Russian Government went 
to the extreme limit of conciliation. 

Austria, for her part, realizing from the Russian mobili- 
zation that her policy of bluff had failed, gave every ap- 
pearance of yielding. She did not airily brush aside 
M. Sazonof's formula, as she had done his earlier proposals. 
The ambassador in Paris, Count Scezsen, declared that 
Austria would respect the integrity and independence of 
Serbia; that she would not occupy the sanjak of Novi- 
Bazar; and she would answer Serbia, or any Power speaking 
in the name of Serbia, any questions as to the conditions 
of a settlement. 2 In London, "Count Mensdorff begged 
the Russian ambassador to do his best to remove the 
wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the 
' door had been banged ' by Austria-Hungary on all further 
conversations." 3 Finally, "Count Szapary at last con- 
ceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof 
that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the 
points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible 
with the maintenance of Serbian independence." 4 The 
Russian foreign minister accepted this on condition that 
Austria refrain from the actual invasion of Serbia, and pro- 
posed that the mediation should be prepared in London. 5 
It would be too much to say that Austria and Russia had 
come to terms, but they were certainly in a fair way to 
do so, and neither Power showed the slightest disposition 
to begin hostilities. 

Suddenly Germany intervened, just as she had in March, 
1909, when the Austro-Russian quarrel over the annexa- 
tion of Bosnia was approaching a settlement, and, to bor- 
row Herr von Jagow's complaint about Russian mobiliza- 

1 French, no. 104. 2 French, no. 120; Russian, no. 73 

3 British, no. 137. 4 British, no. 161 

6 Austrian, no. 56; British, nos. 120, 139. 



ARMAGEDDON 451 

tion, "spoiled everything." Her precipitate action was the 
more remarkable because she was insisting that her media- 
tion at Vienna was responsible for the altered attitude of 
Austria. 1 The explanation given in the White Book runs 
as follows: 

"During the interval from 29 July to 31 July, whilst these en- 
deavors of ours for mediation were being continued with increasing 
energy, supported by English diplomacy, there appeared renewed 
and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilization. 
Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the 
declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Rus- 
sian west frontier allowed us no further doubt that the Russian 
mobilization was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all 
such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg 
on word of honor." 2 

Now the curious thing is that not a single despatch cor- 
roborative of this charge is printed in the White Book, nor 
is there mention of any remonstrances by either the Ger- 
man foreign secretary or the German ambassador in St. 
Petersburg. Not until 2 p. m. on 31 July does the Ger- 
man Emperor protest to the Tsar against "serious prepa- 
rations for war going on on my eastern frontier." 3 The 
White Book produces four telegrams as proof of Russian 
mobilization before 29 July: why is it silent as regards the 
next two days ? The Russian mobilization may have been 
in full swing against Germany before the order for general 
mobilization (31 July), but the historian cannot accept the 
fact as conclusive on Germany's ipse dixit. 

The news of the Russian general mobilization became 
known in the German capital sometime in the afternoon of 
31 July. Kriegsgefahrzustand was at once proclaimed, and 

1 German White Book, pp. 410-41 1; despatch of the German chancellor to the 
German ambassador in Vienna, 30 July, 1014, published in the Westminster Gazette, 
1 August; King George to the Emperor Nicholas, 1 August, Collected Diplomatic 
Documents, p. 536; British, nos. 98, 112. 

2 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 411. 3 German White Book, p. 412. 



452 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

two ultimatums were launched. The one to Russia, pre- 
sented in St. Petersburg at midnight, stated that "if within 
twelve hours — that is by midnight [sic] on Saturday — Rus- 
sia had not begun to demobilize, not only against Germany 
but also against Austria, the German Government would 
be compelled to give the order for mobilization." To M. 
Sazonof's inquiry whether this meant war, "the ambassador 
replied in the negative, but added that they were very near 
it." x For the moment we may postpone the consideration 
of the equity of this demand and continue the narrative 
of events. The ultimatum to France, presented at 7 p. m., 
recited that Germany had taken "no measures toward 
mobilization," but that she would be forced to do so if 
Russia did not demobilize within twelve hours. Since 
"mobilization inevitably implies war," the French Govern- 
ment was asked to reply in eighteen hours "whether it 
intended to remain neutral in a Russo- German war." 2 

Only a miracle could now avoid war. Yet the Tsar did 
not expect war: so he stated in his telegram of 1 August 
to King George. 3 Consequently, although the German 
ultimatum expired at noon, at 2 p. m. he telegraphed to the 
German Emperor: 

"I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, but I should like 
to have from you the same guarantee which I have given you, viz., 
that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue 
to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal 
peace which is so dear to our hearts." 4 

The French Government, for its part, tactfully kept its 
troops ten kilometres behind the German frontier, 5 and Sir 

1 Russian, no. 70; German, no. 24. The British and French ambassadors com- 
plained to Herr von Jagow that Germany had made the matter more difficult by 
requiring to demobilize against Austria as well as herself. (British, no. 121; French, 
no. 116.) 

2 German, no. 25; French, no. 117; British, no. 117. 

3 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 537. 4 German While Book, p. 413. 
6 British, nos. 134, 136, 140; French, no. 136. 



ARMAGEDDON 453 

Edward Grey informed Berlin that "His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment are carefully abstaining from any act which may 
precipitate matters." * 

The British Government may also be credited with the 
last efforts to preserve peace. Sir Edward Grey advised 
Berlin that "things ought not to be hopeless so long as 
Austria and Russia are ready to converse," and commu- 
nicated the amended Russian formula. 2 Then, on the 
basis of a report that the German ambassador had sug- 
gested that Germany might remain neutral in an Austro- 
Russian war if Great Britain secured the neutrality of 
France, Sir Edward made overtures to Prince Lichnowsky 
toward that end, only to learn that the ambassador's pro- 
posal was that Great Britain and France should remain 
neutral while Germany went to war with Russia. 3 

Steps were also taken to restrain Russia. King George 
sent to the Tsar a long statement of the German Govern- 
ment, to the effect that its mediation had been upset by the 
Russian mobilization, and that war was imminent. The 
King made "a personal appeal" to his cousin "to remove 
the misapprehension which he felt must have occurred, 
and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible 
peace." 4 Sir Edward Grey telegraphed that "if, in the 
consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, 
Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to 
be possible to preserve peace." 5 Now, since the Tsar, in 
his reply to King George's telegram, said that he "would 
gladly have accepted your proposals had not the German 
ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my govern- 
ment declaring war," 6 it seems probable that Russia was 
quite willing to negotiate for a general demobilization, and 

1 British, no. 131. * British, no. 131. 

' Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, 28 August, 1914. (5 Hansard lxvi, c. 
264.) 

* Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 536. 6 British, no. 135. 

• Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 537. 



454 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

that, as Sir Maurice de Bunsen sorrowfully said, "a few 
days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe 
from one of the greatest calamities in history," 1 provided, 
of course, that Germany was not determined at all costs 
to pick a quarrel. 

All was in vain. At 12.52 p. m., on Saturday, 1 August, 
or fifty-two minutes after the expiry of the ultimatum, the 
German ambassador in St. Petersburg was instructed to 
declare that, as Russia had refused to comply with the 
German demand for demobilization, "and having shown 
by this refusal that her action was directed against Ger- 
many, . . . His Majesty the Emperor, in the name of the 
German Empire, accepts the challenge and considers him- 
self in a state of war with Russia." 2 According to Baron 
Beyens, the Belgian minister in Berlin, Herr von Jagow 
and Herr Zimmermann, the under-secretary of the foreign 
office, besought the Emperor to await a reply from 
Russia, which might have been delayed by the military 
preparations, and not to order the mobilization of the 
German army. 3 His Majesty, however, followed up the 
declaration of war by an imperious telegram, 4 and at 5 
p. m. ordered the mobilization of the German army and 
navy. Count Pourtales presented the declaration of war 
to M. Sazonof at 7.10 p. m. 

"However," says the White Book, "before a confirma- 
tion of the execution of this order had been received, . . . 
Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into 
German territory. Thus Russia began the war against 
us." 5 No proof is adduced, except a statement in the 
Austrian Red Book that "the Russian troops have crossed 
the German frontier at Schwidden." 6 Nor were the Brit- 
ish and Austrian ambassadors in Berlin informed of this 

1 British, no. 161. 2 German, no. 26; Russian, no. 76. 

3 "La Semain tragique," Revue des Deux Monies, 1 June, 1915. 

* German White Book, p. 413. 5 Ibid., p. 413. 6 Austrian, no. 57. 



ARMAGEDDON 455 

breach of international usage until the next day. 1 But 
granted that the violation of frontier took place: "to put 
it forward, as does the German and Austrian correspond- 
ence, as the actual ground for the commencement of hos- 
tilities is to assume the imposition that the fate of nations 
is subject to the reported action of a roving patrol." 2 

It is now necessary to examine the German contention 
that because Russia mobilized her army while Germany 
was mediating between Russia and Austria, the security of 
Germany was thereby menaced and a declaration of war 
forced upon the Emperor. On general principles, it is 
quite impossible to admit such a theory, for every sovereign 
state has the right to dispose of its armed forces within 
its own frontiers as it sees fit. If a neighboring state con- 
ceives itself endangered by military movements over the 
frontier, it can mobilize its own army, but it cannot make 
such movements a casus belli without putting itself in the 
wrong; the obvious action is to make the other side declare 
war. Unfortunately, German "open mobilization was the 
last stage. It was not a military preparation; it was 
in itself an offensive movement. On that order the Ger- 
man armies did not merely concentrate; they marched." 3 
The German thesis is disproved by two circumstances. 
First, to all the overtures made by the British Government 
to the German for a limitation of armaments, the reply 
invariably was that every state must remain master of its 
military powers. Germany cannot claim such rights for 
herself and deny them to Russia. She could mobilize her 
own army; she might refuse to exert pressure on Austria; 
she could give notice that any attack on Austria would be 
met by a German declaration of war; but by no criterion 
of international conduct was she entitled to go beyond 
that. Second, on the eve of the crisis, the British fleet 

'British, no. 144; Austrian, no. 57. 

1 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. xi. * Ibid., p. xiv. 



456 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

was mobilized for manoeuvres, and when the crisis opened 
was not disbanded. Why did not Germany insist upon 
its demobilization as a condition precedent to British par- 
ticipation in the negotiations ? Its own fleet, then in Nor- 
wegian waters, was surely in as much danger from a Brit- 
ish attack as was the East Prussian frontier on 31 July- 
1 August. Suppose that Great Britain, France, or Russia 
had made formal complaint to Berlin of the preparatory 
military measures which they believed Germany to be 
taking; is it open to doubt what the German answer 
would have been? 

The German case against Russia rests partly upon the 
alleged priority of the Russian mobilization. Now, it is 
difficult to say "who began it." In the various Books 
there are some forty despatches relating to mobilization 
in its various stages. If accepted at their face value, they 
show that the British, French, German, Austrian, and Rus- 
sian Governments were taking precautionary measures 
from the early days of the crisis. Some of the reports may 
be false, but until the records of the general staffs are avail- 
able the chaff cannot be separated from the wheat, and 
meanwhile the student can only speculate upon the psy- 
chological effects produced upon the several foreign offices 
as news of military preparations by a probable enemy 
comes in. If Germany asks us to accept her testimony 
about Russian secret preparations, she must permit us to 
note what the French and Russian despatches say about 
her own activities. In other words, the German charge 
that Russia "betrayed" Germany by denying the existence 
of preparations that were in reality being carried on can 
be met by the counter-charge that Germany "betrayed" 
France and Russia. 

The one serious question, therefore, is: Was the Russian 
mobilization premature ? For it is to be remembered that, 
although Austria began by denying the legitimacy of Rus- 



ARMAGEDDON 457 

sian intervention, she ended by conceding it, since she agreed 
to discuss with Russia the substance of her ultimatum to 
Serbia. Russia mobilized her four southern conscriptions 
on the morrow of the Austrian declaration of war against 
Serbia. Ought she to have waited until the Austrian troops 
actually invaded Serbia? A negative answer seems justi- 
fied by the fact that Count Berchtold, after a brief inclina- 
tion to regard the move as a "threat," soon showed him- 
self ready, for the first time since the crisis began, to make 
concessions which would obviate the necessity for an armed 
intervention by Russia. 

The general mobilization affords a more difficult problem. 
The Germans contend that the Russian order could not 
have been caused by the Austrian mobilization, and that 
it was given before Austria had replied to the proposal 
embodied in M. Sazonof's first formula. 1 As to the first, 
there is the definite statement of the Russian Government 
in its public announcement and the statement of the Tsar 
to King George, that the mobilization was induced by Aus- 
tria's previous mobilization. Is it possible to test the accu- 
racy of these statements ? The one precise piece of informa- 
tion is that given by the French ambassador in Vienna, 
according to whom the Austrian mobilization was declared 
at 1 a. m. on 31 July, 2 the decree for which was appar- 
ently prepared as early as 28 July. 3 For the Russian mo- 
bilization three general statements are available. Count 
Szapary says that it was ordered "early to-day" — 31 
July. 4 What does "early to-day" mean? The German 
White Book says it occurred "am Vormittag," 5 which would 
seem to mean in the latter part of the morning. The 
Emperor, telegraphing to the Tsar at 2 p. m., does not 
mention it. 6 Finally, in his telegram to King George of 

1 Dr. Karl Helflerich, "The Dual Alliance versus the Triple Entente," New York 
Times, 14 March, 1915. 
J French, no. 115. 3 Russian, no. 47. * Au strian, no. 52. 

5 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 412. 6 German White Book, p. 411. 



458 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

31 July, the Emperor says: "I have just heard from the 
chancellor that intelligence had just reached him that 
Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilization of his 
entire army and fleet." 1 The probability certainly is that 
the Russian mobilization was ordered after that of Austria. 
The Russian Orange Book and the Austrian Red Book are 
both strangely silent upon the subject, so it may be that 
each government ordered its mobilization independently 
of any knowledge of the other's intentions; but the pub- 
lished evidence seems to absolve Russia of having antici- 
pated the Austrian mobilization. 

It does appear to be true that Russia ordered her mobiliza- 
tion before Austria had vouchsafed a reply to either Sir 
Edward Grey's proposal that she should open a discussion 
with Russia as soon as she had occupied Belgrade, or to 
M. Sazonof's own formula. And, inasmuch as Russia was 
aware, from the communication of Count Pourtales, that 
Germany would immediately imitate the Russian mobiliza- 
tion and that mobilization meant war, it is evident that 
Russia must have counted the consequences when she or- 
dered the general mobilization. Had she waited another 
twenty-four hours before mobilizing, an agreement might 
have been reached with Austria which would have obviated 
the necessity of mobilization. So far as mobilization was 
the cause of the war, Russia must bear some share of the 
responsibility. 

At the same time, quite apart from the fact that mobiliza- 
tion does not afford a sufficient ground per se for declaring 
war, Russia was in a difficult position. She had every 
reason to believe that Austria would make no concessions. 
Belgrade had been bombarded on 30 July, and the mobiliza- 
tion of the whole Austrian army had been ordered, accord- 
ing to the Russian version of events. M. Sazonof also 
claimed to have information concerning German prepara- 

1 Second German White Book, no. 3. 



ARMAGEDDON 459 

tions against Russia. 1 In these circumstances there is 
much to be said for the plea made to King George by the 
Tsar: 

"That I was justified in ordering a general mobilization is proved 
by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite unex- 
pected by me, as I have given most categorical assurances to the 
Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as media- 
tion negotiations continued." 2 

All things considered, we may admit that it would have 
been wiser for Russia not to have mobilized when she did; 
but we must remember that her provocation was very 
great, that she had throughout the crisis displayed admira- 
ble restraint, and that it was her complete mobilization 
which actually forced from Austria the promise to discuss 
with Russia the substance of her ultimatum. 

Furthermore, if Russia can be criticised for a premature, 
if intelligible, mobilization, Austria is open to the same 
charge. Count Berchtold was fully aware of the demarche 
of Count Pourtales, and had himself requested Germany to 
notify Russia that Russian mobilization would call for 
counter-measures by Germany. 3 Now, it stood on the 
cards that an Austrian mobilization would immediately 
be followed by that of Russia; this was, indeed, a com- 
monplace of diplomacy, and Count Berchtold can scarcely 
have sanctioned the Austrian mobilization without a full 
appreciation of its effect upon Russia, upon Germany, 
and in the end upon Europe. It is this consideration which 
raises the most serious doubt whether the Austrian conces- 
sions on 31 July and 1 August were sincere, were not, in 
fact, intended as plays for time or as manoeuvres to place 
Russia in the wrong. For, although she agreed to discuss 
the substance of her ultimatum with Russia, she did not 

1 British, no. g7; Russian, no. 68; French, no. 102. 

2 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 537. 3 Austrian, nos. 28, 42. 



460 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

promise to stop her march on Belgrade, and did not stop 
it. Nevertheless, the situation as between Austria and 
Russia was not irretrievable until Germany took umbrage 
at the Russian mobilization and proceeded to force the 
pace. 

As a matter of fact, this lengthy analysis of the German 
case against Russia is scarcely needed to demonstrate its 
utter hollowness. If Germany had proceeded to invade 
Russia upon her declaration of war, one could understand 
the argument of Herr von Jagow that Germany "had the 
speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the 
German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia 
time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide 
dominions." 1 But Germany did not attack Russia: she 
waited for the Russian army to invade East Prussia, and 
hurled her own legions against France even before she had 
declared war on the Republic ! One cannot avoid the sus- 
picion that the German attitude toward Russia was as- 
sumed with the view to providing an opportunity for an 
invasion of France, whose conduct throughout the crisis 
was eminently correct and conciliatory. 

The German ultimatum to France expired at i p. m. on 
i August. At n a. m. Herr von Schoen visited the 
Quai d'Orsay, and was informed that "the French Govern- 
ment failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his 
communication of the previous evening." M. Viviani re- 
ferred to the hopeful prospect of an Austro-Russian agree- 
ment, and "laid stress on the serious responsibility which 
the imperial government would assume if, in circumstances 
such as these, it took an initiative which was not justified 
and of a kind which would irremediably compromise 
peace." 2 At 1.05 p. m. Herr von Schoen telegraphed to 
Berlin that "upon his repeated definite inquiry whether 
France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-Ger- 

1 British, no. 138. 2 British, no. 126; French, no. 125. 



ARMAGEDDON 461 

man war, the prime minister declared that France would 
do what her interests dictated." x At 3.40 the mobilization 
of the French army and navy was ordered. 

"On the morning of the next day," says the German 
White Book, "France opened hostilities." 2 In the Reichs- 
tag, on 4 August, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said that 
"aviators dropped bombs, and cavalry patrols and French 
infantry detachments appeared on the territory of the 
Empire." The charges are particularized in the French 
Yellow Book : 

"Eighty French officers in Prussian uniform attempted to cross 
the German frontier in twelve motor-cars at Walbeck, to the west 
of Geldern." 

"Several of the aviators openly violated the neutrality of Bel- 
gium by flying over the territory of that country; one attempted 
to destroy buildings near Wesel; others were seen in the district 
of the Eifel, one threw bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and 
Nuremberg." 3 

The French premier "formally challenged these inaccurate 
allegations," 4 and the government stated that it had given 
explicit orders that its troops should remain ten kilometres 
behind the frontier. Such denials are scarcely conclusive. 
But two French professors, MM. Durkheim and Denis, of 
the University of Paris, had the happy idea to ascertain 
whether German newspapers had given a detailed account 
of the alleged occurrences. Their account of their re- 
searches is as follows: 

"We consulted five of the principal newspapers (Vorwarts, Ar- 

beiter Zeitung of Vienna, Frankfurter Zeitung, Kolnischer Zeitung, 
Miinchner Neuste Nachrichten) from the end of July to 5 August. 
First of all we noticed that the aviator who is said to have flown 
over Carlsruhe is not mentioned. As for the others, the account 
of them is as vague as it is in the official note. These incidents, 
given as the cause of determining war, take up one line, two or 

1 German, no. 27. 2 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 413. 

3 French, nos. 146, 147. * French, no. 148. 



462 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

three at the most. The bombs never left any trace. One of the 
aeroplanes, that at Wesel, is said to have been brought down; 
nothing is said of the aviator and what became of him, nor is there 
anything about the aeroplane itself. In a word, the Germans took 
care to draw attention to their arrival in Germany and then never 
spoke of them again. They were never seen to return to their 
starting-point. 

"But we have still more convincing evidence. We have been 
able to procure a Nuremberg newspaper, the Frankischer Kurrier. 
On 2 August, the day the bombs are supposed to have been thrown, 
not a word is said about the incident. Nuremberg received the 
news on the 3d by a telegram from Berlin identical to that published 
by the other newspapers. Again, the Kolnischer Zeitung of the 
3d, in its morning edition, published a telegram from Munich which 
read as follows: 'The Bavarian minister of war is doubtful as to 
the exactness of the news announcing that aviators had been seen 
above the lines Nuremberg-Kitzingen and Nuremberg-Ansbach, 
and that they had thrown bombs on the railway.' " x 

More interesting is the fact that although the alleged 
violations of the frontier occurred on 2 August, the German 
Government did not declare war on France for thirty-six 
hours, at 6.45 p. m., on 3 August. 2 On the morning of the 
2d the ambassador in London telegraphed that England 
would not guarantee the neutrality of France. 3 If the 
French attacks were to be made the official cause of war, 
why was the declaration delayed so long? The Germans 
have hardly made out a convincing case. 

It may also be observed that Germany did not regard the 
mobilization of the French army as a casus belli, although 
the danger to Germany was very much greater on this side 
than on the Russian. And yet the neutrality of Belgium 
was violated because it was necessary for Germany to 
prevent the French from getting their attack started first ! 
In the midst of such inconsistencies one finds additional 
reason for believing that the German attitude toward the 

1 Who Wanted War ? (igis), p. 50, note 1. 2 French, no. 147. 

* Second German White Book, no. 9. 



ARMAGEDDON 463 

Russian mobilization was only an excuse for launching an 
attack on France. 

The French, on their side, alleged that the German troops 
violated the French frontier at Ciry, Longwy, Delle, 
Joncherey, and Baron, on 2 August. 1 The chancellor's 
statement in the Reichstag on 4 August, that only one of 
these violations, which he did not specify, had been com- 
mitted, is worth as much or as little as the French premier's 
similar denial of French aggressions. But it is curious to 
find, in the German account of the negotiations with Eng- 
land for the neutrality of France, this statement of the 
Emperor William to King George, in a telegram of 1 August : 
"The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept 
back by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French 
frontier." 2 Evidently it was the German intention to in- 
vade France on that date, when the German ambassador 
was still in France and had not asked for his passports. 
This admission and the detail with which the French sup- 
ported their charges afford reasonable ground for believing 
that the Germans were across the French frontier thirty- 
six hours before the declaration of war, conduct which is 
quite on a par with the policy that based a declaration of 
war on the alleged zeal of a few aviators. 

There is, however, one charge against France made by 
the Germans which must be examined with great care. 
In his extremely acute analysis of the Books published 
by the Entente Powers, Dr. Karl Helfferich, secretary of 
the German treasury, contends that "the Franco-Russian 
treaty of alliance did not pledge France to an uncondi- 
tional accompaniment of Russia in war," and that France, 
by prematurely promising to stand by Russia, was unable 
to exert pressure at St. Petersburg in the interests of peace, 
and strengthened the hand of the Russian war party. 3 

1 French, nos. 136, 130. ! Second German White Book, no. 6. 

* New York Times, 14 March, 1915. 



464 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

Inasmuch as the German White Book is generally re- 
garded as perhaps the most damning evidence against its 
authors, Germany is quite justified in trying to prove the 
guilt of the Entente Powers by their own documents. Dr. 
Helfferich first cites the interview on 24 July between M. 
Sazonof, Sir George Buchanan, and M. Paleologue, at 
which the French ambassador declared that "France would 
fulfil all the obligations imposed by her alliance with Rus- 
sia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly 
in any diplomatic negotiations." Sir George Buchanan 
reported to Sir Edward Grey his opinion that, "even if 
England declines to join them, France and Russia are de- 
termined to . make a strong stand," the extent of which 
might be gauged by the remark of M. Sazonof that "Rus- 
sian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried 
out." * This declaration of French policy, according to Dr. 
Helfferich, so tied the hands of Paris that it would not 
listen to the repeated requests of Herr von Schoen to use 
its moderating influence at St. Petersburg. 

The decisive step, however, was not taken until 29 July, 
when the French premier confirmed to the Russian ambas- 
sador "the French Government's firm determination to 
act in concert with Russia," 2 to which M. Sazonof replied 
that "in the existing circumstances that declaration is 
specially valuable to us." 3 The following day M. Viviani 
telegraphed to London and St. Petersburg that "France is 
resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance." 4 
Finally, French diplomacy exerted itself to the uttermost, 
and most unscrupulously, 5 to secure a pledge of English 

1 British, no. 6. ' Russian, no. 55. 

3 Russian, no. 58. * French, no. 101. 

6 In the original edition of the British White Paper, no. 105 (3), which purports 
to be a report from Paris of German military preparations, is dated "31 July," 
although it is enclosed in a British despatch to Paris of 30 July ! It also contains 
the words "yesterday, Friday," yet Friday was 31 July. Is the document a forgery, 
as the Germans contend? No explanation has ever been vouchsafed. In subse- 
quent editions of the White Paper the date and the words quoted have been omitted, 



ARMAGEDDON 465 

assistance. From 29 July France believed herself sure of 
English support, and made her promise to Russia. There- 
fore, argues Dr. Helfferich, the aggression during the crisis 
came from France and Russia, and it was due to France 
that Russia embarked on her policy of mobilization, which 
made war inevitable. 

"Left to depend upon herself alone, Russia would have risked 
the war with Austria-Hungary and Germany only in an extreme 
case in the defense of national vital interests, but never as a result 
of weighing the probable result. Only the assurance of the active 
co-operation of other Great Powers made possible the determination 
of the leading circles of Russia for war." 

Nevertheless, in spite of the sequence of events as estab- 
lished by Dr. Helfferich, his conclusions do not neces- 
sarily follow. First of all, his point about the Franco- 
Russian alliance does not seem well taken. He assumes 
that Germany will loyally support her ally Austria, yet 
questions the justice of France standing by her ally Russia. 
As to the statement that France was not bound under all 
circumstances to fight for Russia, by which is meant, pre- 
sumably, that the alliance was defensive, the same thing 
may be predicated of Germany. Her alliance with Austria 
was also defensive: none the less she considered herself 
bound to declare war on Russia, in defense of her ally, 
before the latter was herself at war with Russia. It would 
have been highly desirable if Germany and France could 
have left the dispute to be settled between the two prin- 
cipals, but since they did not Germany cannot deny to 
France the same privilege to support her ally which she 
claimed for herself. 

In the second place, there is nothing in the whole corre- 
spondence to show that the attitude of Russia was stiffened 

and the French Yellow Book dates a similar document (no. 106) 30 July. British, 
nos. 99, 117, 119, 124, 134, 136; French, nos. 106, 114, 127, indicate how anxious 
France was for the promise of English support. 



466 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

as a result of French policy. The Russian Government 
took its position at the very outset of the crisis and, as we 
have already observed, maintained it consistently to the 
end. Dr. Helfferich would have us believe that the Rus- 
sian mobilization would not have occurred without the 
assurance of French assistance. As a matter of fact, the 
Russian mobilization was determined upon, that is, if 
it was necessary to enforce Russia's claim to share in the 
settlement of the Austro-Serbian question, on 25 July, 1 
or four days before France promised her assistance. Then, 
in spite of Dr. Helfferich's argument to the contrary, 
the actual order for mobilization does seem to have been 
given as a consequence of the Austrian mobilization. 
Nor is it fair to say that France did nothing for peace. 
She did not play a prominent part in the diplomacy of the 
twelve days — 23 July-4 August — but she supported all the 
proposals of Sir Edward Grey, which is more than can be 
said of Germany, and she requested her ally to avoid "every 
military measure that could offer Germany the pretext 
for general mobilization." 2 After all, the Germans them- 
selves have recognized the perfect propriety of France's 
conduct. In the German note to the Entente Powers of 
24 July we read: "The imperial government desires ur- 
gently the localization of the conflict, because every inter- 
ference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty 
obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences." 3 

If Germany had waited for Russia to attack her or Aus- 
tria, and had then been attacked by France, she could 
convince the world that she was the victim of unprovoked 
aggression. But when she declared war on Russia, and 
then on France, while the latter carefully refrained from 
coming to the assistance of its ally, it is absurd for Ger- 

1 Telegram of the Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William, 30 July, German, 
no. 23a. 

2 French, no. 101 3 German, no. 1; British, no. o; French, no. 28 



ARMAGEDDON 467 

many to argue that the war would not have come if France 
had not promised to assist Russia. No amount of special 
pleading can explain away the fact that negotiations were 
proceeding between Austria and Russia when Germany in- 
tervened violently and fatally. Furthermore, if Germany 
had sincerely desired to keep the peace with France, as 
Herr von Schoen kept saying at the Quai d'Orsay, she would 
have concentrated in Alsace-Lorraine — for France had 
promised to respect the neutrality of Belgium — an army 
sufficient to beat back a French attack, and have waged 
her own war immediately against Russia who, it was al- 
leged, had caused all the trouble by threatening Germany's 
ally. 



CHAPTER XV 
THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 

It is at last possible to discuss the reasons why Great 
Britain declared war on Germany. The various phases of 
the rivalry between the two nations have been analyzed: 
the struggle for the control of the seas in time of war; 
the competition for the markets of the world; problems of 
colonial expansion; mutual suspicion generated in the po- 
litical sphere by the reaction of the three factors just 
mentioned; and the profound differences in the national 
temperaments, institutions, and ideals. A conflict was, 
perhaps, inevitable. At the same time, it has been seen 
that the naval rivalry was in process of adjustment; that 
Great Britain was not jealous of the commercial progress 
of Germany; that the colonial ambitions of Germany had 
been recognized by the Anglo-German agreement arrived 
at on the very eve of the war. As a result of this general 
relaxation of tension the relations between the two coun- 
tries in July, 1 9 14, were more friendly than they had been 
at any time since the retirement of Bismarck. The Triple 
Entente still remained as an obstacle to German aggression; 
but Great Britain had made it very plain, not merely in 
words but by her action, that she was in no way disposed 
to support France and Russia in an aggressive policy against 
Germany, and that if Germany was determined to live in 
peace on the basis of a fair field and no favors she would 
find no more earnest coadjutor and friend than England 
and the British Empire. On both sides there seemed to 
be developing a willingness to forget the quarrels of the 
past and to work toward a general understanding which 
would effectually guarantee the peace of the world. 

468 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 469 

When the crisis of 19 14 was sprung, Sir Edward Grey 
had, therefore, every reason to suppose that any efforts 
to preserve peace which he might make would receive the 
cordial approval and support of Germany, more especially 
as such co-operation had been vouchsafed in the crisis of 
1912-13. Instead, he had seen Germany refuse to exert 
pressure on her ally, decline to join in some form of inter- 
national action, and declare war on Russia. As many 
French and English publicists who passed for jingoes had 
predicted, the Bismarckian spirit, without its cleverness, 
still guided German diplomacy; the Teutonic legions had 
been sent forth almost without warning, and the neutrality 
of Belgium was soon discovered to be a paper guarantee. 
Sir Edward Grey's correspondence bears many a trace of 
disappointment that he was unable to secure from Germany 
a favorable response to his repeated overtures, and he is 
reported to have said, after his speech to the House of Com- 
mons on 3 August: "This is the saddest day of my life." 
But such reflections did not solve the awful problem 
whether Great Britain should participate in the war. 
The mere fact that she was not drawn in automatically 
proves that she was not committed to France and Russia 
by secret agreements or military conventions and Sir 
Edward Grey stated to Parliament on 3 August that he 
"did not know the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance." 
Clearly, then, the British Government was a free agent in 
any decision which it might recommend Parliament to 
take. 

Four possible policies presented themselves for its choice: 
First, the British Government might take the position 
that the war was simply an enlargement of the Austro- 
Serbian dispute, that "direct British interests in Serbia 
were nil," and that its "idea had always been to avoid 
being drawn into a war over a Balkan question." L And 

1 British, nos. 6, 87. 



47© ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

as late as 31 July Sir Edward Grey informed Sir Francis 
Bertie, the British ambassador in Paris, that "nobody here 
feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British 
treaties or obligations are involved." 1 The adoption of 
this position would have required England at once to pro- 
claim her unconditional neutrality. This was a possible 
policy, but in the light of British history it was not a very 
probable or promising one. 

Second, England might have decided to cut the Gordian 
knot by following up the cue of Anglo-German reconcili- 
ation made possible by the agreement of 19 14, and, aban- 
doning her friends of the Entente, have contracted a formal 
alliance with Germany. The German chancellor had such 
a development in mind when he made his famous bid for 
British neutrality; and he must have meant the same thing 
when he declared in the Reichstag on 2 December, 19 14, 
that "the cabinet of London could have made the war 
impossible if it had told St. Petersburg unequivocally that 
England had no intention of permitting a Continental war 
of the Great Powers to grow out of the Austro-Serbian 
conflict." For, of course, the Entente would have been shat- 
tered by such a policy, and England would have been thrown 
into the arms of Germany. The very idea of an Anglo- 
German alliance is hard to grasp, in view of the past rela- 
tions of the two countries. But Sir Edward Grey must 
have reckoned with it when he said that "if Germany 
could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made 
it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to pre- 
serve European peace, and that Russia and France would 
be unreasonable if they rejected it, . . . His Majesty's 
Government would have nothing more to do with the con- 
sequences." 2 This offer, more than any other incident 
of the crisis, must prove the disinterestedness and sincerity 
of Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy, and he is not to blame if 

1 British, no. 116. 'British, no. in. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 471 

Germany did not seize the opportunity to place Anglo- 
German relations on a sound basis. 

Third, Sir Edward Grey might, as he was repeatedly 
urged by French and Russian statesmen to do, have imme- 
diately declared the solidarity of Great Britain with France 
and Russia. This step was advocated on the ground that 
Germany would not provoke a general war if she were con- 
vinced that Great Britain would be found in the ranks of 
her enemies. It may be that such a declaration would have 
stayed the hand of the German military party, but it is 
extremely doubtful. Not only were the Germans supremely 
contemptuous of Britain's fighting capacities, but their 
government was repeatedly warned, by the remarks of 
Sir Edward Grey to Prince Lichnowsky, that if the war be- 
came general Great Britain would be drawn in. Sir Ed- 
ward even went so far as to say that "the German Govern- 
ment do not expect our neutrality." x It should be noted, 
however, that the Marquis di San Giuliano thought "it 
would have a great effect" if Germany believed that " Great 
Britain would act with Russia and France." 2 

The Germans have tried to prove that, as a matter of 
fact, England did practically declare her solidarity with 
France and Russia, and that this was responsible for the 
French promise to stand by Russia and the unyielding 
attitude of M. Sazonof. On 29 July Sir Edward Grey 
said to Prince Lichnowsky "something that was on his 
mind." 

"The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the 
issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering 
in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the 
issue might be so great that it would involve all European inter- 
ests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of 
our conversation — which I hoped would continue — into thinking 
that we should stand aside." 3 

1 British, no. 116. 2 British, no. 80. 3 British, no. 89. 



472 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

The ambassador "took no exception" to this, and Herr von 
Jagow admitted to Sir Edward Goschen that he had heard 
it "with regret, but not exactly with surprise." x But Sir 
Edward Grey had already informed the French ambas- 
sador that he intended to convey this warning to Prince 
Lichnowsky. 2 It was this, says Dr. Helfferich, that enabled 
France to promise her assistance to Russia and thus com- 
promise the situation. Proof of the altered state of affairs 
is adduced in the letter from the Belgian charge in St. 
Petersburg to his government which was intercepted in 
Germany after the war began. 

"England," wrote M. de PEscaille on 30 July, "at the start let 
it be understood that she did not want to be dragged into a con- 
flict. Sir George Buchanan said so openly. To-day every one in 
St. Petersburg is convinced — has even the assurance — that England 
will support France. This encouragement has had a powerful 
effect, and has contributed not a little to giving the war party the 
upper hand." 3 

It is possible that some comfort was derived in St. Peters- 
burg from the attitude of Sir Edward Grey, and it is diffi- 
cult to see why he informed M. Paul Cambon of what he 
intended to say to the German ambassador; all the more 
so because his policy was apparently shaped by the feeling 
that uncertainty as to the intentions of Great Britain was 
the best guarantee of peace. If the Entente practically be- 
came an alliance on 29 July, then the German attitude de- 
serves more sympathy than has hitherto been accorded it. 
But such does not seem to have been the case, in spite of 
M. de l'Escaille. If Sir Edward Grey had considered him- 
self morally bound to stand by France, he would scarcely 
have made the two memorable offers to Germany of 30 
and 31 July, which have already been adverted to several 

1 British, no. 98. 2 British, no. 87. 

3 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 September, 1014; published in American 
newspapers, 4 October, 1014. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 473 

times. Nor would he have been at such pains to convince 
M. Paul Cambon that the British attitude would be deter- 
mined by public opinion, and that public opinion would 
not necessarily support British intervention. 1 But there 
is still better proof that England's help was not considered 
as a matter of course. On 31 July M. Poincare, the Presi- 
dent of France, addressed an autograph letter to King 
George, begging the British Government to take some step 
which would demonstrate the solidarity of the Entente; 
to which the King replied in a vague and non-committal 
fashion. 2 On 1 August M. Viviani wrote to London: 

"I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, British 
opinion would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and 
that it would realize the strong reasons which we have given to 
Sir Edward Grey for asking for armed intervention on the part of 
England in the interest of the future of the European balance of 
power." 3 

This is not the language of assurance, but of entreaty. 
On the same day Sir Edward Grey, while refusing to state 
to Prince Lichnowsky the terms on which Great Britain 
would remain neutral, said: "Our hands are still free, and 
we are considering what our attitude will be." 4 On 2 
August the cabinet discussed the terms of neutrality, 5 and 
the promise of naval assistance which was given to France 
on 3 August was made conditional on the approval of Parlia- 
ment. Finally, the Tsar's telegram to King George of 1 
August concluded with the hope that "your country will 
not fail to support France and Russia." 6 On the basis of 
these facts, as opposed to the opinion of a subordinate 
diplomatist in St. Petersburg and the somewhat forced ar- 

1 British, nos. 87, 105, 116, 119, 148; French, nos. no, 126. 

2 Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 542-544. 

3 French, no. 127. * British, no. 123. 

6 Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, 27 August, 1914. (5 Hansard lxvi, 
c. 124.) 

6 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 537. 



474 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

gument of Dr. HeLfferich, it is reasonable to believe that 
Great Britain was not committed to France and Russia 
before the outbreak of war, and that, as Prince Lichnowsky 
reported Sir Edward Grey to have said on i August, 
"there was not the slightest intention to proceed in a hos- 
tile manner against Germany" x merely because she was 
Germany. 

Suppose Great Britain had declared her solidarity with 
France and Russia. If Russia were bent on war, the 
promise of British assistance would make it inevitable. 
Sir Edward Grey evidently believed Russia to be pacific, 
but he could take no chances. Next, such a declaration 
would have infuriated Germany and in all probability have 
whetted her appetite for war; if, by good fortune, peace 
had been preserved, the whole movement toward an Anglo- 
German understanding which had been nursed with such 
tender care would have come to an untimely end, and 
Great Britain would have been faced with still another in- 
crease of the German fleet. In fact, had Sir Edward Grey 
accepted the argument of solidarity, he would have stulti- 
fied himself, for his consistent policy had been to resist 
all temptations toward a formal alliance with France and 
Russia, however much he might support them in opposing 
the aggressions of Germany and Austria. In the existing 
situation, Sir George Buchanan was entirely right when 
he said that "England could play the role of mediator at 
Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as a friend who, if 
her counsel of moderation were disregarded, might one day 
be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare her- 
self Russia's ally at once." 2 

Thus the true policy of Great Britain, and the one which 
she actually pursued, was to co-operate in all measures 

1 Telegrams published in N orddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 September, 1914. 
no. 2 {Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 541). 
' British, no. 17. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 475 

which might preserve the peace of Europe; to suggest such 
measures herself; to use her influence with France and 
Russia in favor of moderation; and to secure the help of 
Germany in calming the adventuresome spirit of Austria. 
At the same time, Great Britain had no intention of aban- 
doning France and Russia if they were the victims of an 
unprovoked attack, and she therefore repeatedly warned 
Germany that, while she desired above all things to 
work with her for peace, yet Great Britain would be 
drawn in if war came about by the action of Germany. 
Nevertheless, she kept her hands free and did not make 
any decision to intervene until 2 August, that is, until 
Germany had declared war on Russia and had violated 
the neutrality of Luxemburg as the first step in her invasion 
of France. It remains to describe the steps by which Great 
Britain abandoned her waiting attitude and became the 
ally of France and Russia. 

On the morning of 30 July it was quite evident, thanks 
to the German bid for British neutrality and the com- 
munications of Count Pourtales to the Russian foreign 
minister, that the storm was about to break, and that its 
extent would not be limited to eastern Europe. In such 
circumstances, the neutrality of Belgium assumed a vital 
importance, not merely because of its bearing on the imme- 
diate diplomatic situation but on its own merits. A short 
statement, therefore, seems desirable, in spite of all that 
has been said and written about the matter since the be- 
ginning of the war. 

The neutrality of Belgium was not born of any particular 
consideration for the people of that country, but was essen- 
tially a political expedient. From time immemorial the 
Low Countries had been the cockpit of Europe, the decisive 
battle-ground of innumerable wars since the sixteenth cen- 
tury. Furthermore, the possession of this territory, which 



476 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

gave outlets on both the Channel and the North Sea, was 
considered the key to European domination, as the careers 
of Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV, and Napoleon showed 
only too well. The French, in particular, had displayed a 
relentless cupidity, and when the Revolution declared war 
on the Old Europe, in 1792, their first step was to occupy 
the southern provinces and, later on, Holland. When the 
Congress of Vienna met, after the fall of Napoleon, to find 
some solution of the problems provoked by his meteoric 
career, nothing aroused more interest than the necessity 
of hemming France in on all sides by states strong enough 
to resist a renewed aggression on her part when she should 
have recovered from the exhaustion of her struggle with 
the rest of Europe. At the demand of Great Britain a 
Kingdom of the Netherlands was created, consisting of the 
old Dutch Republic and the Netherlands proper, which 
had hitherto belonged to Spain or Austria. But that union 
proved utterly unworkable, for the excellent reason that 
between the Dutch of the north and the Belgians of the 
south there was not one interest in common. In religion, 
language, political ideals, economic interests, social organi- 
zation, and traditions, the two peoples were as distinct as 
Frenchmen and Germans; so that union was as unreal 
in the nineteenth century as it was in the sixteenth, when 
William the Silent vainly tried to organize the seventeen 
provinces for resistance to Spain. Inasmuch as the con- 
stitution granted in 18 15 by the Dutch Ring William en- 
tirely favored his own people, the only recourse of the 
southerners was to carry through a revolution, which 
they did in 1830, proclaiming their independence and ap- 
pealing to the Powers for recognition. 

Their conduct was a deliberate violation of the settle- 
ments of 18 1 5, upon which Europe had bestowed so much 
care. None the less, France and England responded fa- 
vorably to the Belgian appeal, which was resisted by the 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 477 

three eastern monarchies, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. 
The difficulty was that Belgium would not be strong enough 
to withstand a French attack, and that the new French 
King, Louis Philippe, who owed his throne to a revolution, 
might be tempted to undertake a war for the sake of pres- 
tige. Prussia did not relish the prospect of an attack on 
the lower Rhine; England was as unwilling as ever for any 
part of the Low Countries to pass into the hands of a 
strong Continental Power. It was therefore agreed that 
the new European state should be "neutral in perpetuity." 1 
The idea of the statesmen who thus divided the Low 
Countries into two independent states was that, "if it was 
made impossible for a Great Power to invade them, war 
would become increasingly difficult and dangerous." 2 
Consecrated by two international treaties (1831, 1839) 
signed by all the Powers and recognized by two generations 
of statesmen, the neutrality of Belgium was observed for 
eighty-three years, during which period only one war har- 
assed western Europe, in striking contrast to the frequent 
conflicts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 
the apt phrase of Sir Edward Grey, Belgian neutrality had 
become "the main rivet" of the peace of Europe. Conse- 
quently the argument of Herr von Jagow to Sir Edward 
Goschen that the Germans "had to advance into France 
by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get 
well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike 
some decisive blow as early as possible," 3 falls little short 
of the ridiculous: "the neutrality of Belgium had not been 
devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak 
of wars." 4 In other words, just as Austria sought to im- 
pose her particular solution of the international Balkan 
question, so Germany proposed to ignore the historical 

1 Article VII, treaties of 1831 and 1839. 

1 Great Britain and the European Crisis, " Narrative," sec. 6, par. 3. 

3 British, no. 160. 

4 Great Britain and the European Crisis, "Narrative," sec. 6, par. 4. 



478 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

background of Belgian neutrality, which had been devised 
in no small degree for the protection of Prussia herself. 

No time need be wasted over the German arguments 
that by her acquisition of the Congo or that, by leaving her 
French frontier poorly defended while she strongly forti- 
fied her German frontier, Belgium had forfeited her neu- 
trality. The assurances given by Herr von Bethmann- 
Hollweg to the Belgian Government in 191 1, the statement 
of Herr von Jagow to the budget committee of the Reichs- 
tag in 1913, 1 and, above all, the admission of the German 
chancellor in the Reichstag on 4 August, 19 14, that the 
entry of German troops into Belgium was "a breach of 
international law," "a wrong," dispose once for all of the 
contention that Germany had in any way repudiated the 
signature of Prussia to the treaty of 1839. 

Great Britain was also formally committed to observe 
her signature to the same treaty. In a despatch of 7 
April, 1 913, recording an interview with the Belgian min- 
ister in London, Sir Edward Grey said that "he was sure 
that this [the Liberal] government would not be the first 
to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and he did not believe 
that any British government would be the first to do so, 
nor would public opinion here ever approve of it." So 
long as it was not violated by any other Power Great 
Britain would certainly not send troops into Belgian ter- 
ritory. 2 

This last sentence is particularly important, because it 
refutes the German interpretation of the documents dis- 
covered in Brussels by the Germans after their capture of 
the city. 3 In the spring of 1906 General Ducarne, of the 
Belgian general staff, and Lieutenant- Colonel Barnardis- 
ton, the British military attacne in Brussels, worked out a 

1 Belgian, no. 12. 

2 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 350. 

3 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 November, 1914; Collected Diplomatic 
Documents, pp. 354-361. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 479 

plan for the co-operation of 100,000 British troops with 
those of Belgium. The Germans published General Du- 
carne's report of this plan as evidence that Belgium had 
sold herself and her neutrality to Great Britain, and that 
the latter would undertake offensive operations against 
Germany through Belgium. Unfortunately, the docu- 
ment bears the following marginal note: "The entry of the 
English into Belgium would take place only after the vio- 
lation of our neutrality by Germany." In 191 2 Lieutenant- 
Colonel Bridges, in a confidential interview with General 
Jungbluth, remarked that "the British Government, at 
the time of the recent events (the Agadir crisis), would have 
immediately landed troops on Belgian territory, even if 
Belgium had not asked for help"; to which the general re- 
plied that "their consent would be necessary for this." 
From the document itself it is impossible to determine 
whether the British attache was revealing what had been 
the secret intentions of his government or was voicing a 
personal opinion; but the Belgian Government has semi- 
officially stated that there was only "a private conversa- 
tion between two officers of high rank, which had no refer- 
ence to any official mission." * The documents are not 
conventions formally signed between the British and Bel- 
gian Governments, but are records of conversations; Sir 
Edward Grey has stated that he never knew of these con- 
versations, and that no reports of them are on file at the 
British war office, which fully demonstrates their unofficial 
character. Finally, King Albert of Belgium has said: 

"No one in Belgium ever gave the name of Anglo-Belgian con- 
ventions to the letter of General Ducarne to the minister of war, 
detailing the entirely informal conversations with the British mili- 
tary attache, but I was so desirous of avoiding even the semblance of 
anything that might be construed as unneutral that I had the matters 

1 J. Van den Heuvel, Belgian minister of state, On the Violation of Belgian Neu- 
trality, in Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 364. 



480 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

of which it is now sought to make so much communicated to the German 
military attache in Brussels. When the Germans went through our 
archives, they knew exactly what they would find, and all their present 
surprise and indignation is assumed." l 

There is, then, no reason for believing that the conduct 
of both the British and the Belgian Governments was oth- 
erwise than correct: the object of the conversations was to 
guard against the two governments being taken unawares 
if the neutrality of Belgium was actually violated by Ger- 
many. Now, "the strategic dispositions of Germany, es- 
pecially as regards railways, have for some years given 
rise to apprehension that Germany would attack France 
through Belgium." 2 This fear was, indeed, a matter of 
common discussion. If the reader will consult the Fort- 
nightly Review for February, 1910, and February, 19 14, he 
will find two articles describing in great detail the military 
railways of Germany on the Belgian frontier, and arguing 
that the purpose of such lines was to make possible a Ger- 
man advance through Belgium. The New York Times of 
23 January, 19 14, contains a Brussels despatch, under date 
of 9 January, describing the new line just completed which 
linked up the Belgian town of Stavelot with the German 
town of Malmedy. The correspondent commented upon 
probable lack of both passengers and freight for the rail- 
way, which he described as "another strategic line which, 
in the case of war between England and Germany, or par- 
ticularly in the case of an Anglo-French and German war, 
would be of great strategic value to Germany." He con- 
tinued: 

"Germany has thereby accomplished the first and more essential 
part of her plan for the peaceful penetration of the Ardennes. Eng- 
land has done nothing to stop it; France has done nothing. With- 

1 Interview with H. N. Hall, in American newspapers, 22 March, 1915. 

2 "Memorandum" prepared by the British foreign office, in Collected Diplomatic 
Documents, p. 365. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 481 

out their very energetic intervention Belgium is helpless, and so 
Germany perfects and prolongs her railway system, like her navy, 
for 'the day' without stay or interference." 

In the light of what has been said, the interest of Great 
Britain in the maintenance of Belgian neutrality is appar- 
ent, and, considering the German attitude assumed on 29 
July, the one hope of preserving peace lay in the chance 
that Germany might hesitate if she were convinced that 
Great Britain would resist by force an attempt to invade 
France through Belgium. Accordingly, on 31 July Sir 
Edward Grey addressed the following identic communica- 
tion to the French and German Governments: 

"I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of 
prospect of mobilization in Germany, it becomes essential to His 
Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether 
French (German) Government are prepared to engage to respect 
neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it." * 

Informing the Belgian Government of this demarche, Sir 
Edward said: 

"I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the 
utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect 
other Powers to uphold and observe." 2 

It is impossible to say whether Sir Edward Grey really 
expected Germany to abide by her treaty obligation, but 
it was his duty to put this question to her, just as Lord 
Granville had put it in 1870. The language used by Sir 
Edward deserves close scrutiny. He asked if the French and 
the Germans were "prepared to engage to respect the neu- 
trality of Belgium." If the replies were in the affirmative, 
his next step would doubtless have been, following the prec- 
edent of 1870, to submit to France and Germany identic 
treaties, by which the British Government bound itself, 

•British, no. 114; Belgian, no. 13; Russian, no. 72. J British, no. 115. 



482 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

in case one Power violated the neutrality of Belgium, to 
assist the other Power with all its forces. Of course, it 
may be argued, and it has been argued, that Sir Edward 
Grey was, for all practical purposes, well aware of Germany's 
intention to march across Belgium, and that his question 
was asked simply to provide him with an excuse for advising 
Parliament to sanction a British declaration of war against 
Germany. Is not the question somewhat academic? 
Those who believe that England was bound, both morally 
and for her own interests, to support France in a defensive 
war against Germany will say that Sir Edward Grey was 
entirely justified in seeking a legal and sound justification 
for British intervention. If the other theory is held — that 
Germany was attacked by Russia, and was driven in self- 
defense to cross Belgium — then British intervention was a 
gratuitous affront; then the parading of Belgian neutrality 
was a sham quite worthy of English hypocrisy. As a 
matter of fact, the following paragraphs will endeavor to 
show that if Germany had agreed to respect the neutrality 
of Belgium British participation in the Great War would 
have been unlikely, as the situation stood on 4 August, 1914. 
The French Government replied immediately to the 
British demand, that they were "resolved to respect the 
neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event 
of some other Power violating that neutrality that France 
might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure 
defense of her own security, to act otherwise." 1 From 
Brussels the news came that "Belgium expects and desires 
that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, 
which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power." 2 
Sir Edward Goschen, however, telegraphed from Berlin: 

"I have seen secretary of state, who informs me that he must 
consult the Emperor and the chancellor before he could possibly 

1 British, no. 125; French, no. 122. 2 British, no. 128; Belgian, no. 11. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 483 

reply. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply 
they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their 
plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore 
very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His 
excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request." J 

This reply, or rather refusal to reply, by the German Gov- 
ernment made it certain not only that Germany was in- 
tending war but that she was preparing to march through 
Belgium. When military considerations prevent an an- 
swer to a diplomatic question, there can be only one in- 
terpretation of the state of affairs, and this must be kept 
in mind when considering the events of Saturday, 1 August. 

Even before receiving the German reply Sir Edward 
Grey knew that the situation was desperate, although he 
continued his efforts for peace ; for the ambassador in Paris 
had informed him of the German ultimatums to Russia 
and France. 2 The French Government inquired what 
would be the attitude of England. A decision must soon 
be made. Nevertheless, at the cabinet meeting held 
Saturday morning no action was taken, 3 no doubt because 
Sir Edward Grey thought he might be able to restrict the 
conflict to eastern Europe. 

It had been reported to him that Prince Lichnowsky 
had suggested that Germany might remain neutral in an 
Austro-Russian war if Great Britain remained neutral and 
secured the neutrality of France, and that in this case 
Germany would engage not to attack France. 4 , Sir Edward 
Grey asked Prince Lichnowsky about this over the tele- 
phone about eleven o'clock Saturday morning. To Sir 
Edward the essential thing was to secure the neutrality of 
Germany, as that would insure the immunity of France, 
but Prince Lichnowsky grasped only the second part of the 

1 British, no. 122; French, no. 123; Belgian, no. 14. 

2 British, no. 117. 'French, no. 126. 

* Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, 28 August, 1914. (5 Hansard Ixvi, 
c. 264.) 



484 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

idea. So he telegraphed for authority to declare that "in 
the event of France remaining neutral in a German-Russian 
war, Germany would not attack the French." l The chan- 
cellor replied to the ambassador, and the German Emperor 
telegraphed to King George, that Germany was ready to 
accept the British proposal "in case England guaranteed 
with all her forces absolute neutrality of France in Russo- 
German conflict." 2 Sir Edward Grey had to explain that 
Prince Lichnowsky had misunderstood his proposal, and 
that the German counter-proposal was, so far as he knew, 
not compatible with the Franco-Russian alliance; that is, 
the casus foederis must operate equally with France and 
Germany. 3 Prince Lichnowsky promised to send a second 
telegram to Berlin to remove the misunderstanding, but 
apparently did not do so, 4 except to say that "the sugges- 
tions of Sir Edward Grey, based on the desire of creating 
the possibility of lasting neutrality on the part of England, 
were made without any previous inquiry of France and 
without knowledge of the [German] mobilization, and have 
since been given up as quite impracticable." 5 In just what 
fashion England could have guaranteed the neutrality of 
France was not explained by the German Government. In- 
deed, at the very time of making this proposal, Germany 
was despatching her declaration of war to St. Petersburg 
(12.52 p. m.). She cannot have seriously imagined that, if 
she attacked Russia, France would remain neutral, unless 
she was prepared to repudiate her alliance and place herself 
at the mercy of a victorious Germany. In view of Prince 
Lichnowsky's first telegram, the German Government may 

1 Second German White Book, no. 5 ; telegrams in Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 
6 September, 1014, no. 1. {Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 541.) 

2 Second German White Book, nos. 6, 7. 

3 Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, 28 August, 1014. (5 Hansard Ixvi, 
c. 265.) 

4 The German Government denied that such a telegram was received from Prince 
Lichnowsky. (Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 September, 1914-) 

5 Second German White Book, no. 9. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 485 

be acquitted of bad faith, but it is scarcely fair to charge, 
as did the N orddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in publishing 
the correspondence, that Great Britain rejected a positive 
opportunity to secure both its own and French neutrality. 
The German offer was based on a misconception, and was 
beyond the realm of practical politics. 

On Saturday afternoon Sir Edward Grey had another 
interview with Prince Lichnowsky. He read to the am- 
bassador this declaration of the cabinet: 

"The reply of the German Government with regard to the neu- 
trality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the 
neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Ger- 
many could see her way to give the same positive reply as that 
which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to 
relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if there 
were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant 
while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to re- 
strain public feeling in this country." * 

The ambassador then asked whether, if Germany promised 
to respect the neutrality of Belgium, Great Britain would 
engage to remain neutral. Sir Edward would only say 
that "our attitude would be determined very largely by 
public opinion, and the neutrality of Belgium would appeal 
very strongly to public opinion." Finally, pressed by the 
ambassador to formulate the conditions of British neu- 
trality, including, it was suggested, the integrity of France 
and her colonies, Sir Edward "felt obliged to refuse defi- 
nitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms." 

This incident has been very generally misunderstood. 
At first sight the British Government seems convicted, on 
its own evidence, of declining to formulate the conditions 
in which it would stand aside. Therefore, it is argued, 
England was committed to France and Russia. Nothing is 

1 British, no. 123. 



486 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

farther from the truth. In the first place, Prince Lich- 
nowsky credited Sir Edward Grey with saying that "for 
the time there was not the slightest intention to proceed 
in a hostile manner against us," and that "it would be their 
desire to avoid this if there was any possibility of doing 
so." 1 Next, as Sir Edward later pointed out, the offers 
of Prince Lichnowsky were entirely unofficial and quite 
contrary to the terms proposed officially by the German 
chancellor; also that so far was the German Government 
from guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium that two days 
later it was asking Great Britain not to make that neu- 
trality one of the conditions of her own neutrality. 2 Third, 
the circumstances of the moment must be fully considered. 
Sir Edward Grey knew that Germany had required Russia 
to demobilize within twelve hours and had asked France 
what her intentions, were; at the same time Austro-Russian 
conversations were proceeding. The German declaration of 
war was on its way, but this was not known in London. 
There was the barest chance that peace might still be kept, 
but that chance depended upon the uncertainty as to the 
British attitude. If Great Britain definitely promised to 
stand aside, the last restraint on Germany would be re- 
moved. Sir Edward Grey could not regard the overtures 
of Prince Lichnowsky as other than a bribe, which was 
unacceptable, no matter what the terms were. The only 
sound policy for the British Government was to stand firm 
against all temptations, whether from Germany or France, 
and to keep its hands free, and this policy it adopted; for, 
if Sir Edward Grey would not promise British neutrality 
to Germany, neither would he promise British assistance 
to France. The wisdom of this decision became apparent 
when the news arrived that the German authorities at 

1 Telegrams in Norddeutscke Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 September, 1914, no. 2. (Col- 
lected Diplomatic Documents, p. 541.) 

2 French, no. 144; cf. also the appeal to British public opinion, published by the 
German embassy on 3 August, 1914, and British, no. 157. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 487 

Hamburg were detaining British merchant ships. 1 Such 
measures certainly cast a doubt upon the sincerity with 
which the German Government was angling for the neu- 
trality of England, and more than justified the waiting 
attitude of Sir Edward Grey. 

From now on events marched rapidly. "Very early" 
Sunday morning German troops penetrated into the 
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg by the bridges of Wasser- 
billig and Remich, in spite of the protests of the Grand 
Ducal Government. 2 Whether this news turned the scale 
in the British cabinet — which was still discussing the ques- 
tion of neutrality — in favor of intervention cannot be ascer- 
tained. Under the terms of the treaty of 1867, as inter- 
preted by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon, the British 
Government was bound to act only if all the guaranteeing 
Powers agreed to do so. The Times, however, demanded 
immediate action on the ground that Belgium would be 
the next victim. At all events, after the cabinet, Sir Ed- 
ward Grey gave the following memorandum to the French 
ambassador: 

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet 
comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hos- 
tile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet 
will give all protection in its power. 

" This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's 
Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be 
taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action 
until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes 
place." 3 

Sir Edward Grey also informed M. Paul Cambon that the 
British Government was considering whether it should 
make the violation of Belgian neutrality a casus belli. 

1 British, no. 130. 

'British, no. 147; French, no. 131; Belgian, no. 18. 

3 British, no. 148; French, no. 137. 



488 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

The next day, 3 August, the decision was taken to regard 
the Belgian question in this light, and this, together with 
the promise of assistance to France, received the support 
of both Houses of Parliament, after Sir Edward Grey, in 
a masterly speech, had explained his policy and the obli- 
gations of the government. 1 

The foreign secretary admitted that no legal obligations 
bound Great Britain to assist France, for the exchange of 
letters of 22 November, 191 2, left the hands of both govern- 
ments free to take what decision the circumstances of the 
moment required. But, since the French Government, re- 
lying on the friendship of England, had withdrawn its fleet 
from the Channel and concentrated it in the Mediter- 
ranean, the British Government was morally bound, urged 
Sir Edward Grey, to protect the undefended coasts of 
France. The question, however, was not so much one of 
sentiment as of British interests, and it was primarily on 
the ground of British interests that Parliament was asked 
to approve the promise of naval assistance. The distinc- 
tion is all-important. If Sir Edward Grey had limited his 
argument to the moral duty of England to support France, 
it is problematical whether he would have carried the 
House of Commons with him. But when he said that Brit- 
ish interests required a certain policy he aroused the pa- 
triotism of members and achieved an ovenv-helming victory. 
Sordid reasoning, perhaps. But does it not show that as 
the situation stood on 3 August, 19 14, Sir Edward Grey 
did not consider that British interests demanded the de- 
spatch of an expeditionary force to the Continent? He 
did not hint at this in the course of his speech, except in 
case Great Britain should be called upon to defend the 
neutrality of Belgium. This is not to say that ultimately 
a British army might not have been sent to the assistance 
of France. But it is useless to discuss possibilities. The 

1 s Hansard Ixv, cc. 1809-27. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 489 

essential fact is that Great Britain, with perfect freedom, 
did not go beyond the offer of naval assistance in a defined 
contingency. 

Now, just before Sir Edward Grey went to the House of 
Commons he was informed that Germany was prepared 
to pledge herself not to attack the coasts of France in re- 
turn for British neutrality. Sir Edward declared that this 
offer was "far too narrow an engagement," because it did 
not guarantee the neutrality of Belgium, although Germany 
was ready to respect its territorial integrity and inde- 
pendence. 1 If to this offer Germany had been willing to 
add the neutrality of Belgium, it would have been prac- 
tically impossible for Great Britain to join France and 
Russia against Germany. Her own conditions would have 
been accepted by Germany; she would have had no case 
before the world; her public opinion would not have sanc- 
tioned a war in which British interests were not directly 
involved, even though the balance of power would have 
been upset by a German victory over France. 

In their book, Why We Are at War: Great Britain's 
Case, the members of the Oxford faculty of modern history 
say: 

"History will doubtless attribute the outbreak of war between 
ourselves and Germany to the development of the Belgian question, 
and, we are confident, will judge that, had it not been for the gratui- 
tous attack made on a neutral country by Germany, war with Great 
Britain would not have ensued on 4 August, 1914." 2 

With this opinion the present writer is in complete agree- 
ment. Sir Edward Grey may possibly have desired a gen- 
eral commitment to France; he did not advocate it to 
Parliament, and his straightforward character and honesty 
forbid us to believe that he would have concealed a per- 

1 British, no. 157; Herr von Bethmann-Hol'.weg, Reichstag, 4 August, 1914. 
* P. 90. 



490 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

sonal opinion of such magnitude. He relied frankly on 
public sentiment, and it is generally agreed that, until 
Belgium appealed for British help against Germany, the 
sentiment of England was averse to intervention in the 
terrible struggle. Once she decided to make war, England 
would fight for her own interests as well as those of Bel- 
gium. But there is nothing in the published evidence to 
show that her declaration of war was dictated by a consid- 
ered hostility to Germany, or that she avoided a single ef- 
fort which would have enabled her honorably and with a 
rightful concern for her own national interests to remain at 
peace. 

The rest of the story can be quite briefly told. As 
early as 24 July the Belgian Government was considering 
what action would be required of Belgium "to fulfil the in- 
ternational obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the 
event of a war breaking out on her frontiers." x On 29 
July the army was placed on "a strengthened peace foot- 
ing," 2 and on the 31st mobilization was ordered, before 
the British minister had communicated the note from Sir 
Edward Grey asking Belgium "to do her utmost to main- 
tain her neutrality." 3 On the same day, however, the 
German minister was informed that Belgium's military 
preparations in no way implied an attitude of distrust 
toward her neighbors, 4 but that she must fulfil her obliga- 
tions. Thus before Sir Edward Grey raised the question 
of her neutrality Belgium was preparing to resist any 
attempt to infringe it: she did not resist under British 
pressure, as has been alleged by Germany. Indeed, on 1 
August, as soon as the refusal of Herr von Jagow to answer 
Sir Edward Grey's question became known in Brussels, 
the Belgian representatives to the guaranteeing Powers 
were instructed to inform those Powers that, although Bel- 

1 Belgian, no. 2. 2 Belgian, no. 8. 

3 Belgian, no. 10. * Belgian, no. 12. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 491 

gium confidently expects that her territory "will remain 
free from attack," nevertheless "all necessary steps to 
insure respect of Belgian neutrality have been taken by the 
government." 1 On Sunday, 2 August, M. Davignon, the 
Belgian foreign minister, and Herr von Below-Saleske, the 
German minister, were assuring each other of the "perfect 
correctness" in the relations of their two countries. 2 

At 7 p. m. Herr von Below met M. Davignon again — 
to present a note proposing friendly neutrality, and allow- 
ing twelve hours for a reply. 

"Reliable information has been received by the German Govern- 
ment," declared the ultimatum, "to the effect that French forces 
intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. 
This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to 
march through Belgian territory." 

Therefore the German Government demanded a free pas- 
sage for its troops through Belgium, in return for which 
it guaranteed to maintain the independence of Belgium in 
full, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of 
peace, and to pay an indemnity for any damage caused by 
the German troops. But, should Belgium oppose the ad- 
vance of the German troops, she would be treated as an 
enemy, and "the eventual adjustment of the relations 
between the two states must be left to the decision of 
arms." 3 At 1.30 A. m. on 3 August the German minister 
came again to the foreign office to say that "French diri- 
gibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol 
had crossed the frontier" into Germany; "these acts, 
which were contrary to international law, were calculated 
to lead to the supposition that other acts contrary to in- 
ternational law would be committed by France" ! 4 

The German ultimatum "made a deep and painful im- 

1 Belgian, nos. 16, 2 (enclosure). * Belgian, no. ig. 

» Belgian, no. 20. 4 Belgian, no. 21. 



492 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

pression upon the Belgian Government," which replied 
with a considered refusal, 1 and informed the Powers that 
"Belgium was firmly resolved to repel any attack by all 
means in her power." 2 But as no act of hostility was com- 
mitted by Germany on 3 August, although the ultimatum 
expired at 7 a. m., the Belgian Government did not ap- 
peal to the Powers for assistance. It contented itself with 
the despatch of a telegram from King Albert to King George, 
making "a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention 
of Your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integ- 
rity of Belgium." 3 At 6 a. m., on 4 August the German 
minister communicated a second note, announcing the in- 
tention of his government "to take — if necessary by force 
of arms — those measures of defense already foreshadowed 
as indispensable, in view of the menace of France." 4 But 
still Belgium waited. Both Great Britain and France of- 
fered their assistance to the harassed little kingdom, 5 but 
not until the evening of 4 August, until the Belgian frontier 
had actually been violated at Gemmenich, 6 did the Belgian 
Government appeal to Great Britain, France, and Russia, 
"to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defense of 
her territory." 7 "We see in this narrative how scrupu- 
lously careful the Belgian Government was to avoid the 
slightest sign of suspicion, the slightest inclination to one 
of the guaranteeing Powers rather than the other, the slight- 
est confession of mistrust — in short, the smallest move- 
ment in any direction, by word or deed, which could fur- 
nish the shadow of a pretext for such charges as those which 
have since actually been made." 8 

With regard to the German allegations that France had 
violated the neutrality of Belgium, it is sufficient to ob- 

1 Belgian, no. 22. 2 Belgian, no. 23. 3 Belgian, no. 25. 

4 Belgian, no. 27; British, no. 154; French, no. 154. 

6 British, nos. 151, 155; French, no. 142; Belgian, nos. 24, 28, 37. 

e Belgian, no. 30; British, no. 158; French, no. 151. 

' Belgian, no. 40; French, no. 152. 8 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. xvi. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 493 

serve: first, that the German ultimatum speaks only of the 
intentions of France; second, that Herr von Bethmann- 
Hollweg, in the Reichstag on 4 August, simply said that 
" France stood ready for an invasion," although he ad- 
mitted that "the French Government declared at Brussels 
that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as 
her adversary respected it"; and third, that the French 
campaign, so far from being launched through Belgium, 
was actually directed into Alsace and Lorraine. Subse- 
quently, the Germans charged that French officers were 
sent to the Liege forts, and that the British had accumu- 
lated supplies in Maubeuge, before the outbreak of war. 
No proof of either charge was ever produced, and both 
were denied by the interested governments. There seems 
to be no adequate ground for assertions that either England 
or France had in any manner trespassed upon Belgian soil 
before their assistance was formally invited by the Bel- 
gian Government. With quite exemplary frankness Herr 
von Jagow brushed aside all such quibbles when Sir Edward 
Goschen made a final appeal to him "to avoid the terrible 
consequences which would necessarily ensue." 

"Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that 
his answer must be 'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops 
having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had 
already been violated; Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons 
why the imperial government had been obliged to take this step, 
namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and 
easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their preparations 
and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as soon as possible. It 
was a matter of life and death for them, as, if they had gone by 
the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of 
the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have 
got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of 
time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the 
Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier." 1 

1 British, no. 160. 



494 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

When King Albert's telegram to King George had been 
considered and when Sir Edward Goschen reported that 
there was "no information available" about the detention 
of British ships at Hamburg, 1 Sir Edward Grey sent an 
exceedingly stiff note to Berlin. Quoting the text of the 
Belgian King's appeal, he said: 

"His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German 
Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note 
proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Bel- 
gian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and 
integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of 
peace, threatening in case of a refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. 
An answer was requested within twelve hours. 

"We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this 
as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. 

"His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this 
violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with 
themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made 
upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality 
will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate 
reply." 2 

In the course of the day the British Government learned 
of the second German note and the violation of Belgian 
territory by German troops. 3 Herr von Jagow sought to 
"dispel any mistrust ... by repeating most positively 
[the] formal assurance that, even in the case of armed 
conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretext what- 
ever, annex Belgian territory," the sincerity of this pledge 
to be guaranteed by the promise to respect the neutrality 
of Holland. "It is obvious that we could not profitably 
annex Belgian territory without making at the same time 
territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland." 4 But 
such a promise, coming as it did from a government which 
had already broken a much more solemn obligation — a 

1 British, no. 150. 2 British, no. 153. 

3 British, nos. 154, 158; Belgian, no. 36. 4 British, no. 157. 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 495 

formal treaty — was obviously worthless, and did not meet 
the unassailable objection that the neutrality of Belgium 
had been devised to prevent, not to encourage, war. So 
Sir Edward Grey despatched his ultimatum: 

"We hear that Germany has addressed a note to Belgian min- 
ister for foreign affairs stating that German Government will be com- 
pelled to carry out — if necessary by force of arms — the measures 
considered indispensable. 

"We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated 
at Gemmenich. 

"In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany 
declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France 
gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Ber- 
lin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satis- 
factory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received 
here by twelve o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask 
for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel 
bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of 
Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as 
much a party as ourselves." ' 

As is well known, Herr von Jagow informed the British 
ambassador that "to his great regret he could give no other 
answer than that which he had given earlier in the day." 
The ambassador then proceeded to visit the chancellor, 
who said that "just for a word — 'neutrality' — word which 
in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap 
of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kin- 
dred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends 
with her." 2 Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg subsequently 
sought to explain away the fatal words. He had meant 
that Great Britain was availing herself of Belgian neutrality 
as a pretext to engage in a war to which she was already 
committed. The argument, however, will not be accepted 
by those who accept the thesis advanced in previous para- 
graphs — that Belgian neutrality was the actual and not the 

1 British, no. 159; Belgian, no. 39. ' British, no. 160. 



496 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

assumed cause of the British declaration of war. In any 
case, the Germans have been too fertile in rinding excuses 
for their acts after they have been condemned by the 
conscience of the world. 

The reflection is inevitably suggested by the German 
violation of Belgian neutrality that it was designed not 
merely as a step in the conquest of France, but as an in- 
centive to involve Great Britain in the war. If the history 
of England holds one hackneyed fact, it is that the island 
kingdom has always resisted any attempt upon the liberties 
of the Low Countries. Germany was as aware of this as 
any one else, and must have counted the consequences. 
It is possible that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr 
von Jagow hoped to cajole Great Britain into standing 
aside; but the military party, which was always the centre 
of the Anglophobe agitation, can have had no illusions. 
After all, Germany could not achieve her self-imposed 
destiny until she had destroyed the existing British Empire; 
so that, if England had bargained away her obligation to 
defend Belgium, she would one day have had to with- 
stand unaided the attack of a Germany that had achieved 
an easy victory over France and Russia. That Germany 
would have been immeasurably more powerful, more ag- 
gressive, than the Germany of 1914. Thus England's 
interest quite as much as England's honor compelled her 
to take sides in the Great War, and it is no reproach to 
her that she made the two identical and declared war to 
preserve both. 

There may have been another motive for the invasion 
of Belgium. For years Germany has looked longingly 
toward the Congo. The chancellor has said that on 4 
August he "already had certain indications, but no abso- 
lute proof upon which to base a public accusation, that 
Belgium long before had abandoned its neutrality in its 
relations with England." This not only confirms the argu- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 497 

ment of the last paragraph, but suggests that Germany- 
knew that Belgium would resist her infringement of neu- 
trality. But Herr von Jagow assured Sir Edward Grey 
that Germany would not annex Belgian territory, meaning, 
according to the context, Belgian territory in Europe. Yet 
Belgium assuredly would not go unpunished for resistance 
to German arms. The penalty might be paid in Africa, 
by the cession of the Congo. This also would have affected 
British interests under certain conditions, and was per- 
haps an additional factor in convincing Sir Edward Grey 
that England must protest to the bitter end against all 
pressure upon Belgium in whatever guise it might be in- 
voked. 

This is the end of our story. It has not been contended 
in this book that all the right in the Anglo- German con- 
troversy has been on one side and all the wrong on the 
other. It has been freely admitted that at times the atti- 
tude of both the British Government and the British people 
was not friendly to the aims and aspirations of Germany. 
But it has been argued that much the greater share of the 
provocation came from Germany, and that the English 
position from first to last was essentially defensive. Fur- 
thermore, in the two years before the war a determined 
effort was made by England to heed such complaints of 
Germany as could be met by reasonable concessions, and 
with such apparent success that an adjustment of all diffi- 
culties seemed possible. In the negotiations preceding the 
war, however, these hopeful auguries were not fulfilled, 
and despite the strenuous efforts of Sir Edward Grey Ger- 
many allowed the war to come — even precipitated it her- 
self. Thus Germany must bear almost the entire respon- 
sibility for the fatal ending of her rivalry with England. 

This fact is too apt to be overlooked, now that the world 
is weary of the great struggle and longs passionately for 



498 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

peace. But for England there can be no bargaining for 
peace until Belgium is restored to her independence and 
integrity, until France is secured against future aggression, 
the rights of small nations vindicated, and the Prussian 
military machine defeated. It is a formidable programme, 
and at the moment of writing (September, 191 5) the pros- 
pect is anything but cheering for the Allies. But to talk 
of peace now — except in the unimaginable hypothesis that 
Germany will evacuate Belgium and Poland — is futile, for 
it would be tantamount to admitting the justice of German 
aggression. Britain's record in the past is not unstained, 
and even in this war she has done some things that are not 
palatable to American tastes. But, compared with the 
crimson offenses of Germany, her peccadilloes are insignifi- 
cant. Until Great Britain and Greater Britain are actually 
beaten to their knees, we shall continue to believe that 
Germany will be punished for having unchained this ter- 
rible war; and we take courage from the glorious past. 
To the lover of liberty and the opponent of forceful domi- 
nation, the situation need not seem less hopeless than was 
the state of affairs about 181 1, when the whole of Europe, 
except England, lay prostrate at the feet of Napoleon. 
The Napoleonic Empire collapsed with nerve-racking sud- 
denness. We are permitted to hope that British stub- 
bornness, British credit, British valor will yet, with the 
assistance of its allies, prevail against the forces of mili- 
tarism and absolutism, and that the German debacle, far 
off as it may be, is as inevitable as the fall of the first 
French empire. 



APPENDIX 

Since this book was written the German Government has 
published, under the title European Politics in the Decade before 
the War as Described by Belgian Diplomatists, a series of secret 
reports made to the Belgian Government in the years 1905-14, 
by its ministers in London, Paris, and Berlin. Found in Brus- 
sels when that city was occupied by the German army, the 
reports are published with the remark that they "provide a 
running commentary on European history during the past 
decade, throwing light which, once shed, could by no means 
ever be spared, on the causes of the cataclysm through which 
Europe is now passing." The future historian is assured that 
the documents "will rank high" among the sources to which he 
will turn in the writing of a definitive narrative: 

"They are not the words of German apologists. They are 
the words of disinterested expert observers — the considered words, 
though set down in the very midst of events as they pass. They 
register the convictions of five professional students of contem- 
porary international history, living in the three chief capitals of 
Europe and possessing unparalleled access to the facts, with the 
advantage of being detached and unprejudiced with regard to them." 

The despatches are supposed to prove that England enticed 
France — and later Russia — to oppose Germany, and engineered 
a campaign for the diplomatic isolation of the great Empire in 
central Europe. Much is also made of reports from the lega- 
tion in Paris respecting the revival in France of the idea of 
revanche, for which President Poincare chiefly, and to a lesser 
extent M. Delcasse, are held responsible. Russian diplomatists 
are criticised by the minister in Berlin for their personal ambi- 
tions and lack of discipline. In short, it is contended, the docu- 
ments prove the entire correctness of German policy in the ten 
years before the war and its eminently peaceful character. 

499 



500 APPENDIX 

"A more complete indictment of English statesmanship," con- 
cludes the introduction, "as the enemy of the peace of the world, 
a deliberate and persistent conspirator against an unoffending 
neighbor, could not possibly be framed." 



As to the renascence of French patriotism, chauvinism if one 
likes, after the crisis of 191 1, no one ever denied it, but surely 
the conduct of Germany in that year and the subsequent in- 
creases of the German army were as much responsible as the 
fact that M. Poincare came from Lorraine and neglected no 
opportunity to remind France of the lost province. The "reve- 
lations" about French policy in Morocco and the willingness 
of Great Britain to assist France in that matter contain nothing 
that was not known to students of diplomacy; as a matter of 
fact, the points made by the Belgian ministers have been dis- 
cussed in Chapters IX and XI of this book. 

The criticisms of Russian policy, although they reflect the 
irritation of the German Government at the Anglo-Russian 
agreement, which had been considered impossible, refer chiefly 
to the period of the Balkan Wars. They do not extend beyond 
the fact that Russia was behind the Balkan League and sup- 
ported the contentions of Serbia against Austria; but they 
testify to the pacific intentions of M. Sazonof, and do not men- 
tion that on the advice of Russia Serbia receded from her posi- 
tion and acceded to the demands of Austria. The comments 
of the Belgian minister in Vienna are not published. 

The minister in London seems to have been genuinely sus- 
picious of the British attitude toward Germany, but he adduces 
no new facts. He merely repeats the hackneyed charge that 
England was jealous of German commercial expansion, laying 
special emphasis on the activities of the late King Edward VII. 
But he does not go so far as his colleague in Berlin, who wrote 
(no. 85) that "everybody in England and France considers the 
entente cordiale as a defensive and offensive alliance against 
Germany"; on the contrary, Count de Lalaing in one despatch 
(no. n) remarked that England was "evidently animated by 
the desire to avoid a conflict." The criticisms of English policy 
furnished by the Belgian minister cannot be ignored, but, after 



APPENDIX 501 

all, he was only an observer, and other observers, probably as 
acute as himself, have formed other opinions. It is pertinent 
to ask: If the Belgian Government shared his views as to the 
danger to Belgium from British or French policy, why did it 
permit the conversations between the British and Belgian mili- 
tary authorities concerning the defense of Belgian neutrality? 
Is it not likely that, with all due respect to Count de Lalaing 
and his colleagues in Paris and Berlin, King Albert's Govern- 
ment regarded the danger as greater from the German than 
from the Anglo-French side? 

It is, indeed, quite impossible to accept the Belgian testimony 
at the value placed upon it by the German foreign office. 
There are constantly references, in the despatches from each 
capital, to reports which are not published. Whether the Ger- 
mans found these reports in the Brussels archives and sup- 
pressed them is not known, but the historian will insist on see- 
ing them before forming a final opinion on the attitude of any 
Belgian minister. Again, there are no reports from Vienna, 
Rome, or St. Petersburg, reports which might very well contra- 
dict the opinions of the ministers in the other three capitals. 
Thirdly, sixty of the one hundred and nineteen despatches 
come from the legation in Berlin, forty-nine during the incum- 
bency of Baron Greindl, who was notoriously anti-English and 
anti-French in his views and descants at length upon the sup- 
posed intentions of London and Paris. His successor, Baron 
Beyens, was more impartial; incidentally, he remarks in one 
place (no. 113) that his view "may be wrong or influenced by 
the reading of political writings emanating from German pens." 

The reports do not cover all the events of the years 1905-14. 
The Baghdad railway is scarcely mentioned; the Turkish revo- 
lution not at all. The Austrian railway scheme of 1908 is re- 
ferred to once casually; the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
in two despatches. The Franco-German convention of Feb- 
ruary, 1909 about Morocco and its subsequent history is ig- 
nored. The truth is, the reports, as they stand, give a very 
incomplete view of the multifarious activities of European 
diplomacy, and with possibly two exceptions bring to light no 
facts which were not known to students of contemporary history. 



502 APPENDIX 

Finally, the German foreign office is not content to let the 
documents speak for themselves. Forgetful that its White 
Book, published at the outbreak of the war, failed to carry con- 
viction, because it presented a German interpretation of events 
supported by occasional telegrams, instead of publishing the 
diplomatic correspondence in extenso, it has prepared an intro- 
duction to the present collection. By removing selected pas- 
sages from their context it is possible to make out a brilliant 
case against the Entente Powers, but sometimes this procedure 
is dishonest. The introduction prints this question, raised by 
Baron Beyens on 24 April, 1914: 

"We have had the proof that a co-operation of the British army 
and the despatching of an expeditionary corps to the Continent 
have been considered by the military authorities of the two govern- 
ments (England and France). 

"Would it be the same to-day, and should we still have to fear 

THE ENTRY OF BRITISH SOLDIERS INTO BELGIUM IN ORDER TO 
HELP US DEFEND OUR NEUTRALITY BY FIRST COMPROMISING IT? " 

But it does not print Baron Beyens's answer to his own question: 

"If the question is examined from the German point of view — 
the only one which I can consider — a negative answer is not doubt- 
ful" (!) 

In general, the introduction never refers to certain statements 
of the ministers in Paris and Berlin, that the people of France 
were peace-loving, and that the policy of their government 
was, on the whole, animated by similar motives, even though 
it was often subjected to pressure from the small but noisy war 
party. Thus Baron' Guillaume, the minister in Paris, writing 
on 25 April, 1914, says, a propos of Anglo-French relations: 

"They have during the^last months given undisputable proofs 
of their efficacy and they were favorable for the maintenance of 
general peace, while at the same time they were not in the way of 
other attempts at rapprochement which equally furthered the 
European equilibrium." (No. 114.) 



APPENDIX 503 

Nor would the reader of the introduction learn that an Anglo- 
German detente was being prepared on the eve of the war, 
although there is some evidence of it in the despatches them- 
selves. To make matters worse, black letters, and sometimes 
capitals, are used to emphasize those passages of the documents 
which are favorable to the German case. 

It would be idle to ignore these Belgian reports, for they are 
almost the only documents covering the years 1905-14 that 
have come to light; but they are incomplete: they may be 
quoted against France and England, but they do not establish 
a case that is irrefutable. 

Another collection of documents has also appeared too late 
for use in the writing of this book. It is the second Belgian 
Grey Book. The first Grey Book dealt with the action of the 
Brussels Government to preserve its neutrality in the struggle 
which was felt to be impending after the presentation of the 
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. In this volume we are allowed 
to see the impressions made upon the Belgian ministers in the 
several capitals by the diplomacy of the Great Powers in July- 
August, 1914. And since the German foreign office, in the col- 
lection of despatches reviewed above, was pleased to insist 
upon the impartiality of the Belgian diplomatists, it is worth 
while to notice what these gentlemen say about the course of 
events immediately preceding the Great War. 

In general, the ministers in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and St. 
Petersburg testify to the absolute loyalty of the Entente govern- 
ments in trying to preserve peace, and to an equally determined 
refusal on the part of Germany and Austria to give heed to 
warnings or expostulations. Space permits only a few cita- 
tions from the correspondence. Count Errembault de Dud- 
zeele at Vienna and Baron Beyens at Berlin agree that Count 
Berchtold's policy was influenced largely by the desire to re- 
cover the prestige which had been shattered by his conduct 
during the Balkan Wars (nos. 3, 6). They also believe that 
he would not have proceeded so recklessly without inspiration 
from Berlin (nos. 8, 9). Baron Beyens is inclined to believe 
that the German foreign office would have liked to see a peace- 



504 APPENDIX 

ful solution of the crisis (nos. 6, 52), but "a superior power in- 
tervened to precipitate the march of events." The minister in 
St. Petersburg quotes the French ambassador in that capital 
to the effect that Count Pourtales worked for peace (no. 17). 
Baron B evens specifically ascribes the attitude of the German 
Emperor to " the opinion which prevails in the German general 
staff that war with France and Russia is unavoidable and near 
— an opinion which the Emperor has been induced to share" (no. 
8). The Emperor's hatred of regicide also played its part in 
bringing about his decision. With respect to the Emperor's 
exchange of telegrams with the Tsar, Baron Beyens writes on 
1 August, 1914 (no. 20): 

"The German Government seems to have arranged this scenario 
in order to lead up to the war, which it seeks to render inevitable, 
but the responsibility for which it desires to throw upon Russia." 

Reference was made on p. 472 to the intercepted despatch 
of the Belgian charge in St. Petersburg, according to which 
Russia was sure of British support as early as 29 July. To 
the reasons there given for rejecting this interpretation may 
be added the statement of the Belgian minister, who returned 
to his post on 31 July (no. 17): 

"I have just had a talk with the British ambassador. He tells 
me that M. Sazonof had tried from the outset to ascertain the in- 
tentions of the London Government, but, up till now, in spite of 
the mobilization of the British fleet, Sir George Buchanan has not 
yet been instructed to make any communication of this kind to 
the Pont des Chantres. The instructions of the ambassador are 
to explain to St. Petersburg that if Russia desires the support of 
Great Britain, it must carefully avoid even the appearance of any 
aggressive step in the present crisis." 

As regards the conduct of Belgium, three despatches may be 
noted. On 22 February, 1913, Baron Guillaume, the minister 
in Paris, explained to the French foreign office that "it was the 
intention of Belgium to possess an army which should be strong 
enough to be taken seriously, and which would allow her to 



APPENDIX 505 

fulfil completely her duty of safeguarding her independence of 
neutrality" (no. 1). This ought to dispose of the German con- 
tention that Belgium had sold herself to England by the con- 
versations of 1906 and 191 2, even if there were not recorded the 
categorical declaration of Baron Beyens to Herr Zimmermann, 
of the German foreign office, that "if France had been ready 
first and had demanded a passage of us on the same con- 
ditions as Germany, we should have made the same reply to 
her" (no. 52). Baron Beyens also forced from Herr von Jagow 
the admission: "Germany has nothing with which to reproach 
Belgium, whose attitude has always been correct." The Ger- 
man foreign secretary finally said that "as a private individual" 
he recognized the justice of Belgium's position, and that the 
violation of her neutrality was "the most painful resolution 
and the most cruel thing [he had] had to do throughout [his] 
career" (no. 51). 

If Germany contends that the Belgian despatches from 1905 
to 1914 establish the guilt of the Entente, Powers, she must also 
admit that the second Grey Book disposes effectually of the 
thesis that she is not to blame for the outbreak of war on 1 
August, 1914. 



INDEX 



Abbas II, Khedive of Egypt, 273. 
Abdel Assiz, Sultan of Morocco, 229, 

304- 
Abdul Hamid, Sultan of Turkey, 142, 

152, 260, 261, 262-263, 272, 278, 279- 

280, 281, 282, 283, 284. 
Abyssinia, Anglo-French-Italian agree- 
ment of 1907 in re, 240. 
Aden, 195. 

Admiralty Memorandum (1912), 174. 
Adrianople, 359. 

Adriatic Sea, 240, 256, 287, 396. 
Aerenthal, Baron von, Austrian foreign 

minister, 1906-1912, 286, 287, 291, 

296, 402. 
Af aires du Maroc (French Yellow Books), 

224, 310. 
Afghanistan, 5, 18, 21, 32, 241, 272. 
Africa, 5, 15, 20-21, 28, 32, 78-79, 84-85, 

I3S-I37. 141-142, 144, 147, 239. 263, 

272, 336, 343. 356, 371-372, 391-392, 

497- 
African Act (1885), 336. 
Agadir, 302, 309, 312, 314-319, 321, 323, 

325-327, 329, 332, 339- 
Akaba, 272. 
Albania, 256-257, 297, 362-364, 378, 

395, 398. 
Albert, King of the Belgians, 384-385, 

392-393, 479-48o, 492, 494, 501. 
Albert, Prince Consort of Queen Vic- 
toria, 123, 125. 
Aleppo, 272. 
Alexander, Crown Prince and Prince 

Regent of Serbia, 412, 418. 
Alexander, King of Serbia, 257. 
Alexander, Prince, of Battenberg, 134. 
Alexander I, of Russia, 120. 
Alexandretta, 300. 
Alexandria, 19, 178, 198. 
Alfonso, King, of Spain, 29, 239. 
Algeciras, Act of, 303-304, 306-307, 309, 

313-314, 3i7, 326, 328, 342. 
Algeria, 79, 230, 233. 
Alsace-Lorraine, 46, 48-49, 118, 120, 

128, 136, 139, 356, 374, 467, 493, 500. 



Ameer of Afghanistan, 17, 29. 

Amran, L. von, Englands Land-und-See 

Polilik und die Mackte, 197. 
"An Englishman's Home," 185. 
Anatolian Railway Company, 266. 
Andre, General, French war minister, 

179. 
Angell, Norman, 98; The Great Illusion, 

63, 76, 355- 
Anglo-Congolese treaty (1894), 141. 
Anglo-Dutch wars, 198, 205. 
Anglo-French arbitration treaty (1903), 

25, 224; convention (8 April, 1904), 

28, 139, 153, 180, 224, 235, 322, 323, 
324, 326, 334, 342. 

Anglo-German agreement in re Turkey 
and Africa (1914), 195, 367-377, 47o; 
alliance, proposed (1899), 148-150; 
convention in re Africa (1890), 137, 
139; convention in re China (October, 
1900), 147, 150-151; treaty in re 
Portuguese colonies (1898), 85, 144, 
346, 372. 

Anglo-German-Japanese alliance, pro- 
posed (1901), 148. 

Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902), 26, 28, 

29, 148, 179, 243, 348. 
Anglo-Portuguese alliance, 348, 371; 

treaty (1884), 136. 

Anglo-Russian convention (31 August, 
*9°l)> 3°, 241-242, 281-282, 286, 298, 
379- 

Anglo-Turkish agreement (19 14), 370. 

Angola, 372. 

Angora, 266. 

Angra Pequena, 78, 135, 145. 

Anna, 279. 

Annual Register, 145, 180, 224, 245, 
250. 

Arabi Pasha, 19. 

Arabia, 253, 258, 262, 271, 275, 297. 

Arbeiter Zeitung (Vienna), 461. 

Arbitration, 25, 413, 428. 

Armenia, 298; massacres, 259-260; re- 
forms, 374. 

Army and Navy Gazette, 206. 



507 



5 o8 



INDEX 



Army increases of 1913, 58-59, 363, 380. 
Arning, Dr. Wilhelm, Marokko-Kongo, 

234- 
Arnold, W. T., German Ambitions as 

They Affect Britain and the United 

States, 159. 
Ashley, Evelyn, Life of Lord P 'aimer ston, 

124. 
Asia Minor, 5, 85-87, 253, 254, 265, 269, 

365. 

Asquith, H. H., prime minister of Great 
Britain, 33, 186, 249, 294, 303, 314, 
321, 329, 333-334, 343-344. 350-351, 
354- 

Atlantic Ocean, 178, 179, 180, 192, 205. 

Australia, 15, 16; navy, 191, 203. 

Austria-Hungary, Balkan policy, 256- 
258, 264, 286-291, 296, 360-363, 365, 
378-380, 383, 501; Morocco policy, 
237, 286; relations with England, 117, 
120, 244, 287-290, 294-295, 362; re- 
lations with Germany, 130, 286, 291- 
292, 296, 356-357; relations with 
Italy, 290-291, 361, 363-381; rela- 
tions with Serbia, 257-258, 288-290, 
296, 361-364, 383, 395-396, 401-402; 
relations with Russia, 256-258, 280, 
286-290, 296, 360-363, 378-380, 383; 
Salonika railway, 286, 501; war de- 
termined on in 1914, 383-384. 

Austria-Hungary, policy during crisis 
of 1914: attitude toward Russia, 
400-402, 408-409, 410-41 1 ; toward 
Serbia, 397-401, 403; Belgrade bom- 
barded, 449, 458; conciliatory atti- 
tude after 29 July, 444, 450; declares 
war on Serbia, 425-426, 434; designs 
in the Balkans, 432; determination to 
have war, 383-384, 403, 405, 407-410, 
417, 427, 437, 459; integrity of Serbia, 
432-433, 436, 444; mobilization, 434, 
449, 456-460; obscurity of intentions 
in July, 402-409; refuses to grant ex- 
tension of time, 416-417; rejects Ser- 
bian reply, 424-425; reasons therefor, 
427-432; rejects conversations with 
Russia and mediation of four Powers, 
425; ultimatum to Serbia, 66, 404, 
410-41 1, 415, 426-427, 435. 

Austrian Red Book (1915), 398, 401-402, 
454, 458. 

Austro-Russian agreement (1897), 142, 
257, 286, 402. 



Avarna, Duke of, Italian ambassador in 

Vienna, 404, 437. 
Azerbaijan, 298. 

Baghdad, 267-269, 274-275, 279, 298- 
300, 370. 

Baghdad railway, 87, 233, 252, 266-272, 
281, 286, 297-300, 370-371, 501. 

Bahrein Islands, 278. 

Balance of power, 2-3, 164, 179, 213, 216, 
219, 224, 242-243, 340-341, 365, 367, 
376-377, 390-391, 502. 

Balfour, A. J., British premier, 23, no, 
187, 211, 213-214. 

Balkan League, the, 291, 296, 358-362, 
380. 

Balkan Wars, 1912-13, 26, 64, 156, 283, 
300-301, 357-362, 380, 383, 398, 500, 
503- 

Balkans, the, 21, 30-31, 179, 255-258, 
358-363, 365; Austro-Russian rivalry, 
256-258, 280, 286-290, 296, 360-363, 
378-380, 383, 401-402; agreement of 
1897, 142, 257, 286, 402; crisis of 1877, 
I 3 2 , 253, 401; crisis of 1908, 208, 247, 
249, 284-296, 302, 305, 378; crisis of 
1912-13, 26, 171, 247, 358-363, 378; 
London conference of ambassadors, 
360-361; Macedonia, reform in, 30, 
241, 258, 269, 280-283, 286; Mtirzsteg 
programme, 258-259; Turco-Ruma- 
nian alliance, 296. 

"Balkans for the Balkans, The" (Sa- 
zonof), 380. 

Baltic Sea, 174, 193. 

Barclay, (Sir) Thomas, 222, 223; Thirty 
Years' Reminiscences, 1876-1906, 21, 
223, 225. 

Bardoux, Jacques, L 'Angleterre radicale, 
1906-1912, 182. 

Barker, J. Ellis, Anglo-German Relations 
and Sir Edward Grey, 318; Modem 
Germany, 2, 153, 171, 204, 2 10-2 n. 

Barnardiston, Lieutenant-Colonel, Brit- 
ish attache at Brussels, 478. 

Bassermann, Ernst, 204, 245. 

Bassorah, 267, 274-276, 300, 370. 

Bebel, August, 40, 157. 

Bedford, Duke of, The Territorial Force 
Fiasco, 208. 

Beethoven, 37. 

Belgian Grey Book II (1915), 372, 503- 
505- 



INDEX 



509 



Belgium, African colonies, see Congo; 
army, 59; military conversations with 
Great Britain, 211, 478-480, 501, 505. 
Belgium, neutrality of, cause of British 
declaration of war, 98, 390-391, 484- 
490; established by treaties of 1831- 
and 1839, 477; observed in war of 
1870, 128,391; policy of Belgian Gov- 
ernment, 478-480, 482, 490-492, 494, 
504-505; policy of British Govern- 
ment, 481-483, 494-497, 502; reasons 
for, 475-478; threatened by proposed 
treaty of 1866, 127; violated by Ger- 
many in 1914, 138, 222, 251, 482-483, 
486, 490-497- 

Belgrade, 285, 292, 399, 449, 458. 

Below-Saleske, Herr von, German min- 
ister in Brussels, 491. 

Benckendorff, Count, Russian ambas- 
sador in London, 437, 450. 

Ben Hamed, grand vizier of Morocco, 
229. 

Berard, Victor, La France et Guillaum 
II, 147, 222; Off res allemandes, La 
Choix de Londres, 299; La Revolution 
turque, 280; Le Sultan, VI slam et les 
Puissances, 266. 

Berchtold, Count, Austro-Hungarian 
foreign minister, 286, 358-359, 361, 
383; policy during crisis of 1914: 
absent from Vienna, 416; accepts 
British mediation with Serbia, 444; 
alleges he is pacific, 430; appeals for 
German assistance, 435-436; aware 
of danger from German mobilization, 
459; confidences for Grey, 412; con- 
siders Serbian reply a hostile act, 425; 
does not regard Russian mobilization 
as hostile, 457; efforts to reassure 
Sazonof, 431-433; prestige at stake, 
503; receptive to Russian formula, 
444; threatens Austrian mobilization, 
437- 

Berlin, Congress of, 132, 133, 134, 256, 
260, 285, 365, 378; treaty of, 18, 259, 
290. 

Berliner Tageblatt, 277, 315, 367, 404. 

Bernard, Augustin, Le Maroc, 234. 

Bernhardi, General von, Germany and the 
Next War, 9, 10, 52, 59-63, 83, 86, 92, 
303, 345- 

Bernstein, Eduard, Die englische Gefahr 
und das deutsche Volk, 157, 354. 



Bertie, Sir Francis, British ambassador 
in Paris, 470, 483. 

Bethmann-Hollweg, T. von, German 
chancellor, 94, 187, 313, 338, 341, 
344-348, 366, 369, 373. 379. 39o; 
policy during crisis of 1914, 422, 424, 
437. 440, 445. 461, 47°. 478, 482, 484, 
489, 493, 495-496. 

Beyens, Baron, Belgian minister in Ber- 
lin, 501-505; Le semaine tragique, 454. 

Bieberstein, Baron Marschall von, Ger- 
man ambassador in Constantinople 
and London, 143, 260-261, 284, 369. 

Bismarck, Prince von Otto, 18, 36-38, 
45. 47, 55, 59, 61-62, 69, 78-80, 124- 
140, 169, 173, 260, 356, 362, 377-379; 
Reflections and Reminiscences, 61, 62, 
127. 

Boer War, 22-23, J 39, 145-147, 150, 152, 
160, 169, 221, 234, 280, 348, 367, 373. 

Bonga, 336. 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, occupation, 256, 
285, 402; annexation, 184, 218, 284- 
296, 402, 501; crisis of 1908-9, 208, 
247, 249, 302, 305, 378, 402, 450. 

Bosporus, 255. 

Botha, General, 32, 391-392. 

Boulanger, General, 56, 134. 

Bourdon, Georges, The German Enigma, 
93, 310, 319- 

Brailsford, H. N., The War of Steel and 
Gold, 374. 

Brandenburg, 8, 41, 45, 54. 

Brazil, 81. 

Breslau (German cruiser), 387. 

Briand, Aristide, French prime minister, 
309, 3"- 

Bridges, Lieutenant-Colonel, British 
attache 1 in Brussels, 479. 

Bright, John, 7. 

British and Foreign State Papers, 25. 

British Chamber of Commerce in Paris, 
222. 

British Empire, origins, 13-14; devel- 
opment in the nineteenth century, 15; 
imperial conference of 191 1, 27; 
growth of an imperial navy, 191, 203; 
revolt expected by Germany, 391. 

Broniewsky, M., Russian charge in Ber- 
lin, 416. 

Brooks, Sydney, England and Germany, 
225. 

Browne, Edward G., Pan-Islamism, 261. 



5i° 



INDEX 



Branner, Sir John, 354. 
Bryce, James (Lord), 207. 
Bubian, island of, 278. 
Buchanan, Sir George, British ambas- 
sador in St. Petersburg, 437, 443, 464, 

5°4- 

Bucharest, treaty of, 361, 364. 

Buenos Aires, 387. 

Bulgaria, 134, 256-257, 259, 264, 284, 
288, 296, 358, 361-362, 365, 380, 395. 

Biilow, Prince, German chancellor, 41, 
69, 133, 143, 145, 151, 182, 187, 197, 
224-227, 231, 238-240, 248-249, 270, 
292-294, 369; Imperial Germany, 41, 
47-48, 87, 144, 148-150, 203-204, 206, 
218, 220-221, 293-294. 

Bunsen, Baron, Prussian minister in 
London, 123. 

Bunsen, Sir Maurice de, British ambas- 
sador in Vienna, 295, 404, 406, 408, 
414, 416, 425, 426, 437, 454. 

Buol, Count, 429. 

Burgulu, 279. 

Burmah, 78. 

Burns, John, 389. 

Busch, Dr. Moritz, Bismarck: Some 
Secret Pages of His History, 79, 127- 
128.. 

Bushire 276. 

Bute, Lord, 118. 

Caillaux, Joseph, French prime minister, 
316. 

Caillaux trial, 388. 

Caliphate, the, 262-263, 279. 

Cambon, Jules, French ambassador in 
Berlin, 300-310, 313-315. 3i8, 320, 
334-336, 372, 385, 406, 421, 423, 438, 
445- 

Cambon, Paul, French ambassador in 
London, 153, 364, 446-447, 462, 472- 
473, 487- 

Cameroons, 78, 136, 233, 314. 

Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, Brit- 
ish prime minister, 32, 101, 182. 

Canada, 15, 16, 303; German protest 
against tariff, 152-153; naval plans, 
191, 203. 

Canning, George, 162-163. 

Cap Trafalgar (German liner), 387. 

Cape Colony, 15, 19, 79, 135. 

Cape of Good Hope, 264. 

Cape Juby, 319. 



Cape to Cairo railway, 144, 372. 
Cape Town, 386, 391. 
Caprivi, Count, German chancellor, 136. 
Carlowitz, treaty of, 253. 
Carlyle, Thomas, 127. 
* Carol, Prince, of Rumania, 365. 
Cartwright, Sir Fairfax, British ambas- 
sador in Vienna, 290. 
Casablanca, 304, 309, 312. 
Cassel, Sir Ernest, 297. 
Castlereagh, Lord, 120, 121. 
Cattaro, 257. 

Causes of the war, 69, 253, 291, 301, 358. 
Cavour, Count, 129, 429. 
Cawdor, Lord, 182, 186. 
Challaye, Felicien, Revue de Paris, 307. 
Chamberlain, Houston Stewart, The 

Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, 

92. 
Chamberlain, Joseph, 21, 98, 100, 144- 

145, 270, 372. 
Channel, English, 179, 180, 192. 
Charles I, 15. 
Charles II, 15. 

Charles Francis Joseph, Archduke, 397. 
Cheradame, Andre, Le Chemin de Per de 

Bagdad, 266. 
China, 21, 29, 83, 147, 151, 241. 
Chirol, Sir Valentine, The Origins of the 

Present War, 148. 
Chotek, Countess Sophie (Duchess of 

Hohenberg), 394, 397. 
Churchill, Winston Spencer, 113, 189, 

190, 191, 192, 201, 345, 386. 
Ciganovitch, Milan, 394, 398, 411, 427, 

430. 
Clarendon, Lord, 487. 
Class, Heinrich, 318; West-Marokko 

deutschl, 87, 234, 319. 
Clausewitz, War, 61. 
Coaling stations, 196-197, 233. 
Cobden, Richard, 7. 
Coldstream, speech of SirE. Grey at, 294. 
Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating 

to the Outbreak of the European War, 

394, 405, 408, 414, 455, 470-480, 490. 
Collier, Price, England and the English, 

in; Germany and the Germans, 10, 

62, 174. 
Cologne Gazette, 59, 379, 380, 461-462. 
Colonial expansion, 4-5, 20, 78. 
Colonies, differential tariff in, 76, 152- 

153, 231. 



INDEX 



5ii 



Concert of Europe, 26, 280, 288, 292, 

29s. 301, 332, 356, 360. 400, 428, 433- 

434- 
Congo, 20, 78, 84, 136, 218, 320, 372, 

478, 496-497- 
Congo, French, 310-311, 314, 319-320, 

322, 335. 
Congo-Cameroon railway, 314. 
Congo River, 334, 336. 
Constantinople, 253-255, 260, 268, 273, 

283, 350-360. 
Convention of London (1884), 19. 
Convention of Pretoria (1881), 19. 
Cook, Sir Edward, How Britain Strove 

for Peace, 183-184, 187-188, 190, 303, 

348, 35o. 
Copenhagen, bombardment of, 162, 198, 

205. 
Cox, Sir Edmund C, England and Ger- 
many: How to Meet the Crisis, 207. 
Cramb, J. A., Germany and England, 52, 

160, 164-165, 169, 192. 
Crete, question of, 142, 259, 260, 284. 
Crimean War, 7, 16, 178, 207, 253, 255, 

258, 377- 
Croiset, Alfred, Bulletin de la Societe 

autour du Monde, 91. 
Cromarty Firth, 335. 
Cromer, Lord, 185. 
Cronberg, 184. 
Cronstadt, 140. 

Crown Prince, German, 315, 338, 385. 
Cruppi, Jean, French foreign minister, 

309, 310, 314. 315- 
Curzon, Lord, Problems of the Far East, 

91. 
Cyprus, 29, 259, 279. 

Daily Chronicle, 206. 

Daily Mail, 155, 160, 182, 185. 

Daily Telegraph, 133, 147; interview 
with William II, 185, 248-249. 

Damascus, 279. 

Dardanelles, 255. 

Davignon, Henri, Belgian foreign min- 
ister, 491. 

Davis, H. W. C, The Political Thought of 
Heinrich von Treitschke, 51, 89, 161. 

Dawson, W. H., Evolution of Modern 
Germany, 76, 90. 

Deir, 279. 

Delbriick, Professor Hans, 157, 373, 378; 
The Price of a German-English Entente, 



135; Why Germany Builds War-ships, 
198. 

Delcasse, Theophile, French foreign 
minister, 1898-1905, 28, 147, 222, 
226-228, 234, 240. 

Denmark, 15, 36, 125, 198, 205. 

Dennis, Alfred L. P., Tendencies in Brit- 
ish Foreign Policy since Disraeli, 17. 

Derby, Lord, 487. 

Deutsche Bank, 270. 

Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg, 

356-357- 

Deutschland sei wach I, 205. 

Dewey, Admiral, 143. 

Diercks, Gustav, Die Marokkofrage und 
die Konferenz von Algesiras, 234, 239. 

Dilke, Sir Charles, 246; Present Position 
of European Politics (1887), 138. 

Diplomaticus, Sir Edward Grey's Stew- 
ardship, 341. 

Disarmament and reduction of arma- 
ments, 182-184, 186-188, 189-191, 
194-195, 203-205, 215-216, 244-248, 

347-351- 

Disraeli, Benjamin, Earl of Beacons- 
field, 16, 29, 132, 133, 258. 

Doberitz, 245. 

Dogger Bank incident, 225. 

Donnersmarck, Prince Henckel von, 228. 

Doumergue, Gaston, French foreign 
minister in 1914, 365- 

Drang nach Osten, 241-242, 286. 

Dreadnought type of battleship, 180- 
181. 

Dual Alliance, 20, 139-140, 178, 225, 
242, 299, 301, 340-341, 352, 356, 375. 
463, 465, 469, 484- 

Dublin, 389. 

Ducarne, General, Belgian general, 478- 

479- 
Duck's Beak, 336. 
Dumaine, Alfred, French ambassador in 

Vienna, 403-405, 416, 426, 437, 457- 
Durazzo, 361. 
Durham, Geoffrey, The Foreign Trade of 

Great Britain and Germany, 106. 
Durkheim, E.and Denis E., Who Wanted 

War ?, 461-462. 

Eastern Rumelia, 257. 

Eber (German cruiser), 386. 

Economist, 156. 

Edelsheim, Operational ilber See, 211. 



512 



INDEX 



Edinburgh Review, 209, 212. 

Edward III, 116. 

Edward VII, King, 28, 184, 222-223, 

226, 240, 243-245, 249, 282, 283, 288, 

295, 302-303, 306. 
Egypt, 17, 19, 28-29, 32, 78, 134, 196, 

218, 223, 226, 259, 261, 262-265, 271- 

273, 303. 327, 39i- 

Einkreisungspolitik, 239, 242-243, 245- 
247,^91, 293-295, 303, 324, 338-339, 
376-377. 

El-Kasar, 314, 317. 

El Rogui, Moorish pretender, 229. 

Elizabeth, Queen, 116. 

Empress Frederick, 134. 

Ena, Princess, of Battenberg, 29, 239. 

England. See Great Britain. 

England and Germany (1912), 23, 156, 
197, 204, 206, 209, 299, 353, 355. 

England in deutscher Beleuchlung, 204. 

"Englishman, An," The German Menace 
and How to Meet It, 207. 

Enos, 359. 

Entente cordiale, 28, 180, 224-225. 

Eregli, 267. 

Errembault de Dudzeele, Count, Bel- 
gian minister in Vienna, 503. 

Esher, Lord, 63. 

Eski-Shehir, 266. 

Euphrates River, 267, 274, 279. 

European Politics in the Decade before the 
War as Described by Belgian Diplo- 
matists, 499-503. 

Faber, Captain, 206. 

Far East, Anglo- Japanese Alliance, 26, 
28, 29, 148, 179, 243, 348; British in- 
terests, 179-180; Franco-Japanese 
convention of 1907, 241; Russian in- 
terests, 259, 265, 378, 379. 

Fashoda, 20, 21, 28, 141. 

Ferdinand I of Austria, 36. 

Fez, 311-314, 327. 

Fisher, Sir John (Lord), 180, 244. 

Fitzmaurice, Lord E., Life of Lord Gran- 
ville, 128, 135, 137. 

Flotow, Herr von, German ambassador 
in Rome, 418. 

Foreign Legion, 305. 

Fortnightly Review, 287, 383, 480. 

France, army, 56-57, 59, 179, 364, 388; 
colonies, 76, 78, 230, 327; navy, 179, 
193, 364; pacific policy, 364, 374 - 375, 



502; revanche, 364, 367, 374-375, 379* 
499-500. 

France, policy during crisis of 1914: 
frontier violated by Germany, 463; 
keeps troops behind frontier, 452-453; 
mobilization, 456, 461; promises sup- 
port to Russia, 463-465, 472; prom- 
ises to respect neutrality of Belgium, 
482; refuses overtures of German am- 
bassador, 422-423; seeks assistance of 
Great Britain, 464-465, 473, 483; 
supports all proposals for peace, 414- 
415, 420, 466; ultimatum from Ger- 
many, and reply thereto, 452, 460- 
461, 483, 486; urges moderation on 
Serbia, 403, 414; violation of Belgian 
and German frontiers charged by 
Germany, 461-463, 491-492; war de- 
clared by Germany, 462. 

France, relations with Germany: arma- 
ments competition, 55-59, 193, 363, 
380; Casablanca incident, 305-306; 
convention of 9 February, 1909, and 
its history, 250, 306-316, 335, 342, 
501; conventions of 4 November, 191 1, 
84, 336-337. 346, 372; crisis of 1875, 
57> 63, 131-132, 227; crisis of 1905, 
226-228, 230, 234-239; crisis of 191 1, 
188, 206, 208, 247, 300, 302-303, 317, 
319-323, 329-331, 357; English at- 
titude toward, 246, 350, 390; German 
designs on France, 5, 60, 138, 348, 373, 
390; hopes of reconciliation, 355-356, 
374 - 37S; negotiations of 1894-8, 140- 
142; treaty of Frankfort, 142; war of 
1870, 37, 126-130, 377. 

France, relations with Great Britain. 
See Great Britain, relations with 
France. 

France, relations with Italy, 79, 134, 
237-238, 240. 

France, relations with Japan, 241. 

France, relations with Morocco, 230, 
234-236, 303-316. 

France, relations with Spain, 235, 365. 

France, relations with Turkey, 268-270, 
296, 374- 

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 69, 374, 
382-383, 394-398, 402, 404; attitude 
of Europe toward assassination, 397, 
401, 434. 

Francis Joseph, Emperor, 140, 184, 244, 
288, 403, 416. 



INDEX 



513 



Franco-German convention (1909), 250, 

306-311, 313, 335, 342. 
Franco-German conventions (4 Novem- 
ber, 191 1), 84, 336-337, 346, 372, 

501. 
Franco-Moroccan convention of 4 

March, 19 10, 304, 307, 3ri. 
Frankfort, treaty of, 142, 147. 
Frankfurter Zeitung, 372, 461. 
Frankischer Kurrier, 462. 
Fraser, David, The Slwrt Cut to India, 

266-267. 
Frederick the Great, 42, 117, 118. 
Frederick III, 62, 130, 134. 
Frederick William, Crown Prince of 

Germany, 315, 338, 385. 
Frederick William, the Great Elector 

of Brandenburg, 42. 
Frederick William I of Prussia, 42. 
Frederick William III, 43, 119. 
Frederick William IV, 36, 42, 55, 123. 
"Freedom of the seas," 199-200. 
French Revolution, 12, 71, 391, 476. 
French Yellow Book (1914), 57, 64, 336, 

384, 392-393, 409. 461, 464- 
Fullerton, W. M., Problems of Power, 

223, 308. 
Fyffe, C. A., History of Modem Europe, 

130. 

Gabrinovitch, Nedeljko, 394. 

Gaedke, Colonel, 188. 

Garvin, J. L., 209. 

Gaster, Vice-Admiral Karl, 204, 206. 

Gaulois (Paris), 228. 

Gemmenich, 492. 

George I, 117. 

George III, 118. 

George V, King, no, 303, 365, 447, 453, 

457, 459- 463, 473, 484, 492. 
George, Prince, of Hesse-Darmstadt, 

117. 
German East Africa, 78, 136, 372. 
German New Guinea, 78. 
German Southwest Africa, 78, 135, 233, 

372, 391-392. 
German White Book (i9r4), 69, 394, 

405, 408, 420-421, 431-433, 438, 442, 

45i, 454, 457, 463, 502. 
Germanentum v. Slaventum, 379. 
Germania (Berlin), 404. 
Germany, attitude toward the Entente, 

5, 224-228, 233-234, 236, 238, 299, 



308, 316-317, 324, 340-34I, 351-352, 
364, 377, 392. 

Germany, economic conditions: agricul- 
ture, 7r, 73-74; conditions before 
1870, 70-71; financial problems, 112, 
114-115, 194; foreign commerce, 74- 
78, 99, 102-103, io 8, 231, 269; indus- 
trial development, 72, 99-100; in- 
vestments abroad, 74, 105-106; popu- 
lation, 72-74, 103; shipping, 13, 72, 
74, 101, 104-105; wealth, 73. 

Germany, expansion: colonial ambi- 
tions, 5, 75-78, 83-89, 135, 143, 218- 
220, 231-234, 251, 298, 313, 317, 320, 
323, 325, 335, 339-340, 356-357, 37o, 
372-373; expansion in Europe, 81-83; 
Pan-German League, 80-84, 157, 210, 
232, 318, 385; policy in the Mediter- 
ranean, 5, 85-87, 233, 240, 27r, 329; 
policy in Morocco, 85-87, 231-234, 
236, 238, 271, 304, 339-34I- 

Germany, history: after 1815, no-' 
120; confederation of 1815, 35, 37, 
55, 120, 125; revolution of 1848, 35- 
36, 42, 50; Frankfort Parliament, 36, 
50, 122; North German Confedera- 
tion, 126, 127; war of 1870. 

Germany, navy: case for, 147, 175-177, 
195-196, 206; growth of, 173-177; 
Navy League, 80, 174, 176, 179, 182, 
210; navy laws: 1898, 175; 1900, 
176-177; 1906, 182; 1908, 184, 248; 
1912, 188-189, 190,349-350; navy in 
1914, 193. 

Germany, policy during crisis of 1914: 
attitude toward Austro-Serbian dis- 
pute, 400, 407-408, 415-416; toward 
Russia, 400-401, 408-409; bids for 
British neutrality, 440, 445-446, 485- 
486,489; British ships detained, 487, 
494; charges against Belgium, 478- 
480; against France, 461-467, 491— 
493; complicity with Austria, 405- 
406; determination to have war, 384- 
388, 405-410, 440-441, 446; efforts to 
detach France from Russia, 422-423; 
equivocal conduct, 420-423, 425; ex- 
pectation that Great Britain would 
stand aside, 390-391, 496-497; first 
ultimatum to Russia, 441-443, 446; 
frontier violated by France, 461-463; 
hollowness of case against Russia, 455- 
460; intervenes in Austro-Russian 



5i4 



INDEX 



negotiations, 451-452; Kriegsgefahr- 
zustand proclaimed, 451; mobilization, 
407, 445, 454. 456, 484; neutrality of 
Luxemburg violated, 487; neutrality 
of Belgium violated, 480, 482-483, 
489-497; note to the Entente Powers, 
407, 415-416; obligation to respect 
Belgium admitted, 478, 505; pressure 
on Austria, 438; protests against Rus- 
sian mobilization, 422, 437, 450-451, 

453, 460; refuses to exert pressure on 
Austria, 415-416, 423; rejects arbi- 
tration, 413; mediation, 421; threats 
against Russia, 422, 424, 432-433, 441; 
ultimatum to Belgium, 491-492; to 
France and Russia, 452, 483, 486; 
violation of French frontier, 463 ; war 
declared on France, 462; on Russia, 

454, 484, 486. 

Germany, political conditions: army 
and armaments, 56-59, 87-89, 363; 
bureaucracy, 43-44; constitution, 
37-41; divisions, 45-46; South Ger- 
many, 7-8, 37, 41, 46, 356; militarism, 
8-10, 55, 60-66, 132, 363, 384-385, 
392-393; national character, 89-94; 
political parties, 38-43, 46, 80, 88, 283, 
354; press, 44-45, 429; Prussianiza- 
tion, 37, 41, 46-49, 56; social democ- 
racy, 39-41, 80, 88, 252, 354; theory 
of the state, 52-54. 

Germany, relations with France. See 
France, relations with Germany. 

Germany, relations with Great Britain. 
See Great Britain, relations with Ger- 
many. 

Germany, relations with Russia, 132, 
139-140, 148, 179, 193, 225, 241, 292, 
299, 336, 3SO, 356, 363, 377-382, 385, 
39°- 

Germany, relations with Turkey, 84-85, 
142, 259-269, 281-285, 292, 297-300, 
336, 356-357, 370-371, 374, 378-379- 

Germany in the Nineteenth Century, 353. 

Gibraltar, 29, 117, 180, 192, 196, 228, 
229, 259. 

Giesl, Baron von, Austrian minister in 
Belgrade, 407, 410, 417, 428. 

Giolitti, Giovanni, speech of, 5 Decem- 
ber, 1914, 36T, 383. 

Givet, 491. 

Gladstone, W. E., 17, 18, 19, 128. 

Gneisenau, 119. 



Goeben (German cruiser), 387. 

Goethe, 37, 250. 

Gold Coast, 135. 

Goluchowski, Count, Austrian foreign 
minister, 285, 286. 

Gordon, General, 134. 

Gortchakoff, Prince, Russian chancellor, 
61, 128, 132. 

Goschen, Sir Edward, British ambas- 
sador in Berlin, n, 64, 322, 369, 408, 
421, 438, 440, 445, 454, 472, 477, 482, 
493- 

Gowan, A.L., Selections from Treitschke's 
Lectures on Politics, 51. 

Granville, Lord, British foreign secre- 
tary, 18, 127, 128, 134, 135. 

Great Britain, economic conditions: 
commerce, 14, 16, 77, 99, 102-104, 
108,269,276-277; commercial policy, 
162; Corn Laws, 163; financial 
strength, 112, 194-195; food supply, 
3, 29; industrial revolution, 12; in- 
vestments abroad, 105; law of 1887, 
96; population, 103; shipping, 101, 
104-105 ; stagnation of industry, 100, 
no; tariff reform, 76, 98, 106, 108. 

Great Britain, foreign policy: Far East, 
26, 28-29, 148, 179-180, 243, 348; 
general principles, 25-31, 205-206; 
Mediterranean, 15, 259; Morocco, 
229-230, 233, 308-309, 314, 3i9-334i 
339-341; "splendid isolation," 24, 
131, 220, 353, 356-357- 

Great Britain, navy: case for supremacy, 
3-4, 199-206, 212-213, 217; condition 
before 1904, 174, 194; in 1914, 193; 
crisis of 1909, 184-187, 250, 295; dis- 
tribution of squadrons, 178-180, 187, 
190-193; mobilization in July, 19 14, 
386-387, 455-456; Naval Defense 
Act of 1889, 177, 216; origins, 15; 
programmes of ship-building, 180, 
182, 183, 188, 190-191; reforms, 178- 
179; two-Power standard, 178, 180, 
186, 190, 215. 

Great Britain, policy in crisis of 1914: 
activity of King George, 447, 453, 
457, 459, 463, 473, 484.. 492; avoids 
acts which might precipitate matters, 
453; considers neutrality, 483, 487; 
efforts for peace, 414-415, 417, 419, 
447-449, 453, 481-483, 494-497; 
keeps hands free till 2 August, 474- 



INDEX 



515 



475; mobilization of fleet, 455-456; 
negotiations for neutrality of France 
and Germany, 453, 483-485; no de- 
sire to fight Germany, 474-475, 486; 
no direct interests in Serbia, 469; 
policy in re Belgium, 481-483, 404- 
497; possible policies, 460-475; 
promises naval assistance to France, 
487; refuses neutrality to Germany, 
446, 485-487 ; refuses to declare soli- 
darity with France and Russia, 471- 
474, 504; ships detained in Germany, 
487, 494; urges moderation on Serbia, 

403. 

Great Britain, political conditions: 
army, 59, 208-209, 389; colossus 
with feet of clay, 164-166, 194-195, 
264; imperial policy, 31-33; insu- 
larity, 166-168; jingoism, 207; Labor 
party, 353; pacific temper, 22-24, 
200-201, 208-209, 246-247, 360, 364; 
military precautions in 1911, 332-333. 
335 _ 336; Parliament Bill, 303; rail- 
way strike of 1911, 335; signs of vigor- 
ous life, 111-113, 194-195; troubles in 
summer of 1914, 389. 

Great Britain, relations with Austria, 
117, 120, 244, 287-290, 294-295, 362. 

Great Britain, relations with Belgium, 
141, 211, 474-480, 504. 

Great Britain, relations with France: 
arbitration treaty of 1903, 25, 224; 
convention of 8 April, 1904, 28, 139, 
153. 180, 224, 235, 322-324, 326, 334, 
342; diplomatic co-operation, 228, 
237-238, 246, 251, 305, 320-334, 336- 
341, 346, 364, 377, 500; during war of 
1870, 126-127; exchange of notes, 22 
November, 191 2, 364, 488; military 
conversations, 211, 367; naval co- 
operation, 364, 488; no alliance be- 
fore war, 343, 350, 367-368, 469, 488; 
rivalry before 1904, 3, 19-21, 28, 79, 
133-135. 141-142, 178-179. 218-219, 
226, 234-235, 374, 381. 

Great Britain, relations with Germany: 
attitude toward German expansion, 
135-137, 343-344. 346, 356, 368-376; 
Agreements, conventions, etc.: Africa 
(1800), 137, 139; alliance proposed 
(1900), 148-150; China (1900), 147, 
150-15 1 ; neutrality treaty pro- 
posed (1912), 187, 346-351; Por- 



tuguese colonies (1898), 85, 144, 346, 
372; Samoa (1899), 144; Turkey 
and Africa (1914), 195, 367~377. 
470. 

British view of Germany, 31, 150, 
154-156, 168-170, 200, 207, 209- 
210, 219-222, 242-243, 247-249, 
251, 341-344. 353-355. 367. 374- 

Causes of rivalry, 1-11, 150-153, 173, 
208, 219, 241-243, 468. 

"Cleaning the slate," 189, 345, 374- 

Commercial rivalry: Anglo-German 
trade, 108; comparison of British 
and German industry, 100-101, 
104-105; of British and German 
trade, 99, 102, 107; competition for 
markets, 3, 96-97; 108-109, 113- 
114, 269, 276-277, 500; effects on 
British industry, 98, 101, 108. 

Conditions of an understanding, 170- 
171, 192, 245-246, 252, 344, 352. 

Friendliness in England to Germany, 
63, 113, 126, 135, 137-138, 156, 207, 
246-247, 251, 294, 341-344, 35°, 

356, 360, 362, 371-374, 474-475, 
486, 500. 

German policy in South Africa, 135, 
141-143, 392. 

German view of England, 60, 96, 108- 
iog, 156-158, 182, 197-200, 248- 
250, 295, 337-339, 344-345, 355- 

357, 372-373. 390-39I- 
Historical: before Bismarck, n 6-1 24; 

temp. Bismarck, 128-138; 1890- 
1900, 141-145; during Boer War, 
I45-I53, i99- 

Interview of William II in Daily Tele- 
graph, 185, 248-249. 

Letter of William II to Lord Tweed- 
mouth, 183, 248. 

Naval rivalry: affects policy in Mo- 
rocco, 329, 340-341; in Turkey, 
278-279; British supremacy at sea, 
186, 194, 200-201, 203-205; Ger- 
man fleet as a danger to Great Brit- 
ain, 168-170, 176-177, 180, 200, 
209-218, 344; regarded as a "lux- 
ury," 201, 345; German view of the 
rivalry, 197-198, 204-207, 212, 220- 
221; lessening of rivalry, n, 191- 
194, 368; movements of British fleet 
in 191 1, 206, 332-333. 335-336; 
naval expenditure, 216-217; reduc- 



5i6 



INDEX 



tion of armaments, 18, 182-184, 
186-190, 194-195, 203-205, 215- 
216, 244-248, 347-35 1 - 
Neutrality negotiations (1912), 187, 

346-351. 
Opposition in re Bosnian annexation, 

291-296. 
Relations: better (1911), 302-303; 
"excellent" (1912), 351; "sensibly 
improved" (1913), 11, 357, 360, 
368-369; "very good" (1914). 369, 
503- 
Rivalry: in Morocco, 5, 86, 233-234, 
314, 319-334. 339-341, 368; in Tur- 
key, 5, 86, 261, 264-279, 296-301. 
Responsibility for final rupture, 497. 
Work of Germans for the British Em- 
pire, 117, 123-124. 
Great Britain, relations with Italy, 129, 

134, 240, 365. 
Great Britain, relations with Portugal, 

136.348,371. 
Great Britain, relations with Russia: 
convention of 31 August, 1907, 30, 
241-242, 281-282, 286, 298, 379; 
diplomatic co-operation, 246, 251, 
287-296, 298; naval convention, 366- 
367; rivalry before 1907, 2, 16, 18, 20, 
29-30, 120, 128, 133-134, 141-142, 
178-179, 206, 219-220, 225, 241, 258- 
259. 374. 381. 
Great Britain, relations with Spain, 29, 

229, 235, 239-240. 
Great Britain, relations with Turkey, 
109, 142, 152, 162-163, 206, 258-260, 
268-284, 296-297, 30o-3or, 370. 
Great Britain, relations with United 

States, 28, 205. 
Great Britain and the European Crisis 
(1914), n, 295, 364, 369, 394, 397-398, 
400-401, 404-405, 412, 464, 477. 
Greece, 13, 255, 358, 361. 
Greindl, Baron, Belgian minister in 

Berlin, 501. 
Grenzboten, 318. 

Grey, Sir Edward, British foreign 
minister, 29, 237; attitude toward 
Germany, 113, 171, 214-215, 243, 
245-246, 249, 252, 302, 341-344, 390; 
Balkan crisis of 1912-1913, 26, 360- 
362, 364, 392; Bosnian annexation, 
288-289, 291-292, 294-295; Morocco, 
237,319-337; naval policy, 189, 201- 



202; Near East, 286-287, 300, 365- 
367; negotiations of 1912, 348-351, 
3S4-3S6. 

Grey, Sir Edward, policy during crisis of 
1914: attitude toward assassination 
of archduke, 397, 405, 409-410, 412; 
toward ultimatum, 406, 410, 412; 
asks Germany to propose form of me- 
diation, 439; bases policy on public 
opinion, 473, 485, 490; calls on Bel- 
gium to protect neutrality, 481; on 
France and Germany to respect that 
neutrality, 251, 481-483; conversa- 
tions with Cambon, 446-447; does 
not know terms of Franco-Russian 
alliance, 469; offers general peace 
agreement, 11, 447-448; proposes ac- 
tion by four Powers, 414-415, 419; 
refuses to state terms of neutrality to 
Lichnowsky, 473, 485-487; refuses 
German bid for neutrality, 446; re- 
quests extension of time for ultima- 
tum, 414: resists arguments for soli- 
darity, 47 1-474; speech in Parliament, 
98, 488-489; suggests Austria stop in 
Belgrade, Russia to stop military prep- 
arations, 447; supports Serbian reply 
as basis of negotiation, 417, 419; tries 
to restrain Austria, 409, 412, 414-415, 
447; tries to secure German neutral- 
ity, 453, 483-485 ; warns Prince Lich- 
nowsky, 471-472; warns Count Mens- 
dorff, 409; will abandon France and 
Russia if unreasonable, 448, 470. 

Guillaume, Baron, Belgian minister in 
Paris, 502, 504. 

Gwinner, Arthur von, 197. 

Hakki, Pasha, 300. 

Haldane, Lord, 189, 194, 208, 346, 347, 
348, 354- 

Hale, William Bayard, The World's 
Work, 1. 

Halif, 299. 

Hall, H. N., interview with King Albert 
of Belgium, 480. 

Hamburg-America Line, 101, 276. 

Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 403. 

Hamilton, Lord George, 178. 

Hamilton, Sir Ian, Compulsory Service, 
212. 

Hanotaux, Gabriel, French foreign min- 
ister, 141. 



INDEX 



517 



Hanover, 117, 121, 129. 

Hansard (Parliamentary debates), 178, 
185-186, 189, 191, 194, 201-202, 211, 
214-215, 237, 246, 275, 287, 303, 322, 
333-334, 343-344. 346, 351, 364, 366, 
370, 453, 473, 483-484, 488. 

Hanseatic League, 13, 70, 116. 

Harden, Maximilian, 44; M anarchs and. 
Men, 184, 244-245. 

Hardenberg, 119. 

Hardinge, Sir Charles, 183, 184. 

Hasse, Ernest, 80. 

Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 28. 

Hedjaz railway, 272-273. 

Helfferich, Dr. Karl, Germany's Eco- 
nomic Progress and National Wealth, 
1888-1913, 74, 106; The Dual Alli- 
ance versus the Triple Entente, 457, 
463-466, 472-474. 

Heligoland, 136. 

Helmolt, Dr. Hans, La Triplice en Orient, 

257- 
Henry VIII, 2. 

Henry, Prince, of Prussia, 447. 
Herggelet, Mariano, England's Weak 

Points and Germany's Position in 

Europe, 166. 
Heydebrandt, Herr von, 338. 
Hirst, F. W., The Six Panics, 215. 
Hislam, Percival, Admiralty of the At- 
lantic, 174, 175, 211. 
Hobbes, Thomas, 68. 
Holland, 13-15, 27, 81, 84, 94, 116, 198, 

205, 494. 
Hollman, Admiral, 174, 175. 
Holy War, 33, 263. 
Homs-Baghdad railway, 279, 314. 
Hotzendorf, General Conrad von, 384. 
Hueffer, Ford Madox, When Blood is 

Their Argument, 115. 
Humbert, Charles, 388. 
Hurd, A., and Castle, H., German Sea 

Power, 101, 105, 126, 175, 176, 

210. 
Hurd, A. S., The Command of the Sea, 

189; Italy's Bolt from the Blue, 212. 
Hurgronje, Dr. C. Snouck, The Holy 

War: "Made in Germany," 260-261, 

263. 

Illustrirte Zeitung, 206. 
India, 15-16, 20-21, 29, 32, 78, 241, 259, 
261, 263-264, 272, 303, 391. 



International situation after 1870, 130- 

131- 

International situation in 1904, 179, 225. 

Invasion of England, 2, 210-212. 

Ireland, S3, 389- 

Ischl, 184, 416. 

Islam, 261-264. 

"Islander," The Naval and Military 
Policy of the British Isles, 209. 

Ismidt, 266. 

Isvolsky, A. P., Russian foreign min- 
ister, later ambassador in Paris, 241, 
286-288, 292-294, 366, 438, 464. 

Italy, policy in Adriatic, 240, 256, 290- 
291, 361; in Mediterranean, 240; in 
Morocco, 237; relations with Austria, 
290-291, 361, 363, 381; France, 79, 
134, 237-238, 240; Great Britain, 129, 
134, 240, 365; Russia, 290-291; 
Tripoli, 84, 211, 218, 291, 336, 363; 
unification, 126, 129-130, 289, 429. 

Italy, policy during crisis of 1914: 
favors mediation by four Powers, 415, 
420; invited to exert pressure on 
Austria, 418; thinks Austria animated 
by desire to recover prestige, 407; 
warns Austria against a war of aggres- 
sion, 418. 

I to, Marquis, 148. 

Jagow, Gottlieb von, German foreign 
minister, 360, 369, 372. 

Jagow, Gottlieb von, policy during crisis 
of 1914: accepts mediation "in prin- 
ciple," 416; admits harsh nature of 
ultimatum, 426-427; arguments for 
invasion of Belgium, 477, 493; atti- 
tude toward Serbian reply, 428; 
breaks bargain with Cambon, 441, 
445; complains of Russian mobiliza- 
tion, 437, 450-451, 460; favors action 
by Powers, 438; not privy to ulti- 
matum, 406; passes on British sug- 
gestions to Vienna, 416, 417, 421; 
promise to Grey in re Belgium, 494; 
recognizes German obligations toward 
Belgium, 478, 505; refuses to answer 
British query about Belgium, 482-483 ; 
rejects Grey's warning, 472; rejects 
Grey's suggestions, 445, 449; re- 
jects Russian formula, 445; tries to 
prevent declaration of war, 454. 

Janina, 359. 



5i8 



INDEX 



James I, 116. 

Jameson, Dr. L. S., 22, 143. 

Jaures, Jean, 41. 

Jena, battle of, 42, 55, 71, 119. 

Jgazmondo (Budapest), 383. 

Johnston, Sir H. H., lecture tour in 
Germany, 355-356; Common Sense 
in Foreign Policy, 356; Views and 
Reviews, 123. 

Jungbluth, General, 479. 

Kagera River, 372. 

Kandahar, 18. 

Kant, 37. 

Kara, George, 257. 

Karageorgevitch family, 257-258. 

Karthaus, 386. 

Kerr, Alfred, 93. 

Khanikin, 298. 

Khartoum, 134, 141. 

Kiamil Pasha, 283. 

Kiao-Chou, 78, 141. 

Kiderlen-Waechter, Alfred von, 64, 313, 
315. 318, 320, 328, 331-332, 334. 339. 
341, 360. 

Kiel Canal, 126, 390. 

Kipling, Rudyard, 22. 

Kirkpatrick, F. A., Lectures on the His- 
tory of the Nineteenth Century, 261. 

Kissingen, 315. 

Kitchener, Lord, 21, 32, 141. 

Konia, 266. 

Konigsberg, 68. 

Konopischt, 383. 

Koweit, Sheikh of, 274, 278, 300, 370. 

Kruger, President, 22, 146-147; tele- 
gram of William II to, 143. 

Krupps, 385. 

Kudachef, Prince, Russian charge in 
Vienna, 413, 416, 418, 432. 

Kuhlmann, Baron von, councillor of 
German embassy in London, 389. 

Kultur, 6, 85-86, 91-95. 

Kurdistan, 298. 

La Fontaine, 25. 

Lake Chad, 336. 

Lalaing, Count de, Belgian minister in 
London, 500-501. 

Lansdowne, Lord, British foreign secre- 
tary, 24, 28, 148, 151, 153, 223, 224, 
275, 286, 324. 



Larache, 314, 317. 

Lascelles, Sir Frank, Thoughts on the 
Anglo-German Problem, 247. 

Lasson, Professor Adolf, 93. 

Lee, Arthur, 206. 

Lee, Sir Sidney, King Edward VII, 244; 
Life of Que'en Victoria, 124. 

Leibnitz, 37. 

Lemonon, Ernest, L'Europe et la Poli- 
tique brittanique, 17, 151. 

Leroy-Beaulieu, Paul, Revue des Deux 
Mondes, 34. 

L'Escaille, B. de, 472, 504. 

Letters of Queen Victoria, 123. 

Liberal, El (Madrid), 387. 

Liberal Year Book, 105. 

Lichnowsky, Prince, German ambassa- 
dor in London, 354, 369, 405, 407, 414, 
416-417, 419, 421, 423, 426, 447-448, 
453, 471-474, 483-486. 

Lichtenberger, Henri, Germany and Its 
Evolution in Modem Times, 74. 

Liebknecht, Karl, 157. 

Liege, 493. 

Lindequist, Herr von, 337. 

Livingstone, David, 79. 

Lloyd George, David, 187, 329; speech, 
329-332, 337-338- _ 

Lokal Anzeiger (Berlin), 64, 445. 

London, treaty of (30 May, 1913), 

359- 
Long, R. C, Germany and the Entente, 

243; Naval Armament Delusions, 

207. 
Lorenz, Dr. Theodor, Die englische 

Presse, 159. 
Loubet, Emile, 223. 
Louis XTV, 2, 116, 391, 476. 
Louis Philippe, 477. 
Low, Sidney, An Anglo-French Alliance, 

34i- 
Low, S. J., and Sanders, L. C, Political 

History of England, 144. 
Luther, 116. 
Luxemburg, 386. 
Luxemburg question, treaty of 1867, 

126, 487. 



Maan, 273. 

McKenna, Reginald, 185. 
Maclaren, A. D., An Australian in Ger- 
many, 171. 



INDEX 



519 



Macchio, Baron, 399, 416, 418. 

Macdonald, J. Ramsay, 389. 

Macedonia, 361, 362. 

Madagascar, 20, 28. 

Magellan, Straits of, 6. 

Magnan, Dr., 386. 

Magyars, 255, 257, 396, 433. 

Mahan, Admiral, Interest of America in 
International Conditions, 195-196, 
200-201, 213. 

Majuba Hill, battle of, 19. 

Malay States, 191, 193- 

Malm^dy-Stavelot railway, 480. 

Malta, 29, 192, 259. 

Manchester, University of, 353. 

Manchester Guardian, 156. 

Manchuria, 21, 151, 218, 241, 264. 

Manila, 143. 

Mannesmann Brothers, 309. 

Marchand, Major, 21, 141. 

Marcks, Erich, England and Germany, 
1500—1900, 120, 128. 

Maria Theresa, Empress, 117. 

Maritz, Colonel, 392. 

Martin, Rudolf, Deutschland und Eng- 
land, 157, 211; Kdnig Eduard und 
Kaiser WUhelm, 167. 

Matin, 228. 

Maubeuge, 493. 

Mead, Edwin D., England and Germany, 
202, 207, 249. 

Mecca, 262, 272. 

Medina, 262, 272. 

Mediterranean, agreements (1907), 29, 
239-240; German ambitions in re the, 
233, 240, 271, 329; naval situation in, 
180, igi-193, 364, 488. 

Mensdorff, Count, Austrian ambas- 
sador in London, 399, 414. 4 X 5> 43°, 
450- 
Mesopotamia, 5, 85, 253, 258, 265, 272, 

275. 277- 
Metternich, 36, 120, 163. 
Meyer, Ernst, Los von England, 194. 
Midhat Pasha, 274-275. 
Midia, 359. 

Miliiarische Rundschau (Vienna), 403. 
Miller, William, The Ottoman Empire, 

1801-1913, 253. 
Millet, Philippe, The Truth About the 

Franco-German Crisis of 1911, 312. 
Mitrofanof, Professor, Preussische Jahr- 

biicher, 378. 



Mobilization during crisis of 1914, 407. 

422, 434, 441-442, 444-445, 449. 45 1 . 

453. 455-46i, 466. 
Mogador, 315. 

Mohammerah, sheikh of, 278. 
Moltke, Count von, 49. 
Moltke, General von, 392. 
Mommsen, Theodor, 146. 
Mongumba, 336. 
Monis, Antoine, French prime minister, 

3°9- 

Monson, Sir Edmond, British ambassa- 
dor in Paris, 21, 223. 

Montenegro, 256-257, 290, 358, 362. 

Moore, John Bassett, International Arbi- 
trations of the United States, 25. 

Morel, E.D.,Morocco inDiplomacy, 234, 
236, 310. 

Morley, Lord, 32, 346, 389; Life of Glad- 
stone, 128. 

Morning Post, 156, 183, 35*. 383- 

Morocco, Algeciras: Act of, 238, 303- 

304, 306-307, 309. 3i3-3i4» 3i7. 326, 
328, 342; Conference of, 182, 228, 236- 
238, 240-241, 286; Casablanca inci- 
dent, 305-306; convention of 1880, 
231; crisis of 1905, 182, 226-228, 247, 
271; crisis of 191 1, 188, 206, 208, 247, 
300, 302-303, 357; Franco-German 
convention of 8 February, 1909, 250, 
306-311, 313. 335> 342, 501; Franco- 
German convention of 4 November, 
1911, 84, 336-337. 346,372; Franco- 
Moroccan convention of 4 March, 
1910, 304, 307, 311; Franco-Spanish 
convention of 3 October, 1904, 235; 
German designs on, 5, 85-87, 231- 
234, 313. 317-320, 334, 339-340, 409, 
467; negotiations of 1911, 316-337; 
public works, 300-310; rivalry of 
European Powers, 228-234. 

Mossul, 267, 279. 

Moulin-Eckart, Richard Graf von, 

Englands Polilik und die Machte, 120, 

123, 128, 130. 
Mozambique, 372. 
Mukden, battle of, 226. 
Mulai Hafid, Sultan of Morocco, 304. 

305. 306, 307, 312. 

Mulai Hassan, Sultan of Morocco, 229. 
Munchner Neuste Nachrichten, 461. 
Miinster, Prince, German ambassador 
in Paris, 141. 



520 



INDEX 



Muriavef, Prince, Russian foreign secre- 
tary, 146. 

Namur, 491. 

Napoleon, 2, 12, 15, 71, 118, 167, 208, 

476, 498. 
Napoleon III, 48, 122, 126. 
Narodna Odbrana, 394-395, 409, 427. 
Natal, 19, 79. 
Nation (London), 182. 
Nation (New York), 64, 207, 386, 404. 
National Review, 160. 
Naval Supremacy : Who ?, 212. 
New Caledonia, 20. 
New Hebrides, 20, 28. 
New York Times, 194, 202, 369, 371, 383, 

387, 389, 480. 
New Zealand, 15, 16, 191, 193. 
Newfoundland, 20, 28. 
Newton, Lord, Life of Lord Lyons, 132. 
Ngoko-Sangha, 310; consortium, 311. 
Nicholas II, the Tsar, 282, 291, 298, 352, 

365, 377> 413, 4S2-4S3, 457. 459, 473, 

504- 
Niger basin, 20, 28. 
Nish, 287, 418. 
Nord und Sild, 213, 355. 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, , 251, 

347, 364-367, 377, 447, 472, 474, 478, 

484-485. 
North Sea, 179, 180, 186, 191, 193. 
Novi-Bazar, sanjak of, 286, 290, 432, 

45o. 

Oberwinder, Heinrich, Die Weltkrise und 

die Aufgaben des deutschen Reickes, 

120, 125, 128. 
Obrenovitch family in Serbia, 257, 264. 
O'Connor, T. A., The Baghdad Railway, 

266. 
Oldenburg, Herr von, 40. 
Olga, Grand Duchess of Russia, 365. 
O'Neill, iEneas, Six German Opinions 

on the Naval Situation, 207. 
Oriental railway, 399. 
Osmanye, 300. 
Our Foreign Policy and Its Reform, 342. 

Pacific Ocean, 19-20, 78, 180, 196, 205. 

Paish, Sir George, 105. 

Paleologue, M., French ambassador in 

St. Petersburg, 442-443, 464. 
Pallavicini, Marquis, 383. 



Palma (Balearic Isles), 387. 

Palmerston, Lord, 120-122, 124, 125, 
126, 129, 162-163. 

Pan-German League, 80-84, I S7> 210, 
232, 318, 385. 

Pan-Islamism, 261-264, 284. 

Panther (German gunboat), 302, 310, 
312, 314, 316, 320, 321, 339. 

Paris, Treaty of (1856), 122, 133, 253. 

Parliamentary Papers, 25, 98, 174. 

"Peace of Rome, 1916," 391. 

Peel, George, The Future of England, 25. 

Pelletan, Camille, 179. 

Pendjeh, 18, 134. 

Penetration pacifique, 234, 266. 

Perris, G. H., Germany and the German 
Emperor, 35, 45, 147, 172; Our For- 
eign Policy and Sir Edward Grey's 
Failure, 341. 

Persia, 21, 30, 242, 262, 264, 272, 275, 
282, 298-299, 341. 

Persian Gulf, 21, 30, 241-242, 264, 266, 
267, 268, 271, 274-278, 280, 300, 370. 

Peter the Great, 379. 

Peter Karageorgevitch, 258. 

Petit Parisien, 386. 

Philip II, 2, 476. 

Phillips, Lady, A Friendly Germany, 
Why Not?, 97, 117, 147. 

Pichon, Stephen, French foreign minis- 
ter, 304, 308-311, 336. 

Pinon, Rene, L'Europe et VEmpire 
Ottoman, 1, 266, 273-274, 280; L'Eu- 
rope et la jeune Turquie, 287. 

Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 1 18, 198. 

"Place in the sun," 5, 87, 325, 344. 

Poincare,Raymond,President of France, 
35i, 365, 367, 388, 473, 499-500. 

Poland, 377, 380. 

Port Arthur, 21, 141. 

Port, Baltic, 352. 

Portugal, 14; African colonies, 78, 85, 
144, 346, 371-372. 

Posen, 46-47, 49. 

Potsdam, interview at, 298, 342. 

Pourtales, Count, German ambassador 
in St. Petersburg, 292, 408, 413, 422, 
433, 436-437, 442-443, 451, 454, 459, 
475, 504- 

Poutiloff Arms Factory, in St. Peters- 
burg, 385. 

Preussische Jahrbiicher, 157. 

Princip, Gavril, 394-395- 



INDEX 



521 



Private property at sea in time of war, 
161, 201-203. 

Prussia, ascendency in Germany, 7-8, 
37-39, 41, 43, 45-49. 56; constitution, 
42; franchise, 42-43; history, 8, 41- 
42, 71, 118, 124-126; militarism, 8, 
36-37, 125, 130. 

Rabat, 312, 319. 

Racconigi, 291. 

Rand mines, 372. 

Redmond, John, ^$. 

Reformation, the, 37, 116. 

Reich, Emil, Germany's Swelled Head, 
93, 170. 

Remich, 487. 

Renaissance, the, 70. 

Reval, 205, 282. 

Reventlow, Count, Die englische See- 
macht, 204. 

Rhenisch-W estjdlische Zeitung, 318. 

Rhine River, 391, 477. 

Rhodes, Cecil, 144. 

Rhodesia, 372. 

Richard of Cornwall, 116. 

Richard the Lion-Hearted, 116. 

Riff, the, 314. 

Rio Grande, 6. 

Roberts, Lord (Sir Frederick), 18, 185, 
209. 

Robertson, J. M., 202. 

Rodd, Sir Rennell, British ambassador 
in Rome, 432. 

Rohrbach, Dr. Paul, Die Bagdadbahn, 
157, 266, 272-273; Der deutsche Ge- 
danke in der Welt, 6, 10, 157, 197, 206, 
279; Deulschland unterden Wellvolkern, 
73. 78, 157-159, 226, 279; Der Krieg 
und die deutsche Politik, 157, 197, 380; 
L'Evolution de I'Allemagne comme 
puissance mondiale, 75, 282; Zum 
Weltvolk hindurch !, 371, 373, 380. 

Rose, J. Holland, The Development of 
the Modern European Nations, 132. 

Rouire, Dr., La Rivalile anglo-russe au 
XIX"" siecle en Asie, 275. 

Round Table, 1, 122, 168, 170-171. 

Rouvier, Maurice, French prime minis- 
ter, 228. 

Rumania, 255-256, 265, 296, 361, 365, 
380, 383. 

Rumbold, Sir Horace, British charge in 
Berlin, 406, 416. 



Russell, Lord John, 126, 129. 

Russia, army, 59, 380; Asiatic posses- 
sions, 76, 78, 263-264; fleet, 193; 
military party, 381; pacific tend- 
encies, 381-382; revolution threat- 
ened in 1914, 388-389. 

Russia, foreign policy : B aghdad railway, 
267-268,298-299, 378; Balkans, 254- 
258, 286-293, 296, 360-365, 378-380, 
383, 396, 400-402; Far East, 30, 141, 

151, 259, 265, 378-379; France, see 
Dual Alliance; Germany, see Ger- 
many, relations with Russia; Great 
Britain, see Great Britain, relations 
with Russia; Italy, 290-291; Turkey, 
120, 128, 134, 241, 254-255, 296, 374, 
378-379- 

Russia, policy during crisis of 1914: 
announcement that Russia cannot re- 
main indifferent, 413; appeal to Eng- 
land for solidarity, 413, 471, 474; con- 
ciliatory attitude, 449-450; formulas 
for international action, 443, 449; in- 
vites mediation by Great Britain, 435, 
437. 439. 450; by Italy, 418; mobili- 
zation, 422, 434-437, 441-442, 444- 
445, 449, 451, 453, 466 ; negotiations 
with Austria, 413, 419, 436, 450; 
promises Germany not to use army 
while negotiations proceed, 452; pro- 
poses arbitration, 413; receives assur- 
ance of French assistance, 463-466; 
requests extension of time for Aus- 
trian ultimatum, 412; ultimatum from 
Germany, 452, 483, 486; urges mod- 
eration on Serbia, 403, 412, 418, 420; 
violation of frontier charged by Ger- 
many, 454-455 ; war declared by Ger- 
many, 454, 486; war not expected, 
453. 459- 

Russian Orange Book (1914), 458. 

Russo-Japanese War, 29, 153, 179, 224, 
258, 348, 378. 

Said-Ruete, R., Anglo-German Relations 
in the Near East, 299. 

Saladin, 260. 

Salandra, Antonio, Italian premier, 418. 

Salisbury, Lord, British foreign secre- 
tary, 7, 24, 26, 133, 136, 139, 144, 146, 

152, 158, 222, 356. 
Salonika, 256, 283, 286, 363. 
Samoa, 144. 



522 



INDEX 



San Giuliano, Marquis di, Italian foreign 
minister, 430, 471. 

San Stefano, treaty of, 17, 258, 378. 

Sanders, General Liman von, 379. 

Santa Lucia Bay, 135. 

Sarolea, Charles, The Anglo-German 
Problem, 170. 

Saturday Review, 155, 166, 206. 

Sazonof, Sergius, Russian foreign min- 
ister, 367, 380-381, 500. 

Sazonof, Sergius, policy during crisis of 
1014: appeals for British mediation, 
435, 437. 439, 45°,* appeals for British 
solidarity with Russia, 413, 471, 504; 
claims to have news of German mili- 
tary preparations, 458-459; concilia- 
tory attitude, 413, 419-420, 434; dic- 
tates formulas for negotiation with 
Austria, 443, 449-450; explains Rus- 
sian mobilization, 441; informs Ger- 
many of mobilization, 435; insists 
Austro-Serbian dispute is interna- 
tional, 413, 433-434; suspicious of 
Austria's intentions, 412-413, 432; 
of Germany's, 424; thinks ultimatum 
directed against Russia, 409; thinks 
war intended by Germany, 452; tries 
to reassure Germany and Austria, 
436; warns Austria, 405; warns Ger- 
many, 435. 

Scezsen, Count, Austrian ambassador in 
Paris, 450. 

Scharnhorst, 119. 

Schebeko, M., Russian ambassador in 
Vienna, 404, 419, 425, 437, 449. 

Schiemann, Professor Theodor, 225. 

Schierbrand, Wolf von, Germany, 106. 

Schiller, 250. 

Schleswig-Holstein, 46, 122, 125, 129, 
228. 

Schneider, Fritz, We Germans and Our 
British Cousins, 166. 

Schoen, Herr von, German ambassador 
in Paris, 311, 319, 334, 422-423, 433, 
438, 460. 

Schubert, Captain Hartwig, Die deut- 
sche Schlachtflotte eine Gefakr fur 
Deutschlands Machtstellung, 212. 

Schulze-Gaevernitz, Professor von, 
Deutschland und England, 108; Eng- 
land and Germany — Peace or War ? 
194, 197. 

Schwidden, 454. 



Scutari, 359, 362. 

Selim I, 262. 

Selves, Justin de, French foreign minis- 
ter, 316, 319, 320. 

Serajevo, 374, 382, 393. 

Serbia, 256-258, 288-290, 294, 296, 358, 
361-364, 383, 395-396, 401-402; dec- 
laration of 31 March, 1909, 290, 410, 
428. 

Serbia, policy during crisis of 19 14: ap- 
peal to Russia, 412, 420; complicity 
in assassination of Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand, 395, 398-399; policy from 
assassination to ultimatum of 23 July, 
398, 402-403; reply to ultimatum, 
417-418, 420, 424, 427-432; war de- 
clared by Austria, 425-426, 434. 

Seven Years' War, 20, 139. 

Shakespeare, 250. 

Shargah, sheikh of, 278. 

Shatt-el-Arab, 274. 

Shaw, George Bernard, The Man of Des- 
tiny, 167-168. 

Shawia, 304, 326. 

Shiites, 262. 

Shimonoseki, treaty of (1894), 141. 

Shuster, W. Morgan, 341. 

Siam, 20, 21, 28. 

Sieper, Dr. Ernst, Die Kultur modernen 
Englands, 355. 

Sigma, The Tu Quoque Quarrel, 171. 

"Slav peril," 299. 

Slavs, Southern, 255, 288, 395-397, 401. 

Sociele marocaine de Travaux publics, 309. 

Solf, Dr., 346. 

South Africa, 17, 19, 32, 78, 81, 141, 143, 
145, 147, 150, 3Q2-393- 

Spain, interest in Morocco, 229, 235- 
236, 238, 303, 308, 314, 317; relations 
with France, 235, 365; relations with 
Great Britain, 29, 229, 235, 239-240. 

Spanish-American War, 142-143, 239. 

Spectator, 170, 257, 351, 354. 

Spender, J. A., The Foundations of Brit- 
ish Policy, 209, 353. 

Stanley, H. M., 79. 

Statesman's Year Book, 99. 

Statistisches Handbuch des deutschen 
Reiches, 99. 

Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das deulsche 
Reich, 99. 

Steed, H. W., The Hapsburg Monarchy, 
287, 292. 



INDEX 



523 



Steelyard, the, 116. 

Stein, 119. 

Stein, Dr. Ludwig, 355. 

Sternberg, Baron Speck von, The Truth 

about German Expansion, 75. 
Straits, question of the, 255, 261, 286, 

287, 289, 359. 
Stubbs, William (Bishop), Lectures on 

Medieval and Modern History, 2. 
Siidkamerungesellschaft, 310. 
Suez Canal, 17, 29, 259, 264, 272, 273. 
Sunnites, 262. 
Super-Dreadnought, 186. 
Swerbeiev, M., Russian ambassador in 

Berlin, 445. 
Syria, 272. 
Szapary, Count, Austrian ambassador 

in St. Petersburg, 413, 419, 425, 430, 

435. 45o, 457- 

Tabah incident, 273. 

Taillandier, Saint-Rene, 236. 

Talleyrand, 120. 

Tangier, 227, 234. 

Tankositch, Major Voija, 395, 411, 427. 

Tardieu, Andre, La Conference d'Alge- 
siras, 234; Le Mystere d'Agadir, 307, 
310, 312; Le Prince de Billow, 308. 

Taurus Mountains, 267. 

Teheran, German school at, 298. 

Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 19. 

Temps, 294. 

The Hague, Second Conference at, 183, 
248. 

Thirlmere, Rowland, The Clash of Em- 
pires, 170. 

Thirty Years' War, 116, 275. 

Three Emperors' League, 131-132, 286. 

Tibet, 21, 32, 241. 

Tigris River, 267, 274, 279, 370. 

Tille, Alexander, Aus Englands Flegel- 
jakren, 165-166. 

Times, 63, 126-127, 131. 143. 147-148, 
156, 193-194. 248-249, 324, 329, 353- 
354, 359, 365, 387. 389, 392, 487- 

Times History of the War, 275, 277. 

Tirpitz, Admiral von, 11, 113, 174, 176, 
182, 186, 191, 193-194, 204, 345, 347. 

Tisza, Count Stephen, 383, 404. 

Togoland, 78, 135, 233, 320. 

Tonkin, 20. 

Transvaal, 17, 19, 22, 32, 79, 135, 143. 

Treitschke, Heinrich von, 51, 89, 91, 



159-165; Deutsche Geschichte, 123, 
159-163; Deutsche Kdmpfe, 160-164. 

Trevelyan, Charles, 156. 

Treves, 386. 

Triple Alliance, 132-133, 139, 237, 240, 
242, 256, 265, 286, 294, 341, 348, 356, 
363, 366, 381, 386, 465. 

Triple Entente, 242, 246-247, 250, 252, 
281, 288-289, 291, 296-297, 299, 301, 
305, 34i, 343. 351-352, 360, 363, 365- 
368, 375-376, 392, 428, 468, 470, 472. 

Tripoli, 84, 2ir, 218, 291, 336, 363. 

Tschirscky, Herr von, German ambas- 
sador in Vienna, 406, 408, 417. 

Tuckwell, W., Reminiscences of Oxford, 
123. 

Tunis, 20, 79, 134, 231. 

Turgot, 16. 

Turkey, Committee of Union and Prog- 
ress, 283, 285; constitution of 1876, 
282; customs, 269, 280, 297, 300, 370; 
Cretan question, 142, 259, 260, 284; 
finance, 260, 270-271, 284, 296-297; 
goes to war at behest of Germany, 
274, 297, 300; navy, 297; revolution 
of 1908, 279, 281, 501; Straits, ques- 
tion of the, 255, 261, 286-287, 289, 
359; Turks, the, 253-254; "Turki- 
fication," 297, 358; war with Greece, 
260; Young Turks, 282, 284-285, 296- 
297, 358. 

Turkey, relations with Germany. See 
Germany, relations with Turkey. 

Turkey, relations with Great Britain. See 
Great Britain, relations with Turkey. 

Tweedmouth, Lord, 183, 248. 

Two-Power standard for British navy, 
178, 180, 186, 190, 215. 

Ubangi River, 334, 336. 

Udja, 304, 309. 

Uganda, 136. 

Ultimatum of 23 July, 19 14, 66, 404, 

410-41 1, 415, 426-427, 435. 
Union des Mines marocaines, 309. 
United Kingdom. See Great Britain. 
United States, 142-143, 231, 239, 303, 

336, 428. 
Urquhart, Francis, 201. 

Vambery, Dr. Arminius, 21. 
Van den Heuvel, J., On the Violation of 
Belgian Neutrality, 479. 



5 2 4 



INDEX 



Venezuela affair, 1902, 152, 223. 

ViaUate, Achille, La Vie politique dans 
les deux mondes, 241, 245, 287. 

Victor Emmanuel III, 291. 

Victoria, Queen, 17, 123-124, 128, 131, 
134, 145, 158, 222. 

Vienna, Congress of, 118, 120, 121, 391, 
476. 

Viviani, Rene, French premier and for- 
eign minister in 19 14, denies violation 
of German frontier by France, 461; 
pledges France to fulfil conditions of 
alliance, 464; protests against Ger- 
man ultimatum, 400; seeks assistance 
of Great Britain, 473; urges Grey to 
let Jagow propose form of mediation, 
438; visits St. Petersburg, 388. 

Voltaire, 122. 

Von der Goltz, Admiral, 176. 

Von der Goltz, General, 260, 284. 

Vorwdrts, 161. 

Walfisch Bay, 135. 

Walpole, Sir Spencer, History of England 

from 1815; History of Twenty-five 

Years, 120. 
Wasserbillig, 487. 
Waterloo, battle of, 118, 208. 
Wellington, Duke of, 118. 
Wells, H. G., Social Forces in England 

and America, 97. 
Wemyss, Mrs. Rosslyn, Memoirs and 

Letters of Sir Robert Morier, 125, 128, 

132. 
Westminster Gazette, 353, 367, 451. 
Whelpley, James Davenport, The Trade 

of the World, 97, 104, 112-113. 
White Ensign, 179. 
Whitman, Sidney, Conversations with 

Prince Bismarck, 136; England and 

Germany, 131, 154, 157-158, 166; 

German Memories, 90, 136; Germany's 

Obsession, 52; Turkish Memories, 282. 
Why We Are at War, by members of the 

Oxford faculty of modern history, 59, 

205, 489. 



Wile, F. W., Men Around the Kaiser, 
40. 

Wilkinson, Spenser, Britain at Bay, 200, 
207, 213. 

Willcocks, Sir William, 269, 279. 

William I, King of the Netherlands, 476. 

William I of Prussia, 55, 128, 131. 

William II, German Emperor, character, 
38, 67-69, 88, 91, 94, 384-385; Daily 
Telegraph interview, 147, 185, 248— 
249; foreign policy, 140-144, 147, 220, 
231,377; interest in Turkey, 142, 260, 
266, 273; naval policy, g, 173, 175, 
183-184, 187-188, 198; relations with: 
Edward VII, 244-245; Francis Fer- 
dinand, 383; Lord Haldane, 347; Tsar 
Nicholas II, 205, 352, 377; role in 
crisis of 1 914, 406, 440, 504; "shining 
armor," 292; speech at Tangier, 227; 
telegrams: to George V, 457, 463, 484; 
Goluchowski, 286; Kriiger, 143; 
Nicholas II, 413, 438, 451, 454, 457, 
504; visits to England, 147, 248, 302. 

William the Silent, 476. 

Willis, W. N., What Germany Wants,. 
170. 

Wilson, Sir Arthur Knyvet, 212. 

Wirth, Dr. Albrecht, Die Entscheidung 
iiber Marokko, 234. 

Wolff-Metternich, Count, German am- 
bassador in London, 319-320, 323, 
325-328, 331-333. 343. 349-351. 369- 

Wolseley, Sir Garnet, 19. 

Wolsey, Cardinal, 2. 

Wonckhaus (Bahrein), 278. 

Yangtze Valley, 20. 
Yemen, 272. 

Yovanonovitch, Y. M., Serbian minister 
in Vienna, 397, 399, 403-404, 406. 

Zabern, 49. 
Zambesi River, 372. 
Zanzibar, 136, 137. 
Zimmermann, Alfred, 318, 454. 
Zwingli, 116. 



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